Como se constrói reconhecimento internacional? Uma metodologia - Marina G. Duque

Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach

Marina G Duque

International Studies Quarterly, sqx001, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy001

Published:

05 April 2018

https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy001

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Abstract

How do states achieve status? Although we rely on status to explain important phenomena in international politics—such as wars and the foreign policy of emerging powers—we still do not understand what status is or where it comes from. Previous research treats status as a function of state attributes, such as wealth and military capability. Following Weber, I argue that status depends on social recognition: it concerns identification processes in which an actor gains admission into a club once they follow the rules of membership. Therefore, systematic social processes, which cannot be reduced to state attributes, influence status. In particular, status is self-reinforcing. Moreover, social closure influences status—which implies that (1) a state's existing relations influence its ability to achieve status and (2) states recognize similar states rather than states with the most impressive portfolio of certain attributes. To investigate the determinants of international status, I move beyond ranking states based on attributes to examine quantitatively how status emerges from state relations. Leveraging inferential network analysis, I examine state practices that express recognition—specifically, the network of embassies. The analysis indicates that self-reinforcing dynamics and social closure, rather than state attributes directly, drive status recognition.

http://marinagduque.com

I am a Postdoctoral Research Associate at Princeton University’s Department of Politics and the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance. Starting in 2018, I will be an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Florida State University.

Before coming to Princeton, I was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow with the International Security Program at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Managing Editor of Security Studies. I earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from The Ohio State University(2016) and an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Brasília (2008). I previously worked in Brazil as a career diplomat in the Ministry of External Relations and an assistant at the Ministry of Defense.

My research explores status in international politics. Working as a diplomat in Brazil during President Lula’s administration, I experienced firsthand the search for status. At the time, Brazilian foreign policy was explicitly concerned about status: like other emerging powers, Brazil wanted to be recognized by the great powers as an equal. Moreover, a growing scholarly consensus indicated that status lay at the root of important phenomena such as hegemonic wars. Yet, scholars and practitioners still do not understand what status is or where it comes from. My research engages these crucial debates by investigating the determinants of international status and its implications for the rise of emerging powers.

Juizes aloprados do STF: preparem-se para o pior - Jose Neumane

Grato a meu amigo e colega Orlando Tambosi.

Atitudes do Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário traem e desmoralizam o Estado de Direito, escreve o jornalista José Nêumanne no Estadão:

A incrível e absurda malandragem perpetrada por três representantes do povo de um partido que diz servir aos trabalhadores e respeitar a democracia, com a cumplicidade de um desembargador federal, no primeiro domingo da Copa da Rússia sem o Brasil, expôs a explícita desmoralização do nosso Estado de Direito. Finda a semana em que os flagrantes delitos no registro espúrio de sindicatos no Ministério do Trabalho afundaram o Poder Executivo no pântano do descrédito, a manobra escusa tentada para retirar Lula da cela pela porta dos fundos foi a gota d’água que inundou as enlameadas cavernas do Judiciário.

Às vésperas de agosto, mês tido como “do desgosto”, o cidadão brasileiro já tinha sido exposto a sórdidos truques de parlamentares, legitimados para legislar em nome do povo. O projeto do deputado Nelson Marquezelli (PTB-SP) perdoando as dívidas das multas de caminhoneiros e transportadoras que provocaram pane seca e desabastecimento de combustíveis e víveres foi incluído no relatório de Osmar Terra (MDB-PR) que torna o frete mínimo obrigatório. Essa iniciativa do Legislativo, com as bênçãos do Executivo, que distribui verbas do depauperado erário a mancheias entre deputados das bancadas governistas, reproduz hoje a mesma relação sórdida já antes condenada pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF). O arrombamento da ordem constitucional, que consagra o mercado livre, para resolver uma crise criada pela ousadia dos chantagistas, que expuseram a fragilidade de um governo impopular e desacreditado, não passa de uma versão contemporânea do mensalão, que abriu a temporada de caça aos gatunos.

Durante curto interregno, a cúpula do Judiciário apoiou o combate à corrupção, efetuado por uma geração competente e proba de policiais, procuradores, juízes e desembargadores federais das instâncias iniciais. Isso deu à população espoliada a sensação de que a Justiça sanearia os altos e podres Poderes da República. Mas tal aliança durou muito pouco.

