A nova Guerra Fria: submarinos equipados de mísseis nucleares - Paul Sonne (WP)

A Guerra Fria está de volta, definitivamente...

U.S. military arms its submarines with new ‘low-yield’ nuclear warheads

Paul Sonne

The Washington Post, February 5, 2020

The U.S. military created the new warhead now fielded on Ohio-class submarines with Trident ballistic missiles by modifying a larger-yield W76-1 warhead. (Lt. Rebecca Rebarich/U.S. Navy/AP)

The U.S. military has put low-yield nuclear warheads into operation on submarines, citing the need to deter a limited nuclear attack by Russia with similarly small warheads in a scenario that worries Pentagon planners.

In a statement released Tuesday, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy John C. Rood confirmed that the W76-2 low-yield warhead had been fielded on submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The introduction of the warhead on Ohio-class nuclear submarines marks the first time the U.S. military has armed underwater vessels with warheads that can explode at such small yields since the George H.W. Bush administration.

The move comes over the objections of top Democrats and antinuclear advocates who have called it dangerous.

Rood said the W76-2 strengthens deterrence against adversaries and gives the United States a low-yield option that is more survivable in the event of a nuclear war. The U.S. military already possesses a low-yield option in the B61 gravity bomb, but that warhead and its variants can be launched only from aircraft, which the Pentagon believes could be stymied by sophisticated Russian air defenses.

The introduction of the W76-2 on American submarines, planned since the beginning of the Trump administration, “demonstrates to potential adversaries that there is no advantage to limited nuclear employment because the United States can credibly and decisively respond to any threat scenario,” Rood said.

In a review of nuclear policy overseen by then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, the Pentagon determined that there was a gap in U.S. nuclear capabilities vis-a-vis Russia.

Officials argued that Russia could employ one of its many small nuclear weapons in a limited attack against an American ally, potentially forcing the United States to choose between responding with a high-yield strategic nuclear warhead, all but guaranteeing full-scale nuclear war, or returning fire with a conventional weapon, risking embarrassment or defeat. The Pentagon refers to this strategy, which it has attributed to Russia, as “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win.”

Top Russian officials have denied such a strategy exists. They have said Russian nuclear doctrine calls for the use of nuclear weapons only when one is used first by an adversary against Russia or its allies, or when the use of conventional weapons against Russia puts the state at risk. Russian President Vladi­mir Putin has said Russia doesn’t envision conducting a preemptive strike with nuclear weapons.

Current and former U.S. officials, however, argue that Russian writings on nuclear doctrine and exercises demonstrate the existence of an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy, which could back the United States into a corner if the U.S. military lacks weaponry to respond in a like-for-like manner.

“It’s necessary to have this capability to close a gap in the credibility of our deterrence, because you have to put yourself in the mind not of some nuclear disarmament advocate but of a Russian general or the Kremlin,” said Tim Morrison, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and former senior director for weapons of mass destruction on the National Security Council under President Trump.

“If they think the use of a very low-yield nuclear weapon by Russia would not credibly be responded to by the United States with a higher-yield weapon, because it would be disproportionate, you have created a gap in your deterrence that the administration is trying to close,” Morrison said.

The U.S. military created the new warhead now fielded on Ohio-class submarines with Trident ballistic missiles by modifying a larger-yield W76-1 warhead.

Official U.S. nuclear-warhead yields remain classified, but experts estimate that the new W76-2 would explode with a yield of about 6.5 kilotons, whereas the full-size W76-1 explodes with a yield of roughly 90 kilotons. By comparison, the warheads the U.S. military used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945 exploded with about 15 and 20 kilotons of force, respectively.

Critics have said the introduction of the low-yield warhead on submarines could potentially confuse an adversary, who in the event of a launch might think it’s a high-yield attack.

“Mixing these indistinguishable low-yield weapons alongside high-yield warheads creates ambiguity and could lead to a massive escalation,” said Andy Weber, former assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs during the Obama administration.

In 2018, then-California Gov. Jerry Brown (D) and prominent former U.S. officials wrote to the Senate majority leader describing the W76-2 as a gateway to nuclear catastrophe.

Read the letter criticizing the new low-yield-warhead

The letter — signed by 32 people, including former secretary of state George Shultz and former defense secretary William Perry — called the rationale for the low-yield warheads a “false narrative.”

The officials said the introduction of the warheads was based on a “mistaken and dangerous belief” that it would be possible to prevent a limited nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States from escalating into an uncontrollable nuclear war. They also said the Pentagon already has low-yield options, making the addition unnecessary.

“Ultimately, the greatest concern about the proposed low-yield Trident warhead is that the president might feel less restrained about using it in a crisis,” the letter said. “When it comes to using a nuclear weapon, restraint is a good thing.”

At the time, Mattis issued a rebuttal, calling the move a modest adjustment necessary because of developments in Russian doctrine, exercises and capabilities.

“Let me be clear, any decision to employ nuclear weapons would be the most difficult decision a President has to make,” Mattis wrote. “This Administration, like the ones before it, has said that nuclear weapons would be employed only in extreme circumstances to protect our vital interests and those of our allies and partners.”

