More Chavismo than Chávez
Letter From Caracas
Foreign Affairs, December 7, 2013
Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro greets supporters during a meeting outside Miraflores Palace in Caracas, November 12, 2013. (Carlos Garcia Rawlins / Courtesy Reuters)
Throughout the fall, things
looked bad for Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. His popularity was
tanking; most Venezuelans blamed his government for the economic crisis
that had been plaguing the country since the end of 2012. In just one
year, inflation had soared from 20 percent to more than 50 percent, and
shortages of electricity, food, and other essentials had become a part
of everyday life. Efforts to control pandemic criminal violence hadn’t
yielded significant results, either. The majority of Venezuelans
believed that their country was headed in the wrong direction. One could
be forgiven for thinking that the Maduro administration was set to lose
the upcoming December 8 local elections -- and big time.
Then, at the beginning of November, Maduro launched an aggressive
campaign to fix his image problems. He proclaimed an “economic war”
against private businesses. He forced them to slash prices on their
merchandise and urged the public to “empty the shelves.” Long lines of
consumers have done exactly that, draining stores of electronics and
appliances, clothing, and even toys. To be sure, Maduro’s campaign
addressed the real needs of those looking to buy plasma TVs at
rock-bottom prices, and it helped him take control of one of Venezuela’s
biggest electronics importers. But he is gambling that his plan will be
enough to convince the public that he is capable of steadying his
country’s tumbling economy and protecting the interests of the
disenfranchised.
The long-term effects of Maduro’s populist strategy are yet to be
seen. But the war on private businesses seems to have paid off in the
short term. According to the latest polls, Maduro likely has the
momentum he needs to win this weekend’s elections and give Chavismo a
much-needed boost of energy.
AFTER CHÁVEZ
To be sure, Maduro’s campaign addressed the real needs of those looking to buy plasma TVs at rock-bottom prices.
Maduro is used to cutting it close. In 2012, a dying President Hugo
Chávez bequeathed on Maduro a solid electoral majority, a party with an
immense political propaganda machine, and the virulent rhetoric of
Chavismo. To Chávez, Maduro was an obvious successor. He had been
Chávez’s closest aid and had spent more time with Chávez than any other
member of the inner circle during Chávez’s long treatments for cancer in
Havana. But none of that came with charisma or strategic vision. In
elections held just weeks after Chávez’s Pharaonic funeral, Maduro won
merely 50.61 percent of the vote.
Once in office, Maduro tried to undo the damage done by his tepid
victory. His initial objective was to demobilize the opposition. He
tried to do so in two ways: first, by convincing any would-be protesters
that they would be targeted and that their leaders would bear the costs
(including through imprisonment) and, second, by persuading civil and
military Chavista elites that he wouldn’t tolerate any threats to the
system that keeps them in power. After that, Maduro has attempted to
strengthen his control of almost every facet of life in Venezuela.
In April, just a few days after Maduro’s election, his government
authorized the purchase of Globovisión, a small news station that was
one of the opposition’s last media bastions, by a group of businessmen
linked to the so-called
boli-bourgeoisie, the economic class that
has flourished under the protection of Chavismo. Since then, the
opposition has virtually disappeared from TV screens. A march of
thousands in Caracas two weeks ago, for example, went unreported. In
2013, there have been more than 160 reported attacks on journalists and
media personnel. Most of the cases have been directly or indirectly
linked to the government. And so Maduro has managed to manufacture an
appearance of consent around his official version of reality.
In early September, Venezuela officially withdrew from the Human
Rights Convention of the Organization of American States, thus
preventing the Inter-American Court of Human Rights from addressing any
violations in Venezuela. Chávez had announced the country’s retirement
from the body in June 2012 after the court issued a ruling in favor of
Raul Diaz, a Venezuelan whom the regime had accused of bombing the
Caracas-based Embassy of Spain and Consulate of Colombia in 2003. The
court found that Venezuela had treated him inhumanely while he was in
prison.
At the end of last September, Maduro decreed the creation of the
Strategic Center for the Defense of the Homeland (CESPPA), an
intelligence and counterintelligence organization that is supposed to
“foresee and neutralize potential threats to [Venezuela’s] vital
interests.” CESPPA’s mission is to censor information and events that
may be considered a threat to the country’s security. Opposition
representatives have denounced the agency as an instrument for spying on
them.
And finally, last month, Maduro asked Venezuela’s National Assembly
to award him special powers to govern by decree. One of his first
executive orders was to turn Chávez’s
Plan de la Patria (Homeland
Plan) into law. The plan, which Chávez first presented during his
electoral campaign of 2012, is a road map for the construction of the
socialist state. It aims to further the country’s independence and
develop Venezuela as a regional superpower but also to preserve life on
earth and save the human race. Maduro’s new law includes the creation of
a system for training, organizing, and mobilizing the population to
defend the homeland during a state of emergency.
For all his attempts to take power, however, Maduro’s grasp on
Venezuela is still shaky. The reason is primarily economic. In February,
as acting president, Maduro ordered a currency devaluation to try to
put the brakes on the rising price of the dollar on the black market.
Instead, its value shot up to ten times the official rate. Since then,
Maduro’s inability to manage Venezuela’s economy has become even more
apparent. According to the country’s central bank, international
reserves are at their lowest since 2003, in the months after some
pro-business elites and military officials attempted to push Chávez out
of power and before a boom in oil prices allowed Chávez to create and
finance a number of social programs to win mass appeal.
Chávez might have been able to get away with economic incompetence.
Thanks to the oil bonanza, he could always dip into state coffers to
ensure public support. (In fact, he dipped into those coffers so often
that he set the stage for today’s economic crisis.) Maduro can proclaim
that he is the son of Chávez, but he has nothing to pay the public to
get it to believe him. This year, Venezuelans have faced soaring prices
and a scarcity of basic goods, such as sugar, milk, coffee, toilet
paper, and medicine. Trips from one supermarket to the next in search of
those products have given Venezuelans lots of time to think about
Maduro’s economics.
SEIZING MOMENTUM
The opposition takes for granted that Chavistas will win most
municipalities in this weekend’s elections. It nevertheless hopes to at
least double its number of mayors and increase its vote share. A month
ago, it had a good chance of doing so. But Maduro’s radicalism and war
on prices have changed things. Luis Vicente León, president of
Datanálisis, one of the most reliable polling firms, says that recent
economic measures have helped Maduro’s image as leader and have
motivated Chavista voters to go to the polls. (Both blocs expect low
turnout, so their ability to mobilize voters will be the key factor in
the result.) Time is of the essence, though. The public was more excited
about the bargains before the stores were emptied of most of their
goods.
Maduro can proclaim that he is the son of Chávez, but he has nothing to pay the public to get it to believe him.
The stakes in this election are high. After Maduro’s power grabs,
there are no counterweights left to the executive branch. If Chavismo
wins the day on November 8, Maduro’s government will be even more
empowered to continue down its radical path. But that is not the only
way the upcoming vote could end. If the opposition achieves its aims and
wins a large share of the total vote and a significant number of the
municipalities, it would deal a major blow to Maduro. The opposition
could then try to use its momentum to oust Maduro from power in a
presidential referendum at the end of 2015.
Because the opposition fears a harsh crackdown and because
Chavismo is still popular in much of the country, the Venezuelan
political dynamic is unlikely to change overnight. For Maduro, stability
depends on a Chavista success this Sunday. If he doesn’t get one, the
opposition will rise -- from the public and from the factious civil and
military groups within Maduro’s party. And if that happens, Venezuelans’
long struggle for democracy could end with a military resolution.