Logo as brechas, pelas quais criminosos de colarinho-branco passavam para ficar fora do alcance da lei, se abriram nas divisões internas da cúpula da atividade judiciária, em que boas iniciativas sempre sucumbiram ao corporativismo e à corrupção. Essas câmaras escuras são percorridas mercê da negação do decantado espírito da colegialidade, do qual somente uma ministra da “Suprema Corte”, Rosa Weber, parece ser adepta. Ao contrário dela, os outros quatro que deram votos vencidos na decisão pela jurisprudência que autoriza prisão de condenados em segunda instância – a dupla Mello e de Mello, Lewandowski e Toffoli – aliaram-se ao pagão novo Gilmar. E a desafiam em capciosas decisões monocráticas.

A tabelinha Lava Jato-STF não resistiu à nada gloriosa entrada dos tucanos nas listas dos delatados da operação. Isso causou a guinada de 180 graus de Gilmar, dos que apoiaram a jurisprudência firmada em três votações de 2016 para os adeptos da distorção de preceitos constitucionais. Essa prática é antiga. Tendo confessado que redigiu artigos da Constituição que não foram aprovados pela maioria do plenário, Nelson Jobim ora é tido por alguns como presidenciável da conciliação em outubro. E o então presidente do STF Ricardo Lewandowski rasurou cinicamente o artigo da Constituição que proíbe condenados em impeachment de exercer cargo público por oito anos. A canetada, sugerida por Renan Calheiros, permite hoje que Dilma se candidate ao Senado pelo PT.

Quem não redigiu nem rasurou a Carta Magna apela para a leitura errada do artigo 5.º, segundo o qual ninguém é “considerado culpado antes do trânsito em julgado” de seu processo. A extensão da isenção da culpa à proibição da prisão ou à presunção de inocência, finda na segunda instância, não está no dicionário, mas pode ser incluída, mercê do “poder da grana, que ergue e destrói coisas belas” (apud Caetano Veloso).

Recentemente, o ministro Mello soltou traficantes condenados em segunda instância com a mesma desfaçatez com que Gilmar concedeu habeas corpus a clientes da banca da mulher. E Toffoli devolveu o ex-chefe Dirceu, condenado em segunda instância a mais de 30 anos de prisão, ao doce lar. Atribui-se a esse duas vezes apenado (no mensalão e no petrolão) o planejamento da molecagem do desembargador do Tribunal Regional Federal da 4.ª Região (TRF-4) Rogério Favreto, por ele indicado, a desafiar os colegas, o Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ) e o STF, mandando soltar o mais famoso presidiário do Brasil.

Si non è vero, è ben trovato (se não é verdade é bem pensado), diria don Vito Corleone, O Poderoso Chefão da ficção de Mário Puzo. A fresta parecia promissora para o trio Paulo Pimenta, Paulo Teixeira e Wadih Damous, dois deputados federais e um levado à vaga aberta pela pressão do dirigente Quaquá na prefeitura do Rio. Um dos 27 desembargadores do TRF-4 em seu primeiro plantão teria de ser mais sensível à ideia “original” de que a pré-candidatura de Lula à Presidência seria o fato novo para lhe permitir conceder o habeas corpus pedido à sorrelfa. Meia hora depois do início do plantão do simpatizante na sexta-feira, deram à luz o mostrengo.

Como Toffoli, Favreto serviu a Dirceu. E como Toffoli mandou a jurisprudência da prisão pós-segunda instância às favas. Não havia mais a possibilidade de contar com o relaxamento da classificação do Brasil para a semifinal da Copa, pois a seleção de Tite fora eliminada duas horas e meia antes. Não é correto, então, perguntar se não combinaram com os belgas e pensar que a molecagem, de que a defesa de Lula se fingiu distante, passaria incólume na euforia geral.

Mas quando setembro vier, Toffoli, que como Favreto nunca foi juiz, será presidente do STF e terá à mão o martelo para triturar a jurisprudência dos colegas, Moro, o TRF-4 e o STJ. E retirar Lula da cadeia. Ingênuo será pensar que ele seria menos cínico que Favreto.