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SECNAV Modly Wants Navy ‘All Ahead Full’ on Hypersonic Weapons in 2020 Ben Warner | USNI News The Navy will focus in 2020 on developing hypersonic weapons at breakneck speed, with testing to occur throughout the year, Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly said Friday in a message to the fleet. Modly’s memo, SECNAV Vectors 9, likens the need to develop hypersonic weapons today to 1957, when the Soviet Union launched the first satellite, Sputnik. The U.S. scrambled to respond to the new reality: the Soviet Union was in space, and the U.S. was not. “The bottom line is that our Navy and Marine Corps team will need to move forward together, reaping the keen intellects and experiences of everyone onboard today in order to fully leverage the full potential of these new weapons in the future,” Modly wrote. Two years ago, Russia claimed to have already deployed hypersonic missile systems in the south of the country, according to media reports of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s March 2018 State of Russia address. The Navy is leading the current U.S. military effort to develop hypersonic weapons. This spring, Modly said, the Navy plans to demonstrate the Navy-designed Hypersonic Glide Body. Hypersonic launcher testing will occur throughout the year.

US Military Invests in New Weapon to Defeat Hypersonic Missiles as Russia Upgrades its Arsenal Tom O’Connor | Newsweek The United States has contracted a leading defense manufacturer to develop a new weapon capable of thwarting hypersonic missiles such as those Russia just added to its own growing arsenal of weapons it claims are too fast to be fought. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) awarded aerospace and defense company Northrop Grumman a $13 million contract Tuesday for work on its Glide Breaker program. The program is described by DARPA as having begun in 2018 “to develop and demonstrate technologies to enable defense against hypersonic systems” and the Pentagon said the new contract would provide investment to acquire such capabilities. The U.S. has raced to build both hypersonic offense and defense as Russia and China have deployed missiles they boasted could travel more than five times the speed of sound. Meanwhile, Moscow's defense systems reportedly gained a new hypersonic asset. The mobile, medium-range Pantsir, known to the U.S.-led NATO Western military as “SA-22 Greyhound,” is designed to take out both missiles and aircraft. The platform has been deployed at home and abroad, including in warzones like Syria, where Slugin said it “proved to be effective” when engaging moving jihadi targets. A Pentagon spokesperson told Newsweek in November that the decision by Washington's rivals to weaponize hypersonic technology “has created a warfighting asymmetry that we must address” and, less than a month later, the Pentagon awarded Lockheed Martin a nearly $1 billion contract to develop a hypersonic air-to-surface missile called the AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon.

RFI repercute Le Monde sobre o Itamaraty olavo-bolsonarista

Diplomatas são perseguidos por Bolsonaro, denuncia jornal Le Monde

Radio France Internationale, programa brasileiro, 04/02/2020 - 20:02

Diplomatas brasileiros afirmam serem vítimas de um clima de "caça às bruxas" e uma "perseguição ideológica"  Reprodução / Le Monde

O texto começa lembrando da tradição diplomática do país, com representações em 222 países. "O Brasil possui o oitavo serviço diplomático mais importante do planeta", explica a reportagem, ressaltando que a presença do Itamaraty no mundo ultrapassa nações como Itália, Espanha ou Reino Unido. 

Além disso, a diplomacia brasileira é formada por profissionais altamente qualificados, aponta o jornal. Quase sempre trilíngues, eles são formados no Instituto Rio Branco, após passarem “um dos concursos mais difíceis do país, com 6.400 candidatos para 20 vagas em 2019”, detalha o jornalista. 

No entanto, ressalta o jornal, o Itamaraty "se tornou um alvo para Jair Bolsonaro". O presidente é apresentado pelo Le Monde como um "modesto capitão da reserva, que despreza o que considera uma ‘aristocracia’ orgulhosa e letrada". Para completar, continua o correspondente, a diplomacia seria “um ninho de partidários da esquerda”, marcado por uma “ideologia marxista”, diz o texto, citando uma declaração de Eduardo Bolsonaro. 

Caça às bruxas

"Desde que a extrema direita de Jair Bolsonaro está no poder, qualquer um que desenvolva um pensamento crítico é punido”, desabafa um diplomata entrevistado pelo jornal francês. “Vivemos um clima de caça às bruxas", denuncia o funcionário do alto escalão do ministério das Relações Exteriores, que preferiu manter o anonimato. 

Para as fontes ouvidas, existe uma tentativa de “destruir o ministério”. Em apenas um ano, cinco embaixadas brasileiras foram fechadas no Caribe e outras duas ou três devem deixar de funcionar na África, contabiliza o correspondente.

Segundo diplomatas entrevistados, uma verdadeira “perseguição ideológica” está acontecendo nesse momento no Itamaraty, visando, principalmente, aqueles que integraram a diplomacia durante as gestões de Lula e Dilma. Os funcionários indesejáveis são geralmente mandados para bases menos importantes e quase sempre substituídos por nomes menos experientes, aponta o texto. 

