GZero on Russia and its war of aggression against Ukraine

 Excelent GZero!

Tomorrow, Feb. 24, marks the second anniversary of Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine — a perfect time to reflect on the most pivotal moments of the past 24 months. Check out our timeline here.

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Russia’s last independent pollster tells me how Putin does it

   

By Alex Kliment, Senior Writer

How does Vladimir Putin manage to keep this up? For all the destruction he’s visited on Ukraine, his invasion has also inflicted so much damage on Russia.

There are the financial and economic costs. There’s the diplomatic isolation. There’s the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Russians who’d rather bet on a future abroad than support Putin’s war for the past at home. 

But above all, there are the dead. The Kremlin doesn’t announce casualty figures, but a running tally by the BBC and the independent Russian outlet Mediazona estimates that at least 45,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine. 

To put that in perspective, it’s triple the number of Soviets killed in the USSR’s decade-long invasion of Afghanistan, often described as the “Kremlin’s Vietnam.” 

In fact, it surpasses the number of Soviet and Russian troops killed in the entire period between 1945 and 2022, a period that also includes the Kremlin’s ham-fisted and initially disastrous bid to suppress Chechen separatists and jihadists in the 1990s. To put it in American terms, those 45,000 dead would amount to 100,000 flag-draped caskets in the United States. 

And yet, there’s hardly been a peep from Russian society. 

To find out why, I sent a note to Lev Gudkov in Moscow. Gudkov is the academic director of the Levada Center, Russia’s last remaining independent pollster. I last saw him in person in 2018, at his messy office on Nikolskaya Street — a ritzy pedestrian boulevard — that’s just a five-minute walk from the Kremlin, which has long considered Levada a “foreign agent.” 

At 77, Lev has the weary, knowing demeanor of a man who has spent his life asking questions in a society that is increasingly wary of answering them.

The Kremlin has pressured Levada over the years but always seemed to allow it to continue its work. Even autocrats, after all, need to know what their people are comfortable saying to strangers. 

“The people don’t know how many are dead and wounded,” he told me. More than 60% of Russians get their news primarily from state-controlled TV, which will shout at you about neo-Nazis in Kyiv, perverts who run Europe, or cats thrown from Russian trains — but will not tell you about the bodybags coming home from Ukraine. 

People who do speak out about casualties are arrested, harassed or, on occasion, driven to suicide, which is what happened this week to a hawkish military blogger who suggested Russia had lost 16,000 troops in its recent campaign for a single Ukrainian town.

Another problem, to adapt a Vietnam-era protest line, is that the Russians dying in Ukraine “ain’t no Gazprom executive’s son.” 

“The funerals are held by individual families,” says Gudkov, “and its overwhelmingly conscripts from marginalized social groups who don’t have the power to mobilize.” 

A look at the casualty map bears this out. Young men in remote and relatively poor Russian provinces like Tuva or Buryatia, for example, are up to 45 times as likely to die as their counterparts in Moscow or St. Petersburg. 

All of this makes perfect sense. Russians don’t know about the casualties, face huge consequences for trying to find out, and are victim to the propaganda mill that keeps support for Putin above 80% and approval of his war not far behind. 

But blaming this sort of collective delusion simply on a Very Bad Autocrat™ is too easy. The reality is that it can happen in democracies too, and it does. 

On the eve of the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, I looked at a poll that showed 72% of the population approving of their government’s decision to launch a disastrous, unprovoked war. 

But it wasn’t from Russia. It was from the US, and it was taken in 2003 to gauge popular support for the invasion of Iraq. 

Say what you will about the failure of mainstream media to question the WMD narrative — and there is lots to say — but the US was, and is, a pluralistic paradise compared to today’s Russia. 

But even so, it took four whole years of debacle in Iraq for a majority of Americans to finally decidethat the invasion was a “bad decision.”

The emergence of social media in the years since has hardly helped. Nearly 20% of Americans today say pop star Taylor Swift was engaged in a Deep State psyop to sway the next election, while a third of Americans still think the last one was “stolen.” And as many as half of Hillary Clinton’svoters once believed Trump’s victory was the result of Russian tampering with vote tallies. None of the above is true. 

The point is that you don’t actually have to live under the sway of a late-stage autocrat who controls the airwaves to believe bad, stupid, or crazy things. 

A badly contaminated news environment can in some ways be as bad as a tightly controlled one. 

 

 

Russia is winning? Winning what?

