Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, em viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas.
O que é este blog?
Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;
Meu Twitter: https://twitter.com/PauloAlmeida53
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/paulobooks
sexta-feira, 5 de maio de 2017
Brazil: the Next OECD Member? - Deborah Farias (Rising Powers Project)
quinta-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2016
Brazil, Argentina and non-proleferation efforts around the word.
Brazil, Argentina, and the Politics of Global Nonproliferation and Nuclear Safeguards
Togzhan Kassenova
Proeferation News, December 1, 2016
Brazil and Argentina influence and are influenced by the global trends in nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear safeguards. This article describes the evolving trends in the global nonproliferation regime, reflects on international nuclear safeguards, and explains how these trends relate to unique challenges and opportunities facing Brazil, Argentina, and ABACC.
As possessors of advanced nuclear technology, Brazil and Argentina bear special responsibility for helping the international community and neighbors in their region feel confident that their nuclear programs are peaceful, secure, and safe.
See the report, in this link.
sábado, 24 de setembro de 2016
China's pivot, Brazil's stance: a personal view - Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
This is the meeting:
GIBSA Workshop: Germany, India, Brazil and South Africa:A Strategic Quadrilogue 2016
Geoeconomics and Geopolitics at Play:
The outlook from Europe, South Asia, South America and Africa
Brasilia, September 25 – 27
The GIBSA Quadrilogue was launched in 2007 as a collaboration between four Think Tanks: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin, the Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI) in Rio de Janeiro, the Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (IPCS) in New Delhi, and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria. The forum is supposed to facilitate exchanges of ideas between these countries with regard to their respective perceptions and analyses of international relations.
And this is my paper:
Available at Academia.edu:
https://www.academia.edu/s/42e5a419f5/3041-chinas-pivot-brazils-stance-a-personal-view-2016
In Twetter:
Join my feedback session on "3041) China's pivot, Brazil's stance: a personal view (2016)." https://www.academia.edu/s/42e5a419f5/3041-chinas-pivot-brazils-stance-a-personal-view-2016?source=twitter
domingo, 24 de abril de 2016
Brazil’s Giant Problem - John Lyons and David Luhnow (WSJ)
Brazil’s Giant Problem
John Lyons and David Luhnow
The Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2016
Corruption is just a symptom of Brazil’s deeper issue: a vast state apparatus that has tried to be the country’s engine of economic growth.
Founded by Portuguese monarchs who moved their court to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, Brazil has experienced almost every conceivable sort of rule over the past two centuries. Its leaders have run the gamut from emperors and dictators to democrats and former Marxists. Regardless of their politics, however, almost all of them have shared a commitment to the Leviathan state as the engine of progress.
“The problem is, from time immemorial, Brazil’s political leaders only see one way forward, the growth of the state,” said Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a former leftist intellectual who sought to reduce the size of Brazil’s government while president from 1995 to 2002. “But you need another springboard for progress, that doesn’t exclude the state but that accepts markets. This just doesn’t sink in in Brazil.”
Today, the Leviathan is sick. Brasília is embroiled in a sprawling embezzlement scandal at the state oil company, Petróleo Brasileiro SA . Investigators say that politicians, oil executives and businessmen conspired for a decade to siphon billions of dollars from the firm, channeling money to Swiss accounts and the slush funds of major political parties.
In Brazil’s Congress, where six in 10 members now face some kind of criminal investigation, lawmakers in the lower house have voted to impeach President Dilma Rousseff, a leftist economist whom many blame for fostering corruption and ruining Brazil’s economy. One vote against her came from Congressman Tiririca, a professional clown who won office campaigning that “it can’t get any worse.”
But it might. Brazil is deep in its worst recession since the 1930s, and it may not yet have hit bottom. The country’s debt tripled to $1 trillion in nine years, and some of its states are already going bust. Government insolvency is a possibility. If Ms. Rousseff is impeached, her vice president, Michel Temer, will need to rely on lawmakers implicated in the Petrobras scandal to make unpopular decisions like spending cuts to prevent Brazil’s crisis from turning into a full-blown calamity.
While many observers of Brazil’s predicament have focused on the country’s corruption, that may miss the point. Brazil’s deeper problem lies in the failures of its Leviathan state, which has perennially reached for the utopian visions embodied in Brasília but instead has produced recurring cycles of boom and dramatic bust.