Um exemplo citado é o do diplomata Paulo Roberto de Almeida, ex-diretor do Instituto de Pesquisas em Relações Internacionais (IPRI), que foi transferido para cuidar dos arquivos do ministério. “Não me deram nenhuma função exata, então eu me ocupo como posso, lendo e escrevendo”, confessa o funcionário, que também teve seu salário reduzido.

Para Almeida, trata-se de uma estratégia de “intimidação”, que ninguém ousa denunciar. “Os corredores estão vazios. As pessoas se trancam em suas salas. A casa ficou silenciosa”, afirma. Outro diplomata diz que tem aumentado o número de casos de depressão entre seus colegas. 

O texto aponta que essa "ofensiva" é liderada pelo chanceler Ernesto Araújo, personagem atípico, capaz de citar Proust e uma réplica de telenovela no mesmo discurso, ironiza o correspondente. E enumera as mudanças de posição da diplomacia brasileira desde o início do novo governo, como o desengajamento na Celac (Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos), a nova postura sobre as questões climáticas, ou ainda o abandono das pautas ligadas à defesa dos direitos humanos, bloqueando discussões sobre imigração, gênero e direito ao aborto. 

Na contramão de Washington?

O embaixador do Brasil em Paris, Luís Fernando Serra, ouvido pelo Le Monde, defende a nova estratégia do Itamaraty e fala de um simples “reequilíbrio”. Segundo ele, o país apenas abandonou, entre outras coisas, o “desalinhamento automático com os Estados Unidos” que primava nas gestões anteriores. O representante brasileiro na capital francesa diz que, com Bolsonaro, o país vive agora “uma diplomacia pragmática e aberta”, que não se submete a Washington, mas também não renuncia à Europa”. 

Mas para o professor de relações internacionais da Universidade de Harvard, Hussein Kalout, o que acontece nesse momento vai além de um simples reequilíbrio. “Há um ano, o alinhamento com Washington é total e incondicional”, afirma, citando como exemplo o voto de Brasília contra o fim de embargo americano em Cuba ou o apoio de Bolsonaro ao assassinato do general iraniano Soleimani. 

“O patrimônio nacional está sendo dilapidado”, insiste um dos diplomatas ouvidos. “Nosso país não é um líder natural, como a França ou os Estados Unidos. Nossa influência é relativa e teve que ser conquistada. Uma hora vamos acordar desse pesadelo e vamos nos dar conta que o soft power brasileiro desapareceu”, desabafa.

Le Monde, sobre o Itamaraty bolsonarista - Bruno Meyerfeld

Le grand blues des diplomates brésiliens

Bruno Meyerfeld

RIO DE JANEIRO (BRÉSIL)- correspondant

Le Monde, 4 février 2020

Matéria original neste link:
 https://www.academia.edu/41858355/Le_grand_blues_des_diplomates_brésiliens_-_Le_Monde_05_02_2020_

Depuis son arrivée au pouvoir, le président Jair Bolsonaro fait tout pour imposer sa vision du monde à cette administration prestigieuse et influente

L’homme nous ouvre la porte, et reçoit tout sourire. Puis il la referme et s’écroule sur une chaise, accablé. « Beaucoup de gens ici sont en dépression. Moi, pour l’instant, je tiens le coup sans médicaments, murmure, les larmes aux yeux ce diplomate haut placé du ministère des affaires étrangères brésilien. Avant, j’allais tous les jours au travail plein d’adrénaline, passionné. Aujourd’hui, j’y vais seulement par obligation. J’ai même pensé à tout quitter. C’est d’une tristesse infinie… »

De lui, nous ne révélerons ni le nom ni la fonction. « Depuis que l’extrême droite de Jair Bolsonaro est au pouvoir, quiconque développe une pensée critique est puni, lâche-t-il. C’est un climat de chasse aux sorcières. »Une demi-douzaine d’autres diplomates ont tout de même accepté de témoigner auprès du Monde, le plus souvent anonymement, sur ce qu’ils considèrent être la « destruction » en cours de leur ministère. Et, avec elle, celle de l’image du Brésil dans le monde.

Avant tout, il convient de rappeler l’importance dans ce pays du ministère des affaires étrangères, surnommé l’« Itamaraty », ce palais des « pierres libres » en langue indienne tupi. Un « temple » de béton conçu par l’architecte Oscar Niemeyer et inauguré en 1970 sur l’axe monumental de Brasilia. Orné d’un jardin aquatique et ceinturé de hautes colonnes, il compte de prestigieux salons et un escalier d’exception, en forme d’hélice, s’élevant vers les étages sans poutre ni rambarde.

Mais la puissance de l’Itamaraty n’est pas seulement une affaire d’architecture. Avec 222 représentations à l’étranger (ambassades et consulats), le pays dispose du huitième service diplomatique de la planète. Mieux que l’Italie, l’Espagne ou le Royaume-Uni. « Peu de pays doivent autant à la diplomatie », écrivit l’ambassadeur et historien Rubens Ricupero (A Diplomacia na Construção do Brasil, 2016, non traduit). Selon lui, l’institution aurait même forgé, au fil du temps, une « certaine idée du Brésil » : celle d’un géant « heureux (…), en paix (…), confiant dans le droit et les solutions négociées (…), force constructive de modération et d’équilibre ».

