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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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Mostrando postagens com marcador Turquia. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Turquia. Mostrar todas as postagens

sexta-feira, 15 de julho de 2016

Tecnica do golpe de Estado - militares turcos nao leram Curzio Malaparte

Em 1931, Curzio Malaparte, um nome de invenção do escritor italiano nascido no final do século 19 como Kurt Erich Suckert (o Malaparte era uma gozação com os Bonaparte), publicou em francês (porque na Itália do fascismo seria difícil), um livro -- que não foi o mais famoso de uma carreira famosa, ainda que camaleônica, indo do fascismo ao comunismo, passando pelo partido republicano e um aceno à Igreja Católica -- escrito a partir das experiências de golpes de Estado contemporâneos, o putsch bolchevique de Lênin, em 1917, a Marcha sobre Roma de Mussolini, em 1992 (da qual ele participou, como entusiasta que era de o fascismo, mas de esquerda, ou seja socialista), e a tentativa de golpe de Hitler em Munique, em 1923, que resultou na prisão do nazista (e no crescimento do partido nacional socialista), cujo título era curto e grosso:

Técnica do Golpe de Estado (Technique du Coup d'État)

Trotsky, retratado no livro (junto com Stalin, Lênin, o próprio Mussolini, e Hitler), leu essa edição francesa e retrucou ao autor, por telegrama desde Copenhagen, pouco antes de partir para o México, onde viria a ser assassinado quase dez anos depois por um mercenário a serviço de Stalin (objeto de um grande romance-verdade de José Padura, El Hombre que Amaba los Perros, além de um outro romance policial-politico de Jorge Semprun, La Deuxième Mort de Ramón Mercader.

Pois bem, parece que os militares golpistas da Turquia não leram nem o livro de Curzio Malaparte, nem aprenderam com os grandes golpes de Estado, que são, paradoxalmente, muito comuns na história política da Turquia, quase tanto, ou mais, quanto em países da América Latina, Brasil inclusive.
O livro explica as várias técnicas (e a palavra era não apenas moderna, naquela época, como absolutamente essencial para explicar o que pretendia esse jornalista-romancista que depois virou romancista exclusivamente, mas sempre mesclando suas obras com elementos retirados da realidade) que os golpistas precisam absolutamente empregar para conduzir um golpe bem sucedido, assim como fizeram Lênin, Mussolini, e menos bem Hitler e outros trapalhões por aqui e em outras partes.
Malaparte retrata o ambiente em Petrogrado antes do putsch dos bolcheviques (muitos deles absolutamente contrários ao golpe proposto por Lênin, pois para eles isso seria contrariar o princípio da revolução da classe operária, que Lênin sabia que não viria), e faz o perfil psicológico dos principais personagens, assim como fez com Hitler e Mussolini, sobre os quais ele insinua gestos efeminados.

Acho que os militares turcos precisariam ler não só Curzio Malaparte, como aprender com o know-how, a técnica, a verdadeira tecnologia de golpes de Estado dos generais latino-americanos (não sei se ainda temos alguns golpistas por aqui, pois já fazem quase 30 anos que não se fazem mais golpes decentes por aqui, e não sei se algum deles deixou um manual operacional para um golpe bem sucedido.

Quem sabe algum gozador bem informado não prepara um:

Coup d'État for Dummies,
ou The Idiot's Guide for Coup d'États,
ou ainda, How to Iniciate, Complete, and Survive a Successful Coup d'État,
ou mesmo um All that you always wanted to know about a good coup d'État and never had someone to ask,
ou quem sabe então um: The Complete Guide on How to Perform a Wonderful Coup, and Become Youself a Brilliant Chef d'État ?

Pronto, já dei minha contribuição para um bom golpe de Estado.
Quem desejar ler o manual (um pouco surrealista, hoje) de Curzio Malaparte, tem uma nova edição italiana na

Piccola Biblioteca Adelphi
2011, 3ª ediz., pp. 270 
isbn: 9788845926327 
 € 12,75
http://www.adelphi.it/libro/9788845926327

Divirtam-se (if you may...)
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 15 de julho de 2016

Tecnica do golpe de Estado - militares turcos nao leram Curzio Malaparte

Em 1931, Curzio Malaparte, um nome de invenção do escritor italiano nascido no final do século 19 como Kurt Erich Suckert (o Malaparte era uma gozação com os Bonaparte), publicou em francês (porque na Itália do fascismo seria difícil), um livro -- que não foi o mais famoso de uma carreira famosa, ainda que camaleônica, indo do fascismo ao comunismo, passando pelo partido republicano e um aceno à Igreja Católica -- escrito a partir das experiências de golpes de Estado contemporâneos, o putsch bolchevique de Lênin, em 1917, a Marcha sobre Roma de Mussolini, em 1992 (da qual ele participou, como entusiasta que era de o fascismo, mas de esquerda, ou seja socialista), e a tentativa de golpe de Hitler em Munique, em 1923, que resultou na prisão do nazista (e no crescimento do partido nacional socialista), cujo título era curto e grosso:

Técnica do Golpe de Estado (Technique du Coup d'État)

Trotsky, retratado no livro (junto com Stalin, Lênin, o próprio Mussolini, e Hitler), leu essa edição francesa e retrucou ao autor, por telegrama desde Copenhagen, pouco antes de partir para o México, onde viria a ser assassinado quase dez anos depois por um mercenário a serviço de Stalin (objeto de um grande romance-verdade de José Padura, El Hombre que Amaba los Perros, além de um outro romance policial-politico de Jorge Semprun, La Deuxième Mort de Ramón Mercader.

