O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

Mostrando postagens com marcador South Africa. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador South Africa. Mostrar todas as postagens

quinta-feira, 11 de janeiro de 2024

What to know about the genocide case against Israel at the ICJ - The Washington Post

The Washington Post, January 11, 2024 

 

The Washington Post, January 11, 2024 

What to know about the genocide case against Israel at the ICJ

Israel appeared before the International Court of Justice in The Hague on Thursday to face accusations it is committing genocide in Gaza in a case that could impact the trajectory of the war.

South Africa, which brought the case, alleges that Israel is violating international law by committing and failing to prevent genocidal acts “to destroy Palestinians in Gaza.”

Israel has rejected the allegations — as has its most important ally, the United States.

The ICJ case adds to international pressure on Israel to scale back or end its war against Hamas, which health officials in Gaza say has killed more than 23,000 people — many of them women and children. The war also has rendered much of the enclave uninhabitable and pushed the population to the brink of famine.

Israel launched the campaign after Hamas militants rampaged through Israeli communities on Oct. 7, killing around 1,200 people and taking more than 200 hostage.

After hearings Thursday and Friday, judges are expected to rule within weeks on interventions that South Africa has requested to change Israel’s conduct of the war. A verdict on the question of genocide could take years.

Here’s what to know.

What is the ICJ, and what authority does it have?

The International Court of Justice, established after World War II to settle disputes between countries, is the main judicial body of the United Nations.

The U.N. General Assembly and Security Council elect the court’s 15 judges to nine-year terms. Its president is Joan Donoghue, a former legal adviser to the State Department.

A 1948 convention, ratified after the Holocaust, made genocide a crime under international law and gave the ICJ the authority to determine whether states have committed it.

The court’s rulings are legally binding, but enforcement can be tricky, and the rulings can be ignored. Russia, for example, rejected a 2022 order to cease its war against Ukraine.

The ICJ is distinct from the International Criminal Court, a newer body that tries individuals accused of violating international laws including war crimes and genocide. Neither Israel nor the United States recognizes the ICC’s jurisdiction.

What is South Africa’s genocide case against Israel?

In an 84-page filing, South Africa accuses Israel of intending “to destroy Palestinians in Gaza as a part of the broader Palestinian national, racial and ethnical group.”

“Israel has reduced and is continuing to reduce Gaza to rubble, killing, harming and destroying its people, and creating conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction as a group,” the country argues.

South Africa points to Israel’s large-scale killing and maiming of civilians; its use of “dumb” bombs; the mass displacement and the destruction of neighborhoods; “deprivation of access to adequate food and water,” medical care, shelter, clothes, hygiene and sanitation to civilians; its obliteration of Palestinian civic institutions; and its failure to provide any place of safety for Gazans.

South Africa also accuses Israel of preventing Palestinian births by displacing pregnant people, denying them access to food, water and care, and killing them.

To be successful, South Africa will have to show that Israel’s goal is not just to wipe out Hamas, but to destroy Palestinians “as such” in Gaza. The country quotes Israeli leaders calling for mass expulsions from Gaza or denying that anyone there is innocent.

Proving genocidal intent will be a challenge, said Adil Haque, a professor of international law at Rutgers. Still, he said, Israel will be called to explain: “How can it be that all of these military and political leaders are making these extreme statements?”

Amichai Cohen, a law professor at Israel’s Ono Academic College and senior fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute, said South Africa’s case reflects “classic cherry-picking.”

“There have been things said and tweeted and written by Israeli politicians that are extremely problematic,” he said. “But these are not the decision-makers.” Still, he said, a recent uptick in calls from right-wing Israeli ministers for the “emigration” of Palestinians from Gaza “doesn’t help.”

How does Israel respond?

Israel vehemently denies the allegations and says South Africa is “criminally complicit” with Hamas.

“We have been clear in word and in deed that we are targeting the October 7th monsters and are innovating ways to uphold international law,” government spokesman Eylon Levy said last week.