The world according to Beijing - Kevin Rudd (Australia)

The Australian, Sydney – 12.7.2018

Xi Jinping’s Vision for Global Governance

Last month, the Communist Party of China (CPC) concluded its Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, the second since Xi Jinping became China’s undisputed ruler in 2012. These meetings express how the leadership sees China’s place in the world, but they tell the world much about China as well.

Kevin Rudd

New York - The contrast between the disarray in the West, on open display at the NATO summit and at last month’s G7 meeting in Canada, and China’s mounting international self-confidence is growing clearer by the day. Last month, the Communist Party of China (CPC) concluded its Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, the second since Xi Jinping became China’s undisputed ruler in 2012. These meetings are not everyday affairs. They are the clearest expression of how the leadership sees China’s place in the world, but they tell the world much about China as well.

The last such conference, in 2014, marked the funeral of Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of “hide your strength, bide your time, never take the lead,” and heralded a new era of international activism. In part, this change reflected Xi’s centralization of control, Chinese leaders’ conclusion that American power is in relative decline, and their view that China had become an indispensable global economic player.

Since 2014, China has expanded and consolidated its military position in the South China Sea. It took the idea of the New Silk Road and turned it into a multi-trillion-dollar trade, investment, infrastructure, and wider geopolitical/geo-economic initiative, engaging 73 different countries across much of Eurasia, Africa and beyond. And China signed up most of the developed world to the first large-scale non-Bretton Woods multilateral development bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

China has also launched diplomatic initiatives beyond its immediate sphere of strategic interest in East Asia, as well as actively participating in initiatives such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. It has developed naval bases in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Djibouti, and participates in naval exercises with Russia as far away as the Mediterranean and the Baltic. In March, China established its own international development agency.

The emergence of a coherent grand strategy (regardless of whether the West chooses to recognize it as such) is not all that has changed since 2014. For starters, the emphasis on the CPC’s role is much stronger than before. Xi, concerned that the party had become marginal to the country’s major policy debates, has reasserted party control over state institutions and given precedence to political ideology over technocratic policymaking. Xi is determined to defy the trend-line of Western history, to see off Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” culminating in the general triumph of liberal democratic capitalism, and preserve a Leninist state for the long term.

This approach – known as “Xi Jinping Thought” – now suffuses China’s foreign policy framework. In particular, Xi’s view that that there are identifiable immutable “laws” of historical development, both prescriptive and predictive, was particularly prominent at last month’s foreign policy conference. If this sounds like old-fashioned dialectical materialism, that’s because it is. Xi embraces the Marxist-Leninist tradition as his preferred intellectual framework.

Given its emphasis on iron laws of political and economic development, a dialectical-materialist worldview means that there is nothing random about world events. So, Xi argues, if Marx’s analytical framework is applied to the current period, it is clear that the global order is at a turning point, with the West’s relative decline coinciding with the fortuitous national and international circumstances enabling China’s rise. In Xi’s words, “China has been in the best period of development since modern times, while the world is undergoing the most profound and unprecedented changes in a century.” Of course, formidable obstacles lie ahead for China. But Xi has concluded that the obstacles facing the US and the West are greater.

How such thinking will now drive China’s concrete foreign policy is anyone’s guess. But how one-party states, particularly Marxist states, choose to “ideate” reality matters a great deal: it is how the system speaks to itself. And Xi’s message to China’s foreign policy elite is one of great confidence.

Specifically, the Central Conference called for the country’s international policy institutions and personnel to embrace Xi’s agenda. Here Xi seems to have the foreign ministry in his sights. There is a strong ideological flavor to Xi’s apparent frustration with the ministry’s glacial approach to policy innovation. China’s diplomats were urged to bear in mind that they are first and foremost “party cadres,” suggesting that Xi is likely to push the foreign policy apparatus toward greater activism, to give full effect to his emerging global vision.

The biggest change to emerge from last month’s conference concerns global governance. In 2014, Xi referred to an impending struggle for the future structure of the international order. While he did not elaborate, much work has since been devoted to three inter-related concepts: guoji zhixu (the international order); guoji xitong (the international system), and quanqiu zhili (global governance).

