O mundo – ou melhor, o mundo das grandes potências, onde talvez a Europa queira entrar – se prepara para iniciar uma nova, grande, louca corrida nuclear, digna do Dr. Strangelove, dos tempos da MAD, a destruição mutuamente assegurada. Vão torrar bilhões de dólares, para finalmente não dar em nada, apenas perda de tempo, de dinheiro, de desenvolvimento social.
Não é dissuasão, não será: apenas construção de armas que nunca serão usadas... (PRA)
The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security's Forward Defense program is excited to share our new report, "Requirements for nuclear deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment." Historically, the United States faced only Moscow as its nuclear peer, but the rapid and ongoing expansion of Beijing's nuclear arsenal threatens to upend the status quo and confront Washington with the problem of deterring two nuclear peers by the 2030s. How should the United States conceptualize its requirements for deterring two nuclear peers? What possible avenues for arms control and risk reduction are still viable under these conditions? In this report, former Deputy Director for Strategic Stability for the US Joint Staff J5 Gregory Weaver and Atlantic Council Nonresident Senior Fellow Amy Woolf examine the future of US nuclear strategy in a two-peer nuclear environment.
This compendium includes one paper focusing on nuclear posture from Greg Weaver and one paper focusing on arms control from Amy Woolf. With the backdrop of Russia's ongoing nuclear modernization and China's continued nuclear expansion, Weaver warns that the US force structure is not presently prepared for a second nuclear peer. He emphasizes the possible risk of opportunistic or cooperative aggression by the two revisionist powers, which seek to upend the US-led, rules-based international order. His paper argues that, should the United States desire a larger or different force to address this challenge, policymakers need to take urgent action to enable those solutions in future years.
Woolf casts doubt on the future of numerically limiting, legally binding nuclear arms control but explains why policymakers should not expect such arrangements in the early period of responding to the two-nuclear peer environment. Noting the decades of negotiations between Moscow and Washington before treaties like START came into place, she suggests that China and the United States will not immediately begin negotiations with formal, numerically limiting arms control treaties. She argues that communication and risk-reduction measures may, instead, be a more successful avenue in reducing nuclear dangers and heading off a nuclear arms race.
Click below to read the full findings of how the United States might think about deterrence and arms control in the emerging two-nuclear-peer environment.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/requirements-for-nuclear-deterrence-and-arms-control-in-a-two-peer-nuclear-peer-environment/?mkt_tok=NjU5LVdaWC0wNzUAAAGRI4pNq9R8Abj3LwQedKSDZbpJ3fR4QQIKF1KwFXF1X4xNfXLcFtZ8UXZC3bRpIg8m8ySisiEpFkR6pBsLEeV7Tk3KA4ZgBCKiXUmbtAOA_esY
