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quarta-feira, 22 de abril de 2020

Diplomacia populista - Guilherme Casarões (FSP)

Política externa sob Bolsonaro e Ernesto Araújo inaugura a diplomacia populista
Gestão se baseia em propostas simples para problemas complexos, mobilização das massas e construção de inimigos externos

SÃO PAULO
Desde o início do mandato de Jair Bolsonaro, a política externa sob influência direta do guru intelectual Olavo de Carvalho foi um dos traços mais marcantes do novo governo.
O desejo manifesto de ruptura fez com que muitos buscassem adjetivos para caracterizá-la. Conservadora? Nacionalista? Antiglobalista? Subserviente?
Cada um desses adjetivos descreve aspectos importantes da atuação do Brasil no mundo, mas acredito que a palavra que melhor descreve o estado atual da política externa do país é populista.
A total submissão das diretrizes diplomáticas ao projeto pessoal (ou familiar) de poder de Jair Bolsonaro, marcado pelo reacionarismo ideológico e pela truculência política, é algo inédito no Brasil, mesmo nos períodos autoritários, e desconhecido entre democracias consolidadas.

O chanceler Ernesto Araújo, à esq., e o presidente Jair Bolsonaro durante reunião do G20, por teleconferência, em Brasília
O chanceler Ernesto Araújo, à esq., e o presidente Jair Bolsonaro durante reunião do G20, por teleconferência, em Brasília - Marcos Correa - 26.mar.20/Presidência da República via AFP
Ao tentar indicar seu filho Eduardo, de parcas credenciais, para chefiar a embaixada brasileira em Washington, Bolsonaro deixou claro que se vê como um monarca absolutista, legitimado pelo povo e inspirado pela graça divina.
Esse comportamento subverte a própria lógica do interesse nacional sob a qual operam chancelarias ao redor do globo. À esquerda ou à direita, a ideologia serve como filtro das estratégias para projetar o país no mundo, mas não deve ser tratada como um fim nela mesma.
E nem todo líder populista faz da diplomacia a extensão de seu jogo político interno. A atuação internacional de Getúlio Vargas, até durante o Estado Novo, ficou conhecida por seu pragmatismo na relação com Berlim e Washington.
Mesmo Donald Trump, um dos símbolos do moderno populismo conservador, não radicalizou sua política externa, encontrando certo equilíbrio entre bravatas esporádicas e concessões amplas, como se viu nas relações com a Coreia do Norte.
Não é o caso da diplomacia bolsonarista, cujo traço de populismo revela uma construção ampla, que condena objetivos, princípios e estratégias de relações internacionais à dinâmica própria do personalismo do líder populista.
Ela se baseia em três pilares: propostas de soluções simples para problemas complexos, mobilização direta das massas e aposta na construção de inimigos externos.
Para tanto, dispensa os mediadores institucionais, como o Itamaraty e a diplomacia profissional, além de abusar da comunicação direta, sobretudo via redes sociais.
O simplismo da visão de mundo bolsonarista se revelou desde a campanha. Povos de bem, em defesa da liberdade, da família e da fé, travam uma batalha permanente contra o socialismo e o globalismo.
A solução é igualmente rudimentar: para o governo, o Brasil só reconquistará sua credibilidade se o governo hostilizar Venezuela, China e Irã e abraçar Israel, Hungria e, quem diria, o absolutismo teocrático da Arábia Saudita.
A ideia é rezar pela cartilha trumpista, sem filtros, ressalvas ou concessões, numa adaptação da folclórica frase do ex-chanceler Juracy Magalhães: o que é bom para Donald Trump é bom para Jair Bolsonaro (e, portanto, para o Brasil).
O recurso às massas se traduz na utópica ideia, repetida diversas vezes pela cúpula bolsonarista, de que a política externa deve refletir os valores profundos do povo brasileiro.
Rejeita, portanto, interlocuções com sociedade civil, lideranças políticas progressistas ou organismos multilaterais, acusando-os de serem parte de uma suposta elite globalista que apregoa o marxismo cultural.
Essa apropriação de um povo imaginário, que se confunde com a militância bolsonarista das ruas e das redes, é importante para manter a base mobilizada.
Para atingir o “povo”, a política externa populista precisa de inimigos, que sempre devem ser descobertos, denunciados e combatidos. Ela se nutre, portanto, de espantalhos externos e teorias conspiratórias.
No começo, os alvos eram os socialistas: Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela e o Foro de São Paulo. Aos poucos, o leque de inimigos foi se ampliando para os considerados globalistas: o presidente francês, Emmanuel Macron, a ONG ambiental Greenpeace e a ativista pela mudança climática Greta Thunberg.
A paranoia bolsonarista que inunda o WhatsApp não poupou nem o papa Francisco, acusado de ser agente do bolivarismo.
Como voz institucional do Itamaraty, Ernesto Araújo costuma ser discreto ao revelar seu apetite conspiracionista, deixando suas elucubrações quixotescas para palestras longas ou ensaios em seu blog pessoal.
O chanceler reserva as tiradas mais agressivas a seus colegas, como os ministros Ricardo Salles, do Meio Ambiente, e Abraham Weintraub, da Educação, além do assessor Filipe Martins, bem como alguns deputados e influencers da tropa de choque bolsonarista.
Todos que bebem da fonte de Olavo de Carvalho são versados nas táticas de guerrilha informacional do ideólogo e estrategista da alt-right americana, Steve Bannon.
O principal método de ação da política externa populista é disparar fake news contra desafetos internacionais do governo, como no episódio do vazamento de óleo na costa nordestina, que seria parte de uma trama venezuelo-ambientalista.
A ideia, claro, é criar a sensação permanente de que há um complô global contra o presidente, acossado pelo sistema.
Por isso, os bolsonaristas sabotam qualquer movimento mais pragmático no campo político ou comercial, vindo do agronegócio, dos militares ou da equipe econômica. Normalizar com o “sistema” é sinal de fraqueza.
Essa lógica binária e belicosa, inspirada na obra do jurista nazista Carl Schmitt, é um dos pilares da chamada “metapolítica” da extrema direita, que atribui grande importância à guerra cultural, que antecede a disputa política, e opera tanto no campo das ações quanto das narrativas.
A pandemia de Covid-19 escancarou o lado populista da política externa brasileira.
Mimetizando Trump, a insistência na hidroxicloroquina como o remédio milagroso é a típica solução simples para um problema complexo, assim como o slogan, posteriormente negado pelo próprio governo, de que o Brasil não poderia parar.
O apelo direto às massas se manifesta tanto na retórica bolsonarista de “salvar empregos” quanto na deturpação sorrateira das diretrizes do G20 ou da Organização Mundial da Saúde para legitimar as posições aberrantes do presidente no combate à pandemia.