A sensation of déjà vu hangs over Brasília right now. The current downturn follows one of Brazil’s greatest booms. Just a few years ago, the country appeared to be climbing into the global club of developed nations. The economy surged 7.6% in 2010, capping a decade in which millions of the poor climbed into the middle class. Diplomats opened new embassies and lobbied for a seat on the U.N. Security Council. Brazil was selected to host the 2014 World Cup and this year’s Olympic Games.
But the country has been here before. With 10% annual growth in the 1970s, some declared a “Brazilian Miracle,” only to see the 1980s become the “Lost Decade”: Inflation surged to four digits, and workers rushed out on payday to spend their wages, knowing that their money would be worthless by morning.
But it might. Brazil is deep in its worst recession since the 1930s, and it may not yet have hit bottom. The country’s debt tripled to $1 trillion in nine years, and some of its states are already going bust. Government insolvency is a possibility. If Ms. Rousseff is impeached, her vice president, Michel Temer, will need to rely on lawmakers implicated in the Petrobras scandal to make unpopular decisions like spending cuts to prevent Brazil’s crisis from turning into a full-blown calamity.
While many observers of Brazil’s predicament have focused on the country’s corruption, that may miss the point. Brazil’s deeper problem lies in the failures of its Leviathan state, which has perennially reached for the utopian visions embodied in Brasília but instead has produced recurring cycles of boom and dramatic bust.
A sensation of déjà vu hangs over Brasília right now. The current downturn follows one of Brazil’s greatest booms. Just a few years ago, the country appeared to be climbing into the global club of developed nations. The economy surged 7.6% in 2010, capping a decade in which millions of the poor climbed into the middle class. Diplomats opened new embassies and lobbied for a seat on the U.N. Security Council. Brazil was selected to host the 2014 World Cup and this year’s Olympic Games.
But the country has been here before. With 10% annual growth in the 1970s, some declared a “Brazilian Miracle,” only to see the 1980s become the “Lost Decade”: Inflation surged to four digits, and workers rushed out on payday to spend their wages, knowing that their money would be worthless by morning.
“It really begs the question: Is all this cyclical, is our economy and politics like a chicken trying to take flight, rising a few feet and then settling back down again?” said Marcos Troyjo, a former Brazilian diplomat who now teaches at Columbia University. “We seem to have returned to a spot in the past where inflation is a real threat, where debt is rising exponentially, where the president must act or the scenario deteriorates further.”
Brazil inspires optimism because it has a lot going for it. The South American nation has qualities that Americans would find familiar. It is a continent-sized nation with fertile land, abundant natural resources and a deeply ingrained sense of national destiny. Its population of 200 million is mixed, including descendants from a dark past of slavery (Brazil imported more slaves than the U.S.) and waves of European and Japanese immigration. But Brazil remained underdeveloped as the U.S. became a superpower.
“Brazil has yet to find a way to combine an enormous economic potential with the political leadership needed to sustain the needed enabling reforms,” said Mohamed El-Erian, chief economic adviser at Allianz. “As such, the economy ends up behaving like a thoroughbred horse that can run really fast on smooth ground but stumbles and falls when it gets bumpy.”
One explanation for Brazil’s stop-and-start development path is reliance on commodities. The country is even named for one: Brazilwood, used to make red dye in the 16th century. Brazil’s history can be told through commodities cycles, from sugar in the mid-1500s to coffee and rubber in the 1800s. In the early 2000s, iron, oil and soy positioned Brazil to soar as Chinese demand for the goods surged.
While commodities exports represent a small part of Brazil’s largely closed economy, they are a direct driver of growth. No other country in Latin America has a tighter correlation between commodity prices and growth, according to a survey by Morgan Stanley.
Brazil’s leaders spent much of the 20th century attempting to diversify away from natural resources, but their approach almost always relied on state banks and state companies—and it failed time and again. Juscelino Kubitschek, who built Brasília, promised “50 years of progress in five.” He created a state company to build the capital, called Novacap, and put a rival political party in charge to ensure stability. The cost of the city is still a matter of debate in Brazil, but the central bank printed so much paper money that inflation surged.
