A última mensagem do ano do FMI é uma homenagem à globalização e ao globalismo; Leu EA?

 

Dear Colleague, We just published a new blog—please find the full text below.    Reclaiming Our World Post-2020 By Atish Rex Ghosh As 2020 draws to a close, many of us cannot wait for this annus horribilis to end. And for good reason: this year has seen more than a million and a half COVID-19 deaths; an economic collapse far greater than that of the 2008 financial crisis; a boiling-over of resentment against decades of racial and social injustice; record numbers of wildfires decimating millions of acres of pristine forests; and locust plagues of Biblical proportions. Yet, 2020 also gives us reason for hope. The development, within a few short months, of at least three COVID-19 vaccines that promise a high degree of efficacy is nothing short of miraculous: a great triumph of medical science, technology, and yes, globalization. Consider how impossible the discovery and distribution of these vaccines would have been without the cross-border exchange of ideas, goods, and services. Between the research labs and the researchers as well as the testing and manufacturing (including the various ancillary materials such as glass vials and syringes and special refrigerants), at least a dozen or more countries have already been involved in the development and production of these vaccines.     Toward a Better World One hundred years ago, the famed Spanish artist José Marià Sert laid out a vision for a better world on the walls of the Council Chamber in the Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland—seat of the first great experiment in international cooperation, the League of Nations, and the current European offices of the United Nations. His murals depict all that separates fellow human beings—war, hatred, cruelty, vengeance, exploitation, injustice—and all that brings them together—peace, liberty, and freedom from drudgery and enslavement. There is Hope, a mother and child standing astride defunct cannons, reveling in peace while crowds joyously hurl away their guns now that wars have ended; Scientific Progress, doctors liberating humanity from the scourge of disease; Social Progress, slaves shattering their chains; and Technical Progress, technology relieving humans from physical toil and bringing the promise of economic prosperity. On the ceiling, towering above the chamber, are five great, sinewy giants, allegories of the continents, reaching across the room with clasped hands, drawing the peoples of the world together—as the only means of achieving a brighter future for all. Of course, it was the end of a war that gave birth to the IMF—an institution dedicated to international monetary cooperation, thus helping to avoid trade and currency wars, and providing the basis for jobs for people across the world amid sound economic growth. The form of that cooperation—and the nature of the shocks impinging on the world economy—has evolved considerably in the 75 years since the IMF was established. The great insight of the founders was that, regardless of the specific disturbances—the oil price hikes of the 1970s, the developing country debt crisis of the 1980s, the capital account crises and the transformation of the centrally planned to market economies in the 1990s, the current account imbalances, global financial crisis, and the Great Recession in the 2000s, or the pandemic and Great Lockdown this year—both the shocks themselves and the national policy responses to them inevitably create cross-border spillovers that often result in tensions between countries. Resolving them requires cooperation, not confrontation: when each country tries to be first, all end up as last. Onward and upward As the COVID-19 pandemic unfolded, the IMF went into overdrive—even as it scrambled to re-organize operations for its staff to work from home—helping its members secure urgent financing and facilitating debt relief so countries could prioritize health expenditures. But the IMF’s work—and that of its membership—is just beginning. Once there is widespread distribution of the vaccine and the recovery gets underway, there are bound to be economic and financial dislocations as governments and societies grapple with the legacies of the global financial crisis, the pandemic, and the Great Lockdown, and strive to rebuild a better, more equitable, and more environmentally sustainable world. Helping to manage the international economic repercussions of these dislocations—manifested through exchange rate dynamics, net and gross capital flows, and asset price movements—is very much the bread and butter of the IMF’s work, and will be a vital part of its contribution to crafting a better world for tomorrow. Atish Rex Ghosh is the IMF’s Historian.  ***** Thank you again for your interest in IMF Blog. Read more of our latest content here. Take good care, Glenn Gottselig Blog Editor, IMF GGottselig@IMF.org

Ricos sempre ficam mais ricos? Tem esse risco? SIM! Cabe expropriá-los? Não! - FMI e Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Ricos tendem a ficar mais ricos? SIM, SIM. Riqueza, especialmente financeira, traz retornos mais altos, inclusive por economias de escala, por melhores oportunidades de grandes investimentos e por melhor aconselhamento por especialistas refinados.

O Piketty está certo, portanto, com suas digressões sobre a concentração de capital? NÃO, NÃO. Que existe concentração de renda é um fato, pelos fatores apontados acima.