Por fim, a cantilena do nós contra eles agora busca demonizar a China como fabricante de um vírus para destruir o Ocidente. Nascida na ultradireita americana, a expressão “vírus chinês”, de contornos racistas, caiu nas graças do bolsonarismo e estimula delírios conspiratórios de funcionários do governo.
O próprio Ernesto, em texto publicado em seu blog, sugere que o coronavírus e o movimento “sanitariamente correto” que dele emana fazem parte de um plano totalitário para implementar o comunismo em escala global.
Não restam dúvidas de que esse empreendimento populista tem pés de barro. Ao equiparar presidente e Estado, submetendo os interesses estratégicos do país às veleidades e às idiossincrasias da família Bolsonaro e de seus assessores próximos, a política externa populista causa danos irreparáveis à imagem do país.
Não bastassem os males da negligência ambiental na Amazônia, a insistência do presidente em minimizar a pandemia já o tornou uma espécie de pária sanitário, que só se compara aos excêntricos governantes de Nicarágua, Belarus e Turcomenistão.
Ao hostilizar parceiros estratégicos, como chineses, franceses e argentinos, joga por terra os esforços de recuperação econômica pela via do comércio internacional e destrói qualquer possibilidade de liderança brasileira nos temas multilaterais.
Pior ainda: caso o resultado das eleições americanas não seja o que os conselheiros palacianos desejam, o Brasil será jogado no abismo da irrelevância mundial.
Se tivermos sorte, por pouco tempo.
Guilherme Casarões, 37, é cientista político e professor da FGV-EAESP. Foi pesquisador visitante da Universidade de Michigan

Xi Jinping Knows Who His Enemies Are - Book Review

Book Review
Xi Jinping Knows Who His Enemies Are
A new book lays out the Chinese leader’s stark worldview.
Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping, François Bougon, 
Trans. Vanessa Lee, Hurst, 232 pp., $19.95, September 2018
Foreign Policy, NOVEMBER 21, 2019, 3:21 PM

Chinese President Xi Jinping arrives for a bilateral meeting with Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro (out of frame) ahead of the 11th edition of the BRICS Summit in Brasília on Nov. 13. SERGIO LIMA/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