Pois bem, parece que os militares golpistas da Turquia não leram nem o livro de Curzio Malaparte, nem aprenderam com os grandes golpes de Estado, que são, paradoxalmente, muito comuns na história política da Turquia, quase tanto, ou mais, quanto em países da América Latina, Brasil inclusive.
O livro explica as várias técnicas (e a palavra era não apenas moderna, naquela época, como absolutamente essencial para explicar o que pretendia esse jornalista-romancista que depois virou romancista exclusivamente, mas sempre mesclando suas obras com elementos retirados da realidade) que os golpistas precisam absolutamente empregar para conduzir um golpe bem sucedido, assim como fizeram Lênin, Mussolini, e menos bem Hitler e outros trapalhões por aqui e em outras partes.
Malaparte retrata o ambiente em Petrogrado antes do putsch dos bolcheviques (muitos deles absolutamente contrários ao golpe proposto por Lênin, pois para eles isso seria contrariar o princípio da revolução da classe operária, que Lênin sabia que não viria), e faz o perfil psicológico dos principais personagens, assim como fez com Hitler e Mussolini, sobre os quais ele insinua gestos efeminados.

Acho que os militares turcos precisariam ler não só Curzio Malaparte, como aprender com o know-how, a técnica, a verdadeira tecnologia de golpes de Estado dos generais latino-americanos (não sei se ainda temos alguns golpistas por aqui, pois já fazem quase 30 anos que não se fazem mais golpes decentes por aqui, e não sei se algum deles deixou um manual operacional para um golpe bem sucedido.

Quem sabe algum gozador bem informado não prepara um:

Coup d'État for Dummies,
ou The Idiot's Guide for Coup d'États,
ou ainda, How to Iniciate, Complete, and Survive a Successful Coup d'État,
ou mesmo um All that you always wanted to know about a good coup d'État and never had someone to ask,
ou quem sabe então um: The Complete Guide on How to Perform a Wonderful Coup, and Become Youself a Brilliant Chef d'État ?

Pronto, já dei minha contribuição para um bom golpe de Estado.
Quem desejar ler o manual (um pouco surrealista, hoje) de Curzio Malaparte, tem uma nova edição italiana na

Piccola Biblioteca Adelphi
2011, 3ª ediz., pp. 270 
isbn: 9788845926327 
 € 12,75
http://www.adelphi.it/libro/9788845926327

Divirtam-se (if you may...)
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 15 de julho de 2016

quinta-feira, 2 de junho de 2016

Deputados alemães reconhecem o genocídio dos armênios pela Turquia - BBC

German MPs recognise Armenian 'genocide' amid Turkish fury

BBC World Service, June 2, 2016

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36433114 

Armenian commemoration in Istanbul, 24 Apr 16
 Persecuted Armenian intellectuals were remembered at a ceremony in Istanbul in April

The German parliament has approved a resolution declaring that the mass killing of Armenians by Ottoman Turks during World War One was a "genocide".
Turkey is bitterly opposed to the Bundestag (lower house) resolution, and has warned that it could hurt ties.
Armenians say up to 1.5 million of their people died in the atrocities of 1915. Turkey says the toll was much lower and rejects the term "genocide".
The timing is awkward, as the EU needs Turkey to help stem the migrant influx.
More than 20 nations, including France and Russia, as well as Pope Francis, have recognised the 1915 killings as genocide.
Turkey denies that there was a systematic campaign to slaughter Armenians as an ethnic group during WW1. It also points out that many Turkish civilians died in the turmoil during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
Chancellor Angela Merkel was not in the Bundestag for the vote. Her Christian Democrats (CDU), their coalition partners the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens all supported the resolution. 
Turkish opposition
German MPs came under pressure from Turks in the run-up to the vote, including threatening and abusive e-mails, German ARD news reports.
Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim said approval of the resolution would be "irrational". And Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan phoned Mrs Merkel, warning her that ties would suffer "if (Germany) falls into such a game". 
The resolution uses the word "genocide" in the headline and text. It also says Germany - at the time an ally of the Ottomans - bears some guilt for doing nothing to stop the killings. 
Under a deal struck in March, Turkey agreed to take back migrants - including Syrians - arriving on the Greek islands, in return for EU aid and a pledge to give Turks visa-free travel to most of Europe. 
Germany accepted 1.1 million migrants last year - by far the highest influx in the EU.
German-Turkish relations were also strained this year by the case of comedian Jan Boehmermann, whose obscene poem about Mr Erdogan prompted a criminal complaint from the Turkish leader.
Last month a court in Hamburg ruled that Boehmermann's poem was satire, but banned him from repeating the sexual references in it, deeming them unacceptable. 
Germany plans to repeal a clause in the constitution prohibiting insults that target foreign leaders - the clause invoked by Turkey in the complaint.
Armenian genocide dispute
Boy victim of 1915 deportation of Armenians
■   Hundreds of thousands of Armenians died in 1915 at the hands of the Ottoman Turks, whose empire was disintegrating
■   Many of the victims were civilians deported to barren desert regions where they died of starvation and thirst. Thousands also died in massacres
■   Armenia says up to 1.5 million people were killed. Turkey says the number of deaths was much smaller
■   Most non-Turkish scholars of the events regard them as genocide - as do more than 20 states including France, Germany and Russia, and some international bodies such as the European Parliament
■   Turkey rejects the term "genocide", maintaining that many of the dead were killed in clashes during World War One, and that many ethnic Turks also suffered in the conflict

Find out more about what happened

sexta-feira, 7 de março de 2014

Big Brother: enfermidade chinesa-orwelliana atinge outros países, Turquia, por exemplo...