Le pays voue donc un culte à ses diplomates. Et son Dieu se nomme José Maria da Silva Paranhos Junior, baron de Rio Branco, ministre des relations extérieures de 1902 à sa mort, en 1912, qui donna sa pleine mesure à l’Itamaraty. Cet homme raffiné, moustache taillée à l’anglaise, sécurisa les frontières, signa des traités de paix avec une dizaine de pays voisins, agrandit pacifiquement le territoire de 190 000 km² et légitima la jeune république aux yeux du monde. Lors de son décès, survenu en plein carnaval, on alla jusqu’à repousser les festivités de quelques semaines.

Depuis, à l’image du « baron », l’ambassadeur brésilien se doit d’être charmant, bien mis, cultivé et expert en tout (« Des clones de Philippe II d’Espagne, altiers, barbus, cultivés, sourcilleux et méprisants », s’amuse un diplomate européen). Formés à l’Institut Rio Branco, à Brasilia, les fonctionnaires sont recrutés lors d’un concours considéré comme le plus difficile de la république : 6 400 candidats pour 20 places en 2019. Les « itamaratistes », au minimum trilingues, maîtrisent aussi bien les textes antiques que le droit international et sont souvent « prêtés » aux autres ministères, aux exécutifs locaux, voire aux entreprises publiques. « Nous sommes le “deep state” », résume un ambassadeur. Autrement dit, les vrais maîtres du jeu brésilien.

« Persécutions idéologiques »

Dans ces conditions, il n’est pas étonnant que l’Itamaraty soit devenu la cible de Jair Bolsonaro, modeste capitaine de réserve, qui vomit cette « aristocratie » aussi orgueilleuse que lettrée. Pour ne rien arranger, l’Itamaraty est perçu par le pouvoir comme un nid de gauchistes, « l’un des ministères où l’idéologie marxiste est la plus enracinée », selon les mots d’Eduardo Bolsonaro, influent fils du président. Dès lors, une purge s’imposait, doublée d’une saignée.

En un an, cinq ambassades ont été fermées dans les Caraïbes, et deux ou trois autres devraient l’être sous peu en Afrique. Le nombre de « secrétariats » – équivalent des directions générales du Quai d’Orsay – a été ramené de neuf à sept, et l’ensemble de ses chefs remerciés, remplacés par des diplomates moins capés et de grades inférieurs. « Le nouveau ministre Ernesto Araujo a voulu s’entourer de personnes de confiance, se justifie-t-on à la direction de l’Itamaraty. C’est naturel, dans le monde entier c’est comme ça ! » Faux, rétorquent des agents du ministère sollicités par Le Monde.« Démettre tous les chefs d’un coup, c’est inédit, assure l’un d’eux. Araujo a voulu s’entourer de gens sans expérience, qui lui doivent tout et ne peuvent pas le contredire. »

Selon les diplomates interrogés, des « persécutions idéologiques » seraient en cours, orchestrées par un cabinet « semant la terreur », décrit comme « totalitaire » ou « inquisitorial », visant en priorité les « barbudinhos », ces « petits barbus » issus de la gauche et entrés dans cette administration durant les présidences de Lula (2003-2010) et Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). Parmi les cas cités, celui du diplomate Audo Faleiro : nommé en octobre 2019 à la tête de la division « Europe » du ministère, il fut démis de ses fonctions au bout de quelques jours, à la suite de pressions venues de groupes d’extrême droite.

« Tous les ministres des affaires étrangères de Dilma ont été envoyés dans des ambassades de second plan », constate une source, citant Luiz Alberto Figueiredo (au Qatar), Mauro Vieira (en Croatie) et Antonio Patriota (en Egypte). Pour certains, c’est une punition. Pour d’autres, un choix. « Je n’allais pas représenter à l’étranger ce gouvernement de clowns ! J’ai préféré me mettre en retrait », confie ainsi un diplomate, marqué à gauche, ayant accepté une fonction subalterne à l’étranger.

A Brasilia, les ex-chefs de service, « recasés à des postes inférieurs ou laissés sans charge précise, viennent au ministère pour prendre un café, s’asseoir sur une chaise, regarder les murs. C’est très humiliant », explique-t-on. Parmi ces fonctionnaires désœuvrés, Paulo Roberto de Almeida est l’un des rares à témoigner à visage découvert. Ancien directeur de l’Institut de recherche des relations internationales (IPRI), il fut débarqué en mars 2019 pour des posts critiques du ministre publiés sur son blog. Depuis, cet homme de 70 ans a été «relégué» aux archives du ministère. « Mais on ne m’a attribué aucune fonction précise… donc je m’occupe comme je peux : je passe mon temps à la bibliothèque, je lis, j’écris des livres… », dit-il.