Xi Jinping is a Chinese renaissance man. Self-assured, self-possessed, and utterly unflappable, Xi is equally at home on the hearths of struggling farmers and in the greeting halls of foreign capitals. State media likes to juxtapose the years he spent in the caves of Shaanxi with the days he spent governing Shanghai’s glittering towers. Here is a man as men should be: a leader who can grasp both the plow and the bond market! So things go with Xi Jinping.
Though Xi studied chemical engineering, he presents himself as a littérateur. In Russia, he peppers his speeches with Dostoevsky and Gogol; when in France, Molière and Maupassant. To better grasp the meaning of The Old Man and the Sea, Xi traveled to Ernest Hemingway’s favorite bar in Havana. Xi has a hankering for historical sites like these, especially those associated with famous scenes from the stories of Chinese antiquity. He cultivates a reputation for taking history seriously; his speeches are filled with allusions to obscure sages and statesmen from China’s past.
But Xi is also eager to present himself as a man of the future. He revels in touring laboratories and centers of scientific innovation. He dabbles in complexity science and has tried to integrate its findings into Chinese Communist Party policies. There is a certain flexibility to China’s leader: To financiers, he adopts the argot of debts and derivatives. To Davos revelers, he drifts easily into the trendy buzzwords of the global business class. To soldiers, he speaks in military idiom (on many occasions happily attired in army greens), and to party members, the jargon of Marxist theory. For the common people of China, he consciously models an ideal of patriotic service and loving family life.
But what of the person behind the persona? Unearthing that man is the goal of François Bougon’s book Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping, translated from the original French into English in 2018. A journalist and editor who covered China throughout the Hu Jintao and Xi eras, Bougon aims to untangle the web of literary, historical, and biographical influences that have shaped Xi’s ideology. Bougon’s conclusions may surprise: His Xi is not far removed from the propaganda caricature. Though he undoubtedly has a cohort of speech writers ready to supply him with learned literary allusions, Xi’s public image is grounded in fact. Xi is comfortable in the presence of both the princelings and the poor. Xi genuinely treasures literature. He has a sincere love for China’s historical heritage.
That is all real. But it is a reality used for larger purpose.
That is all real. But it is a reality used for larger purpose.
 Xi’s constant allusions to traditional Chinese thought, for example, are not mere flashy displays of personal erudition. Behind “this wide-ranging borrowing,” Bougon observes, is “a sign that [Xi] finds the Marxist-Leninist base solid enough to graft onto it the long history of ‘wonderful Chinese civilisation.’” Xi’s allusions signal to party members that one can be a proud Marxist and proud of China’s traditional culture at the same time. So-called “Xi Jinping Thought” promises to weave the strands of China’s history and heritage into one grand whole.
Xi generally divides this history into four historical acts. The first is China’s imperial and pre-imperial past, the so-called “5,000 years of history” that culminate in the splendor of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) at its height. This, in Chinese terms, is their country’s “ancient history.”
The remaining years are divided into three parts: “the century of humiliation,” in which China was ravished by imperial powers; “the New China era,” Xi’s favored term for China under Mao Zedong; and “the era of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” which began under the guiding hand of Deng Xiaoping and continues on to the present. Xi quite consciously draws inspiration from each of these eras when framing his policies. Most references to China’s pre-modern past are superficial, more important for their aesthetic effect than ideological power. Far more serious is Xi’s quest to reclaim the legacy of New China. Harmonizing the institutions of 21st-century China with the party’s Maoist ideological heritage is central to Xi’s political project. Bougon argues that it is the defining feature of Xi’s inner sense of purpose.
Xi’s driving need to rehabilitate Mao is partly born out of practical necessity. For Xi, venerating the old helmsman is the difference between death and survival. “If at the time of reform Comrade Mao had been completely repudiated, would our party still be standing? Would our country’s system of socialism still be standing?” he asked the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee several days after being elevated to the position of general secretary. Answering his own question, he quoted the words of Deng: “These things cannot be cut away from the entire history of our party and our country. To grasp this is to grasp everything. This is not just an intellectual issue—it is a political issue.”
But this political calculation is only half of the story. Added to it is a sincere emotional attachment to Mao and his era. This nostalgia for Maoism at first seems an incredible delusion. Why does Xi yearn for an era that saw his father, a prominent Communist Party leader, maligned, mother tortured, sister killed, and himself banished? Xi’s own answer to that question: Yanan. Xi’s associates New China not with the terrors his family experienced in Beijing but with the seven years he spent as a “sent-down youth” farming with the same peasants his father had governed 20 years earlier as a young revolutionary. More than a decade before Xi was elevated to dictatorship, he described his time farming the yellow loess of Yanan as “seven years of rural life [that] gave me something mysterious and sacred.”