Parece que a mania vai além da China, que já tem uma Grande Muralha barrando todas essas ferramentas inconvenientes que são as de comunicação social independentes dos governos. Nem se trata de Cuba e Coreia do Norte, dois recantos miseráveis do planeta nos quais os cidadãos não conseguem se comunicar normalmente.
Agora a Turquia ameaça aderir a práticas orwellianas que julgávamos em extinção.
Mais um pouco a Venezuela chavista deve entrar no mesmo circuito, querem apostar?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Turkey’s Prime Minister Threatens to Ban Facebook, YouTube
Foreign Policy, March 7, 2014


Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has threatened to shut down social media sites Facebook and YouTube in response to recent wiretap recordings released anonymously over YouTube. The controversial recordings, the latest development in Turkey's corruption scandal, allegedly incriminate Erdogan and other government officials. In a late Thursday ATV broadcast, Erdogan asserted, "We are determined on this subject. We will not leave this nation at the mercy of YouTube and Facebook," adding that such measures would not take place until after March 30 municipal elections. Turkey's President Abdullah Gul commented Friday that such a ban is "out of the question." Gul, however, added that authorities had the power under a new law to block access to certain materials if a person's privacy is being violated. Meanwhile, new labor statistics show that Turkey's unemployment rate for 2013 increased to 9.7 percent, surpassing the government's goal of 9.5 percent. Despite the economic situation and recent corruption allegations, a poll released Tuesday reported that Erdogan's approval rating rose from its all-time low of 39.4 percent in January to 43.5 percent in February.

domingo, 30 de junho de 2013

Tom Friedman on manifestations (NYT)

OP-ED COLUMNIST

Takin’ It to the Streets



THE former C.I.A. analyst Paul R. Pillar asked this question in a recent essay in The National Interest: Why are we seeing so many popular street revolts in democracies? Speaking specifically of Turkey and Brazil, but posing a question that could be applied to Egypt, Israel, Russia, Chile and the United States, Pillar asks: “The governments being protested against were freely and democratically elected. With the ballot box available, why should there be recourse to the street?”
It is an important question, and the answer, I believe, is the convergence of three phenomena. The first is the rise and proliferation of illiberal “majoritarian” democracies. In Russia, Turkey and today’s Egypt, we have seen mass demonstrations to protest “majoritarianism” — ruling parties that were democratically elected (or “sort of” in Russia’s case) but interpret their elections as a writ to do whatever they want once in office, including ignoring the opposition, choking the news media and otherwise behaving in imperious or corrupt ways, as if democracy is only about the right to vote, not rights in general and especially minority rights.
What the protesters in Turkey, Russia and Egypt all have in common is a powerful sense of “theft,” a sense that the people who got elected are stealing something more than money: the people’s voice and right to participate in governance. Nothing can make a new democrat, someone who just earned the right to vote, angrier.
Here is what the satirist Bassem Youssef, the Jon Stewart of Egypt, wrote in the Egyptian daily Al Shorouk last week, on the first anniversary of the election of President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood’s party: “We have a president who promised that a balanced constituent assembly would work on a constitution that everyone agrees on. We have a president who promised to be representative, but placed members of his Muslim Brotherhood in every position of power. We have a president and a party that broke all their promises, so the people have no choice but to take to the streets.”
A second factor is the way middle-class workers are being squeezed between a shrinking welfare state and a much more demanding job market. For so many years, workers were told that if you just work hard and play by the rules you’ll be in the middle class. That is just not true anymore. In this age of rapid globalization and automation, you have to work harder, work smarter, bring more innovation to whatever job you do, retool yourself more often — and then you can be in the middle class. There is just so much more stress on people in, or aspiring to be in, the middle class, and many more young people wondering how they’ll ever do better than their parents.
Too few leaders are leveling with their people about this shift, let alone helping them navigate it. And too many big political parties today are just vehicles for different coalitions to defend themselves against change rather than to lead their societies in adapting to it. Normally, this would create opportunities for the opposition parties, but in places like Turkey, Brazil, Russia and Egypt the formal opposition is feckless. So people take to the streets, forming their own opposition.
In America, the Tea Party began as a protest against Republicans for being soft on deficits, and Occupy Wall Street as a protest against Democrats for being soft on bankers. In Brazil, a 9 cent increase in bus fares set off mass protests, in part because it seemed so out of balance when the government was spending some $30 billion on stadiums for the Olympics and the World Cup. Writing in The American Interest, William Waack, an anchorman on Brazil’s Globo, probably spoke for many when he observed: “Brazilians don’t feel like their elected representatives at any level actually represent them, especially at a time when most leaders fear the stigma of making actual decisions (otherwise known as leading). ... It’s not about the 9 cents.”
China is not a democracy, but this story is a sign of the times: In a factory outside Beijing, an American businessman, Chip Starnes, president of the Florida-based Specialty Medical Supplies, was held captive for nearly a week by about 100 workers “who were demanding severance packages identical to those offered to 30 recently laid-off employees,” according to Reuters. The workers feared they would be next as the company moved some production from China to India to reduce costs. (He was released in a deal on Thursday.)
Finally, thanks to the proliferation of smartphones, tablets, Twitter, Facebook and blogging, aggrieved individuals now have much more power to engage in, and require their leaders to engage in, two-way conversations — and they have much greater ability to link up with others who share their views to hold flash protests. As Leon Aron, the Russian historian at the American Enterprise Institute, put it, “the turnaround time” between sense of grievance and action in today’s world is lightning fast and getting faster.
The net result is this: Autocracy is less sustainable than ever. Democracies are more prevalent than ever — but they will also be more volatile than ever. Look for more people in the streets more often over more issues with more independent means to tell their stories at ever-louder decibels.

domingo, 23 de junho de 2013

Seis surpresas protestatarias - Moises Naim

EL OBSERVADOR GLOBAL

Turquía, Brasil y sus protestas: seis sorpresas

Los movimientos de protesta que florecen en el planeta comparten algunas características