   

Western press coverage of Ukraine’s war has shifted. Today, there are few stories about determined, resourceful Ukrainian fighters pushing back Russian invaders and regaining lost ground. Most current coverage focuses on Ukraine’s exhaustion, its wavering Western backers, and Vladimir Putin's recent swagger.

Yes, as my friend Alex Kliment noted yesterday, Ukraine’s future is genuinely uncertain. Its material losses are far heavier than Russia’s, mainly because the war has been fought almost entirely on Ukrainian land. Damage to its trade and infrastructure shrank Ukraine’s economy by 29.1% in 2022 before the return home of some of the country’s millions of refugees brought a modest rebound last year. EU membership remains a distant dream.

Russia’s economy has notably strengthened. This country of 140 million people (Ukraine now has fewer than 40 million) has far more young men to push to the front, more industrial capacity, and far more natural resources to sell to finance the carnage. Its troops are deeply dug in to defend the 18% of Ukrainian territory they still hold.

Since invading Crimea 10 years ago on Feb. 27, 2014, and destabilizing the Donbas region a few weeks later, the Russian government has wisely kept foreign debt low, reducing the country’s vulnerability to Western sanctions. The war has boosted Russia’s economy by sending weapons production into overdrive, and despite Europe’s bold move to halt the import of Russian energy, Russia now sells more oil to energy-thirsty customers in China and India.

Finally, critics of aid for Ukraine in America and Europe are growing more politically aggressive. Fears that Donald Trump will again become president, abandon Kyiv, and perhaps yank the US from the transatlantic alliance encourage bravado from Putin and weigh heavily on European minds. 

So … is Russia winning? Let’s look at the bigger picture here.

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A China vai trazer a paz à Ucrânia? - Ian Bremer (GZero)

 Will China end Russia’s war?

   Xi Jinping

Ian Bremer

GZero Daily, July 24, 2023

China can end the war in Ukraine. Xi Jinping is the one major world leader that both Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky would gladly meet with. And China is the one country that has both the carrots and the sticks that can persuade Putin and Zelensky to accept the tough-to-swallow compromises needed to make peace. 

China has leverage with Russia. Europe’s post-invasion refusal to buy Russian oil and gas sharply increases China’s importance as an energy buyer. In fact, China bought a record amount of Russian energy over the first half of this year, thanks in large part to the steeply discounted price the war has forced Russia to offer.

But China has more energy suppliers than Russia has alternative high-volume buyers. A Chinese decision to reduce those imports would hurt Russia far more than China. China is also a major supplier of computer chips and other products Russia badly needs and can’t buy elsewhere. These facts give Xi real leverage with Putin if he wants to use it. 

Xi can tell his friend Putin that he must accept a peace deal that brings Russia a modest amount of Ukrainian land that he can use to declare “victory” in return for letting the rest of Ukraine go. Even if that means the remainder of Ukraine one day joins NATO and the EU. 

Putin, of course, will oppose any such suggestion. But if Xi privately advises his friend that refusal means China will publicly distance itself from Russia’s invasion and apply heavy economic pressure on his government, Putin will have to listen. With China on board, Putin looks much more powerful. Were Xi to publicly back away, Putin would be far more isolated. 

Xi can then promise that a peace deal with Ukraine will bring China and Russia economically and politically closer than ever before … and that China will pay to rebuild and modernize Russia’s war-depleted military. 

From Xi’s point of view, pushing Putin toward peace isn’t a betrayal. It’s a credible plan to save Russia from a disastrous war before much more damage is done. He’s giving Putin the “off ramp” the Russian president can’t (or won’t) create for himself. 

And if Putin isn’t ready to cut this deal now, wait through a few more months of military frustration with continuing Western support for Ukraine. 

China has leverage with Ukraine. Xi can assure Zelensky that if Ukraine will make the hard choice to surrender the Donbas region and Crimea, that China can stop the war, invest billions in the country’s reconstruction, and free Ukraine to join Western clubs. (Let Ukraine and the West argue over when and how.)

Ukraine gets peace, a European security guarantee, underwritten by Chinese infrastructure investment, and a new lease on life as an independent nation with powerful friends and allies. 

Xi can use this plan to divide Europe from the United States, an outcome that expands China’s global influence. Most European leaders would surely cheer an end to the war and reconstruction of Ukraine that Europe doesn’t have to pay for. 

