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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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quinta-feira, 13 de junho de 2019

Os judeus e o dinheiro: mitos, historia e preconceitos - Museu judeu de Londres

A Terribly Durable Myth

Jews, Money, Myth

an exhibition at the Jewish Museum, London, March 19–July 7, 2019

Exchequer receipt roll showing the oldest known anti-Jewish caricature, 1233
National Archives, LondonDetail of an Exchequer receipt roll showing the oldest known anti-Jewish caricature, 1233
In 2006 much of French society was divided over a strange and painful question: Is it anti-Semitic to assume that a Jew is rich? The debate was sparked by the kidnapping, torture, and murder of a twenty-three-year-old Jewish cell phone salesman from Paris named Ilan Halimi. The details of the torture, which extended over a three-week period as the kidnappers made various demands for ransom, were horrific enough. But when their ringleader, who was quickly apprehended, publicly stated that they had targeted Halimi, who was of modest background and means, because Jews were “loaded with dough,” a brutal crime morphed into a political crisis.
Prosecutors wavered over whether to invoke France’s hate crime statute. Defense lawyers claimed that money, not anti-Semitism, was the suspects’ motive, and the police and much of the public seemed to agree. The Halimi family, however, insisted that Ilan would not have died if he had not been Jewish, and tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets to support them. Politicians, historians, and philosophers offered dueling definitions of anti-Semitism; an eminent sociologist suggested that one must distinguish between beliefs about Jewish wealth, even if based on discredited stereotypes, and “Jew-hatred.”1
The exhibition “Jews, Money, Myth” at the Jewish Museum in London makes such a distinction hard to maintain. It examines its theme through a wide range of documents, artworks, portraits, posters, and souvenirs. The very first item on view is a copy of The Oxford English Dictionary from 1933, whose entry for “Jew” includes the definition: “1. Jew: trans. and offensive. As a name of opprobrium: spec. applied to a grasping or extortionate person.” Object after object testifies to the persistence and the toxicity of the association of Jews and money, from a 1790s print entitled “I’ve got de Monish,” which mocks the pretensions, profile, and accent of a gentleman Jewish banker, to the Mafia IIvideo game, whose characters are harassed by a Jewish loan shark. By the end of this short but shattering survey, it becomes painfully clear that economic assumptions and personal and societal animosity are inextricably intertwined.2
“Jews, Money, Myth” seeks both to document and to refute the stereotype of the moneyed Jew. The subject is distressingly timely. Propelled by rising nationalism on the right and antiglobalism on the left, in the past two years anti-Semitism has come back into the headlines. Politicians and activists on all sides now implicitly endorse or even repeat accusations of Jewish greed and financial power. The Labour Party in the United Kingdom has instituted a complaints procedure to deal with allegations of anti-Semitism in its leadership and ranks, which has resulted in the expulsion of a dozen members. In 2017, hate crimes against Jews in the US rose by 37 percent from the previous year (accounting for almost two thirds of all religious-based hate crimes), and across Europe in 2018 almost one in three Jewish people experienced anti-Semitic harassment.
Although these developments are presumably the impetus for mounting this exhibition, the first substantial section in “Jews, Money, Myth” takes a positive tone. The Oxford English Dictionary is immediately followed by a wall panel emphasizing the centrality of economic ethics in Judaism and a selection of objects illustrating Jews’ commitment to tzedakah, or assistance to the poor (literally “righteousness”). A letter written in Hebrew on papyrus in eleventh-century Egypt on behalf of a poor blind man asks his congregation for financial aid to help his family journey from Alexandria to join him in Fustat (Cairo); a seventeenth-century Dutch painting commissioned by a wealthy Jewish merchant exalts anonymous giving by depicting a disembodied hand offering a coin to another outstretched hand (see illustration on below).
The misconceptions concerning Jewish rapaciousness are perhaps widespread enough to justify opening with this theme. But a pitfall of doing so is that it echoes the anti-Semitic suggestion that Jews have a particular preoccupation with money, albeit one driven by philanthropy rather than avarice.
The show then takes a second approach to refuting the myth of the moneyed Jew: it examines Jews’ economic status in various periods, primarily in British history. A panel introducing a section on Jews in seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-century Britain notes that far more Jews were poor peddlers and beggars than affluent, influential bankers. An early-twentieth-century soup kitchen tally board vividly conjures the struggles of destitute Eastern European immigrants in London’s East End.
