Vem ai uma nova, super, grandiosa nova corrida nuclear, que vai arrastar novos candidatos... - Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

 O mundo – ou melhor, o mundo das grandes potências, onde talvez a Europa queira entrar – se prepara para iniciar uma nova, grande, louca corrida nuclear, digna do Dr. Strangelove, dos tempos da MAD, a destruição mutuamente assegurada. Vão torrar bilhões de dólares, para finalmente não dar em nada, apenas perda de tempo, de dinheiro, de desenvolvimento social. 

Não é dissuasão, não será: apenas construção de armas que nunca serão usadas... (PRA)

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security's Forward Defense program is excited to share our new report, "Requirements for nuclear deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment." Historically, the United States faced only Moscow as its nuclear peer, but the rapid and ongoing expansion of Beijing's nuclear arsenal threatens to upend the status quo and confront Washington with the problem of deterring two nuclear peers by the 2030s. How should the United States conceptualize its requirements for deterring two nuclear peers? What possible avenues for arms control and risk reduction are still viable under these conditions? In this report, former Deputy Director for Strategic Stability for the US Joint Staff J5 Gregory Weaver and Atlantic Council Nonresident Senior Fellow Amy Woolf examine the future of US nuclear strategy in a two-peer nuclear environment.

This compendium includes one paper focusing on nuclear posture from Greg Weaver and one paper focusing on arms control from Amy Woolf. With the backdrop of Russia's ongoing nuclear modernization and China's continued nuclear expansion, Weaver warns that the US force structure is not presently prepared for a second nuclear peer. He emphasizes the possible risk of opportunistic or cooperative aggression by the two revisionist powers, which seek to upend the US-led, rules-based international order. His paper argues that, should the United States desire a larger or different force to address this challenge, policymakers need to take urgent action to enable those solutions in future years.

Woolf casts doubt on the future of numerically limiting, legally binding nuclear arms control but explains why policymakers should not expect such arrangements in the early period of responding to the two-nuclear peer environment. Noting the decades of negotiations between Moscow and Washington before treaties like START came into place, she suggests that China and the United States will not immediately begin negotiations with formal, numerically limiting arms control treaties. She argues that communication and risk-reduction measures may, instead, be a more successful avenue in reducing nuclear dangers and heading off a nuclear arms race.

Click below to read the full findings of how the United States might think about deterrence and arms control in the emerging two-nuclear-peer environment.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/requirements-for-nuclear-deterrence-and-arms-control-in-a-two-peer-nuclear-peer-environment/?mkt_tok=NjU5LVdaWC0wNzUAAAGRI4pNq9R8Abj3LwQedKSDZbpJ3fR4QQIKF1KwFXF1X4xNfXLcFtZ8UXZC3bRpIg8m8ySisiEpFkR6pBsLEeV7Tk3KA4ZgBCKiXUmbtAOA_esY

US Strategy and Force Posture for an Era of Nuclear Tripolarity - Keir Lieber, Daryl Press (Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security)

 

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program is delighted to share our latest issue brief: US Strategy and Force Posture for an Era of Nuclear Tripolarity. How will the consequences of nuclear tripolarity--a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as the world’s leading nuclear powers--affect US nuclear strategy and force posture? What deterrence posture should the United States take on to meet a simultaneous challenge from both Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals? In this issue brief, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellows Dr. Keir Lieber and Dr. Daryl Press suggest that, without a change to targeting doctrine, US nuclear force levels will need to expand, potentially touching off a dangerous arms race among these powers.  To avert a three-way arms race, the authors propose revisiting the "no cities" requirement for US nuclear targeting. By threatening to target adversary population centers in retaliation for an all-out nuclear attack on US urban areas, US nuclear policy may achieve greater deterrent effect with less upward pressure on the size of the US arsenal. Moreover, a "no cities" targeting framework is a dangerous fiction, the authors argue, since plenty of legal military targets for nuclear strikes are within cities, even if the targets are not cities per se. Therefore, the authors conclude, such a policy would remove a hidden driver of US nuclear force size without meaningfully increasing the danger to civilians in a nuclear war.

Read the Issue Brief Read the Issue Brief

Meet the authors

Dr. Keir Lieber Nonresident Senior Fellow, Forward Defense,Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Dr. Daryl Press Nonresident Senior Fellow, Forward Defense,Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

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About the Scowcroft Center & Forward Defense

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and its allies and partners. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. Forward Defense (FD) generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict. The Scowcroft Center’s namesake, General Brent Scowcroft, was the chairman of the 1983 Scowcroft Commission that established the foundation for US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy through the present day. As the United States enters a new era of strategic challenges, the Scowcroft Center, through its Nuclear Strategy Project, is proud to play a central role in crafting an effective and nonpartisan strategic forces strategy and policy for the twenty-first century.