Moises Naim
El Pais, Junio 23, 2013

Primero fue Túnez, luego Chile y Turquía. Y ahora Brasil. ¿Qué tienen en común las protestas callejeras en países tan diferentes? Varias cosas… y todas sorprendentes.
1. Pequeños incidentes que se hacen grandes. En todos los casos, las protestas comenzaron con acontecimientos localizados que, inesperadamente, se convierten en un movimiento nacional. En Túnez, todo empezó cuando un joven vendedor ambulante de frutas no pudo soportar más el abuso de las autoridades y se inmoló prendiéndose fuego. En Chile fueron los costes de las universidades. En Turquía, un parque y en Brasil, la tarifa de los autobuses. Para sorpresa de los propios manifestantes —y de los Gobiernos— esas quejas específicas encontraron eco en la población y se transformaron en protestas generalizadas sobre cuestiones como la corrupción, la desigualdad, el alto costo de la vida o la arbitrariedad de las autoridades que actúan sin tomar en cuenta el sentir ciudadano.
2. Los Gobiernos reaccionan mal. Ninguno de los Gobiernos de los países donde han estallado estas protestas fue capaz de anticiparlas. Al principio tampoco entendieron su naturaleza ni estaban preparados para afrontarlas eficazmente. La reacción común ha sido mandar a los agentes antidisturbios a disolver las manifestaciones. Algunos Gobiernos van más allá y optan por sacar al Ejército a la calle. Los excesos de la policía o los militares agravan aún más la situación.
La principal sorpresa de estas protestas callejeras es que ocurren en países económicamente exitosos
3. Las protestas no tienen líderes ni cadena de mando. Las movilizaciones rara vez tienen una estructura organizativa o líderes claramente definidos.
Eventualmente destacan algunos de quienes protestan, y son designados por los demás —o identificados por los periodistas— como los portavoces. Pero estos movimientos —organizados espontáneamente a través de redes sociales y mensajes de texto— ni tienen jefes formales ni una jerarquía de mando tradicional.
4. No hay con quién negociar ni a quién encarcelar. La naturaleza informal, espontánea, colectiva y caótica de las protestas confunde a los Gobiernos. ¿Con quién negociar? ¿A quién hacerle concesiones para aplacar la ira en las calles? ¿Cómo saber si quienes aparecen como líderes realmente tienen la capacidad de representar y comprometer al resto?
5. Es imposible pronosticar las consecuencias de las protestas.Ningún experto previó la primavera árabe. Hasta poco antes de su súbita defenestración, Ben Ali, Gadafi o Mubarak eran tratados por analistas, servicios de inteligencia y medios de comunicación como líderes intocables, cuya permanencia en el poder daban por segura. Al día siguiente, esos mismos expertos explicaban por qué la caída de esos dictadores era inevitable. De la misma manera que no se supo por qué ni cuándo comienzan las protestas, tampoco se sabrá cómo y cuándo terminan, y cuáles serán sus efectos. En algunos países no han tenido mayores consecuencias o solo han resultado en reformas menores. En otros, las movilizaciones han derrocado Gobiernos. Este último no será el caso en Brasil, Chile o Turquía. Pero no hay duda de que el clima político países ya no es el mismo.
6. La prosperidad no compra estabilidad. La principal sorpresa de estas protestas callejeras es que ocurren en países económicamente exitosos. La economía de Túnez ha sido la mejor de África del Norte. Chile se pone como ejemplo mundial de que el desarrollo es posible. En los últimos años se ha vuelto un lugar común calificar a Turquía de “milagro económico”. Y Brasil no solo ha sacado a millones de personas de la pobreza, sino que incluso ha logrado la hazaña de disminuir su desigualdad. Todos ellos tienen hoy una clase media más numerosa que nunca. ¿Y entonces? ¿Por qué tomar la calle para protestar en vez de celebrar? La respuesta está en un libro que el politólogo estadounidense Samuel Huntington publicó en 1968: El orden político en las sociedades en cambio. Su tesis es que en las sociedades que experimentan transformaciones rápidas, la demanda de servicios públicos crece a mayor velocidad que la capacidad de los Gobiernos para satisfacerla. Esta es la brecha que saca a la gente a la calle a protestar contra el Gobierno. Y que alienta otras muy justificadas protestas: el costo prohibitivo de la educación superior en Chile, el autoritarismo de Erdogan en Turquía o la impunidad de los corruptos en Brasil. Seguramente, en estos países las protestas van a amainar. Pero eso no quiere decir que sus causas vayan a desaparecer. La brecha de Huntington es insalvable.
Y esa brecha, que produce turbulencias políticas, también puede ser transformada en una positiva fuerza que impulsa el progreso.
Sígame en Twitter @moisesnaim

sábado, 22 de junho de 2013

A paranoia normal de dirigentes eleitos: atinge qualquer um...

Dirigentes acuados, ou contestados, sempre tendem para a paranoia, e começam a falar bobagem, como o Erdogan, neste caso.
Interessante como pessoas que subiram pelo voto, uma vez no poder, tendem a se sentir autorizados a tudo, e desenvolvem não só comportamentos paranoicos, como também sentimentos autocráticos ou autoritários, quando não tendencialmente totalitários.
Já vimos isso no Brasil, também, basta olhar os candidatos a déspotas...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

PROTESTOS
Erdogan: Brasil e Turquia são alvo de conspiração internacional
Folha de S.Paulo, 22/06/2013 - 15h38 | Redação | São Paulo

Premiê turco afirmou que os dois países -- duas potências emergentes -- sofrem tentativa de desestabilização vinda de fora

O primeiro-ministro da Turquia, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, que enfrenta uma onda de manifestações em seu país, afirmou neste sábado (22/06) que os protestos registrados nos últimos dias no Brasil fazem parte uma conspiração para desestabilizar a presidente Dilma Rousseff, assim como estaria acontecendo com ele próprio.

Erdogan falava a centenas de milhares de simpatizantes na cidade de Samsun, uma das paradas de uma jornada de mobilizações em apoio a ele. Há três semanas, protestos contra a construção de um centro comercial da Praça Taksim de Istambul foram violentamente reprimidos pela polícia. A repressão impulsionou as manifestações, onde palavras de ordem contra Erdogan e pela sua saída do governo são frequentes.

Situação semelhante aconteceu no Brasil, quando a repressão da Polícia Militar do Estado de São Paulo nas quatro primeiras manifestações contra o aumento da tarifa de ônibus (responsabilidade da prefeitura), metrô e trem (responsabilidade do governo do estado) – especialmente em 14 de junho, pela violência e agressão contra jornalistas – chocou o país.