The focus on Jews in Britain, though, somewhat undermines the force of the argument, since British Jewish communities, unlike those in many other places, were in fact almost exclusively urban, and were fairly narrowly occupied in finance, shopkeeping, and trade. This was for specific historical reasons: Jews arrived in England only after the Norman Conquest, when merchants and minters were invited from the Continent by the new rulers and settled in royal towns in order to promote commerce and provide economic expertise.3 Though these medieval communities were expelled from the kingdom in 1290, the basic pattern was repeated after Jews were readmitted to Britain in the seventeenth century. Elsewhere in Europe and the Mediterranean, medieval, early modern, and modern Jews lived more varied economic lives, engaging in agriculture, manual labor, and a wide range of crafts.
The power of the exhibition lies not in such well-intentioned correctives but in its relentless documentation of the reach and virulence of the stereotype of the money-grubbing Jew. Sections on stock characters of anti-Jewish propaganda and political satire from across the centuries, such as Judas and the figure of the Jewish moneylender, expose the malignity and menace of the myth. In the thirteenth century, Christian artists modified existing symbols of sin to develop a visual convention for embodying Jews’ supposed bestial and devilish greed that far outlived its original inspiration.4 The same hooked nose, thick lips, and dark scowl appear in a doodle of a Jewish businessman on an English court document from 1277, in an 1825 English print suggesting that Jews caused and profited from a financial crash, on a 1944 Italian poster that blames the bloodshed of World War II on Jewish bankers, and on a 2012 mural painted on the wall of a London building criticizing “class and privilege.” (This mural, which has since been painted over, became a cause célèbre in 2018 when it was found that the leader of the Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, had posted his sympathy for the artist on Facebook after protests demanding its removal; Corbyn subsequently apologized for failing to notice its anti-Semitic tenor.)
As the curators’ selection of objects makes clear, the fleshy features in nineteenth-century English caricatures and the intimations of moral turpitude they convey were not reserved for the wealthy. They are shared by a destitute Jewish beggar in an 1824 cartoon lampooning the charitable activities of Nathan Meyer Rothschild and by a shabbily dressed dealer in secondhand clothes mocked on the cover of The London Saturday Journal in 1841. Contradiction was inherent in the stereotype: Jews were despised for being both rich and poor, capitalist and communist, and they have been portrayed as gross-featured and blatantly different, yet distrusted for supposedly being adept at assimilation and disguise.
What “Jews, Money, Myth” does not, perhaps cannot, do (given the limitations of a small museum exhibition) is explain the origins of the stereotype of the money-grubbing Jew or the intensity of the hatred it has inspired. A display headed “Medieval Commerce,” which includes medieval Jewish loan and lease documents, and another called “The Figure of the Jewish Moneylender,” which explores negative representations of Shylock, suggest that Jewish financial activities are at the root of anti-Jewish hostility. Because “the Catholic Church regarded [usury] as sinful,” we are told in a wall panel, Jews were pushed into occupations forbidden to Christians, such as moneylending, and then excoriated for it.
It is true that economic resentments did often provoke and exacerbate Jew-hatred, but the stereotype considerably predates the development of such resentments. Jews were labeled materialistic and corrupt centuries before the Catholic Church began to worry about usury, or even about the sin of avarice. Moreover, throughout the Middle Ages many more Christians than Jews engaged in lending at interest—a fact that was well known and openly acknowledged by Church authorities, who in the decades around 1200 outlawed moneylending for Christians, and thereafter regularly castigated Christians’ attempts to disguise now-illicit financial transactions.