Mas está certo em querer PUNIR os que ficam absurdamente mais ricos, investindo a sua fortuna? NÃO e NÃO. Se esses super-ricos se tornaram hiper-ricos pela simples multiplicação da sua fortuna, sem tornar os pobres mais pobres, não existe NENHUMA RAZÃO para o governo pretender over-taxar essa riqueza para distribuir entre os pobres, pois o mais provável de ocorrer é que o governo vai gastar esse dinheiro com o próprio governo e com os Mandarins do Estado, em lugar de reduzir a pobreza (a não ser que investissem tudo na capacitação educacional de famílias desfavorecidas).

Se os mega-bilionários ficam trilionários investindo a sua fortuna – ou seja, correndo riscos – e não roubando nada dos pobres, não existe NENHUM MOTIVO para que o governo queira mudar as regras apenas para arrancar mais dinheiro dos extra-ricos. O mais provável é que estes façam melhores investimentos, criando empregos e distribuindo renda, do que os governos. Todo o resto é apenas inveja e raiva do CAPITAL, como esses socialistas franceses.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

How the Rich Get Richer

IMF Blog, November 30, 2020

By Davide Malacrino

Wealth begets wealth. This simple concept of privilege has added to growing discontent with inequality that has escalated under the shadow of the COVID-19 pandemic.

A paper co-authored this year by economists from the IMF and other institutions confirms that wealthier people are more likely to earn higher returns on their investments. It also shows that the children of wealthy people, while likely to inherit that wealth, aren’t necessarily going to make the same high returns on investments.

Detailed data on wealth are extremely rare, but 12-years of tax records (2004-2015) from Norway have opened a new window into wealth accumulation for individuals and their offspring. The Nordic country has a wealth tax that requires assets to be reported by employers, banks and other third parties in order to reduce errors from self-reporting. The data, which are made public under certain conditions, also make it possible to match parents with their children.

The data show that an individual in the 75^th percentile of wealth distribution who invested $1 in 2004 would have yielded $1.50 by the end of 2015—a return of 50 percent. A person in the top 0.1 percent would have yielded $2.40 on the same invested dollar—a return of 140 percent.

Another significant finding: High returns both bring individuals to the top of the wealth scale and prevent them from leaving it. Controlling for age, parental background and earnings, moving from the 10^th percentile to 90^th percentile of wealth distribution increases the probability of making it to the top 1 percent by 1.2 percentage points compared to an average probability of 0.89 percent.

Why do rich people earn high returns? Conventional wisdom suggests that richer individuals put more of their assets toward high risk investments, which can result in higher returns. But our research finds that wealthy people often earn a higher return even on more conservative investments. Richer individuals enjoy pure “returns to scale” to their wealth. Specifically, for given portfolio allocation, individuals who are wealthier are more likely to get higher risk-adjusted returns, possibly because they have access to exclusive investment opportunities or better wealth managers. Financial sophistication, financial information, and entrepreneurial talent are also important. These characteristics make the returns to wealth persistent over time. This research is the first to quantify this mechanism and show that it is likely to matter empirically.

Do high returns persist across generations? The answer is a qualified yes. Wealth has a high degree of intergenerational correlation, but there are important differences in how returns to wealth accrue across generations. The children of the richest are likely to be very rich, but unlikely to get as high returns from this wealth as their parents did. This suggests that while money is perfectly inheritable, exceptional talent is not.

Mercado estima recuo de 6,5% no PIB este ano; provavelmente será maior (FMI: -9,1%) -

IMF forecasts deeper Latin America recession in 2020

The International Monetary Fund is forecasting a nearly double-digit recession for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2020 – a contraction of 9.4% – as the region is dragged down by its two largest economies, which continue to suffer from the coronavirus

https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/imf-forecasts-deeper-latin-america-recession-2020-71425688

DAVID BILLER and MARK STEVENSON Associated Press

ABC News, June 24, 2020

RIO DE JANEIRO -- The International Monetary Fund is forecasting a nearly double-digit recession for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2020 – a contraction of 9.4% – as the region is dragged down by its two largest economies, which continue to suffer from the coronavirus.

The updated outlook for the region, released Wednesday, is down sharply from the 5.2% recession forecast in April, which already would have been the worst performance since at least 1980, the first year in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database.

The multilateral lending agency said in its report that in Latin America, “most countries are still struggling to contain infections.”

The new forecast includes a 10.5% dive for Mexico, which has lost about a million jobs during the pandemic.

The country’s industrial activity plunged nearly 30% in April compared to a year earlier amid its lockdown.