Antes apoiada pelos principais jornais, a ação da polícia gerou uma onda de protestos, que acabaram absorvendo outras pautas, como corrupção, inflação, insegurança, algumas incluídas em um rechaço à realização da Copa do Mundo de 2014 e das Olimpíadas de 2016.

A violência registrada nas manifestações seguintes – quinta-feira (20/06) na cidade de São Paulo houve agressão contra militantes de partidos de esquerda – foi condenada nesta sexta-feira (21/06) por Dilma, que se dispôs a receber os manifestantes e propôs um pacto para buscar atingir as demandas dos que protestaram.

Assim como Dilma, que lidera um país com altos níveis de crescimento econômico e social, Erdogan tem alta aprovação após 10 anos de governo. Para ele, os protestos são alimentados por forças estrangeiras, banqueiros e a mídia turca. Em Samsun, o premiê disse que o Brasil – outra economia emergente – foi alvo da mesma tentativa de desestabilização.

“O mesmo jogo está sendo jogado no Brasil. Os símbolos são os mesmos, Twitter, Facebook, são os mesmos, a mídia internacional é a mesma. Os protestos estão sendo levados ao mesmo centro”, analisou Erdogan. “Eles estão fazendo o máximo possível para conseguir no Brasil o que não conseguiram aqui. É o mesmo jogo, a mesma armadilha, o mesmo objetivo”. 


Leia mais

quarta-feira, 5 de junho de 2013

Turquia: entre a preeminencia islamica e a heranca laica - Stratfor


Turkey's Violent Protests in Context

Stratfor Analysis
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Turkey's Violent Protests in Context
Turkish protesters gather in Taksim Square in Istanbul on June 1. (BULENT KILIC/AFP/Getty Images)

Summary

The rapid escalation of anti-government protests in Turkey in recent days has exposed a number of long-dormant fault lines in the country's complex political landscape. But even as the appeal of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's ruling Justice and Development Party (also known by its Turkish acronym, AKP) is beginning to erode, it will remain a powerful force in Turkish politics for some time to come, with its still-significant base of support throughout the country and the lack of a credible political alternative in the next elections.

Analysis

The foundation for the current unrest was laid May 28, when a small group of mostly young environmentalists gathered in Istanbul's Taksim Square for a sit-in to protest a planned demolition of walls, uprooting of trees and the perceived desecration of historical sites in the square's Gezi Park. The initially peaceful demonstration turned violent the night of May 30, when police tried to break up what had grown to more than 100 protesters.
The environmental protesters were joined the next day by high-level representatives of the Justice and Development Party's main opposition, the secular Republican People's Party (known as CHP). The message of the protests soon evolved from saving Gezi Park's trees to condemning Erdogan and his party for a litany of complaints. Anti-government chants included "Down with the dictator," "Tayyip, resign," and "Unite against fascism."
The protests grew rapidly when the weekend began, with more than 10,000 people gathering in Taksim Square on June 1. Many of these made their way to the square from the district of Kadikoy, a Republican People's Party stronghold on the Asian side of Istanbul, by walking across the Bosphorus Bridge banging pots and pans in defiance of laws against pedestrian use of the bridge. Some reportedly threw Molotov cocktails, fireworks and stones at police, prompting the use of tear gas and water cannons on the protesters. However, this quickly drew condemnation, leading the government to temporarily withdraw police at the cost of allowing more protesters to gather.
Spread of Protests in Turkey: May 31-June 2, 2013
Erdogan's response was defiant. While admitting excessive force by the police and ordering an investigation of the matter, he said that he would not give in to "wild extremists" who belong to an "ideological" as opposed to "environmental" movement and that he would bring out a million supporters from his party for every 100,000 protesters. The same night, riots broke out and some 5,000 protesters threw stones at the prime minister's office in the Besiktas neighborhood in Istanbul.
On the morning of June 2, heavy rains kept protesters away from Taksim Square save for a few dozen who huddled around bonfires. More protesters made their way back to the square in the afternoon while Erdogan made another defiant speech blaming the Republican People's Party for the unrest and vowing to proceed with the development plans. Clashes between police and protesters have resumed, and close to 1,000 people have been detained and dozens injured.

Erdogan's Limits

The size and scope of the protests must be kept in perspective. By the end of June 1, protests had reportedly spread to Izmir, Eskisehir, Mugla, Yalova, Antalya, Bolu, Adana, Ankara, Kayseri and Konya. Many of the areas where protests were reported are also areas where the Republican People's Party would be expected to bring out a large number of supporters. Konya, Kayseri and Ankara, strong sources of support for the Justice and Development Party, were notable exceptions. The largest protests, in Istanbul and Izmir, brought out predominantly young protesters in the tens of thousands. The protests would be highly significant if they grow to the hundreds of thousands, include a wider demographic and geographically extend to areas with traditionally strong support for the ruling party.
The protests so far do not indicate that Erdogan's party is at serious or imminent risk of losing its grip on power, but they do reveal limits to the prime minister's political ambitions. Erdogan is attempting to extract votes from a slow-moving and highly fragile peace process with the Kurdistan Workers' Party to help him get enough support for a constitutional referendum. The referendum would transform Turkey from a parliamentary system to a presidential system and thus enable Erdogan, whose term as prime minister expires in 2015, to continue leading Turkey as president beyond 2014, when presidential elections are scheduled. The sight of protesters from the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (known as the BDP) joining Republican People's Party supporters for the June 1 protests does not bode well for Erdogan's plan to rely on those votes in the constitutional referendum. Though the Justice and Development Party, which remains highly popular with Turkey's more conservative populace in the Anatolian interior, so far does not face a credible political contender for the October local elections or 2015 parliamentary elections, Erdogan's political maneuvering to become president will face more resistance.
The ruling party's main secular opposition is alarmed at Erdogan's policies that compromise the core founding principles of the state as defined by Kemal Ataturk. From social measures that ban the sale of alcohol after 10 p.m. to foreign policy measures that have Turkey trying to mold and influence Islamist rebel groups in Syria, these are policies that directly undermine the Ataturkian mandate that Turkey must remain secular and avoid overextending itself beyond the republic's borders. But the growing dissent against the party is not a simple Islamist-secular divide, either. A perception has developed among a growing number of Turks that the party is pursuing an aggressive form of capitalism that defies environmental considerations as well as Islamic values. Within business circles, frustration is building over the number of concessions handed out to Erdogan's closest allies.