Of course, these terms have different and overlapping meanings in English, too. But, broadly speaking, in Chinese, the term “international order” refers to a combination of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the G20, and other multilateral institutions (which China accepts), as well as the US system of global alliances (which China does not). The term “international system” tends to refer to the first half of this international order: the complex web of multilateral institutions that operate under international treaty law and seek to govern the global commons on the basis of the principle of shared sovereignty. And “global governance” denotes the actual performance of the “international system” so defined.

What is startlingly new about Xi’s remarks at the Central Conference was his call for China now to “lead the reform of the global governance system with the concepts of fairness and justice.” This is by far the most direct statement of China’s intentions on this important question offered so far. The world should buckle up and get ready for a new wave of Chinese international policy activism.

Like much of the rest of the international community, China is acutely conscious of the dysfunctionality of much of the current multilateral system. So Xi’s wish to lead “reform of the global governance system” is no accident. It reflects growing diplomatic activism in multilateral institutions, in order to reorient them in a direction more compatible with what China regards as its “core national interests.”

Xi has reminded China’s international policy elite that the totality of China’s future foreign policy direction, including the reform of global governance, must be driven by these core national interests. In this context, China also wants a more “multipolar” international system. This is code for a world in which the role of the United States and the West is substantially reduced.

The challenge for the rest of the international community is to define what type of global order we now want. What do existing institutions like the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or the African Union want for the international rules-based system for the future? What exactly does the US want, with or without Trump? And how will we collectively preserve the global values embodied in the UN Charter, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

The future of the global order is in a state of flux. China has a clear script for the future. It’s time for the rest of the international community to develop one of its own.

Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia, is President of the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York and Chair of the Independent Commission on Multilateralism.

This is an edited version of an address delivered to the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.

Madeleine Albright: uma grande entrevista com a grande dama da diplomacia americana

Der Spiegel, Hamburgo – 11.7.2018

Interview with Madeleine Albright'I Am an Optimist Who Worries A Lot'

Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 81, is concerned about the possibility of a new rise of fascism in the world. But she remains confident in the strength of liberal democracy and its institutions. 

Interview by Christoph Scheuermann

She could long-since have stopped working. At 81 years old, she can look back at a successful career in diplomacy, numerous books and a flourishing consulting firm. But Madeleine Albright is not the kind of person who can just disappear into retirement. She remains the Grande Dame of U.S. foreign policy, a career she began as UN ambassador in New York from 1997 to 2001 before becoming President Bill Clinton's secretary of state.

She focused on the Middle East conflict, the development of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union and North Korea's nuclear program -- all issues that have not disappeared. Even today, she remains a keen observer of world events and takes a global view of trends and developments. The most important issue that is currently driving Albright is U.S. President Donald Trump, who has inflicted grave damaged to the trans-Atlantic relationship and has taken aim at the Western political order, an order that Albright helped create. In mid-July, her most recent book is appearing in German, the English title of which is "Fascism: A Warning."

She receives visitors in her office in Washington, D.C. In the corner is a stuffed tiger toy with a huge package of Toblerone chocolate on it, a gift from her students at Georgetown University. Albright points to a framed photo on the wall of an extract from the passenger list of the SS America, the ship on which she traveled to America from Europe following World War II.

Albright: You can see my name written over here, Marie Korbelova, 11 years old. Korbelova is my maiden name. I came to the U.S. on Nov. 11, 1948, on the SS America, together with my three siblings and my parents. Next to the passenger manifest you can see my commissions from former President Bill Clinton and the Medal of Freedom from ex-President Barack Obama. This is my life story if you will.

DER SPIEGEL: You were born in Prague, fled from the Nazis during World War II to London, and later escaped from communism to the U.S. How did this experience shape you in later life?

Albright: I saw what difference it makes when the United States is involved in global matters - and when not. The Munich Conference in 1938 is the watershed episode. It was an agreement made between the French and British with the Germans and Italians, without Czechoslovakia, and without the United States at the table. Hitler was allowed to take a part of Czechoslovakia. And when America came in, that made every difference. After 1945, as a result of the arrangements made during the war, Europe was divided into half and the country where I was born was behind the Iron Curtain for 40 years. So in my own case I can argue that when the U.S. is not involved then bad things happen. The U.S. needs to be a part of it.