Dans l’intervalle, M. de Almeida – pourtant marqué à droite – dit avoir perdu sa « gratification », un complément de salaire pour les chefs de service : « Mon revenu a baissé d’un quart, passant de 26 000 reais [5490 euros] à 21 000 reais [4 430 euros] », précise-t-il, dénonçant un climat « de persécution, d’intimidation, doublé de vengeance personnelle». « Plus personne n’ose se parler librement, les couloirs sont vides. Les gens s’enferment dans leur bureau. La maison est devenue silencieuse. »

A l’Itamaraty, dans l’un des salons orné de tableaux de maître et de tapisseries, trônait jusqu’à il y a peu le buste d’un monsieur austère, au crâne dégarni et à la fine moustache : San Tiago Dantas, ministre des affaires étrangères au début des années 1960. Il fut le chantre d’une politique extérieure indépendante, proche des pays en développement et critique à l’égard des Etats-Unis. D’après la presse, sa statue aurait été discrètement retirée.

Car sur le fond aussi, l’offensive idéologique est lancée, menée par le ministre Ernesto Araujo. Climatosceptique assumé, complotiste notoire, ce diplomate un brin farfelu, capable, dans un même discours, de citer Proust et une réplique de télénovela, prône l’édification d’un axe mondial « chrétien-conservateur », mené par l’Américain Donald Trump, « sauveur de l’âme de l’Occident ». Conséquence : à l’Itamaraty, un nouveau secrétariat à la « souveraineté nationale et à la citoyenneté » a été créé, quand celui dédié à l’environnement a disparu.

« De l’antidiplomatie ! »

Auparavant moteur de l’intégration régionale, le Brésil a annoncé début 2020 son retrait de la Communauté d’Etats latino-américains et caraïbes (Celac). Jadis leader dans les négociations climatiques, il a participé à plein au désastre de la COP25 de Madrid. Autrefois très investi dans les droits de l’homme à l’ONU, il y bloque aujourd’hui nombre de discussions sur les migrations, le genre ou le droit à l’avortement.

« La nouvelle diplomatie brésilienne, c’est la fin du Forum de Sao Paulo [organisation rassemblant les partis de gauche sud-américains] et du désalignement automatique sur les Etats-Unis », se réjouit Luis Fernando Serra, nommé en 2019 ambassadeur du Brésil à Paris. Un temps pressenti pour diriger l’Itamaraty bolsonariste, il évoque un simple « rééquilibrage » : « A présent, avec Jair Bolsonaro, nous avons une diplomatie pragmatique et ouverte. Nous ne sommes pas soumis aux Etats-Unis et on ne renonce pas à l’Europe : c’est d’ailleurs sous Bolsonaro qu’a été signé l’accord commercial entre l’Union européenne et le Mercosur. L’un n’exclut pas l’autre. »

Pour les experts, le parti pris est pourtant évident : « Depuis un an, l’alignement sur Washington est total et inconditionnel », estime Hussein Kalout, professeur de relations internationales à l’université Harvard, citant le vote récent de Brasilia contre la levée de l’embargo américain sur Cuba ou le soutien de Jair Bolsonaro à l’assassinat du général iranien Soleimani. « Bolsonaro remet en cause l’insertion du Brésil dans le monde et les fondamentaux de notre diplomatie, fondée sur le multilatéralisme, la résolution pacifique des conflits et le respect de la souveraineté nationale. C’est sans précédent », décrypte M. Kalout.

Mais Aurajo n’est pas tout-puissant. A plusieurs reprises, sous la pression combinée de l’agronégoce et de l’armée, il a dû reculer, cesser ses attaques contre la Chine communiste, renoncer à quitter le Mercosur ou à déménager l’ambassade du Brésil de Tel-Aviv à Jérusalem et, surtout, rester dans l’accord de Paris sur le climat. « Sur les sujets-clés, des forces extérieures au ministère se dressent pour dire : “On arrête les conneries!”», observe un diplomate européen.

« Moi, j’appelle ça de l’antidiplomatie! », enrage Celso Amorim, 77 ans, ancien grand chef de la diplomatie de Lula. Pour cet « itamaratiste » raffiné, qui nous reçoit dans son appartement donnant sur la plage de Copacabana, rempli de livres en français et d’objets d’art, « la diplomatie, c’est résoudre les problèmes par la conversation. Aujourd’hui, on a un discours belliciste, guerrier même. Aussi loin que je me souvienne, même au temps de la dictature, je n’ai jamais éprouvé une telle honte de la politique extérieure de mon pays », s’attriste cette mémoire vivante du « palais ».

Mais l’onde passée, que restera-t-il sur le rivage brésilien, mis à part un navire Itamaraty échoué? Avant de rouvrir la porte et de dire au revoir, notre premier diplomate se confie une dernière fois : « C’est un patrimoine national qu’on est en train de dilapider. Notre pays n’est pas un leader naturel, comme la France ou les Etats-Unis. Notre influence est relative. On a dû la conquérir. Et un jour, on va se réveiller de ce cauchemar et on va se demander : il est où le soft power brésilien? Il aura disparu. »