Rising Dissent

The polarization of the state could be plainly seen in the reporting of the Gezi Park protests. The protests appear to have emboldened once critical newspapers such as Hurriyet to reassume an anti-ruling party stance unseen in the recent years of Erdogan's media taming. Hurriyet has broadcast Erdogan's "defeat" with headlines such as "Erdogan no longer almighty." On the other end of the political spectrum, the state-funded news agency Anatolia is reporting the protests as a "brawl" between police and firework-throwing youth extremists, while stressing a democratic message that the government permitted the Republican People's Party to demonstrate in Taksim.
Far more interesting is reporting from the Justice and Development Party's traditional sources of support. Yeni Safak, a newspaper close to the ruling party, has condemned the park project and sympathized with the protesters. The same was seen in Zaman newspaper, run by followers of the moderate Islamist Gulen movement. The Gulenists form a crucial component of the ruling party's broader support base but also keep their distance from the ruling party. The movement has been increasingly critical of Erdogan, strongly suggesting that he and his party have become too powerful. Editorials from the newspaper admonished Erdogan for his "excessive" behavior and sided with the protesters.
Though dissent is rising, Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party still have a substantial support base, and the opposition continues to lack a credible political alternative (local elections scheduled for October likely will indicate how much support for the party has waned). At the same time, Turkey is pursuing a highly ambitious agenda abroad, from negotiating peace with Kurdish militants and developing oil pipelines in Iraqi Kurdistan to trying to fend off Syrian-backed militant attacks. Turkey was already highly constrained in pursuing these foreign policy goals, but they will take second place to Turkey's growing political distractions at home as Erdogan prioritizes the growing domestic challenges and as foreign adversaries such as Syria try to take advantage of preoccupied Turkish security forces to try to sponsor more attacks inside Turkey.


Read more: Turkey's Violent Protests in Context | Stratfor 

domingo, 2 de junho de 2013

A Turquia e as dores da transicao, para tras (NYTimes)

Protests in Turkey Reveal a Larger Fight Over Identity


Ed Ou for The New York Times
Turkish antigovernment protesters chanted slogans from behind barriers during a clash with police officers in Istanbul on Sunday. More Photos »




ISTANBUL — Across this vast city, a capital for three former empires, cranes dangle over construction sites, tin walls barricade old slums, and skyscrapers outclimb the mosque minarets that have dominated the skyline for centuries — all a vanguard for more audacious projects already in the works.
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For many Turks, though, the development is not so much progress as a reflection of growing autocratic ambitions by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his government. Anger and resentment boiled over onto the street over the past three days, as the police barraged demonstrators with tear gas and streams from water cannons — and as the protesters attacked bulldozers and construction trailers lined up next to the last park in the city’s center.
In full public view, a long struggle over urban spaces is erupting as a broader fight over Turkish identity, where difficult issues of religion, social class and politics intersect. And while most here acknowledge that every Turkish ruling class has sought to put its stamp on Istanbul, there is a growing sense that none has done so as insistently as the current government, led by Mr. Erdogan’s Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party, despite growing resistance.
On Sunday, Mr. Erdogan went on television to reject accusations of dictatorial behavior while flatly discounting the protesters’ legitimacy.
“We would not yield to a few looters coming to that square and provoking our people, our nation, based on their misinformation,” Mr. Erdogan said, in a speech that managed to feel provocative even as he called for a return to order, and as protesters returned to Taksim Square. Demonstrators also took to the streets of Ankara, the capital, and several other cities and were met with tear gas from the police.
Edhem Eldem, a historian at Bogazici University in Istanbul, has criticized the government for undertaking large-scale development projects without seeking recommendations from the public. “In a sense, they are drunk with power,” he said. “They lost their democratic reflexes and are returning to what is the essence of Turkish politics: authoritarianism.”
The swiftly changing physical landscape of Istanbul symbolizes the competing themes that undergird modern Turkey — Islam versus secularism, rural versus urban. They highlight a booming economy and a self-confidence expressed by the religiously conservative ruling elite that belies the post-empire gloom that permeates the novels of Istanbul by Orhan Pamuk, Turkey’s Nobel laureate and most famous writer.
Mr. Erdogan’s decade-long rule has dramatically reshaped Turkey’s culture by establishing civilian control of the military. It has broken down rules of the old secular order that now permit the wide public expression of religion, seen in the proliferation of women wearing head scarves, by the conservative masses who make up the prime minister’s constituency. His rule has also nurtured a pious capitalist class, whose members have moved in large numbers from rural Anatolia to cities like Istanbul, deepening class divisions.
The old secular elite, who consider themselves the inheritors of the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, modern Turkey’s secular founder, have chafed under these transformations. So, too, have liberals, who do not label themselves Kemalists and are tolerant of public displays of religion. But they object to Mr. Erdogan’s leadership style, which they describe as dictatorial, and are put off by many of the development projects on the grounds of bad taste, a view imbued with a sense of social elitism.
For many, it has also created a sense of resentment and loss — for longtime residents, urban intellectuals and many members of the underclasses who are being pushed from their homes so that upscale housing complexes and shopping malls can be built.
And there is much more on the drawing board that evokes greater ambitions and controversies: the world’s largest airport, the country’s biggest mosque, and a proposed canal that would split Istanbul’s European side and is so audacious that even the project’s most vocal supporter, Mr. Erdogan, has called it “crazy.” Ground has already been broken on a third bridge over the Bosporus, named for a contentious Ottoman sultan who was accused of massacring Alevi Muslims, a large minority in Turkey.
“I was born and raised here, and there is nothing from my youth that I can connect to anymore in this city,” said Ersin Kalaycioglu, a professor of international relations at Sabanci University. “Istanbul is seen as a place where you earn a living, where you get rich. It is a gold rush.”
Reflecting a sense of elitism that is widely shared by secular Turks in Istanbul, he complained that the city had “been invaded by Anatolian peasants” who were “uncultured.”
Ara Guler, who is 84 and Turkey’s most famous photographer, having produced volumes of black-and-white photographs of Istanbul’s cityscapes, sat in a cafe that bears his name. He said there was only one neighborhood left that reminded of him of his city and where he still liked to take pictures: Eyup, a waterside district that is home to a famous mosque and many conservative Muslim families.
“The Istanbul that we grew up with is lost,” he said. “Where is my Istanbul? It’s all about the money.”
A government plan to convert Taksim Square, historically a place of public gathering, into a replica Ottoman-era army barracks and shopping mall — what Mr. Eldem, the historian, called “a Las Vegas of Ottoman splendor” — is what incited the demonstrations. But there are many other contentious projects that have drawn public outrage.
The city’s oldest movie theater was recently demolished for another mall, raising howls of protests, including an objection from Turkey’s first lady, Hayrunnisa Gul, the wife of the Turkish president, Abdullah Gul. A 19th-century Russian Orthodox Church may be destroyed as part of an overhaul of a port. And in ghettos across the city, the urban poor are being paid to leave their homes so that contractors — many with ties to government officials — can build gated communities.
The neighborhood of Avcilar, near the airport and historically a place for Bulgarian immigrants, is another area where residents are being uprooted. As the process unfolds, it has become complicated by opaque property records in which it is sometimes impossible to determine ownership.
“One day we just got a notice, and bam, before we could put up a proper fight, 300 to 400 police came and held us back from intervening with the bulldozers that knocked down our restaurant,” said Coskun Turan, who owned a fish restaurant. “They said we didn’t have deeds for the property, but we do. We showed them. They argued that we only had a deed for part of the property, so they knocked the rest down.”
At 87, Dogan Kuban is perhaps Istanbul’s foremost urban historian. He has written numerous books and worked with the United Nations on preservation issues in Turkey. He complained that he has never been consulted by the current government. “I am the historian of Istanbul,” he said. “They don’t consult with anybody.”
He criticized the government for ignoring the country’s pre-Islamic history by not protecting certain archaeological sites and structures, an issue he cast as highlighting Turkey’s turn away from Western culture under Mr. Erdogan’s rule.
“The only things being preserved are mosques,” he said. “Preservation is a very refined part of the culture. It’s very much a part of European civilization.”
The outcome of the protest movement is still uncertain. With Mr. Erdogan still able to count on the support of religious conservatives, who make up a large voting bloc, few believe that his hold on power is in jeopardy. But there has been a hint of potential political damage, and the pulling back of police forces on Saturday, and allowing tens of thousands of protesters to demonstrate in Taksim Square on Saturday and again on Sunday night, was seen by some as a sign of weakness.
“This is the first battle Erdogan lost in recent memory,” said Soli Ozel, an academic and columnist here. “He overreached — his hubris, arrogance and authoritarian impulse hit a wall.”
But on Sunday, Mr. Erdogan struck a defiant chord, and while he said no shopping mall would be built in Taksim, he vowed to build another mosque in the square.