DER SPIEGEL: If you look at the state of the West today, are you optimistic or pessimistic?

Albright: Well, I'm an optimist who worries a lot.

DER SPIEGEL: You write in your book that you fear a return to the international climate that prevailed in the 1920s and '30s. What do you mean by that?

Albright: When I wrote this book, I decided I needed to do something that was historical, not emotional. There are striking similarities between then and now that have to do with divisions in society, a sense that there are winners and losers in economic terms, and politicians that take advantage of these divisions. Instead of looking for common ground they do everything they can to exacerbate the divisions. I believe in patriotism, but I am concerned by nationalism. We've all benefitted from globalization, in many ways, but it also is a doubleedged sword, because people seem to have lost their identity, and a feeling of belonging.

DER SPIEGEL: The title of your book is "Fascism: A Warning." Isn't that a bit alarmist? Is there really a threat of falling back into fascism?

Albright: It is supposed to be alarmist. But I specifically made clear that I don't think President Donald Trump is a fascist. He is antidemocratic; he does not respect democratic institutions like the free press, which he calls "enemies of the people." At the end of the book I say: If people think I'm sounding alarmist, it's because of the times we live in.

DER SPIEGEL: A majority of Americans thinks Trump isn't doing a good job, his core base represents only around a third of the electorate. Aren't you over-estimating the power of populists?

Albright: Better to over-estimate than assume all is well when it is not. The fact is that Trump's approval ratings are rising, not falling.Republican politicians are afraid to oppose him. Week by week, he is changing the nature of political debate, and we need to pay attention to that. I think the best quote in the book is from Mussolini: "If you pluck the chicken one feather at a time people won't notice."

DER SPIEGEL: Do you think democracy is fading as a grand idea?

Albright: No. And just because I see signs of fascism, it's not necessarily the same fascism as we witnessed during the 20th century. The Third Reich won't reappear. Democracy goes back to the ancient Greeks and there are various ways that democracy has been practiced throughout history. In the end, liberal democracy prevailed. "Compromise" is a good word, it's the element of democracy. But there are those leaders who operate on the basis of exacerbating divisions in society for their own advantage. By doing so, they're destroying the possibility of finding common ground.

DER SPIEGEL: Why do you think so many people mistrust their elected governments?

Albright: There's always this argument as to what comes first -- political development or economic development. Because people want to vote for their representatives and they want to eat. The bottom line is, democracy has to deliver. And there has been a sense, in some places, that democracy has not really effectively addressed this growing division between the rich and the poor. Citizens demand jobs, a working healthcare system, education. Populists offer seemingly easy solutions, they say "I've got an easy answer for you," and that's what we're watching now.

DER SPIEGEL: Your own Democratic Party is struggling to deal with politicians like Donald Trump. Why is this?

Albright: I believe the social contract that used to keep our societies together has broken. People gave up some of their individual rights in order to be protected by the state, and to have the state also provide a certain number of services to them. What has happened over the years is that neither side has kept its part of the bargain. The state has neglected its citizens, and the citizens evade taxes and are willing to be seduced by populists. I think now we have to figure out how to get the social contract back into some kind of genuine contract where both sides know what they're supposed to be doing. At the moment we are in that period where both the far-left and the far-right are taking advantage of the divisions and uncertainties to exacerbate them.

DER SPIEGEL: As secretary of state in the Clinton administration, you saw a fascist system from up close when you traveled to North Korea in 2000. You met Kim Jong Un's father and spoke with him for 12 hours. What did you learn in Pyongyang?

Albright: Well, first of all, we didn't know a lot, frankly, about that regime. I said repeatedly that the Kim dynasty really is one of fascists. What they developed there is, first of all, a narrative that they were being attacked by everybody in the world, and, therefore, they were able to use the propaganda to isolate and starve their people completely, while at the same time glorifying themselves. Kim Jong Il was smart, a fascinating character. He had kind of a colorful aspect to him in terms of wanting to be a movie director. He knew all about who won Oscars at the Academy Awards.