Xi came to Yanan as a bitter teenager unafraid to flout party rules. (He ran away once during his first year there and spent some time doing forced labor because of it.) He would leave Yanan a man so deeply committed to life in party service that he would apply for party membership 10 times.
Bougon traces how these experiences with the peasants of Yanan formed the bedrock of later political positions: a withering distaste for conspicuous consumption, the belief that corruption among party cadres brings disaster, a idolization for the revolutionary heroes of his father’s generation, and the deep conviction that the party must present the Chinese people with larger ideals worth sacrificing for. “Even now,” Xi said in 2004, “many of the fundamental ideas and basic features that I have formed were formed in Yanan.” Two years earlier, he voiced a similar message: “Wherever I go, I will always be a son of that yellow earth.”
Xi is deeply troubled that the same spirit of self-denial and sacrifice that was instilled in him at Yanan is missing from later generation of party members. (His own belief in his sacrifice has not prevented his family from accumulatingimmense wealth, both inside China and off-shore in foreign accounts; as with other leaders, Xi has particularly targeted any institution that reports on this.) This is one of the reasons Xi resurrected what Bougon labels the “national imaginary” of Communist China.
Xi delights in the legendary heroes whom Maoist propagandists manufactured in Xi’s childhood: the selfless youth Lei Feng, the incorruptible cadres Jiao Yulu and Gu Wenchang, the martyred soldiers of Mount Langya, and so forth. He invokes their names and examples in speech after speech. The box office failure of three films about Lei Feng in 2013 seems to have been one of the spurs for a renewed insistence on patriotic movies. That their deeds are exaggerations or fabrications does not concern him much. Absent a personal history of sacrifice for the sake of revolutionary ideals, a spirit of consecration must be cultivated through myth. Xi believes he is the personnel caretaker of the national mythos that Chinese society needs to survive and thrive in an era of intense international competition.
This self-conception helps explain Xi’s other great obsession: defeating the so-called hostile forces inside and outside of China that would weaken the people’s faith in the political and ideological system that Xi helms. The view that China is locked in an ideological struggle for survival predates the Xi era—Bougon traces it to the later years of Hu’s administration, but scholars like John Garver and Matthew Johnson have traced the origin of these ideas all the way back to the late 1980s—but it is essential to understanding Xi’s policies. Bougon highlights a speech given in 2009 as especially important statement of Xi’s beliefs: “There are certain well-fed foreigners who have nothing better to do than point the finger. Yet, firstly, China is not the one exporting revolution.”
In numerous speeches, Xi has identified the Soviet Union as the most prominent victim of revolutionary export. The United States and allied hostile forces, he maintains, successfully destroyed the Soviet Communist Party through a strategy of cultural subversion. Xi is determined not to let the same fate befall the Chinese Communist Party. In Bougon’s words, Xi has becomes a “culture warrior.” This culture war is more deserving of that title than the political debates that are given that name in Western countries. It has led to the jailing of historians; crackdowns on internet personalities, human rights activists, feminists, and labor organizers; censorship in literary journals, newspapers, and Chinese social media; an all-out assault on Chinese Christianity; and the labyrinth of detention centers in Xinjiang. It is also, though Bougon does not mention them, the impulse behind the coercion and surveillance of activists, students, dissidents, former officials, and Chinese-language media outlets outside of China’s borders. Culture and ideology spill across borders. To fight his culture war, so must the iron hand of the Communist state.
Bougon conveys all of this with a wry touch. Most readers will find Bougon’s portrait of Xi and his era disturbing and dispiriting. It naturally leads to fundamental questions about the aim of U.S. policy toward China. How should the United States, Europe, and the democracies of the Pacific Rim deal with a regime whose leaders believe that Western ideals and culture pose an existential threat to their rule—even their lives? What enduring compromise is possible with a leader who treats cultural change the way most leaders treat insurrection or terrorism? How do we accommodate a superpower directed by men like Xi? Bougon does not provide answers to these questions. One can only hope that his sharply drawn picture of Xi inspires us to.
Tanner Greer is a writer and strategist based in Taiwan. Twitter: @Scholars_Stage
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Beijing is famous for putting engineers and scientists in charge. But that doesn’t make for better leaders.
China's president radically changed his country, and the Communist Party, through skill, determination — and a series of lucky breaks.


A revolução econômica das pandemias - Ishita Gupta


Parece que a Peste Negra, no século XIV, acelerou o desaparecimento do feudalismo e o aparecimento do capitalismo, segundo esta scholar indiana. De fato, o desaparecimento de um quarto, talvez um terço da população em vastas regiões, aumentou o nível dos salários e os índices de produtividade do trabalho humano. Se isso é verdade, a atual "Peste Invisível" vai acelerar o quê? O desaparecimento do capitalismo e a emergência do socialismo "pikettyano"? Não acredito: acho que a globalização microeconômica – aquela conduzida pelos indivíduos, com menor intervenção dos Estados – vai se reforçar, ao contrário do que dizem os atuais keynesianos "retardados" (quero dizer, retardatários).

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Is There a Revolution on the Brink of This Pandemic?


https://thegeopolitics.com/is-there-a-revolution-on-the-brink-of-this-pandemic/
The Bubonic Plague of the 1340s that wiped off a third of humanity quite possibly did away with feudalism and could be partially credited with triggering the rise of capitalism. Since it cut off the population significantly, it left ample bargaining power in the hands of the survivors, affording them the liberty to negotiate wages. In England as a last effort to protect the withering upper-class institutions, a law for ceiling the upper limit for wages was set, however, strong peasant revolt led to the tumbling of the feudal system altogether. A minor recession was followed by surging economic growth in Europe. An increase in wages led to an increase in spending capacity and higher consumption rates. More and more people were drawn to the market economy, as the trade networks became widespread.
Almost 700 years later, capitalism is not as liberating as it once proved to be. Another economic revolution might be on the brink of this ongoing pandemic. A socialist one perhaps.
Ever since countries started falling down the chutes into the hollows of a pandemic; economists, researchers, and scientists have been plagued with questions of how this could have been avoided; who should be held responsible; and how far are we yet to fall?
The answer to all of them is a resounding accusation pointing directly at us. In a global bid at profit maximization, squeezing out the maximum interest and securing the largest surplus, human welfare has been left far behind.
The virus that has us all in havoc belongs to a family of coronavirus, (including SARS and MERS) that we have been familiar too. However, there was never any inclination to research and develop a vaccine for it by pharmaceutical companies since it did not invite profit. Hence here we are, without a cure for an illness that could have very well been avoided. Even now, pharmaceuticals have coronavirus therapies under development, but the prospect of grabbing the market with their own COVID-19 therapy keeps them from pooling their collective resources for a more advanced and quick solution. This situation definitely busts the myth around the farce that capitalism fuels innovation.
The only reason that Italy is still standing is because of its universal single-payer health care system, which ensures that no matter the job or income level, they are entitled to the best treatment possible. While on the other hand, countries with rigorously privatized healthcare systems, with the motto that ‘you need to earn the right to healthcare with work and income’ are understaffed, lacking in resources and are faltering on the face of a pandemic.
What happens to the overpopulated developing world that is not only understaffed, lacks resources and has irregularly distributed healthcare but is also home to a capitalistic set-up that profits from such scarcity? Would it survive a pandemic of this magnitude?
Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics says “2020 is a real inflection point.” One would have to live under an unusually large rock to not realize the impending recession that we are walking into. Last year, Bloomberg Economics created a model to determine the odds of America entering into a recession. The chances now stand at 100 percent.
In other words, what we are looking at is an extraordinary number of layoffs, a situation of excruciating unemployment, mass hysteria and among other things a severe political crisis as governments scramble to rebuild what was lost.
As India witnesses an overwhelming migration of laborers, the largest in recent history, a precursor of the fate that so many hopeless, clueless men and women are walking towards, the privilege of the ones who can afford to ‘stay at home’ becomes blatantly evident. What is the utility of coming out of a pandemic if you slide back down into poverty?
Countries with viable social safety nets may soften the blow of the harsh recession. Norway, for instance, is giving all workers affected by the slowdown a generous paid leave. The United Kingdom and Denmark are putting forward expansive relief packages, covering workers out of work.
In countries where such systems don’t exist, this is a one time opportunity to develop them. A great challenge awaits us at the end of this tunnel. Seven hundred years ago, the end of a pandemic resulted in a revolution, sweeping aside one economic order to make way for another. Will the survivors of this pandemic pool their collective discontentment to stand up to an order that has repeatedly overlooked them?
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.

Academia.edu: postagens mais acessadas no mês transcorrido

A crer nas estatísticas do Analytics da plataforma Academia.edu, o acesso às minhas postagens tem crescido mês a mês. Desse jeito, vou precisar pedir para eles colocarem um "taxímetro", para ver se eu compro novas estantes para os livros que se espalham pelas cadeiras e pelo chão...

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