As a leftist militant in the 1960s, Ms. Rousseff was tortured by the military dictatorship, which itself tried to drive growth by creating state factories and Pharaonic projects such as giant dams. As an energy minister and later president of a left-leaning democracy, Ms. Rousseff helped to implement the same sort of industrial strategies.
Why does Brazil’s Leviathan state endure? One reason is a strong current of nationalism running through Brazilian life. Another is that it has delivered just enough on its grand promises to win the loyalty of key segments of the population.
Brazil has modernized significantly since World War II, when half the population was illiterate and much of it hungry. The government also created national health and educational systems that, though of poor quality, reach even into the country’s remote Amazon jungles.
Research by the government-backed Embrapa agricultural institute helped Brazil to expand soy and cattle ranching to the harsh soils of its West, and the country became a farming power. State initiative turned Brazil into a leader in ethanol, and the oil firm Petrobras was known as a pioneer in deep-water drilling before the corruption scandal overwhelmed it.
When Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was elected in 2002, he set the Leviathan in motion to lift the poor. A massive expansion of a welfare program called Bolsa Familia fed families while encouraging children to attend school. Birth-weights in the poor northeast rose. Other programs expanded the electricity grid to regions without light and provided water where there was little. State-subsidized mortgages turned swaths of the working class into homeowners.
“There are vast parts of our country that are poor and without security or education. The state needs to reach these people. Brazil’s history has shown that the free market simply won’t do it,” said Luiz Torelly, a bureaucrat at the state-run Institute for National and Artistic Patrimony in Brasília who defends the size of Brazil’s state.
At the same time, there are few voices in Brazilian public life to challenge the ideas of people like Mr. Torelly. There is no major political party advocating limited government. Politicians who do are likely to be derided by nationalists as sellouts to the free-market U.S.
Unlike other nations in the New World, Brazil never had a revolution that set it in opposition to an intrusive state. The Portuguese monarchy brought an entire ship filled with royal files and documents when it relocated to Rio. Successive governments have added new layers of regulation to a state that began as a royal court. In 1979, military rulers tried to pare back the bureaucracy by creating a cabinet post, the Minister of De-bureaucratization.
The result today is a bureaucracy that spends 41% of the country’s gross domestic product—about double the rate of the U.S. The return for all that tax money is questionable: poorly built roads, ports and bridges, and second-rate education and health services. As one travelers’ cliché goes, Brazil taxes like Scandinavia but has Africa-level infrastructure. In 2013, huge and sometimes violent protests erupted across the country, with protesters upset that the country was spending billions on World Cup stadiums while patients died waiting on the floors of hospital hallways.
Brazil’s government employs millions of workers, most of whom are nearly impossible to fire because of protections written into the constitution. The sheer extent of the bureaucracy and red tape stifles job creation. Brazil ranks 174th in the world for ease of starting a business, behind Uganda and Djibouti, according to the World Bank.
During the “Lost Decade” of hyperinflation in the 1980s, the Leviathan went haywire. State banks that had made bad loans to state enterprises posted enormous losses, forcing Brazil to print money to support them, which in turn created hyperinflation. The currency changed value and even names so often that old bills started circulating with rubber stamps on them showing their new denominations.
Perhaps the most insidious legacy of Brazilian’s Leviathan state is the country’s endemic corruption. Bureaucrats with broad controls become tempted to seek bribes to issue permits, licenses and contracts. Businessmen become tempted to pay them.
Brazil’s Leviathan grew so great that it gave rise to a popular theory that corruption could be a good thing because it “greased the wheels” of otherwise paralyzed bureaucracies. The idea was outlined in a 1964 paper by the American economist Nathaniel Leff, who worked extensively in Brazil.
That view was challenged in the 1990s by economists such as Paulo Mauro, who saw that corruption directly inhibits development: Officials make investments based not on the country’s best interests but on the size of the bribes they get. Matters get worse during commodity booms, when corruption expands in a tide of easy money. “Corruption becomes a system, and the bigger the system, the harder it is to break it,” Mr. Mauro said.
Exhibit A is the Petrobras scandal. After Brazil discovered massive oil fields off Rio de Janeiro, planners sought to make Petrobras a driver of development. They required the company, for example, to source oil platforms locally, with hopes of creating a ship-building industry. Investigators now say that oil executives, businessmen and politicians conspired to skim contracts from Petrobras, channeling money back to Ms. Rousseff’s Workers’ Party and its allies, including the party of Mr. Temer, the vice president who will take over if she is impeached. Ms. Rousseff and Mr. Temer are not charged and deny involvement in the scheme.