The figure of the Jewish moneylender is the product, not the source, of the myth of the worldly, greedy Jew. The seeds of that myth were planted in the earliest surviving Christian texts, the letters of Saint Paul. Paul of Tarsus was a Hellenized Jew from Asia Minor who, in the decades following Jesus’s death, appointed himself “apostle to the gentiles.” Paul believed that anyone who insisted on continuing to observe the “letter” of Judaic law, or who refused to recognize Christ’s true, salvific nature, was mired in the flesh and the material world. A series of oppositions emerges in Paul’s attempts to reconcile ancient Hebrew scripture with the new faith: literal versus allegorical, material versus spiritual. Jews (meaning not necessarily people born Jewish but anyone, gentiles included, who obeyed Jewish law) were aligned with the former, Christians with the latter. But Paul’s polemic against “Jewish” materialism was therefore about biblical interpretation and religious practice and had nothing to do with Jewish wealth or economic activities.
A second source for the myth of the materialistic Jew is the Gospels themselves, written slightly later than the letters of Paul. The central episode occurs when Jesus, recently arrived in Jerusalem for the Passover festival, drives merchants and moneychangers from the Temple forecourt, saying, according to Matthew, “It is written, ‘My house shall be called a house of prayer; but you are making it a den of robbers.’”
Painting by Benjamin Senior Godines depicting an act of ­anonymous giving, 1679–1681
Jewish Museum, LondonDetail of a painting by Benjamin Senior Godines, commissioned by a Jewish ­merchant, that depicts an act of ­anonymous giving, 1679–1681
This scene is frequently cited as a source of anti-Jewish economic animus, and medieval and early modern illustrations of the episode often employ anti-Jewish motifs, as in a sixteenth- century stained glass panel from Germany in “Jews, Money, Myth” that shows a righteously angry Jesus threatening two men with a cudgel—one a merchant selling a lamb for sacrifice, the other a bearded, frowning moneychanger balancing a treasure chest on his head as he flees. But the dispute was, in fact, a religious rather than economic one—Jesus was not objecting to business per se or articulating any kind of commercial morality. He was, rather, incensed by the presence of commerce near the sanctuary. It is for this reason that in the Gospel of Mark, Jesus’s actions are opposed by “the chief priests and the scribes,” guardians of ritual, not financial authorities—the currency exchange and selling of animals allowed pilgrims to offer Temple sacrifices.
Neither the letters of Paul nor the Gospels were intentionally anti-Semitic. Jesus, Matthew, and Paul were all Jews, addressing audiences who were either Jewish themselves or sympathetic to Judaism. But texts outlive the people who write them, memory of their initial purpose fades, and words take on new meaning and power. Paul’s division of humankind into “spiritual” believers and “carnal”—that is, Jewish—unbelievers and Jesus’s tarring of trade around the Temple proved to be immensely influential. When Saint Jerome wanted to contrast Christian faith with Jewish error, he repeated Paul’s condemnation of Jewish materialism and insisted that the idols in Isaiah 2:8 signified Jewish (though also Roman) avarice. When Augustine of Hippo wanted to attack Jews’ rejection of the New Testament, he wrote, “Jews do not grasp [its] meaning and as a result they prove themselves indisputably carnal.”
Although Jews were firmly established in Christian polemic as avaricious and carnal unbelievers, anti-Jewish polemics had little to say about the Jews’ economic activities until around the eleventh century. A commercial and urban revolution was then altering the landscape of Christendom, and the traditional tripartite division of society into nobles, clerics, and peasants was supplemented by a nascent fourth estate: a prosperous urban bourgeoisie. Church authorities finally felt the need to articulate a Christian economic morality. They naturally turned to Scripture. There they found not just Old Testament injunctions against lending at interest—though church leaders did not at first adopt them, preferring instead to regulate interest rates—but also Paul’s denigration of “Jewish” materialism and Jesus’s (apparent) condemnation of commerce.
A conflation of these various Jewish trespasses (overly literal biblical interpretation, unspiritual ritualism, and crass mercantilism) infuses the most celebrated artwork in the exhibition: Rembrandt’s Judas Returning the Thirty Pieces of Silver (1629), which has rarely been displayed in public. Though the curators rightly note the hint of sympathy in the portrayal of a repentant Judas, Rembrandt betrays no equivalent understanding of the Jewish priests, shown as fat-bellied, hard-hearted servants of their massive book of the Law, arrogantly adorned in gold turban, silver crown, and fur cloak.
