China and the (Non) Peace Process in Ukraine
By Anton Geraschenko
November 2, 2026
[Note by PRA: Brazil’s government under Lula has had a similar approach of China to the Ukrainian war, that is an objective support to Russia’s war of aggression against the brave people of Ukraine. It’s a shame for the professional diplomacy.]
China talks a great deal about peace in Ukraine, but it has shown little visible initiative in pressing Russia to take concrete steps toward ending the war. China does not demand that Russia stop its aggression, does not make its strategic cooperation with Moscow conditional on progress toward peace, and does not fully use the leverage it has gained as Russia has become increasingly dependent on China.
At the same time, Xi Jinping’s latest conversation with Frank-Walter Steinmeier introduced an important clarification of China’s position: Beijing does not support a format in which the United States, Russia, and China determine the terms of a settlement without European participation, and believes that Europeans should have a seat at the negotiating table.
China’s peace diplomacy has so far remained focused largely on declarations.
Beijing has proposed its own peace formulas, conducted consultations through its special envoy Li Hui, and created the Group of Friends for Peace, but these initiatives have not produced a ceasefire mechanism, a system for monitoring compliance, or guarantees that Russia would implement any agreements reached.
China continues to speak about the “root causes of the conflict” and the security interests of all parties, while making no public demand that Moscow withdraw its forces from occupied Ukrainian territories and specifying no consequences should Russia refuse to stop the fighting.
At the same time, China has the political capacity to play a more active mediating role because it maintains contacts with both Russia and Ukraine.
On 13 February 2026, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha met Wang Yi in Munich, discussed China’s possible role in ending the war, and invited the Chinese foreign minister to visit Ukraine. Beijing agreed to provide additional humanitarian assistance for Ukraine’s energy sector. Ukrainian diplomacy has therefore demonstrated its readiness to work with China. Yet the Chinese side did not propose a new negotiating mechanism.
This suggests that the lack of a visible Chinese initiative cannot be explained simply by the absence of communication channels with Kyiv.
Russia’s economic dependence on China already gives Beijing significant leverage over Russian policy. China is Russia’s largest trading partner, its biggest buyer of oil, and a key supplier of industrial goods and dual-use technologies.
According to a study published by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy in June 2026, 76 percent of Russia’s microprocessor imports in 2022–2023 came through China. The study also confirmed China’s leading role in replacing sanctioned Western products with Chinese goods. The U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission has found that Chinese and Hong Kong companies play an important role in supplying Russia’s military-industrial complex with critical components.
In July 2026, Reuters reported that Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov had personally approved the training of Russian military personnel in China. Beijing denied these reports. Such cooperation nevertheless increases Moscow’s dependence on Chinese decisions.
So why is China so restrained in its peace initiatives?
China’s strategic priority is to preserve Russia as a partner in counterbalancing U.S. influence.
In July 2025, the South China Morning Post, citing sources, reported on the substance of a conversation between Wang Yi and EU High Representative Kaja Kallas. According to the newspaper, the Chinese foreign minister said that Beijing did not want to see Russia defeated because this would allow the United States to concentrate its full attention on China. This position helps explain Beijing’s strategic calculation.
Russia remains an important military and political partner capable of tying down U.S. resources in Europe. A strategic Russian defeat could create conditions for Washington to redirect some of its military and financial resources toward the Asia-Pacific region.
A prolonged war also creates opportunities for China to strengthen its position as Russia becomes increasingly dependent on it. Russia needs Chinese export markets, industrial components, transport routes, and financial instruments.
This strengthens Beijing’s bargaining position in its trade and investment relations with Moscow. Russia’s battlefield experience also gives the Chinese military an opportunity to study the use of drones, electronic warfare systems, air defence, and Western weapons.
Therefore, Chinese statements about peace are not backed by a willingness to use China’s influence over Russia to bring the war to an end.
Beijing calls for negotiations while continuing its strategic cooperation with Moscow without attaching any peace-related conditions. Its strategic interest is to preserve Russia as a counterweight to the United States, deepen Moscow’s dependence on China, and postpone broader geopolitical settlements until Beijing is in a stronger position to shape the rules on terms more favourable to itself.
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