terça-feira, 4 de dezembro de 2012

Cultura: Turquia multa 'Os Simpsons' por debochar de Deus

Cultura? Como cultura?
Isso se parece mais com obscurantismo.
Na verdade, como diria alguém, não existem limites à idiotice humana.
Acho que foi Einstein: "existem duas coisas infinitas no mundo: o universo e a estupidez humana, e eu não tenho certeza quanto ao universo..."
Como diria um bookmaker inglês: "Nunca, jamais, alguém perdeu dinheiro apostando na estupidez humana".
A Turquia poderia dispensar entrar nesse rol...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Cultura

Turquia multa 'Os Simpsons' por debochar de Deus

Episódio da série mostra Deus servindo uma xícara de café a Satã

Agência France-Presse, 2/12/2012
 
O Alto Conselho do Audiovisual (RTUK) turco aplicou uma multa de 22.600 euros ao canal de televisão turco CNBC-E por ter exibido um episódio da série animada 'Os Simpsons' em que Deus aparece servindo uma xícara de café a Satã, informou nesta segunda-feira a imprensa local.
O RTUK justificou sua decisão alegando que o episódio "debocha de Deus". Na história, Deus também encoraja os jovens a consumir álcool por ocasião do Ano Novo e a morte é incentivada por "ordem divina", segundo o jornal Hurriyet.
"A Bíblia é publicamente queimada e Deus e Satã são mostrados sob a forma de humanos", denunciam as autoridades citadas pelo jornal. No passado, o RTURK já tomou outras decisões controversas, como condenar um canal de televisão que mostrou o capitão Haddock, um dos principais personagens do desenho Tintin, fumando um cachimbo.

sexta-feira, 30 de dezembro de 2011

Le génocide arménien : l'extermination (3/3) - Vincent Duclert, Le Monde


Le génocide arménien : le négationnisme d'Etat turc (3/3)