“Our war is against Hamas, not against the people of Gaza,” an Israel Defense Forces spokesman, Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari, said Tuesday.

Israeli officials say they’re not targeting civilians or trying to force Palestinians out of Gaza. Israel blames Hamas, charging that it uses civilians as human shields. The government has embarked on a public-relations campaign to rebut allegations that it is obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Israeli officials accuse Hamas and allied groups of waging a genocidal campaign against Jews. The government on Wednesdaycreated a website intended for foreign viewers and posted graphic vides on it from the Oct. 7 attacks and their aftermath.

But the ICJ has authority to examine allegations only against states, not militant groups.

Israel vehemently denies the allegations and says South Africa is “criminally complicit” with Hamas.

“We have been clear in word and in deed that we are targeting the October 7th monsters and are innovating ways to uphold international law,” government spokesman Eylon Levy said last week.

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“Our war is against Hamas, not against the people of Gaza,” an Israel Defense Forces spokesman, Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari, said Tuesday.

Israeli officials say they’re not targeting civilians or trying to force Palestinians out of Gaza. Israel blames Hamas, charging that it uses civilians as human shields. The government has embarked on a public-relations campaign to rebut allegations that it is obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Israeli officials accuse Hamas and allied groups of waging a genocidal campaign against Jews. The government on Wednesdaycreated a website intended for foreign viewers and posted graphic vides on it from the Oct. 7 attacks and their aftermath.

But the ICJ has authority to examine allegations only against states, not militant groups.

Who will argue and try the case?

South African human rights specialist John Dugard leads his country’s legal team. He has extensive experience investigating Israel’s alleged rights violations in the occupied Palestinian territories and has served as an ad hoc judge on the ICJ.

Israel’s defense team is led by British lawyer Malcolm Shaw, a specialist in territorial disputes who has defended the United Arab Emirates, Cameroon and Serbia before the ICJ.

The choice of a figure respected in the field, Cohen said, “signifies that Israel is taking the case seriously.”

Each side is allowed to appoint one judge to the bench, for a total of 17. These ad hoc judges are supposed to weigh facts independently, but states tend to appoint judges they believe will be sympathetic to their arguments.

Israel has picked the former president of its high court, Aharon Barak, an advocate for judicial independence and, notably, a critic of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s efforts to overhaul Israeli courts. Barak’s appointment Sunday drew praise from Israeli centrists and condemnation from Netanyahu’s right-wing allies.

Cohen described Barak is a “great defender of the state of Israel.” Barak told Canada’s Globe and Mail several weeks into the war that Israel’s mission and conduct in Gaza did not violate international law.

South Africa chose Dikgang Moseneke, a former deputy chief justice of its constitutional court. Moseneke helped to draft South Africa’s interim constitution in 1993, as the country transitioned from apartheid to democracy.

The appointees’ personal backgrounds — Barak is a Holocaust survivor; Moseneke spent time in prison for his activism against apartheid — “might make for a very interesting clash,” said Haque, the Rutgers professor.

Why are the hearings this week significant?

The hearings are to consider “provisional measures” to stop conditions in Gaza from worsening while the case progresses. One measure South Africa is requesting: that Israel “cease killing” the people in Gaza. South Africa will argue its case Thursday. Israel will respond Friday.

The order for Moscow to cease fighting in Ukraine showed the limits to the court’s power. Juliette McIntyre, a lecturer in law at the University of South Australia who specializes in international courts and tribunals, said she would be surprised if the court issued a similar order against Israel.

“I think we are likely to see a much more nuanced order relating to ensuring that aid, water, etc. is allowed into Gaza and that Israel has to uphold its commitments,” she wrote in an email.

The only way to enforce an ICJ order is through a vote of the U.N. Security Council. Any of the council’s five permanent members, including the United States, could veto any such measure. Secretary of State Antony Blinken this week called the genocide case “meritless.”

But given recent U.S. efforts pushing Israel to try harder to minimize civilian deaths, McIntyre wrote, an order could provide cover to apply greater pressure “without being perceived as backing down against Hamas.”