Oil industry and its consequences -IMF review Finance and Development

Dear Colleague, National oil companies (NOCs) are economic giants. They control at least $3 trillion in assets and produce most of the world’s oil and gas. They dominate energy production in some of the world’s most oil-rich countries, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, and they play a central role in the oil and gas sector in many emerging producers. But there's one problem. These companies are poorly understood because of their uneven and often opaque financial reporting practices. And because they are so large, shortcomings in their reporting pose several economic risks. It's time to peel back the curtain on Really Big Oil. In our latest issue of F&D, David Manley, David Mihalyi, and Patrick Heller of the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) pen a very thoughtful and researched look at exactly this challenge and how best to foster (and perhaps mandate) openness. NRGI's new report and accompanying database focuses on the failure to rigorously scrutinize NOCs and the policies their governments employ to manage them, and how this failure carries major risks for dozens of economies around the world that depend on these companies’ sound management of public resources. On average, the authors found that NOCs in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa disclosed the least amount of information. These findings reinforce the results of the institute’s Resource Governance Index, which revealed that 62 percent of the NOCs reviewed exhibited “weak,” “poor,” or “failing” performance in regard to public transparency. That's not so bad, is it? Well, some national oil companies carry huge debts that burden their national economies. Some have debts in amounts higher than 10 percent of their countries’ GDP. Venezuela’s troubled state oil company PDVSA has debt exceeding 20 percent of GDP. Many NOCs have required multibillion-dollar government bailouts in recent years, becoming a costly drain on public finances. At the peak of the oil price boom in 2013, there were at least 25 “NOC-dependent” countries—those where the NOC collects funds equivalent to 20 percent or more of government revenues (Chart 1). In most cases only a fraction of these resource revenues are then transferred to the governments, with the NOCs spending and investing the rest themselves. The median NOC in this sample transferred only 17 percent of its gross revenues to the state in 2015. The key here is that the fiscal health of many countries and their governments’ ability to use oil revenues for development depend heavily on how well the NOC is run, how much revenue it transfers to the state, and the quality of its spending. State-owned enterprises can weigh a country down or help propel growth, and in these countries, subpar governance of national resources perpetuates poverty and inequality.  You're right. This is a real problem. So how do we solve it? To start, NOCs and their governments should ensure that company strategies outline a sustainable vision for their futures. Such a vision can facilitate clear and effective rules on how much these companies are allowed to spend and borrow, and how much they must transfer to the government treasury. To ensure that these rules are followed, citizens and governments need better reporting from NOCs. Separating public relations from reality in company pronouncements about investments in renewables or boosting commercial efficiency requires consistent reporting on spending, production costs, and revenues. Like private oil companies, NOCs should also start assessing and disclosing how prepared they are for the coming energy transition. This should include an analysis of climate-related risks, and progress made in diversifying and mitigating those risks. Finally, in many countries, NOCs are not held sufficiently accountable, either because they don’t disclose enough information, or because formal oversight by government or informal oversight by civil society and the media is inconsistent. Under-scrutinized companies might perform poorly or become vessels for corruption. Increased transparency is a critical lever for holding company leadership accountable and encouraging strong returns on public investment. Drill deeper and read the full 1600-word article, which contains the latest data, charts and examples from around the world and how best to move forward. This piece is also available in pусский, español, français, 中文, and عربي. See you next week,

Rahim Kanani Digital Editor, F&D Magazine International Monetary Fund rkanani@imf.org P.S. I wanted to flag that in our June 2018 issue of F&D, Harvard's David Bloom et al wrote a very detailed and insightful piece on the economics of epidemics. _____ Make a colleague's day: forward this emailWas this newsletter shared with you? Sign up for future updates Update your profile for tailored content (new) Unsubscribe from F&D here

McCloskey’s Brief Against Antiliberalism - James R. Rogers (Law & Liberty)

McCloskey’s Brief Against Antiliberalism

by James R. Rogers1 Comment

Law and Liberty, February 4, 2020

From its very title, Deirdre McCloskey’s new book takes up the mantle of liberalism’s cause against naysayers both left and right. Why Liberalism Worksplays off against Why Liberalism Failed, the title of the much-discussed book by Patrick Deneen. By “liberalism” McCloskey means classical liberalism of one version or another, the ideas which today’s anti-liberals often refer to as “neoliberalism.” McCloskey’s book is the place to start for a vigorous, easy-to-read, fact-based case for the significant benefits provided by market liberalism over the last 200 years.

I cannot recommend it more highly for both liberals and for critics of liberalism. Any reasonable case against liberalism must recognize the tradeoffs that will have to be borne by ordinary people—not just wealthy capitalists—if market liberalism is to be limited or rejected. At the same time, McCloskey shares the deafness of many liberals to antiliberal suggestions that the personal and social losses caused by the market’s “creative destruction” cannot be compensated by material gains, and that philosophical problems remain at liberalism’s core in which liberal principles can lead to illiberal outcomes.

The Great Expansion

McCloskey focuses on the staggering gains in income realized as a result of liberalism in the West and, indeed, realized throughout most of the world over the last two centuries. Most folks in the West recognize living standards have increased over the last century or two. Most underestimate the magnitude of the increase, and to a massive degree. In a poll of informed folk, most guessed that incomes in the U.S. have increased “by around fifty percent” since 1900. That guess is off by a factor of ten. In the last century, U.S. incomes have increased by a multiply of five to seven. Since 1800, per capita income in the U.S. has increased by a factor of 30.

McCloskey calls this the “great expansion.”