DER SPIEGEL: Kim Jong Il desperately wanted to meet President Clinton. Why did that never happen - contrary to the meeting between Trump and Kim?

Albright: President Clinton was deeply involved in the Middle East peace talks at the time. Ultimately, he wasn't successful, he ran out of time. But we had been dealing with North Korea over two presidential terms, between 1993 and 2000. Pyongyang threatened to leave the non-proliferation treaty, which they later did in fact. We negotiated a framework agreement to deal with North Korea's nuclear program; we had communication channels open on various levels. President Clinton said he would certainly travel to Pyongyang at some point.

DER SPIEGEL: Then George W. Bush was elected and included North Korea in the "axis of evil." Three years later, North Korea tested its first nuclear bomb.

Albright: But when we left office, there were no nuclear weapons. There was some fissile material -- we thought just enough to make one or two bombs -- and no ICBMs.

DER SPIEGEL: Kim Jong Un promised in the meeting with President Trump to end his nuclear program. Do you think North Korea is trustworthy?

Albright: There has to be an independent regime of verification, no matter what. We have to define "denuclearization" and what the parameters of the verification process should be. Which is why it's so crazy that President Trump tore apart the Iran nuclear deal, which has a very tough nuclear verification process.

DER SPIEGEL: Do you see a chance of rescuing the nuclear deal with Iran at all?

Albright: I hope it can be rescued. I've made very clear that I was supportive of the deal when it was negotiated, even though I knew that not everything could be dealt with all at once.

DER SPIEGEL: It didn't stop Iran from expanding its sphere of influence in the Middle East, though. Is Trump right when he says that we Europeans were naïve when it came to the intentions of Tehran?

Albright: I wouldn't say naïve. Iran is kind of putting its tentacles out in many directions, to Hamas in Palestine, to Hezbollah in Lebanon, to Yemen. There are some justified concerns about that. But us pulling out of the agreement makes dealing with the tentacles harder and more complicated.

DER SPIEGEL: The conflict surrounding the Iran agreement is not the only one between the Trump administration and Europe. Trump is waging a trade war against the EU. He speaks about friends as though they were enemies. Nothing seems to help to calm his anger down. Are we seeing the end of diplomacy?

Albright: No, I don't think so. We are all democratic countries, and just in the last days and weeks, some members of the House of Representatives and the Senate came forward to take action and limit the powers of the president in terms of some of the trade policies. We still do have checks and balances. But what worries me is that people will be deflected by those conflicts on the surface from actually trying to solve the underlying problems.

DER SPIEGEL: Trump attacks Germany and the German government on a regular basis. At the G-7 in Canada he reportedly threw Starbursts on Merkel's table and said: "Don't say I never gave you anything." What is a good strategy for dealing with a man like this?

Albright: Individual relationships at the top, between heads of state and government, obviously make a difference. But foreign policy shouldn't be based on personality. Even during the Cold War, there were people who really did talk about the fact that it was important to have relationships with the Soviet Union at other levels. The world is in disarray, but I think that there are mechanisms which help to foster a variety of discussions on a technical and diplomatic level.

DER SPIEGEL: But what can you do with a president who has such contempt for international institutions like the World Trade Organization or NATO?

Albright: Many people still believe U.S. foreign policy comes in fouryear segments. But it doesn't. We've had 70 years of good relations with Europe, not always exactly similar. We've had many highs and lows, and that's the way to look at the current administration. Under this president, trans-Atlantic relations are going through a difficult period, but I don't think we should give up on it. It will persist.

DER SPIEGEL: President Trump demands more commitment and more contributions from his European allies, while at the same time, he is cozying up to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Do you fear NATO is losing its relevance for European security?

Albright: Despite recent controversy, NATO remains the world's most potent and versatile institution of its type. Every Alliance member has agreed, in the past, to devote at least 2 percent of its GDP to defense spending. In urging support for this standard, President Trump is merely echoing past U.S. presidents, as well as NATO leaders. There is also nothing remarkable about American or European heads of government meeting with the president of Russia. It is vital, however, that leaders on both sides of the Atlantic reaffirm their commitment to a cooperative and productive partnership. The alliance is only as strong as the bonds of friendship and trust that exists between and among its members.