By defending itself in court, Haque said, Israel is accepting its legitimacy — and that “will make it more difficult to defy the court’s orders later on.”

John Hudson and Lior Soroka in Tel Aviv contributed to this report.

 

segunda-feira, 24 de julho de 2017

BRICS Co-operation: Assessment and Next Steps - Seminar Itamaraty, August 1, 2017, 9am-4pm




BRICS Co-operation: Assessment and Next Steps
Auditório Paulo Nogueira Batista, Anexo II, Palácio Itamaraty
Brasília, 1 August 2017

Draft Programme*

09:00–09:20
Opening

§  Ambassador Sérgio Eduardo Moreira Lima, President of FUNAG
§  Ambassador Georges Lamazière, Under Secretary General for Asia and the Pacific
§  Ambassador Li Jinzhang, Ambassador of China to Brazil
§  Assistant Minister Hu Zhengyue, Vice President of China Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA)

09:20–10:40
One Decade of the BRICS: Assessment and Next Steps

§  Professor Wu Xiaoqiu, Vice-President of Renmin University
§  Ambassador Sergio Florencio, Director for International Economic and Political Relations, IPEA
§  Minister Mariana Madeira, Head of the Division for BRICS and IBSA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
§  Minister Benoni Belli, Secretary for Diplomatic Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
§  Professor Thomas Dwyer, Co-ordinator, BRICS Studies Project, University of Campinas

10:40–11:00
Coffee Break


11:00–12:40
Breadth and Depth: Priorities for BRICS Co-operation
Moderator : Professor WangWen, Executive Dean Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China

§  Mr. Zhao Xiyuan, Secretary-General of China Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA)
§  Counsellor Rina-Louise Pretorius, Embassy of South Africa to Brazil
§  XX, Embassy of India to Brazil
§  XX, Embassy of Russia to Brazil
§  Professor Zhao Xijun, Deputy Dean of School of Finance, Renmin University of China
12:40–14:00
Lunch Break



14:00– 15:40

Financial Co-operation, Investment and the New Development Bank
Moderator: Minister Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Director of IPRI

§  Professor Murilo Portugal, President of FEBRABAN
§  Minister Norberto Moretti, Director of the Department for Financial Affairs and Services, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
§  Professor Wang Wen, Executive Dean, Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China (RDCY)
§  Professor Marcos Troyjo, Director, BRICLab, Columbia University
§  XX, Embassy of China in Brazil
15:40–16:00
Wrap-up and Closure

§  Minister Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Director of IPRI
§  Minister Mariana Madeira, Head of the Division for BRICS and IBSA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
§  Professor Wu Xiaoqiu, Vice-President of Renmin University

Supporting Partners:
Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG)
China Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA)

Co-Host:
Institute for Research on International Relations (IPRI), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil
Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies,Renmin University of China (RDCY)



* Participants' names to be confirmed.


Chinese Participants' list:
- Wu Xiaoqiu, Vice President of Renmin University of China
- Zhao Xijun, Deputy Dean of School of Finance, Renmin University of China
- WangWen, Executive Dean Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies ,Renmin University of China
- Cui Yue, Executive Editor-in-Chief of Information Centre, Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies ,Renmin University of China
- Cheng Cheng, Vice Research fellow of Industry Research Department of Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies , Renmin University of China

sábado, 24 de setembro de 2016

China's pivot, Brazil's stance: a personal view - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Invited, at the last minute, to a GIBSA (Germany, India, Brazil, South Africa) conference in Brasilia, to express myself about China's pivot in Asia Pacific and its implications for Brazil, I have chosen to put a few ideas on paper about this important relationship, much more of a mere commercial nature than having greater geopolitical implications. Brazil is not part of the big geopolitical game of the Asia Pacific region, we are just a middle country struggling to recover ourselves from the Great Destruction brought by the criminal government of Worker's Party and its mafia kind of government.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

This is the meeting: 

GIBSA Workshop: Germany, India, Brazil and South Africa:A Strategic Quadrilogue 2016
Geoeconomics and Geopolitics at Play:
The outlook from Europe, South Asia, South America and Africa

Brasilia, September 25 – 27


The GIBSA Quadrilogue was launched in 2007 as a collaboration between four Think Tanks: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin, the Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI) in Rio de Janeiro, the Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies (IPCS) in New Delhi, and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria. The forum is supposed to facilitate exchanges of ideas between these countries with regard to their respective perceptions and analyses of international relations.