US officials would not look happily on China’s ability to make new friends and extend its influence in Europe, but Washington would be hard-pressed to block a peace plan that everyone else favors. 

China can use this plan to enhance its reputation as a leader and peacemaker around the world.The Americans could not have made this deal, Xi can fairly claim. Only China has the power and the will to stop this terrible war, ending the pressure the war creates on food and energy supplies and prices for poor countries and stopping the killing of innocents. 

That’s a huge propaganda win for Beijing. At a time of frustratingly slow economic growth at home, Xi can use that win. 

Xi has already shown he wants to play peacemaker. He brokered a minor deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran this spring, and he has already offered a sketch of a Ukraine peace plan, though its current form lacks the detail needed to make it credible. Xi has even been understanding in response to a Russian strike on Ukrainian cities last week that destroyed a facility that contained grain reportedly destined for export to China and damaged a Chinese consulate building. 

Obviously, as with any plan to end a war, several hundred devils lurk in the details. But Xi has real leverage, even with Putin, if he wants to use it. What’s stopping him?

60 Anos da Crise dos Mísseis Soviéticos em Cuba (Signal newsletter, GZero)

 

Another nuclear showdown?

   Signal GZero, October 14, 2022

Sixty years ago today, Maj. Richard Heyser took hundreds of photos of suspicious installations in the Cuban countryside from a US spy plane. Close inspection of the photos back in Washington revealed that the Soviet government, then led by Nikita Khrushchev, had secretly installed missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads over 90 miles of ocean to hit targets across much of the United States. You can hear audio recordings of the initial White House discussion of this threat here. 

Over the following days, the White House and Kremlin found themselves looking for ways to avoid nuclear war. The crisis was resolved when a deal was reached that pulled the Soviet missiles from Cuba and later withdrew US missiles from Turkey.

Today, a Kremlin leader has created a new crisis. A Russian invasion has produced a military stalemate in the south and east of Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin has warned that nuclear weapons remain an option for Russia if he believes his country’s national security is threatened. Other Russian officials and allies have issued more explicit threats. President Joe Biden has invoked “the prospect of Armageddon” and spoken about lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis that might help avert catastrophe today. 

In some ways, the 1962 nuclear face-off was more dangerous than the current standoff. Sixty years ago, the threat of nuclear attack was made against the territory of the United States, a nuclear-armed superpower that would have retaliated instantly against attack. Millions of Americans and Soviets would have been killed within minutes. Today, most of the specific Russian threats center on so-called tactical nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield in Ukraine. Their effect would be horrific, but the scale of destruction would be much smaller than an attack on the US in 1962 – unless retaliation against a Russian strike provoked escalation. 

In addition, communication between Washington and Moscow, crucial in any potential military confrontation, was more complex in 1962. Then, it took hours for secure communications to reach the other side, increasing the risk of miscalculation and deadly accidents while leaders waited for responses. And President John Kennedy faced an especially dangerous problem 60 years ago: It was not clear who was in charge in the Kremlin. Contradictory messages from Moscow led some in Washington to fear that Khrushchev had been removed from power and that the US faced an unknown adversary in a potentially unstable situation. 

But in other ways, it’s the current standoff that’s more dangerous. The Cuban missile crisis took place just 17 years after the end of World War II. The devastating consequences of war were lived experience for leaders on both sides. Today, 77 years after the end of the last global war, the destructive potential is more abstract. It’s possible to be complacent about a threat no one has faced in decades. 

Second, the crisis over Cuba occurred in peacetime, while today’s Russia finds itself in a shooting war in which the United States is very much involved. As a result, there are other players in today’s drama. The risk that an action taken inside Ukraine could send nuclear forces onto high alert adds a layer of complexity that didn’t exist in 1962. 

Finally, we now know that Kennedy and Khrushchev were able to communicate through a back channel that even senior US and Soviet officials didn’t know about. Secret negotiations between Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin were crucial for averting catastrophe and building a deal. Today’s White House and Kremlin may have their own backchannel to avoid nuclear war, but it may be years before details emerge on the quality of that communication. 

US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev agreed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” But for now, Russian leaders are determined to project strength and confidence at the expense of any hope of reconciliation. Ukraine’s government refuses to compromise on control of its territory, and Ukraine’s backers in Europe and the United States know that surrender to nuclear blackmail sets a dangerous precedent that makes the world less, not more, secure. 

US and Soviet leaders resolved the Cuban missile crisis through flexibility and creativity on both sides. Today, there’s no sign of any such solution.

