Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, em viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas.
O que é este blog?
Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;
How will the consequences of nuclear tripolarity--a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as the world’s leading nuclear powers--affect US nuclear strategy and force posture? What deterrence posture should the United States take on to meet a simultaneous challenge from both Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals? In this issue brief, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellows Dr. Keir Lieber and Dr. Daryl Press suggest that, without a change to targeting doctrine, US nuclear force levels will need to expand, potentially touching off a dangerous arms race among these powers.
To avert a three-way arms race, the authors propose revisiting the "no cities" requirement for US nuclear targeting. By threatening to target adversary population centers in retaliation for an all-out nuclear attack on US urban areas, US nuclear policy may achieve greater deterrent effect with less upward pressure on the size of the US arsenal. Moreover, a "no cities" targeting framework is a dangerous fiction, the authors argue, since plenty of legal military targets for nuclear strikes are within cities, even if the targets are not cities per se.
Therefore, the authors conclude, such a policy would remove a hidden driver of US nuclear force size without meaningfully increasing the danger to civilians in a nuclear war.
The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and its allies and partners. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders.
Forward Defense (FD) generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.
The Scowcroft Center’s namesake, General Brent Scowcroft, was the chairman of the 1983 Scowcroft Commission that established the foundation for US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy through the present day. As the United States enters a new era of strategic challenges, the Scowcroft Center, through its Nuclear Strategy Project, is proud to play a central role in crafting an effective and nonpartisan strategic forces strategy and policy for the twenty-first century.
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