And this is my paper: 


China’s pivot, Brazil’s stance: a personal view

Paulo Roberto de Almeida
 [GIBSA meeting, Brasília, September 26, 2016]

Since August, I’m Director of the Brazilian International Relations Research Institute, supposedly a think tank for Itamaraty, today much more a tank than a think. Let’s assume, then, that we are capable of doing some free think work, as we do not have financial resources of our own, or a proper research staff to fill the tank side of this dependent body of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation.
Alexandre de Gusmão is said to be the grand-father of the Brazilian diplomacy, as the role of father is reserved to our Grand Priest, Baron of Rio Branco, for once minister in Berlin, before being the most famous Brazilian diplomat, the sole to be reproduced in at least six of our last eight currencies throughout the 20th century. Gusmão, a Brazilian diplomat on behalf of the Portuguese crown, negotiated the 1750 partition of South America between Spain and Portugal, redrawing the geopolitical map of the region and in fact abolishing the famous Tordesillas treaty (1494), a kind of Yalta partition of the world at the dawn of modern era.
Being currently outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I cannot pretend to speak on behalf of this respectable, traditional and very old institution, older than the corresponding bodies of Germany, India and South Africa. As I cannot speak for the Ministry, and as I cannot either redraw any geopolitical map for today’s international relations of Brazil, I’ll speak for myself, trying to express personal views about, not exactly China’s role in the world, but Brazil’s stance towards the new giant of the 21st geopolitical scenario. I will try to correct some misperceptions, among our friends from abroad, about Brazil’s stance in relation to the new kids in the block, that is, IBSA and BRICS, the innovations of the 2000s, and about Brazil’s recent partisan diplomacy.
What is important to perceive, at the start, and I stress this for our guests, is that we have to make a very clear distinction between Brazilian traditional, and professional, diplomacy, and that other “diplomacy”, the one that was publicized and practiced by the Worker’s Party governments, both under Lula and Dilma, a diplomacy that was based much more on ideological choices than well reflected decisions, a foreign policy that pursued old beliefs based on a North-South divide, and on an delusional and futile attempt to unite “non-hegemonic” countries in the restructuring of global relations.
(...)

Available at Academia.edu: 

https://www.academia.edu/s/42e5a419f5/3041-chinas-pivot-brazils-stance-a-personal-view-2016

In Twetter: 
Join my feedback session on "3041) China's pivot, Brazil's stance: a personal view (2016)." https://www.academia.edu/s/42e5a419f5/3041-chinas-pivot-brazils-stance-a-personal-view-2016?source=twitter

quarta-feira, 27 de março de 2013

To Bric or not Too Brics? - Le Monde, Estadao, NYT

Um piquenique de chefes de Estado, ou como já disse alguém dos summits iberoamericanos: um envelope em busca de algum conteúdo...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Le Monde, blog Amérique Latine (Paulo Paranaguá)

Que fait le Brésil dans le bric-à-brac des BRICS ?