LEMONDE.FR | 29.12.11 | 17h14   •  Mis à jour le 29.12.11 | 17h30
Comment la recherche sur le génocide arménien avance-t-elle, malgré tout, en Turquie ?
Il y a une élite intellectuelle de très grande qualité, qui a compris qu'il y avait undevoir à la fois scientifique et civique de se saisir du refoulé, d'envisager les questions interdites : le génocide arménien, la nature de l'Etat kémaliste, présenté en Turquie comme le modèle indépassable alors qu'il s'apparente aussi à des formes de dictature, la guerre contre les Kurdes, la situation de l'"Etat profond", lepouvoir militaire, les réseaux religieux…
Ils veulent ouvrir ces dossiers, et sont prêts à prendre des risques considérables : Taner Akçam a été emprisonné, avant de devoir s'exiler ; Hrant Dink, qui lui aussi a mené un travail très important avec sa revue bilingue arméno-turque, a été assassiné en 2007 dans un contexte de chasse à l'homme. Hrant Dink a été visé parce que ses travaux tendaient à rappeler combien la société turque est en réalité mélangée, complexe, et que c'est la prise en compte de ce tissage – souvent tragique – qui permettrait de faire la paix avec le passé et de préparer l'avenir. Et puis il n'y a pas que les problèmes ethniques et religieux, il y a la place du genre, des femmes, des homosexuels…
Pour le gouvernement turc, le fait que des universitaires se décident à étudier ces pans du passé constitue une menace pour l'intégrité de la nation, pour la mémoire de Mustafa Kemal. Ils ne peuvent plus incriminer un complot de l'étranger, même s'ils essaient par tous les moyens de discréditer ces recherches et d'imposer le silence aux chercheurs, y compris en recourant à l'emprisonnement et aux procès arbitraires. Il est certain que le vote de la loi va rendre encore plus difficile leur travail en les faisant passer, encore davantage, pour des ennemis intérieurs.
Comment les intellectuels turcs peuvent-ils se tirer du piège dans lequel la loi votée par l'Assemblée française le 22 décembre les place : soutenir la loi, au risque de passer pour ennemis de la nation, ou la rejeter, au risque de devoirs'allier à ceux qui nient le génocide ?
Lorsqu'il y avait eu la première tentative française de pénalisation de la négation du génocide, en 2006, Hrant Dink et d'autres intellectuels démocrates avaient protesté contre une loi qui menacerait leurs recherches. En 2011, certains, notamment les membres de l'association des droits de l'homme turque, ont souligné que le plus important est de combattre le négationnisme.
Ils soulignent la vacuité des arguments officiels, notamment lorsque le pouvoiraffirme que cette loi française est contraire à la liberté d'expression : en Turquie, la liberté d'expression sur ces sujets-là n'existe pas.
Tout de même, il est possible aujourd'hui, en Turquie, d'affirmer qu'il y a eu un génocide…
Le nouveau pouvoir dit "islamiste modéré" a créé l'illusion, à partir de 2002, qu'il était porteur d'une vraie démocratisation. Il y a eu des évolutions, indéniables, sur le plan de la liberté d'expression, surtout sur les sujets mettant en cause le régime kémaliste. Mais lorsqu'ils s'intéressent aux liens entre le gouvernement et les religieux, les journalistes sont aussitôt emprisonnés.
Cette relative démocratisation a permis des avancées comme l'édition et la traduction d'ouvrages, ou l'organisation de colloques sur les événements génocidaires de la Première Guerre mondiale, ou sur les massacres d'Adana de 1909. Mais depuis la fin 2009, il y a eu un raidissement considérable. Les intellectuels et historiens qui travaillent sur le passé vivent sous la menace permanente d'arrestations et de procès. C'est dans ce contexte, et pour soutenirces chercheurs, que nous avons créé, à Paris, un groupe international de travail (GIT) "Liberté de recherche et d'enseignement en Turquie". Plusieurs branches sont déjà créées ou en cours de fondation, en France, aux Etats-Unis, en Grande-Bretagne, et en Turquie même, bien sûr. Il s'agit de déployer la recherche sur la recherche, et de mettre sous surveillance les pouvoirs qui terrorisent les chercheurs.
Comment les intellectuels turcs ressentent-ils que ce soit la France qui se penche, par la loi, sur leur passé ?
La vérité historique ne nécessite pas une loi pour se fonder. C'est même un risque d'affaiblissement. Mais il faut considérer l'importance de l'offensive négationniste. Ce que veulent les autorités turques, ce sont des commissions constituées uniquement d'historiens turs et arméniens. Or l'Arménie a tant besoin de la Turquie que cela ne peut être qu'un marché de dupes. Il faudrait des commissions plus larges : cette question dépasse du reste le cadre historiographique des deux pays.
Reste que même une loi pleine de bons sentiments amène un encadrement de la recherche, donc son affaiblissement, alors même que les travaux sur le génocide arménien demeurent insuffisants. La demande légitime des Arméniens de lire et deretrouver leur histoire est paradoxalement menacée. L'histoire du génocide arménien reste sous-dimensionnée. Il n'y a pas de chaire sur ces questions, d'étude d'histoire comparée sur les génocides, les publications sont peu nombreuses, les maisons d'édition fragiles. Des ouvrages majeurs sur les génocides – incluant le premier des génocides comme A Problem from Hell. America and the Age of Genocide de la politiste d'Harvard Samantha Power (2002) – ne sont toujours pas accessibles en langue française…
Même si cette loi peut se comprendre, elle aura des effets dangereux sur la recherche en Turquie et en France. D'autant que le jusqu'au-boutisme des associations, déjà puissant à l'époque des affaires Bernard Lewis et Gilles Veinstein, risque d'amener les chercheurs à se désengager de ce terrain. Il y a un vrai risque pour la recherche indépendante. La loi vise à défendre la vérité historique, mais elle en sape les bases théoriques et morales.
Mais si on ne peut pas faire de lois, comment lutter contre le négationnisme ?
La vraie solution, c'est de développer la recherche. Si un pouvoir politique veutlutter contre le négationnisme, il peut créer des chaires, ouvrir des laboratoires,soutenir des publications… Il peut aussi défendre le travail des chercheurs sur le terrain. Il est ainsi regrettable que la France n'ait pas voulu soulever la question des intellectuels persécutés en Turquie. Quand le ministre des affaires étrangères, Alain Juppé, est allé à Ankara, en novembre dernier, il ne s'est pas inquiété du sort des chercheurs emprisonnés… La mise au clair du passé, en Turquie, ne se fera que par l'évolution de la société. Cette évolution est en cours mais elle risque d'êtrebloquée par cette loi. Et les historiens indépendants en payeront à nouveau le prix fort.
Propos recueillis par Jérôme Gautheret