These gains are not confined to the West. Both right-wing and left-wing antiliberals habitually refer to incomes stagnating over the last generation, as if the U.S. experience of income stagnation is in fact a global phenomenon. First, incomes have not actually stagnated in the U.S. over the last generation. But it’s even more untrue of the world where over one billion people have escaped “extreme poverty” in the last thirty years. In 1960, half of the world’s populationlived in “extreme poverty.” Today about a tenth do, and this number keeps falling.

McCloskey underscores again and again that if one cares that the poorest among us have more to eat, then one ought to desire market liberalization, not oppose it.

McCloskey also aims several well-placed darts at arguments advanced by proponents of a postliberal order. Modern Romantic antiliberals tend to idealize social relationships that existed in aristocratic and other pre-modern hierarchical societies. They often ignore or minimize the dark side of these societies. Why the idealization in the first place? Neo-Romantic antiliberals of both left and right long for the humane manners of aristocratic societies, manners that leavened all classes of those societies, not simply the aristocratic class. Antiliberals reject liberal-democratic society because it does not, and cannot, generate those manners. Yet this idealization often results in antiliberals minimizing the constriction, even oppression, that also characterized those societies. Karl Polanyi, for example, makes only passing mention of the fact that the economy prior to The Great Transformation necessarily confined the movement of commoners to their lords’ estate. Milbank and Pabst similarly acknowledge only in passing that movement of workers would be restricted in the virtue-economy they envision. McCloskey provides a corrective against the romantic idealization of premodern social relationships, as if pre-modern hierarchical societies reflected only paternalistic nurturing.

McCloskey also makes the important point that many of the problems antiliberals ascribe to markets would be replicated in non-market social economies. Modern socialists seem ignorant of the extended debate in the 1930s over pricing and production decisions in socialist economies. This debate effectively ended with socialist economists conceding that centrally-controlled production decisions advancing the common good would necessarily replicate a market pricing system.

Oskar Lange, a socialist economist and communist functionary of note, declared that for Mises’s role in making the point clear, “a statue of Professor Mises ought to occupy an honorable place in the great hall of the Ministry of Socialization or of the Central Planning Board of the socialist state.”

So, too, non-market economies would need to take advantage of the efficiencies inherent in the division of labor and scale economies. While antiliberals may romanticize pre-modern small-is-beautiful economies, those economies can be replicated only with significantly lower living standards or a much smaller world population.

Of note as well, and contrary to antiliberal snarking on both the right and the left, is McCloskey’s observation that modern market economies do not in fact require ever-expanding consumption and debt in order to sustain themselves.

There are any number of additional points McCloskey makes in the book that any serious antiliberal will want to engage. I don’t mean that liberalism necessarily “wins.” But engaging McCloskey’s arguments, and the tradeoffs they imply, would create a more honest, more-productive debate over liberalism.

That said, there are several points at which I would challenge McCloskey’s argument.

Polanyi’s “Great Transformation” in Light of McCloskey’s “Great Expansion”

The first requires that we look across McCloskey’s work rather than simply within this book. There is an inconsistency in McCloskey’s treatment of the uniqueness of the period that saw the heyday of the rise of market liberalism. McCloskey identifies this heyday as occurring uniquely in the first half of the 1800s. Yet in other venues McCloskey takes Karl Polanyi to task for arguing for the historical uniqueness of market liberalization during this very same period.

This may seem an obscure quibble to take up. But Polanyi’s 1944 book, The Great Transformation, plays an outsized role in the arguments of today’s antiliberals on both the left and the right. Recently, for example, right-wing antiliberals such as Patrick Deneen cite and rely on Polanyi’s argument, as do Milbank and Pabst. On the left, antiliberals such as Wendy Brown, Eugene McCarraher, and others, also rely on Polanyi’s analysis.

Polanyi argues that a “great transformation” occurred in the early 1800s that made economic life after this transformation discontinuous with the experience of economic life before this transition. He argues that Western economies transitioned from non-market economies based on hierarchical and horizontal “gift” exchange to economies in which the “autonomous” market ruled. Polanyi argues that this transition to market rule ran roughshod over the more human and humane scale of social and economic life in the earlier era and caused untold human misery. The political and economic history of the West in the following century, Polanyi argues, can be understood as a reaction to the unleashing of this autonomous market.

In reviewing Polanyi’s book, McCloskey, with co-author Santhi Hejeebu, takes issue particularly with Polanyi’s historical argument that the post-1800s market economy stood in essential discontinuity with economies before 1800. McCloskey summarizes her signal argument against Polanyi in her review of Deneen’s book:

Deneen swallows whole Karl Polanyi’s “classic study” of economic history The Great Transformation (1944). Polanyi’s claim . . . is that the evil “liberal” market is a Western novelty of the nineteenth century. That way we can set aside modern liberalism as a lamentable aberration and get back to God or community and be truly happy. Though conservatives and socialists believe the tale and accept its moral, historians have since the 1950s shown over and over that it is entirely, even embarrassingly, wrong. Markets of supply and demand have existed since the caves . . .