Le Brésil, la Russie, l’Inde, la Chine et l’Afrique du Sud se retrouvent au 5e Sommet des BRICS, à Durban, en Afrique du Sud, mercredi 27 mars. L’acronyme, inventé en 2001 par un analyste de Goldman Sachs, s’est taillé une réputation, à défaut d’une identité.
Les Brésiliens veulent y voir une « entité politico-diplomatique » destinée à mieux faire entendre la voix des émergents sur la scène internationale, tout en mettant l’accent sur les performances économiques. Ainsi, la croissance de 6,9 % prévue en 2013 pour les BRICS serait presque le double des pronostics pour l’économie mondiale dans son ensemble. Sauf qu’à cette aune, le Brésil fait figure de canard boiteux, avec une hausse du produit intérieur brut d’à peine 0,9 % en 2012, ce que les Brésiliens appellent un Pibinho (un PIB minuscule).
Les échanges entre les BRICS s’élèvent à 282 milliards de dollars (219 milliards d'euros), soit dix fois le volume d’il y a dix ans. Cependant, ils restent négligeables en comparaison avec le volume du commerce entre ces cinq pays et le reste du monde : 6 000 milliards de dollars.
Un examen plus attentif des chiffres confirme ce qu’on sait déjà : les BRICS comptent un géant, la Chine, la seule justifiant le terme de puissance émergente. La Russie est une puissance en déclin, maintenue à flot par les exportations de gaz et des ventes d’armes. L’Inde n’est pas sortie du bourbier de ses contradictions et conflits, tandis que l’Afrique du Sud, puissance régionale à l’échelle de l’Afrique australe, gère tant bien que mal (plutôt mal) le lourd héritage de l’apartheid.
Lula et Dilma Rousseff à Sao Paulo en 2012.
Photo Ricardo Stuckert
Le bric-à-brac des BRICS est une auberge espagnole. Le Brésil est en concurrence avec la Chine en Amérique latine et en Afrique, mais aussi sur son propre marché intérieur. Tandis que les Brésiliens leur vendent du fer et du soja, les Chinois font du dumping face aux produits industriels « made in Brazil ». Si prompt à dénoncer la « guerre des monnaies », en pointant du doigt le dollar, Brasilia se tait sur le taux du  yuan.
Il y a une sorte de schizophrénie brésilienne, partagée entre l’empressement à conforter les BRICS et une diplomatie économique pour le moins poussive, pour ne pas dire erratique. Sous les présidences de Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva et de Dilma Rousseff, le Brésil a beaucoup misé sur les relations Sud-Sud, comme si l’Union européenne (UE) et les Etats-Unis n’étaient pas ses principaux partenaires.
Le Mercosur et l'UE, un mariage de raison ?
Pourtant, le Mercosur (l’union douanière sud-américaine) et l’Amérique latine ne semblent plus vraiment prioritaires pour les Brésiliens, si ce n’est dans la rhétorique. Le Mercosur est en panne, sans que Brasilia ne réagisse autrement que par la fuite en avant, l’élargissement au Venezuela compliquant la donne. L’Union des nations sud-américaines (Unasur) et la Communauté des Etats latino-américains et caribéens (Celac) restent des forums politiques, tandis que d’autres pays de la région avancent vers une intégration et une ouverture accrues, grâce à l’Alliance du Pacifique.
Ce contexte éclaire la place accordée aux BRICS. Le Brésil se rêve en puissance émergente et n’hésite pas à faire cavalier seul par rapport à ses turbulents voisins. Bien sûr, les diplomates brésiliens font ce qu’ils peuvent pour éviter des problèmes de voisinage, mais ne vont pas jusqu’à se salir les mains dans les litiges qui les entourent. Seule exception, la participation à la Mission des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti (Minustah), gage de la candidature brésilienne à un poste permanent au Conseil de sécurité, insaisissable faute de réforme de l’ONU.
Cette gestion diplomatique à la petite semaine est en crise. Brasilia se voit menacé par le projet de Trans-Pacific Partnership (Accord de partenariat trans-pacifique, TPP) et la future négociation d’un Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Accord de commerce et d’investissement transatlantique, TTIP) entre les Etats-Unis et l’UE.
Pris de court, le Brésil tente de relancer les échanges et le partenariat avec le Canada et avec les Etats-Unis, et mise aussi sur un accord entre le Mercosur et l’UE, après dix ans de négociations infructueuses. Le moment est difficile pour la reprise des tractations entre le Mercosur et l’UE, car l’Argentine est réticente, le Venezuela s’oppose à tout accord de libre-échange et la crise rend problématiques des concessions de l'UE sur le marché agricole. Les Brésiliens pourraient essayer de négocier seuls, à l’instar des négociations entre l’UE et les pays andins.
Pour le Brésil, la présence dans le club exclusif des BRICS ne règle rien, c’est une sorte d’ersatz, une façon de jouer dans la cour des grands, par le verbe et la posture.
==========
Um fundo político
27 de março de 2013 | 2h 08
Celso Ming - O Estado de S.Paulo