The Petrobras scandal is also a case study in opportunities squandered by Brazil’s Leviathan state. Huge investments in refineries and other projects at the center of the scandal were largely wasted—just as Mr. Mauro had predicted. In 2006, Petrobras bought an aging refinery in Texas for $1.2 billion, 30 times what it sold for just the year before. Petrobras’s new $18.5 billion Abreu e Lima refinery is eight times over budget and still incomplete. Both deals are under investigation, and neither may ever be profitable, analysts say.
The Petrobras scandal also allegedly shows how politicians used corruption to retain control. Brazil has 35 registered political parties, some 27 of which are represented in the lower house. The variety is almost comical. Aside from the Workers’ Party, there is the Democratic Labor Party, the Brazilian Labor Party, the Christian Labor Party, the Labor Party of Brazil, the National Labor Party and the Brazilian Labor Renewal Party—and those are just the parties that mention labor or workers.
Many of these parties have no ideology: They exist to capture federal funds budgeted to political parties in the constitution. Their allegiance is for sale, political scientists say. Mostly that means swapping congressional votes for control of cabinet ministries and political appointments. Some 20,000 high-ranking posts in Brazil’s bureaucracy are political appointments, including posts at Petrobras, where investigators say that officials embezzled money for their parties and themselves.
The Workers’ Party came to power vowing to wipe out corruption but was pulled into it, some longtime members say. In 2005, the party and its founder, Mr. da Silva, were rocked by the “Mensalão” vote-buying scandal. Mr. da Silva’s chief of staff resigned and was later jailed. But the economy was booming, and Mr. da Silva was re-elected.
The 84 arrests in the Petrobras scandal—among them a senator and high-profile chief executives of big construction firms—show that Brazil’s big state has at least built a judiciary with strength and independence to go after elites. Part of the credit goes to the 1988 Constitution, which ensured lifetime jobs for judges and prosecutors and shielded their budgets from politicians.
In recent years, prosecutors also won the ability to use plea bargains to offer cooperating witnesses reduced sentences. And suspects could no longer avoid jail by endlessly appealing a guilty verdict in the country’s slow courts, as they had in the past.
“The culture of compliance is sinking in fast. Companies are all persuaded they need to change their ways,” said Rubens Ricupero, a former Brazilian finance minister.
What’s unclear yet is whether the Petrobras investigations represent a watershed for Brazil or an isolated crusade driven by a few willing to exert their power. “A big reason for the independence of the judiciary was not some high-minded separation of powers, but a happy byproduct of the lobbying of judges and prosecutors who wanted job security,” says Ivar Hartmann, a law professor at the Getulio Vargas Foundation law school in Rio.
Trimming back Brazil’s Leviathan state won't be easy. As much as 85% of Brazil’s federal budget goes to spending that is guaranteed by law, from increases in retirement plans to spending on housing. Changes will require constitutional amendments.
“The trouble is, the only way to fix the politics is through the politicians,” says Mr. Ricupero. “Are they really going to vote against their own self interest?”
Write to John Lyons at john.lyons@wsj.com and David Luhnow at david.luhnow@wsj.com
quinta-feira, 22 de outubro de 2015
How Brazil was downgraded: PRAlmeida at Yale
‘Too Introverted’: Economist Paulo Roberto de Almeida on Brazil
The Latino Leadership Association hosted the talk by Almeida, deputy consul general of Brazil in Hartford and professor of political economy at University Center of Brasília, at Yale SOM. Almeida discussed Brazil’s current fiscal crisis in a talk titled “How Brazil was Downgraded: Economic Challenges and Political Turmoil.”
Among Brazil’s longstanding problems, Almeida said, is an insular approach to trade that prevents it from playing a major role in the world economy.
“Brazil is too introverted,” Almeida said. “The coefficient of opening [in] the Brazilian economy is less than 20% compared to the world average of more than 40%—China [is] 60%.”
“Historically, Brazil [accounts for] just 1% of the world trade,” he said. “Even in the last decade, when Brazil benefited from the Chinese bonanza, there was much more increase in value than in volume. For an economy who pretends to be the sixth- or the seventh-largest economy, it’s too low a share.”