DER SPIEGEL: European security and stability are being challenged on multiple fronts -- by Russia, by immigration, by the war in Syria; the list could go on. Is there a role for NATO in this scenario at all?

Albright: NATO's revised doctrine seeks to defend member states from security threats that are both direct and indirect, new and old. NATO has a clear role, therefore, in safeguarding members from potential aggression by Russia and in containing the threat posed by cyberattacks and international terrorism. However, as a military alliance, NATO does not infringe on civilian policy matters -- such as immigration -- that are rightfully the concern of national governments and the EU.

DER SPIEGEL: Do you think that the relationship between Trump and Putin is a danger for Europe?

Albright: I expect that, during the NATO summit in Brussels, President Trump and alliance leaders will have time to discuss a coordinated approach to various topics related to Russia. My hope is that they will agree to continue supporting the sovereignty of Ukraine, a negotiated end to the war in Syria, and opposition to Russian-sponsored interference in democratic elections.

DER SPIEGEL: You are friends with former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who says that we can't take the trans-Atlantic alliance for granted anymore. German Chancellor Angela Merkel says we can no longer rely on America. Aren't those signs that the trans-Atlantic relationship is already imploding?

Albright: The worst thing would be to give up now, wouldn't it? Joschka Fischer is one of my dearest friends and I admire him tremendously. It doesn't hurt to put out a warning of that kind, just the way my book is a warning, because I think that people need to be aware of the discontinuity and what is going on. But what is going on right now will not be solved by saying: "It's all over." The European Union, too, has internal issues, for example how Hungary and Poland are behaving, and what structures can be used to deal with that. Many Europeans were upset when Obama said that we were going to pivot to Asia, and I would say regularly, the U.S. is not monogamous. We are an Atlantic and a Pacific power.

DER SPIEGEL: Are you concerned that Trump insults even his closest allies like Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada, whom he called "very dishonest and weak?"

Albright: This can't possibly help. I was very distressed by that. I have never seen behavior like that from an American president. I was taking part in a conference at the time, which was run by Lloyd Axworthy, the former Foreign Minister of Canada. I was wearing a pin with a maple leaf on it -- the Canadian flag. For me, the Canadians are the best international citizens that exist. They have participated in peacekeeping operations, had done tremendous work at the International Criminal Court, fought against land mines, all kinds of things. They are remarkable, and the best allies. We have a 3,000mile border with them, and so I'm hoping that this will get worked out.

DER SPIEGEL: The whole situation seems to be getting more difficult and complex every day, and yet you don't seem fearful or desperate.

Albright: The world is in chaos, but from the perspective of a political scientist, it's a very interesting time. Western institutions, just like people at the age of 70, need a little refurbishing. Perhaps the time is now. What we need is the best minds to try to solve 21st century problems.

DER SPIEGEL: But do we have enough time left, considering the deterioration of the transAtlantic alliance and a rising China that is becoming ever more powerful?

Albright: I think it just requires all of our attention.

DER SPIEGEL: Will Trump be re-elected in 2020?

Albright: I know what I hope, but I have no idea.

FMI conclui exame do Brasil sob Artigo IV

International Monetary Fund, Washington DC – 11.7.2018

IMF Executive Board Concludes 2018 Article IV Consultation with Brazil

On July 9, 2018, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation [1] with Brazil.

A mild recovery supported by accommodative monetary and fiscal policies is currently underway. But the economy is underperforming relative to its potential, public debt is high and increasing, and, more importantly, medium-term growth prospects remain uninspiring, absent further reforms. Against the backdrop of tightening global financial conditions, placing Brazil on a path of strong, balanced and durable growth requires a committed pursuit of fiscal consolidation, ambitious structural reforms, and a strengthening of the financial sector architecture .

Following the severe recession in 2015-16, real GDP grew by 1 percent in 2017. Growth is projected to be 1.8 and 2.5 percent in 2018 and 2019, respectively, driven by a recovery in domestic consumption and investment. Even if federal expenditure remains constant in real terms at its 2016 level, as mandated by a constitutional rule, public debt is expected to rise further and peak in 2023 at above 90 percent of GDP. Fiscal consolidation is key to maintain confidence in debt sustainability. Brazil is also vulnerable to a tightening of global financial conditions and possible trade disruptions, even though trade diversion effects may attenuate the impact. These risks can be compounded if there is no continuity in the reform agenda.