Here’s the thing. McCloskey’s central criticism of Polanyi is that, contrary to Polanyi’s historical claim, the rise of market society is NOT a Western novelty of the nineteenth century. Continuity reigns with earlier economies. But McCloskey’s central claim in Why Liberalism Works is that the rise of the market in the first half of the nineteenth century was a unique historical event: The development of the market during this period was fundamentally discontinuous from the economic life before this period, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Polanyi thinks the Great Transformation is a bad thing; McCloskey thinks “the great expansion” is a good thing. But contrary to McCloskey’s criticism of Polanyi, they both now seem to agree that this historical period was qualitatively unique and pivotal for markets and for society. The argument is not whether the great transformation occurred, the argument is over the consequences of that transformation.

Polanyi’s black and white line between the pre-market economy before 1800 and the market economy after 1800 is incorrect. But taking issue with Polanyi’s rhetorical excess is just a debater’s point if Polanyi’s central historical claim can be made substantially true with the addition of a few weasel words.

McCloskey too confirms Polanyi’s argument that after huge gains by market liberalism in the first half of the nineteenth century there was a dramatic retrenchment. Polanyi cheers this pullback while McCloskey laments it. Yet while McCloskey discusses several hypotheses to account for this pullback, she doesn’t consider Polanyi’s hypothesis, that the speedy transition to market liberalism ran roughshod over the lives of many ordinary people and disrupted traditional life. In essence, McCloskey is too sanguine about the personal and social costs of the market’s creative destruction, costs that can arise along side the market’s massive material benefits.

Here’s where things get complicated because antiliberals miss the upshot of Polanyi’s argument: In agreement with McCloskey, Polanyi argues that the market transformation was incredibly productive. His criticism is that the transformation took place more rapidly than people and communities could accommodate without harmful disruption.

Polanyi argues that the response to this disruption then not only birthed modern, big-state liberalism, but more pathologically also birthed nationalism and fascism.

McCloskey’s and Polanyi’s arguments are not as contradictory as they initially seem: Markets producing fabulous advances in wealth can occur in tandem with harmful disruptions of traditional life and communities. The spread of markets provides diffuse gains to all people as consumers in the form of lower prices and more goods and services. But individual workers and entrepreneurs typically work in only one or a few markets. The individual cost of disruption in these particular markets can outweigh diffuse gains of competition, prompting a political backlash. Liberalization causes both the gain and the backlash.

The antiliberal case then is this: That it is possible people in a society can judge the disruption caused by liberalism to traditional social and economic life to be so significant that they would forgo the disruption even at the cost of significant losses in material well-being. McCloskey shows that the material tradeoff would be huge. Antiliberals need to deal with the argument head-on.

Tensions Between Liberal Principles and Liberal Outcomes

McCloskey also glosses over philosophical tensions at the heart of liberalism. At the center of liberalism is the ideal of “voluntary arrangements”; that contract and consent should structure human interaction. McCloskey writes, “The classic definition of liberty/freedom is the condition of being liberated/free from physical interference by other human beings. It means . . . not being a slave.”

There are a couple of problems with McCloskey’s analysis.

First is the problem of the materialism inherent in the traditional liberal definition of freedom. That is, that only harms of “physical interference” count. It is arbitrary to limit recognition of “interference” to physical harm unless one denies that important aspects of humanity—perhaps the most important aspects of humanity—derive from incorporeal aspects of what it means to be human. Even if one does not believe in the soul, the human mind cannot be reduced without loss to mere physical matter. To be sure, the liberal limitation to “physical interference” serves a very practical purposes in liberal philosophy in limiting the domain over which the state can interfere. But while practical, the limitation is arbitrary and anthropologically indefensible.

Even more problematic is McCloskey’s repeated treatment of “slavery” as the definitional opposite of “voluntary arrangements.” The philosophical question is whether “liberty” itself is an alienable or an unalienable right. Locke and the Declaration of Independence hold liberty to be an unalienable right, a right that individuals cannot consent away. Philosopher Robert Nozick, whom McCloskey commends, holds that liberty includes the freedom to sell oneself into slavery. The problem for liberal theory is this: Holding that some rights are unalienable is a restriction on the freedom of the individual.

This may sound irrelevantly abstract. Who would choose voluntarily to become a slave? Yet well-known examples exist. In the Bible, the book of Deuteronomy recognizes that people might sell themselves into slavery if they become too poor. So, too, in the book of Genesis almost the entire civilian population of Egypt voluntarily alienate their liberty to Pharaoh. Less draconian, McCloskey praises the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Yet why on classical liberal principles should the government be allowed to restrict private property owners from voluntarily choosing to discriminate on the basis of race, religion or other characteristics?

Irrespective of these and other problems, McCloskey’s book is a welcomed addition to the debate over liberalism. She provides a largely fact-based account of the advantages that liberalism has conferred on the modern world. Modern antiliberals on both the right and the left must account for these benefits, recognizing that antiliberalism necessarily posits there are fundamental, even tragic, tradeoffs at stake.

James Rogers is associate professor of political science at Texas A&M University, and a fellow with the Institute for Science, Technology and Public Policy at the Bush School of Government and Public Service. He served as editor of the Journal of Theoretical Politics from 2006 through 2013.