In order to shame churchmen and laypeople alike into being less focused on wealth and luxury, moralists mobilized all the rhetorical weapons at their disposal. The great Cistercian abbot Bernard of Clairvaux applied the old word “judaizer”—used by Paul for followers who practiced circumcision, and by John Chrysostom for congregants who celebrated the Sabbath on Saturday instead of Sunday—to Christians who lent money at interest. The twelfth-century abbot of the great monastery of Cluny, drawing on Chrysostom’s fiery oratory, called pawnshops “Synagogues of Satan.” Through such new applications of the age-old linkage of Jews to “filthy lucre,” a perception began to form that commerce and the money trade were characteristically Jewish endeavors. This wasn’t because Jews monopolized the money trade, but precisely because they did not. Although many Jews did indeed participate in the new economy, Jewish and Christian financial activities were not distinct, a fact of which Christian moralists were all too aware and that they were determined to change. And so the stereotype of the Jewish usurer first appears.
Preachers began to tell anecdotes about deceitful Jewish misers who consorted with the devil; artists began to visualize such tales in grotesque and frightening detail, endowing their Jewish villains with distinctively fleshy and bestial features. The aim was to intensify the negative connotations of “Jew” and thereby create a more negative attitude toward usury, so that it would be shunned by Christians, or so that Christians who practiced usury would be shunned by others. They achieved neither goal, but they did impel moneylending Christians to cloak their loans with various subterfuges, thereby reinforcing the stereotype by leaving Jews as among the only people openly charging interest.
Because “Jews, Money, Myth” focuses on Jews, it does not discuss Christian biblical interpretation or, for that matter, Christian economic activities. Yet this is the essential background for understanding the images and objects in the exhibition. The oldest Jewish caricature in the show appears on an English tax receipt roll dating to 1233 (see illustration above). The label correctly identifies the three Jews who are mocked in a kind of doodle drawn in ink at the top, and rightly notes its anti-Jewish import. But as I have argued elsewhere, Jewish usurers were probably not the sole, or even primary, targets of this cartoon.5They appear as proxies for the main object of the scribe’s bile: his new boss, a much-despised and famously rapacious royal favorite who used his control over Jewish moneylenders to fleece Jews and their Christian clients alike. Indeed, the favorite’s behavior generated such anger that the king ultimately dismissed him and deflected further criticism by turning viciously on the Jews.
Acknowledging the political message underlying the caricature does not lessen its anti-Judaism. Rather, it underscores the dangers inherent in anti-Semitic scapegoating. Royal courtiers, medieval Christian merchants, and nineteenth-century British bankers were all guilty of the vices imputed to Jews. To defend Jews from such slanders was to risk being lumped together with them. It was easier to scapegoat, expel, and continue to lend money.
The effects of the anti-Jewish rhetoric and imagery devised in the Middle Ages are all too vividly still with us. “Jews, Money, Myth” closes with a film by the artist Jeremy Deller in which he has spliced together recent cartoons, memes, speeches, interviews, and advertisements that spew hatreds and flaunt falsities that many people hoped were deeply buried, if not long dead. Some are the work of deranged conspiracy theorists, but others appear on successful media outlets (the Trinity Broadcasting Network) or feature respected pastors (Pat Robertson) and leading politicians (Donald Trump, Nigel Farage). Just as rage and anxiety about royal policy and economic change were deflected onto Jews in the Middle Ages, so now Jews are identified with the ill effects of globalization, inequality, and immigration. Just two months ago, a tree planted in Paris in memory of Ilan Halimi was hacked down by anonymous vandals.
  1. 1
    See “Inside France’s ‘Barbarians’ Trial,” BBC News, July 10, 2009: “But Michel Wieviorka, the author of a book on anti-Semitism in France, says the motive for the murder was money first. “Anti-Semitism added to what happened,” he told journalists at the start of the trial. “Initially it wasn’t about expressing hatred of Jews…. The target was a Jewish man because Jews are supposed to have money and are believed to look after their own, so they’ll pay up.” 
  2. 2
    There is also a companion volume, Jews, Money, Myth, edited by Joanne Rosenthal and Marc Volovici (Jewish Museum/Pears Institute/Birkbeck University, 2019), to which I contributed a short essay. 
  3. 3
    William probably encouraged Jews from his duchy of Normandy to settle in England because Jews, who had no separate power base, were more dependent on the king or duke for privileges and protections than most Christians. He therefore could tax Jews readily, whereas kings and dukes had difficulty taxing Christians.  
  4. 4
    I discuss these developments in my essay “Jewish Money and the Jewish Body in Medieval Iconography” in Jews, Money, Myth. See also my “The Invention of the Jewish Nose,” NYR Daily, November 14, 2014. 
  5. 5
    See my “The First Anti-Jewish Caricature?,” NYR Daily, June 6, 2016. 