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segunda-feira, 5 de outubro de 2015
In Brazil, Free-Market Ideas Rise as the Economy Falls - Antony P. Mueller (Mises Daily)
Antony P. Mueller
Mises Daily, October 5, 2015
The Mises Institute spoke with Associated Scholar Antony Mueller last week about recent economic and ideological trends in Brazil. Prof. Mueller teaches economics at Federal University of Sergipe (UFS) in Brazil.
Mises Institute: For those of us not in Brazil, it is hard to interpret the commentary on Brazil’s economy right now. Brazil’s debt was recently reduced to junk status, and we can see that Brazil’s economy is not doing well. But how severe is the crisis?
Antony Mueller: Part of the explanation is that for a large part of the population and for the government itself, the crisis came as a shock. At first, the Brazilian government ignored the coming of the crisis and when it arrived, the government ignored its existence.
Imagine Brazil like a family with a lot of inherited wealth that spends as if there were no tomorrow. Yet someday this family wakes up to the fact that its wealth has been squandered and its financial accounts are in the red. The government did not recognize that the boom would be temporary. The Brazilian economy began to sputter as commodity prices fell and the demand from China decreased. Yet in order to adapt to the new situation and cut expenditures, the Brazilian government spent even more.
Incumbent President Dilma Rousseff from the Workers Party, which has been in power since 2003, won a second term in 2014 with a campaign that deceived the population about the true state of the economy. The government implemented a series of cheap financial tricks such as delaying the rise of the prices for fuel and electricity and of other items in the large list of administered prices.
After the election, hell broke loose and the true state of the economy became visible for the broad public. The popularity of the president began to fall to single-digit approval ratings. The crisis is serious in itself, yet its psychological impact becomes more severe because of the shock of disillusion. In part, this shock also applies to foreign observers and investors who bought into government propaganda or based their outlook on the projections of the International Monetary Fund whose prognosis in 2013 said that Brazil would maintain economic growth rates of at least over 4 percent for each of the years to come up to 2018.
MI: Ambrose Evans-Pritchard is writing off Brazil as if it’s a total disaster area, and he quotes one observer who says “things will get much worse before they get better.” Is this true, and if so, what are the obstacles to improvement?
AM: Evans-Pritchard’s remarks reflect the consensus among foreign observers and there is indeed little doubt that the crisis will deteriorate before it gets better. Even worse, the recuperation could take much longer than is generally assumed. The reason for a pessimistic outlook comes from the fact that the crisis is not only economic, but also political in character. Not only members of the present government, but also figures of the opposition parties are under investigation about massive corruption linked to the major Brazilian oil company Petrobras. There is much frustration in the country because there is no promising alternative in sight.
MI: Assuming we are looking at real declines in standards of living, how long will it take the country to get back to where it was at the height of the boom?
AM: This is a difficult question for a specific answer. So let me answer in a more fundamental way. Brazil’s economic development has been on a roller coaster ride for centuries. Phases of extraordinary booms were followed by long periods of busts and stagnation.
In the second half of the twentieth century, the boom of the 1950s, with the promise that Brazil would achieve growth and development of “fifty years in five years” ended in economic disaster and the military dictatorship that lasted from 1964 to 1985, which in turn ended with Brazil’s catastrophic foreign debt crisis. It took a “lost decade” for the country to recuperate.
The 1990s saw a series of reforms that put the country back on the track. In 2003, when the newly elected president, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva from the Workers Party took over the government, the economy was already on a growth path. Then came the commodity boom with a seemingly insatiable appetite for Brazilian natural and agricultural products. Yet, instead of using the good times that filled the coffers of the Brazilian treasury to carry out highly necessary reforms, the Labor government pursued a populist policy of generous social spending, particularly for the poor parts of the population.
Now, these achievements of reducing poverty and inequality have come under threat because of the lack of financial funds. This means that Brazil must face not only an economic and a political crisis, but also a social crisis. The confluence of such a triple crisis increases the risks that any one of them gets worse because each individual crisis affects negatively the other crises. The consequential chain from the economic to the political and from there to the social crisis then goes into reverse and the social crisis worsens the outlook to get out of the political and the economic crisis.
MI: Brazil was a big part of the BRICS effort to create a group of up-and-coming economies that could rival the big economies like the US and Germany. Is that idea totally dead, or is the demise of BRICS overstated?