Irã: a revolução das mulheres jovens, que querem liberdade - GZero

 

Why Iran’s protests are different this time

   

They come from the capital city and from rural townships. Some wear makeup and jeans while others are clad in traditional robes though they leave their silver hair uncovered. They are all Iranian women uniting against the Islamic Republic’s oppressive regime.

Nationwide protests – that have spread to Iran's 31 provinces – broke out on Sept. 17 after Mahsa Amini, 22, a young Iranian woman, was allegedly beaten to death by the regime’s “morality police” for failing to fully cover her hair.

🌖A symbol like the moon🌖. Mahsa, a name of Persian origin that means like the moon, has emerged as a symbol of the ayatollahs’ oppressive system that sometimes sends women to “reeducation centers” for failing to comply with strict modesty requirements – sometimes with deadly consequences.

Iran has a long tradition of mass demonstrations, including those that led to the 1979 revolution and the country’s current system of clerical despotism. However, in recent years many of the country’s mass movements have had their momentum halted by brute government force. Will this time be different?

Not your grandmother’s revolution. There are several indications that this uprising is different from previous ones. Historically in Iran, anti-government movements were galvanized by an overlapping set of economic and political grievances. The 2009 Green Movement, for example, which saw millions of Iranians take to the streets in defiance of the totalitarian government, was moved to action after a rigged presidential election that saw the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad return to power despite conspicuous electoral irregularities. 

Moreover, mass protests in 2019 over the hiking of fuel prices as well as broader economic grievances spread to more than 200 cities before being violently quashed in a crackdown known as “Bloody November.” 

This time, however, the primary motivating factor is … sisterhood. Incensed by years of oppression at the hands of Iran’s morality police, Iranian women are leading the call for revolution. In most instances, women spanning the generational divide are risking their lives by tearing off their headscarves – and burning them – in a show of defiance against the gray-bearded ayatollahs who govern their bodies. 

To be sure, there is an amalgamation of interests on the ground. Iranian men disillusioned with the dismal state of the economy and lack of political agency have joined protesters in calling for change. From 2012 to 2020, income per head shrunk by 68%, and around 40% of Iranian households now live below the poverty line. 

Hamid Dabashi, a professor of Iranian Studies and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, says that while there are indeed economic undertones to these protests – pointing to crippling Western sanctions – “a serious component of the uprisings are middle class women who are highly educated, globally wired” and united by mutual loathing of a system that enforces mandatory veiling. Indeed, the movement is diffuse and leaderless – centered around one key demand: to let women choose.

Conversely, the 2009 Green Movement was led by old school reformist politicians with deep ties to the established regime. Mir Hossein Mousavi, a former prime minister during the Iraq-Iran war who adopted the traditional Islamic color of green for his campaign, co-led the protest movement along with Mehdi Karoubi, a Shia cleric, after the two ran in the 2009 presidential race. They were both placed in 2011 under house arrest – where they’ve remained for over a decade – for their roles in the Green Movement after emerging as key protest leaders jostling for power withina system they were deeply entrenched in.

But Dabashi says that being leaderless is not necessarily a bad thing. “We have had too many leaders,” in the past, he says, adding “that revolutions used to be on the level of epics that required a hero,” which could be distracting. 

Still, the current dynamic of the movement means that the situation is much more fluid. “We don’t know what’s going to happen on the next page because there's a democratic distribution of characters,” Dabashi explains. As a result, “there’s no clear agenda, political program … or identifiable objective that in a week they can point to and say this is what the uprising achieved.”

Looking ahead. Iran’s security forces, including the notoriously brutal Basij paramilitary that’s part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, are known for using coercive means to quash dissent. Already in recent weeks, there have been reports of at least 75 deaths.

But it’s one thing to crack down on a group of poor Iranians protesting high fuel prices. It is quite another to arrest or shoot women who are demanding change from across the generational spectrum. The regime can’t shoot millions of women who refuse to put their hijabs back on. 

What happens next is anyone’s guess, but Dabashi says that things aren’t going backwards. “An epistemic shift has happened in terms of the partition of the relationship between the nation and the state,” he says, adding that “the ruling regime has now painted itself into a corner that if mandatory veiling disappears so will the Islamic Republic itself.”

The supreme leader and his regime has a time-tested approach for quashing dissent. Still, each confrontation with the Iranian people leaves the regime a little more bruised and battered.