The fiscal deficit has declined, but public debt is growing and deeper reforms are lagging. Non-financial public-sector debt rose from 78.3 percent of GDP to 84 percent between 2016 and 2017. The primary fiscal deficit declined to 1.7 percent of GDP in 2017, below the authorities’ target, reflecting under-execution of spending. The government aims to restore fiscal sustainability by faster fiscal consolidation than implied by the expenditure ceiling, depending on revenue performance. For 2018, they aim to bring the primary deficit down by keeping discretionary spending under control, containing wage increases, and optimizing social benefits eligibility, where possible.

Inflation has declined to record lows. During 2017, inflation decreased from 6.3 to 2.9 percent, just below the target range, owing largely to slack in the economy, a notable fall in food prices due to an exceptional harvest, and well-anchored expectations. Inflation is projected to increase towards the 4.25 midpoint of the inflation target in 2019, as the food price shock dissipates and the output gap narrows. Since the beginning of the easing cycle in September 2016, the Central Bank has lowered the policy rate by 775 bps to the record low level of 6.5 percent.

The current account deficit shrank from 4.2 percent of GDP in 2014 to 0.5 in 2017 as imports contracted with the collapse of private investment. As the recovery gains strength, the rebound in investment will offset the effects of fiscal consolidation and lead to a deterioration of the current account to about ‑2 percent of GDP over the medium term. On average in 2017, the external position was broadly consistent with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. Brazil has continued to attract sizeable capital inflows, especially foreign direct investment.

Banks have been broadly resilient. Despite large losses during the 2015-16 recession, the recent FSAP found the banks to be well capitalized, profitable, and liquid, in large part reflecting high interest margins and fees. The economic recovery led to a decline in loan losses, which boosted profits. Capital ratios are above regulatory minima. The FSAP systemic risk analysis suggests that bank solvency and liquidity are broadly resilient to further severe macro-financial shocks.

Executive Board Assessment

Executive Directors concurred that Brazil’s economic recovery is under way but remains subject to significant downside risks stemming from uncertainty regarding the continuity of reforms and the ongoing tightening of global financial conditions. Directors encouraged the authorities to continue their efforts to ensure fiscal sustainability and remove structural impediments to strong and durable growth.

Directors underscored that, given the high level of public debt, continued fiscal consolidation is of paramount importance. They regretted that some measures for the 2018 budget could not be passed, but noted positively the authorities’ commitment to save any revenue overperformance. Directors agreed that pension reform is imperative to ensure the sustainability of the system and improve equity. Additional expenditure measures could include decisive efforts to contain the public wage bill while protecting public investment and social programs. Reforms to simplify taxes should be considered and the fiscal framework should continue to be strengthened.

Directors welcomed the reduction in inflation and the anchoring of inflation expectations. They agreed that the current monetary policy stance is appropriate and should remain accommodative to help close the output gap but should be vigilant to domestic and external sources of inflationary pressures.

Directors underscored that the floating exchange rate regime and the large reserve buffers are important cornerstones of the policy framework and should be preserved. They recommended that intervention in the foreign exchange market be limited to addressing disorderly conditions. Monetary policy should respond to movements in the exchange rate only insofar as there are risks for inflation expectations. In this context, Directors underscored the importance of central bank independence.

Directors concurred that the financial system is broadly resilient. Nonetheless, they agreed with the FSAP recommendation that further action is needed to strengthen the microprudential, macroprudential, and safety net frameworks. Directors underscored the importance of improving the efficiency of the financial system, especially by reducing the high intermediation costs.

Directors welcomed the recent reforms to the labor market and subsidized credit. Nonetheless, they urged the authorities to proceed with additional prioritized structural reforms, which are essential to raise productivity and potential growth. Reforms should focus on reducing state intervention in credit markets, enhancing trade integration, and improving public infrastructure. Directors underscored that the ongoing efforts to combat corruption and money laundering are vital to secure strong and inclusive growth.