AM: The BRICS never managed to operate as a coherent group. Now, that not only Brazil is in crisis, but also Russia, and that China is in troubled waters, the outlook for the BRICS as a group of playing a major role in global affairs has diminished even more.
It is similar with MERCOSUL, the common market project in South America. Instead of achieving free exchange, trade conflicts are on the rise and not a single supranational institution has become effective. From my observations of Latin America and of Brazil in particular, I conclude that there are still vast mental and ideological barriers in place that work against sustained prosperity. The ideological dominance of statism, socialism, and interventionism is present in every layer of the Brazilian society — not only in politics or academia, but also in the business community itself.
Bureaucracy is a nightmare without end. Taxation is high and brings little return. The public educational system is in shambles. The legal system is unable to cope with an enormous backlog of unresolved cases, while at the same time, judges and other legal authorities enjoy grandiose privileges. Salaries in the judiciary are astronomical compared to what the average person or the poorer parts of the Brazilian society earn.
The public sector in general is extremely inefficient and is an El Dorado of rent-seekers. I do not expect that any of these obstacles will be resolved in the coming years. I fear that it is not much different in some other BRICS countries. They are all stuck in the “middle income trap,” as they are apparently unable to change from a statist to a free market system. There are many vested interests in place, in both politics and in established business, preventing change from state capitalism to an entrepreneurial capitalism. Only based on a fundamental change of ideology in favor of markets and individual and entrepreneurial liberty, will countries like Brazil gain long-term prosperity. I would also say that the same holds for China and the other members of the BRICS and emerging markets in general.
MI: Ideologically, is there any hope of a shift in Brazilian ideology? Some in the US media have featured libertarian free market groups in Brazil and suggested there is a change going on. Do you see any of that?
AM: Well, there is hope, yet it is a long way down the road. The Brazilian libertarian movement is gaining strength, particularly among students and young people in general. In fact, the spread of libertarian ideas among young Brazilians is amazing. The Brazilian Mises Institute is overwhelmed by visits to its site and the Institute’s events are grandiose. There is much good will, high hopes, a lot of serious dedication and extreme diligence at work in the libertarian movement of Brazil. If this trend continues, the walls that surround the established ideology will finally crumble. Anybody with an alert mind must see that statism has failed; that the ideas of socialism and interventionism are sterile and that they produce mainly frustration, stagnation, and crises. The libertarian movement in Brazil is the new avant-garde; its members are the true “progressives.”
The modern electronic media help to accelerate their ascendancy to influence and recognition. The current crisis will be a further wake-up call for young people to recognize that it is their future which is at stake if Brazil should continue in its old ways. With ever more young people joining the libertarian movement, I am sure that sometime in the future a critical mass will be reached and things will change.
quarta-feira, 23 de setembro de 2015
Economic Freedom of the World: Brasil na rabeira
Economic Freedom of the World 2015
O Brasil, como seria de se esperar, não só ocupa o ÚLTIMO LUGAR na lista dos grandes países, como não para de recuar nas liberdades econômicas.
Vejam neste link:
http://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/economic-freedom-of-the-world-2015.pdf
Os paises economicamente mais livres (e o Chile passa à frente dos EUA):
Top-rated countries
Hong Kong and Singapore, once again, occupy the top two positions. The other nations in the top 10 are New Zealand, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, Mauritius, Jordan, Ireland, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
Outros grandes países, e sua posição, o Brasil ocupando o último lugar das grandes economias:
The rankings of some other major countries are the United States (16th), Japan (26th), Germany (29th), South Korea (39th), Italy (68th), France (70th), Mexico (93st), Russia (99th), China (111th), India (114th), and Brazil (118th).
A ficha para o Brasil vai aqui reproduzida:
domingo, 13 de setembro de 2015
How Brazil got junked (it could have happenned sooner) - Economist
quinta-feira, 16 de julho de 2015
Latin American development trends and Brazil’s role in the region - Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Latin American development trends and Brazil’s role in the region
Resumo
Texto completo em pdf: http://seer.ufms.br/index.php/revpaiaguas/article/view/997/606
quinta-feira, 5 de junho de 2014
Deu no New York Times: a Copa pode ser ruim para o Brasil...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida