Los suculentos negocios que atan a Brasil con Venezuela
BBC News, 18/03/2015
Brasil nunca ocultó que veía en la Venezuela socialista de Hugo Chávez un mercado atractivo para sus empresas.
“La presencia de Venezuela en el Mercosur (…) abre oportunidades a varios emprendimientos”, dijo la presidenta brasileña, Dilma Rousseff, cuando dio la bienvenida al país vecino y rico en petróleo al bloque regional, en julio de 2012.
Y varios números sugieren que la apuesta brasileña rindió sus frutos.
Sólo el año pasado, el gigante sudamericano tuvo en su intercambio comercial con Venezuela un superávit de US$3.450 millones.
Para Brasil ese saldo positivo fue a contramano de su balanza comercial total, que el mismo 2014 registró su primer déficit anual en lo que va de este siglo.
Expertos como Oliver Stuenkel, profesor de relaciones internacionales en la Fundación Getulio Vargas, con sede en São Paulo, calculan que las empresas brasileñas tienen contratos en Venezuela por unos US$20 mil millones.
“Brasil obtuvo muchos beneficios económicos (en Venezuela) a lo largo de los últimos 15 años y el chavismo era un socio comercial confiable. Chávez y (su sucesor Nicolás) Maduro dieron preferencia a las inversiones brasileñas”, indicó Stuenkel a BBC Mundo.
Pero esa relación enfrenta desafíos inéditos ahora que Venezuela pasa crecientes problemas económicos, tensiones políticas y surgen reclamos de una actitud más firme de Brasil ante el gobierno “amigo”.
“Cuestión interna”
Hasta ahora la administración de Rousseff evitó criticar directa y públicamente a Maduro, lo que contrasta con la actitud de Estados Unidos, otro actor clave en el hemisferio y socio comercial importante de Caracas.
El presidente estadounidense, Barack Obama, declaró a Venezuela una amenaza para la seguridad nacional y ordenó sanciones contra siete altos funcionarios de ese país.
En cambio, Brasil ha medido sus palabras sobre Venezuela desde el arresto el mes pasado del alcalde de Caracas, el opositor Antonio Ledezma, acusado por el gobierno de Maduro de participar de un supuesto plan para derrocarlo.
La Cancillería brasileña primero señaló que acompañaba “con gran preocupación la evolución de la situación en Venezuela”. Pero la propia Rousseff calificó el arresto de Ledezma como una “cuestión interna” de ese país.
Unos días después, Itamaraty emitió otro comunicado sobre Venezuela que afirmó que “son motivos de creciente atención medidas tomadas en los últimos días, que afectan directamente partidos políticos y representantes democráticamente electos”.
Al igual que lo hizo el año pasado tras las manifestaciones antigubernamentales que fueron reprimidas en Venezuela, Brasil llamó a retomar “el diálogo” en el país, a través de la Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas (Unasur) y el apoyo del Vaticano.
Grupos defensores de los derechos humanos como Human Rights Watch y Amnistía Internacional han criticado la posición de Brasil —el primero la calificó de “tímida”— ante la “prisión arbitraria” de opositores y otros abusos que afirman que se cometen en Venezuela.
Y opositores brasileños acusaron al gobierno de Rousseff de ser “cómplice” de Maduro y actuar en función de vínculos ideológicos con las autoridades vecinas.
Sin embargo, Stuenkel calificó esta visión como “simplista”.
“La cuestión económica (en Venezuela) es más importante que cualquier factor político”, sostuvo. “El comportamiento brasileño hasta hoy fue principalmente pautado por intereses económicos”.
Pero, ¿cuáles son exactamente esos intereses?
Puentes, usinas y deudas
Las empresas brasileñas tienen un abanico amplio de actividades en Venezuela: desde la colocación de alimentos y otros bienes de consumo en un mercado con serios problemas de escasez, hasta grandes obras de infraestructura.
La constructora Odebrecht, por ejemplo, tiene una docena de proyectos en Venezuela, incluida la ampliación del metro de Caracas, el tendido de un puente de 11,4 kilómetros sobre el Lago de Maracaibo (al oeste del país) y el desarrollo de la central hidroeléctrica Tocoma (al este).
Por otra parte, la lista de productos brasileños exportados a Venezuela es extensa: las carnes bovinas tienen un peso destacado, pero también hay leche, azúcar, medicamentos, maquinarias, champú, afeitadoras…
El propio gobierno brasileño ha buscado empresas brasileñas que abastezcan productos básicos a Venezuela para aliviar la crisis, tras al menos dos pedidos personales de Maduro a Rousseff, informó el diario Folha de S.Paulo el martes.
No obstante, las dificultades de los importadores venezolanos para obtener dólares ha provocado importantes atrasos de pagos a los exportadores brasileños, mientras que empresas brasileñas instaladas en el país vecino también tuvieron problemas para enviar fondos a la matriz.
La Cámara de Comercio Venezuela-Brasil calculaba a comienzos de año que esos atrasos sumaban US$5.000 millones. Pero un funcionario venezolano que habló en condición de anonimato por tratarse de un tema sensible dijo a BBC Mundo que la cifra podría llegar al doble.
Welber Barral, exsecretario brasileño de Comercio Exterior y socio de la consultora Barral M Jorge, señaló que los atrasos varían según del ramo del exportador y que a clientes suyos del área de los alimentos “les están pagando”.
Sin embargo, indicó que los atrasos que hubo en general y los problemas de liquidez que causó a Venezuela el desplome del precio del petróleo provocaron una reciente contracción del comercio bilateral.
Las exportaciones brasileñas a Venezuela cayeron 47% en los dos primeros meses de este año respecto al mismo período de 2014, mientras el superávit del intercambio se redujo 53%.
La situación parece preocupar al gobierno de Rousseff, que estudió plantearle a Venezuela que las exportaciones brasileñas tengan como garantía el petróleo de la estatal PDVSA o sus derivados, para "desmonetizar" el comercio, informó el diario brasileño Valor Económico a fines de enero.
Pero Barral dijo a BBC Mundo que eso sería insuficiente, ya que Brasil produce el mismo tipo de petróleo que su vecino. “Brasil no tiene qué importar” de Venezuela, resumió.
Con crecientes dificultades políticas y económicas también en Brasil —que incluyen un creciente descontento social doméstico, una devaluación de más de 20% del real ante el dólar este año y una inflación a 12 meses que en febrero llegó al máximo en una década— muchos creen que lo último que quiere Rousseff es más inestabilidad en Venezuela.
“No se puede decir que el impacto de un colapso venezolano afectaría apenas algunos sectores de la economía brasileña”, dijo Stuenkel. “En la situación actual, con tantas noticias negativas, sería otro factor que afectaría de manera muy negativa el cuadro”.
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sexta-feira, 20 de março de 2015
sexta-feira, 18 de maio de 2012
Coreia do Norte: uma potencia capitalista
Piada, claro, mas seria o caso de saber se essa maravilhosa associação de interesses entre o bandido e os bandidos se deu antes ou depois do estabelecimento das relações diplomáticas bilaterais, por mais uma dessas brilhantes iniciativas da doutrina do nunca antes neste país...
IR de bicheiro aponta sócio na Coreia do Norte
A declaração de Imposto de Renda Pessoa Física de Carlos Augusto Ramos, o Carlinhos Cachoeira, apresenta uma informação que surpreendeu os parlamentares. Que o contraventor era sócio da Bet Capital, com 49%, todos sabiam. O que chamou a atenção dos senadores é que a outra parte da sociedade, em nome da Bet Corporation, estaria sediada na Coreia do Norte, um dos países mais fechados do mundo, onde não há empresa privada, pois é um estado comunista. As informações levantam suspeitas de lavagem de dinheiro em empresa de fachada.
De acordo com o senador Randolfe Rodrigues (PSOL-AP), Cachoeira recebeu vultosos recursos da Bet Capital. Em 2008, foram R$ 2,8 milhões; em 2009, R$ 4,3 milhões, mesmo valor repetido em 2010. No entanto, como afirmou o senador Cássio Cunha Lima (PSDB-PB), os rendimentos tributáveis do contraventor eram espartanos.
Lavagem de dinheiro na Coreia
A análise dos 41 volumes de documentos relativos à declaração de Imposto de Renda dos últimos 10 anos do bicheiro Carlinhos Cachoeira, encaminhados pela Receita Federal à CPI, indica que o contraventor tinha uma espécie de “lavanderia” internacional do dinheiro sujo obtido no Brasil. Nas declarações de IR dos exercícios referentes aos anos de 2008, 2009 e 2010, o bicheiro informa que recebeu da empresa BET Capital R$ 11,4 milhões a título de empréstimos. A suspeita é de que os recursos da organização criminosa eram encaminhados para a empresa BET Company, estranhamente com sede na comunista Coreia do Norte, na Ásia, e acionária majoritária da BET Capital.
Carlinhos Cachoeira teria 49% das ações e a BET Company outros 51%. O esquema que começa a ser desvendado aponta que o dinheiro sairia do Brasil e voltava para a BET Capital, que emprestava milhões ao contraventor. Cachoeira declarou ter recebido da empresa R$ 2,8 milhões em 2008; R$ 4,3 milhões em 2009; e novamente R$ 4,3 milhões em 2010. Existem também empréstimos com cifras milionárias no nome da ex-mulher e de um ex-cunhado.
sexta-feira, 18 de junho de 2010
Chavez: montando um pre-exilio na Argentina?
A pergunta pode parecer absurda, mas me veio a mente ao ler sobre todos esses negócios escusos entre os K e Mister Chávez. Quem sabe?
Argentina: New roads for Chávez
Carolina Barros
Buenos Aires Herald (Argentina), June 14, 2010
All roads ultimately lead to the Venezuela of Chávez. But the uproar over the 15 percent commissions, the dollar-laden suitcases and an elastic Argentine-Venezuelan trust holding (which from the original 231 million dollars agreed in 2004 has mushroomed to over two billion with the welter of deals and agreements, leading Government House to now deny its existence) has obliged the latest projects between Caracas and Buenos Aires to seek new short cuts by other financial routes.
Like the Bolivarian plan for the commercial control of the Hidrovía (the waterway connection via the Paraná and Paraguay Rivers between the River Plate estuary, the Argentine Northwest, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and southern Brazil). How? By creating a huge Argentine-Venezuelan fleet which was originally christened Fluvialba, a combination of the Argentine-Paraguayan Fluviomar and the Venezuelan Albanave, one of the countless divisions or sub-holdings of the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA. Its funding was initially designed to fall under the vast umbrella of the bilateral trust holding established in 2004 but the uproar over irregularities has prompted the contractual parties to go looking for less shady means since last December.
The original plans for a Bolivarian fleet date from early 2009 but only took on life last December after Hugo Chávez visited the Tandanor shipyards and signed with his local colleague Cristina Fernández de Kirchner a letter of intent for the construction of 50 barges, 10 tugs and six unloading vessels with Tandanor (which depends on the Defence Ministry) acting as the “co-ordinator” of the construction contracts with various shipyards. These vessels serve only one purpose: to monopolize the upstream transport of fossil fuels (Venezuelan, obviously), returning with a freight which could include iron ore and lithium, as well as grain.
Tender. During the last trip of President Kirchner to Caracas on April 20, the two governments signed 25 agreements. Of these, the 14th and the 25th refer to “receipt of the tender to build barges and freighters for river transport between Tandanor and Fluvialba” and the “creation of a mixed capital company between PDVSA Argentina and Fluviomar with the legal denomination of Fluvialba,” respectively.
At the end of April, the Herald was assured by both Tandanor and Caracas sources that the “meeting point” (Chávez jargon for having the strongman’s signature and the corresponding funding already arranged) already existed but the contract (with an estimated value of 100 million dollars) could only be signed at the end of May because a legal framework similar to the 2004 trust holding was being sought.
Nobody talks about that today, as Tandanor director Omar Riveiro confirmed when consulted by the Herald: “We rule out a trust holding and we’re ready to sign but the problem is that we have no shipper or consignee since Fluvialba has yet to be established.”
He might well say so since in shipping circles they say that Fluviomar is virtually broke but was chosen by Chávez because of its CEO Andrés Guzmán’s excellent relationship with both Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo and Chávez himself.
Banco Nación. As for financing the Bolivarian fleet (yet to be designated), this will probably proceed via letters of credit from Banco Nación “always provided that it is legally domiciled in Caracas or Buenos Aires,” according to Tandanor, not without pointing out that first they ruled out tax havens such as the Virgin Islands, Panama and even Uruguay in order to set up the firm.
In the market they assure that the Bolivarian fleet will sail under three flags (Argentina, Paraguay and Venezuela) and that it will flood Mercosur with Venezuelan fuel. They also say that Petropar, the Paraguayan oil company, is trapped by its debts to PDVSA (over 500 million dollars)and that the Argentine-Paraguayan-Venezuelan venture seeks to displace Horamar, the navigation company of the López brothers, which currently dominates fuel oil transport in the Hidrovía.
There is also some hard data: between December and now, the fleet plans have been scaled down to the construction of only 50 barges, to be delivered in three stages over five years. The 30 smaller vessels (2,500 tons, for grain and minerals) will be outsourced among Argentine shipyards (Torresint of Puerto Deseado and Astilleros Corrientes). As for the 20 larger vessels (6,500 tons and double-decker for fuel transport), Tandanor itself could take charge.
“That is, if everything goes according to plan and in 10 days we sign the contract,” says Riveiro.
Argentina: New roads for Chávez
Carolina Barros
Buenos Aires Herald (Argentina), June 14, 2010
All roads ultimately lead to the Venezuela of Chávez. But the uproar over the 15 percent commissions, the dollar-laden suitcases and an elastic Argentine-Venezuelan trust holding (which from the original 231 million dollars agreed in 2004 has mushroomed to over two billion with the welter of deals and agreements, leading Government House to now deny its existence) has obliged the latest projects between Caracas and Buenos Aires to seek new short cuts by other financial routes.
Like the Bolivarian plan for the commercial control of the Hidrovía (the waterway connection via the Paraná and Paraguay Rivers between the River Plate estuary, the Argentine Northwest, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and southern Brazil). How? By creating a huge Argentine-Venezuelan fleet which was originally christened Fluvialba, a combination of the Argentine-Paraguayan Fluviomar and the Venezuelan Albanave, one of the countless divisions or sub-holdings of the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA. Its funding was initially designed to fall under the vast umbrella of the bilateral trust holding established in 2004 but the uproar over irregularities has prompted the contractual parties to go looking for less shady means since last December.
The original plans for a Bolivarian fleet date from early 2009 but only took on life last December after Hugo Chávez visited the Tandanor shipyards and signed with his local colleague Cristina Fernández de Kirchner a letter of intent for the construction of 50 barges, 10 tugs and six unloading vessels with Tandanor (which depends on the Defence Ministry) acting as the “co-ordinator” of the construction contracts with various shipyards. These vessels serve only one purpose: to monopolize the upstream transport of fossil fuels (Venezuelan, obviously), returning with a freight which could include iron ore and lithium, as well as grain.
Tender. During the last trip of President Kirchner to Caracas on April 20, the two governments signed 25 agreements. Of these, the 14th and the 25th refer to “receipt of the tender to build barges and freighters for river transport between Tandanor and Fluvialba” and the “creation of a mixed capital company between PDVSA Argentina and Fluviomar with the legal denomination of Fluvialba,” respectively.
At the end of April, the Herald was assured by both Tandanor and Caracas sources that the “meeting point” (Chávez jargon for having the strongman’s signature and the corresponding funding already arranged) already existed but the contract (with an estimated value of 100 million dollars) could only be signed at the end of May because a legal framework similar to the 2004 trust holding was being sought.
Nobody talks about that today, as Tandanor director Omar Riveiro confirmed when consulted by the Herald: “We rule out a trust holding and we’re ready to sign but the problem is that we have no shipper or consignee since Fluvialba has yet to be established.”
He might well say so since in shipping circles they say that Fluviomar is virtually broke but was chosen by Chávez because of its CEO Andrés Guzmán’s excellent relationship with both Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo and Chávez himself.
Banco Nación. As for financing the Bolivarian fleet (yet to be designated), this will probably proceed via letters of credit from Banco Nación “always provided that it is legally domiciled in Caracas or Buenos Aires,” according to Tandanor, not without pointing out that first they ruled out tax havens such as the Virgin Islands, Panama and even Uruguay in order to set up the firm.
In the market they assure that the Bolivarian fleet will sail under three flags (Argentina, Paraguay and Venezuela) and that it will flood Mercosur with Venezuelan fuel. They also say that Petropar, the Paraguayan oil company, is trapped by its debts to PDVSA (over 500 million dollars)and that the Argentine-Paraguayan-Venezuelan venture seeks to displace Horamar, the navigation company of the López brothers, which currently dominates fuel oil transport in the Hidrovía.
There is also some hard data: between December and now, the fleet plans have been scaled down to the construction of only 50 barges, to be delivered in three stages over five years. The 30 smaller vessels (2,500 tons, for grain and minerals) will be outsourced among Argentine shipyards (Torresint of Puerto Deseado and Astilleros Corrientes). As for the 20 larger vessels (6,500 tons and double-decker for fuel transport), Tandanor itself could take charge.
“That is, if everything goes according to plan and in 10 days we sign the contract,” says Riveiro.
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