Boris Johnson como primeiro ministro da GB? Non, merci - Editorial Le Monde

Poderia ser um pequeno Trump no comando de um dos países mais importantes da Europa, a sexta economia mundial. Le Monde se inquieta.
De vez em quando, grandes mediocridades chegam ao comando de certos países. Nenhum está imune a esses desastres, como sabemos muito bem...
Grato a Pedro Luiz Rodrigues, por esta transcrição.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida


Le Monde, Paris – 13.6.2016 - Editorial
Boris Johnson à la tête du Royaume-Uni ? Non merci !
Pour l’Union européenne, l’accession de M. Johnson au poste de premier ministre équivaudrait à l’installation à Londres d’un Trump au petit pied se consacrant à la saboter.

En juin 2016, au lendemain de la victoire de la campagne en faveur du Brexit qu’il avait conduite, Boris Johnson avait disparu, passant le week-end à jouer au cricket. Dépassé par un succès non anticipé, lâché par son compère Michael Gove, il avait renoncé à briguer Downing Street et à gérer la sortie de milité. Trois ans après, alors que le divorce avec l’UE tourne au cauchemar pour le Royaume-Uni, revoilà Boris Johnson en pole position pour succéder à Theresa May, dont il n’a cessé de savonner la planche.l
Une partie de la biographie de Boris Johnson ressemble à celle d’un leader nationaliste ordinaire, comme l’Europe mais aussi les Etats-Unis en produisent désormais en quantité. Correspondant du Telegraph à Bruxelles dans les années 1990, souvent à coup de bobards sur de prétendues décisions de l’UE, il a largement contribué à la transformation de l’europhobie en cause populaire au Royaume-Uni et en arme redoutable pour le Parti conservateur, jusque-là pro-européen. Qu’il prenne enfin aujourd’hui la responsabilité du Brexit pourrait découler d’une certaine logique. Mais Boris Johnson n’a rien à faire de la logique ni des convictions. Il a même théorisé son absence de principes en se vantant d’avoir préparé deux lettres ouvertes avant de se jeter dans la campagne de 2016, l’une pro-européenne, l’autre favorable au Brexit. Depuis lors, la liste de ses impostures, de ses bévues et de ses échecs n’a cessé de s’allonger. Mensonges sur le juteux rapatriement de « l’argent donné à l’Europe » sur son bus de campagne, promesse que le Royaume-Uni obtiendrait « le beurre et l’argent du beurre » dans la négociation sur le Brexit, comparaison de l’UE avec le IIIe Reich et de François Hollande avec un kapo. Nommé à la tête du Foreign Office par Mme May, qui voulait ainsi l’éloigner, il tente d’humilier les dirigeants européens et ridiculise son pays sous toutes les latitudes par son amateurisme, sa légèreté et sa méconnaissance des dossiers.

Rhétorique chauvine

C’est cet homme-là qui prétend aujourd’hui prendre la barre du paquebot Britannia en détresse. Rivalisant de populisme avec l’extrême droite de Nigel Farage, qui prospère sur la colère suscitée par l’impasse du Brexit, Boris Johnson jure qu’avec lui le pays sera sorti de l’UE d’ici au 31 octobre, même sans accord avec Bruxelles. La catastrophe économique consécutive à un « no deal » ne lui fait pas peur. Sa rhétorique chauvine promet aux Britanniques un avenir radieux et « mondial » une fois qu’ils seront délivrés du carcan européen.
Sa démagogie va jusqu’à menacer de ne pas acquitter les 39 milliards d’euros que le Royaume-Uni s’est engagé de verser aux Vingt-Sept dans le cadre du budget pluriannuel en cours. Une décision aux conséquences incalculables, puisqu’elle entacherait la crédibilité internationale d’un pays qui se veut le champion de la primauté du droit. Pour l’UE, l’accession de M. Johnson au pouvoir à Londres équivaudrait à l’installation d’un Trump au petit pied outre-Manche se consacrant à la saboter. Le Royaume-Uni ne se contenterait plus de cultiver son malaise européen, voire d’entraver le développement de l’UE. Il deviendrait une principauté hostile fondée sur la déréglementation sociale, fiscale et environnementale. « Boris » doit cesser d’être vu seulement comme un bouffon. Son entrée au 10, Downing Sreet serait une calamité pour son pays et pour l’Europe.