Na reunião de cúpula iniciada ontem e que continua hoje, na África do Sul, os chefes de governo dos Brics (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul) criaram um fundo de resgate cuja utilidade não é clara. Parece mais uma iniciativa destinada a passar para o mundo a ideia de que a sigla Brics não é artificial e que pode vir a construir boa unidade política.

Pela sua condição de contingência, esse fundo estaria disponível sempre que um dos países-membros enfrentasse crise de liquidez, ou seja, tivesse de lidar com repentina incapacidade de honrar compromissos no exterior. Assim, desempenharia função parecida com a do Fundo Monetário Internacional e, nesse sentido, se apresentaria como alternativa ao Fundo.

A tabela que está logo aí mostra que as cinco economias têm impressionante volume de reservas internacionais. E reserva é o que o nome diz: uma carteira de recursos imediatamente disponíveis cuja função é proteger a economia contra eventuais crises de caixa.

Em outras palavras, fica difícil entender como um fundo extra de somente US$ 100 bilhões poderia propiciar mais defesa contra sufocos dessa natureza do que esse montão de recursos formado pelas próprias reservas internacionais. As da China, por exemplo, são 35 vezes maiores do que será o patrimônio desse fundo; as da Rússia, 5 vezes; as do Brasil, 3,7; e as da Índia, 2,9.

Neste momento, o único país que poderia ser atingido por um esvaziamento relativamente rápido de suas reservas seria a África do Sul, que, no entanto, tem sozinha mais da metade dos recursos disponíveis nesse fundo.

Do ponto de vista do Brasil, a disponibilidade dessa nova fonte de recursos de contingência poderia servir para que o Banco Central reduzisse sua demanda de dólares que depois fossem estocados nas reservas, como são hoje, a um custo muito alto. (Porque cada compra de dólares que depois serão aplicados a juros baixos exige emissão de títulos da dívida pública, que pagam juros de ao menos 7,25% ao ano.)

Mas a decisão de aumentar ou diminuir as reservas internacionais do Brasil não é determinada pela necessidade de construir um colchão de proteção contra crises, mas pela de executar a política cambial. Se o governo federal entende que é preciso desvalorizar o real (elevar a cotação do dólar) ou impedir valorização maior, o Banco Central compra moeda estrangeira no câmbio interno; se o objetivo é o contrário, vende.

Do ponto de vista técnico, esse fundo não faz lá muito sentido. Nenhum grupo de países se disporia a criar um patrimônio desses somente para uma ajuda eventual à África do Sul.

O que se pode dizer é que se trata de uma iniciativa destinada a passar o recado de que as cinco economias que fazem parte do Brics querem demonstrar que são mais do que uma sigla inventada em 2001 por um economista (Jim O'Neill, então do Grupo Goldman Sachs). E que, agora, se propõem a dar certo conteúdo político a uma aglomeração que, no momento, está longe de compor uma unidade.
 ===========