Hong Kong: a revolução dos guarda-chuvas - Paulo Roberto de Almeida, João Perassolo (FSP)

Qualquer que seja o resultado final da "revolução do guarda-chuva" em Hong Kong – e o autoritarismo semi-tirânico do novo imperador chinês parece ter condições de se impor, ainda que apenas recorrendo a métodos brutais, contra o espírito democrático e libertário da antiga colônia britânica, atualmente revertida ao domínio do despotismo oriental de Beijing –, o exemplo de resistência oferecida pelos seus habitantes haverá de impressionar de alguma maneira seus irmãos chineses do continente, que, a exemplo dos estudantes da Praça da Paz Celestial, em 1989, também passarão a oferecer crescente resistência aos atuais ditadores do gigante asiático. Não importa quanto tempo se exercerá essa luta, hoje desigual, entre a liberdade e a tirania, o espírito da liberdade acabará por triunfar na China como um todo, pois ele é inerente ao ser humano, qualquer que seja o tempo e o lugar. 
Minha homenagem aos bravos resistentes da "revolução do guarda-chuva" em Hong Kong: sua persistência e denodo deixarão sementes que irão frutificar também no continente. Vocês já passaram à História...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 13 de junho de 2019


Guarda-chuva se firma como símbolo da democracia em Hong Kong

Objeto usado em manifestações em 2014 volta a aparecer em protestos contra projeto de lei de extradição


João Perassolo
Folha de S. Paulo, 12/06/2019

As imagens de milhares de jovens, a maioria estudantes, segurando guarda-chuvas enquanto se aglutinam ao redor da sede do governo da região remetem ao histórico "Movimento dos Guarda-Chuvas", manifestação pró-democracia ocorrida 2014.
À época, mais de 100 mil pessoas ocuparam o distrito financeiro de Hong Kong em um movimento que pedia eleições livres. Eles reivindicavam a escolha do chefe executivo local nas eleições de 2017 por meio de votação direta, e não por uma eleição realizada a partir de uma lista com candidatos previamente aprovados por Pequim. 
A ocupação durou 79 dias e foi majoritariamente pacífica, mas se tornou violenta perto do fim, quando manifestantes e policiais entraram em confronto. Para se protegerem de bombas de gás lacrimogêneo e jatos de spray de pimenta disparados pelas forças de segurança, os manifestantes seguravam guarda-chuvas amarelos.

"Não falamos ao fim do Movimento dos Guarda-Chuvas que estaríamos de volta?", disse a legisladora pró-democracia Claudia Mo nesta quarta (12), nas ruas de Hong Kong. "Agora estamos de volta!", completou, ao passo em que manifestantes repetiam as suas palavras.
Não se sabe se a proposta de lei de extradição será ou não aprovada pelo Parlamento local, que adiou a discussão do projeto para uma data indefinida em razão dos protestos. 
Mas o histórico não parece favorável, já que os guarda-chuvas de 2014, além de não protegerem efetivamente contra os efeitos dos gases, não foram bem-sucedidos no campo político. Pequim não atendeu à demanda pelo voto direto, cem manifestantes foram processados nos meses seguintes e nove líderes do movimento foram considerados culpados em um veredito de abril deste ano.
A eles foi imputado o crime de conspirarem para causar "incômodo à ordem pública". A sentença se baseou em uma lei de quando Hong Kong ainda era colônia britânica, há mais de 20 anos. A pena será de 16 meses de prisão.
O território localizado na costa sul da China voltou ao comando central chinês em 1997, em um acordo feito com a ex-primeira ministra britânica Margaret Thatcher que deveria garantir eleições livres e democracia para a região. 
Hoje, é um território semiautônomo da China, no regime que ficou conhecido como "um país, dois sistemas", e há a preocupação crescente de que esteja perdendo autonomia e sucumbindo pouco a pouco ao regime ditatorial do partido único chinês. 
Além dos guarda-chuvas, os manifestantes têm tentado "apagar" as bombas jogadas pela polícia de Hong Kong com água. Mas esta tática não é muito efetiva, de acordo com Fabio Rodrigues, professor do Departamento de Química da USP.

Segundo ele, o gás se espalha e ocupa todo o ambiente. Derramar água sobre o frasco que o contém ajuda a dissolvê-lo um pouco, o que diminui os efeitos marginalmente, uma vez que esses compostos gasosos são pouco solúveis em água. 

Of the countless protests and riots I've covered over the years, I've never once seen this tactic used. Tear gas grenades extinguished almost immediately with water. Hong Kong protesters seem incredibly well organised.

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A lógica da contenção de danos vale ainda para as máscaras de enfermagem que os manifestantes também utilizam. Rodrigues explica que elas não são efetivas no combate a gases tóxicos, mas ajudam a retardar o contato da substância com o aparelho respiratório.
Eficazes, mesmo, só máscaras como as usadas em guerra, que tem filtros de carvão ativado, responsável por prender as partículas tóxicas e deixar passar o ar puro. A julgar pelas fotos do protesto, são como as que a polícia de Hong Kong usa.
Diante deste cenário de equipamentos de proteção improvisados, fica claro que os guarda-chuvas têm pouco valor como escudo —mas não deixam de ser um símbolo na luta pela democracia.

quarta-feira, 12 de junho de 2019

Upheaval: novo livro de Jared Diamond (não creio que resolva a decadência brasileira)

Já li o "sample" oferecido pela Amazon, e não me parece que o Brasil chegou a tal ponto de deterioração para ser instruído por meio de um manual de "salvamento" da decadência.
Mas, aproveito para recomendar este livro do autor: Guns, Germs and Steel.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Upheaval: Turning Points for Nations in Crisis Kindle Edition



A "riveting and illuminating" (Yuval Noah Harari) new theory of how and why some nations recover from trauma and others don't, by the Pulitzer-Prize-winning author of the landmark bestsellers Guns, Germs, and Steel and Collapse.

In his international bestsellers Guns, Germs and Steel and Collapse, Jared Diamond transformed our understanding of what makes civilizations rise and fall. Now, in his third book in this monumental trilogy, he reveals how successful nations recover from crises while adopting selective changes -- a coping mechanism more commonly associated with individuals recovering from personal crises.

Diamond compares how six countries have survived recent upheavals -- ranging from the forced opening of Japan by U.S. Commodore Perry's fleet, to the Soviet Union's attack on Finland, to a murderous coup or countercoup in Chile and Indonesia, to the transformations of Germany and Austria after World War Two. Because Diamond has lived and spoken the language in five of these six countries, he can present gut-wrenching histories experienced firsthand. These nations coped, to varying degrees, through mechanisms such as acknowledgment of responsibility, painfully honest self-appraisal, and learning from models of other nations. Looking to the future, Diamond examines whether the United States, Japan, and the whole world are successfully coping with the grave crises they currently face. Can we learn from lessons of the past? 
Adding a psychological dimension to the in-depth history, geography, biology, and anthropology that mark all of Diamond's books, Upheaval reveals factors influencing how both whole nations and individual people can respond to big challenges. The result is a book epic in scope, but also his most personal book yet.

Dia dos namorados: eu e Carmen Lícia namoramos desde o século passado, desde o milênio anterior


Assim que ingressei na carreira diplomática, no exato primeiro dia, meu destino já estava traçado: encontrei alguém que lê ainda mais do que eu, muito mais. Aqui está ela, mais isso foi um bocado antes de nos encontrarmos, e antes de eu ter o acordo do Dr. José Truda Palazzo para o casamento.

Além de tudo, é muito mais inteligente do que eu, mais perspicaz, mais sensata, antecipa os desenvolvimentos, quer em economia, quer em política. Aqui abaixo em Bretton Woods, NH.

Sabe julgar as pessoas, pois além de tudo é uma fina psicóloga, e me avisa em quem confiar e de quem desconfiar. Invariavelmente está certa.


Sempre foi uma excelente guia de viagens, organizando tudo, e incansável acompanhante de longas jornadas em carro. Aqui em Veneza, numa de nossas muitas visitas à cidade
.

Não preciso dizer que criou nossos dois filhos maravilhosamente bem, em todas as latitudes e longitudes, nas melhores e menos melhores condições de temperatura, pressão e lugar.


Agora sabe cuidar, e educar muito bem nossos netos, cercados de carinho e de sua atenção.

O que mais poderia eu desejar neste dia dos namorados?

Um bom jantar, obviamente, o que vai ocorrer logo mais...





Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 12 de junho de 2019