Group of Emerging Nations Plans to Form Development Bank

Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia on Tuesday in Durban, South Africa,  just ahead of Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, South Africa’s defense minister.
JOHANNESBURG — A group of five emerging world economic powers met in Africa for the first time Tuesday, gathering in South Africa for a summit meeting at which they plan to announce the creation of a new development bank, a direct challenge to the dominance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
The leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, all members of the so-called BRICS Group of developing nations, have agreed to create the bank to focus on infrastructure and development in emerging markets. The countries are also planning to discuss pooling their foreign reserves as a bulwark against currency crises, part of a growing effort by emerging economic powers to build institutions and forums that are alternatives to Western-dominated ones.
“Up until now, it has been a loose arrangement of five countries meeting once a year,” said Abdullah Verachia, director of the Frontier Advisory Group, which focuses on emerging markets. “It is going to be the first real institution we have seen.”
But the alliance faces serious questions about whether the member countries have enough in common and enough shared goals to function effectively as a counterweight to the West.
“Despite the political rhetoric around partnerships, there is a huge amount of competition between the countries,” Mr. Verachia said.
For all the talk of solidarity among emerging giants, the group’s concrete achievements have been few since its first full meeting, in Russia in 2009. This is partly because its members are deeply divided on some basic issues and are in many ways rivals, not allies, in the global economy.
They have widely divergent economies, disparate foreign policy aims and different forms of government. India, Brazil and South Africa have strong democratic traditions, while Russia and China are autocratic.
The bloc even struggles to agree on overhauling international institutions. India, Brazil and South Africa want permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council, for example, but China, which already has one, has shown little interest in shaking up the status quo.
The developing countries in the bloc hardly invest in one another, preferring their neighbors and the developed world’s major economies, according to a report released Monday by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
Just 2.5 percent of foreign investment by BRICS countries goes to other countries in the group, the report said, while more than 40 percent of their foreign investment goes to the developed world’s largest economies, the European Union, the United States and Japan.
Africa, home to several of the world’s fastest-growing economies, drew less than 5 percent of total investment from BRICS nations, the report said. France and the United States still have the highest rate of foreign investment in Africa. Despite China’s reputation for heavy investment in Africa, Malaysia has actually invested $2 billion more in Africa than China has.
Still, 15 African heads of state were invited to the summit meeting in South Africa as observers, a sign of the continent’s increasing importance as an investment destination for all of the BRICS countries.
China is in many ways a major competitor of its fellow BRICS member, South Africa. South African manufacturers, retail chains, cellphone service providers, mining operations and tourism companies have bet heavily on African economic growth and in some ways go head-to-head against Chinese companies on the continent.
South Africa is playing host for the first time since becoming the newest member of what had been known previously as BRIC. Many analysts have questioned South Africa’s inclusion in the group because its economy is tiny compared with the other members, ranking 28th in the world, and its growth rates in recent years have been anemic.
In an interview last year with a South African newspaper, Jim O’Neill, the Goldman Sachs executive who coined the term BRIC, said South Africa did not belong in the group.
“South Africa has too small an economy,” Mr. O’Neill told the newspaper, The Mail & Guardian. “There are not many similarities with the other four countries in terms of the numbers. In fact, South Africa’s inclusion has somewhat weakened the group’s power.”
But South Africa’s sluggish growth has become the rule, not the exception, among the onetime powerhouse nations. India’s hopes of reaching double-digit growth have ebbed. Brazil’s surging economy, credited with pulling millions out of poverty, has cooled drastically. Even China’s growth has slowed.
And once welcome, Chinese investment in Africa is viewed with increasing suspicion.
On a visit to Beijing last year, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa warned that Chinese trade ties in Africa were following a troubling pattern.
“Africa’s commitment to China’s development has been demonstrated by supply of raw materials, other products and technology transfer,” Mr. Zuma said. “This trade pattern is unsustainable in the long term. Africa’s past economic experience with Europe dictates a need to be cautious when entering into partnerships with other economies.”
Mr. Zuma appeared to have a change of heart before the summit meeting, saying Monday that China does not approach Africa with a colonial attitude.
But other African leaders are not so sure. Lamido Sanusi, governor of Nigeria’s central bank, wrote in an opinion article published in The Financial Times this month that China’s approach to Africa is in many ways as exploitative as the West’s has been.
“China is no longer a fellow underdeveloped economy — it is the world’s second-biggest, capable of the same forms of exploitation as the West,” he wrote. “It is a significant contributor to Africa’s deindustrialization and underdevelopment.”