Prodded by the United States, Mexico reopened its automotive, mining and construction industries starting in June, but plans for a broader restart of the economy have been delayed due to the continued high rates of new COVID-19 cases.

The IMF predicts a 9.1% plunge for Brazil, which is Latin America’s biggest economy and most populous nation. That would be the deepest single-year tumble since at least 1901, when national accounts data from the government’s economics institute begin. Brazil contracted 2% in 1918, the year of the Spanish flu pandemic, according to the institute.

Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro has argued that hardship inflicted by shutting down economic activity would ultimately be worse than that caused by the virus, even as the nation’s death toll rose to the second highest in the world. Mayors and governors responsible for when and how to restart their economies mostly ignored Bolsonaro’s desire for a swift reopening. Following extended restrictions, cities and states have begun gradually resuming activity.

In late April, Economy Minister Paulo Guedes was still projecting a V-shaped recovery and said Brazil was “going to surprise the world.”

Brazil’s central bank said in the minutes to its most recent monetary policy meeting, released Tuesday, that data indicate economic activity reached its low point in April. Industrial production that month fell 18.8% from the prior month, including an 80% decline in output of durable goods, according to data published June 3. From January to April, Brazil’s economy shed 763,000 formal jobs, a report by the federal government said May 27.

Economists surveyed by Brazil’s central bank currently forecast a 6.5% contraction this year.

Stevenson reported from Mexico City

==========

FMI prevê recuo maior: (O Globo, 24/06/2020, 20:00hs)

FMI projeta queda de 9,1% na economia do Brasil A economia brasileira vai encolher 9,1% em 2020, prevê o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI). Se confirmada, a queda representará o pior resultado desde 1900. Para 2021, no entanto, a projeção é de crescimento de 3,6%, patamar que aumentou desde o último relatório da entidade. Em foco: 9,7 milhões de trabalhadores brasileiros estavam sem remuneração em maio, segundo o IBGE. O contingente corresponde a 11,7% da população empregada no país. A perda de renda está relacionada à suspensão temporária dos contratos de trabalho, autorizada pelo governo.

Demografia e Desenvolvimento - FMI

The International Monetary Fund (IMF Blog) – 3.3.202

Demographics and Destiny

Gita Bhatt

Finance and Development (IMF), Washington DC – 3.3.2020

Population 2020

Demographics can be a potent driver of the pace and process of economic development

David E. Blum

The International Monetary Fund (IMF Blog) – 3.3.202

Demographics and Destiny

Gita Bhatt

When I visit my home country, India, I am always struck by how young it looks. From the big cities to the tiny villages, one can see the hopes and aspirations of twenty-somethings, many in search of work. In Japan, demographic trends have been moving in the opposite direction. Homes sit vacant, and villages are vanishing, as people have fewer children. In response, the Japanese are embracing technology to fill the gaps through innovations like robot chefs and automated medical services.

Changes in the size and structure of a nation’s population affect how we work, age, and live. In many advanced and emerging market economies, a shrinking pool of working-age people will have to support a growing number of retirees. Other countries—in Africa and elsewhere—will need to generate a staggering number of new jobs just to keep pace with the youth joining the job market.

Changing age dynamics have profound implications for growth, social stability, and geopolitics. They influence how people save, spend, and invest, with consequences for everything from marriage to retirement to migration.

In this issue, we bring together the leading thinkers in their fields to explore the many facets of population trends. And we asked them to consider what they mean for our future.

David Bloom focuses on the main drivers of demographic transitions, including life expectancy, fertility, and migration. David Amaglobeli, Era Dabla-Norris, and Vitor Gaspar look at the fiscal sustainability of health and pension financing. Other contributors highlight novel approaches, the role of incentives, and tried-and-tested policy solutions, such as using technology to boost productivity, raising the retirement age, opening up to immigration, and increasing women and older workers’ labor force participation.

Demographics can shape a country’s destiny. But policy choices matter, from encouraging technological innovation and institutional reform to investing in people, both young and old. With wise policies, more of us will enjoy the long, good life.

GITA BHATT, editor-in-chief, Finance & Development

*

Finance and Development (IMF), Washington DC – 3.3.2020

Population 2020

Demographics can be a potent driver of the pace and process of economic development

David E. Blum

“Demography is destiny” is an oft-cited phrase that suggests the size, growth, and structure of a nation’s population determines its long-term social, economic, and political fabric. The phrase highlights the role of demographics in shaping many complex challenges and opportunities societies face, including several pertinent to economic growth and development.

Nevertheless, it is an overstatement to say that demography determines all, as it downplays the fact that both demographic trajectories and their development implications are responsive to economic incentives; to policy and institutional reforms; and to changes in technology, cultural norms, and behavior.

The world is undergoing a major demographic upheaval with three key components: population growth, changes in fertility and mortality, and associated changes in population age structure.

Population growth

It took more than 50,000 years for world population to reach 1 billion people. Since 1960, we have added successive billions every one to two decades. The world population was 3 billion in 1960; it reached 6 billion around 2000, and the United Nations projects it will surpass 9 billion by 2037. The population growth rate has been slowing, however, from peak annual rates in excess of 2 percent in the late 1960s, to about 1 percent currently, to half that by 2050.

Although global income per capita more than doubled, life expectancy increased by 16 years, and primary school enrollment became nearly universal among children during 1960–2000, rapid population growth poses myriad challenges that are both privately and publicly daunting. These challenges include the need for more food, clothing, housing, education, and infrastructure; the absorption of sizable numbers into productive employment; and more strenuous environmental protection. Although the explosive nature of global population growth is abating in relative terms, decade-on-decade increases remain sizable and are taking place from ever more populated starting points.

Earlier concerns about a global population explosion have, to some extent, yielded to concerns about rapid population growth in particular countries and regions (see “Coming of Age” in this issue of F&D). Indeed, the overall slowdown in the rate of world population growth masks significant shifts in the distribution of world population by development status and geographic region.

Countries the United Nations classifies as less developed encompassed 68 percent of world population in 1950; today they represent 84 percent. That share will continue to rise, because virtually all of the nearly 2 billion net additions to world population projected over the next three decades will occur in less developed regions. This is a major concern, because less developed regions tend to be more fragile—politically, socially, economically, and ecologically—than their more developed counterparts.

With 1.44 billion people, China currently has the largest national population in the world, followed by India, with 1.38 billion. But by the end of this decade, India will be the most populous country, with a projected 1.50 billion people, compared with China’s peak population of 1.46 billion. Between 2020 and 2050, Nigeria (projected to overtake the United States to become the world’s third-most-populous nation) and Pakistan—already among the 10 most populous—will surge forward. Asia will continue to be home to a dominant but declining share of the world’s population (60 percent today and 54 percent in 2050).

Finally, notwithstanding continued global population growth, in 61 countries and territories that are currently home to 29 percent of the world’s people, population growth in 2020–50 is projected to be negative, with the sharpest decline (?23 percent) projected for Bulgaria (see “Eastern Europe's Exodus” in this issue of F&D).

Mortality, fertility, and migration

Population size and growth reflect the underlying forces of mortality, fertility, and international migration. These forces vary considerably across countries and can help account for key differences in economic activity and performance, such as physical capital, labor, and human capital accumulation; economic well-being and growth; and poverty and inequality.

These forces generally respond to economic shocks; they may also respond to political developments such as the beginning and ending of wars and governance crises. In many developing economies, population growth has been associated with a phenomenon known as the “demographic transition”—the movement from high to low death rates followed by a corresponding movement in birth rates.

For most of human history, the average person lived about 30 years. But between 1950 and 2020, life expectancy increased from 46 to 73 years, and it is projected to increase by another four years by 2050. Moreover, by 2050, life expectancy is projected to exceed 80 years in at least 91 countries and territories that will then be home to 39 percent of the world's population. Increased longevity is a colossal human achievement that reflects improvements in survival prospects throughout the life cycle, but especially among infants and children.

Cross-country convergence in life expectancy continues to be strong. For example, the life expectancy gap between Africa and North America was 32 years in 1950 and 24 years in 2000; it is 16 years today. Historic and anticipated reductions in cross-country health disparities reflect gains in income and nutrition among low- and middle-income countries, the diffusion of innovations in health technologies and institutions, and the distribution of international aid.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the average woman had roughly five children over the course of her childbearing years. Today, the average woman has somewhat fewer than 2.5 children. This presumably reflects the growing cost of child-rearing (including opportunity cost, as reflected mainly in women’s wages), increased access to effective contraception, and perhaps also growing income insecurity.

The social and economic implications of this fertility decline are hard to overstate. Among other things, lower fertility has helped relieve many women of the burden of childbearing and child-rearing. It has also contributed to the empowerment of women in their households, communities, and societies and has allowed them to participate more actively in paid labor markets. All these factors reinforce the preference for low fertility.

Between 1970 and 2020, the fertility rate declined in every country in the world. Fertility tended to decrease more in countries with high initial fertility, another facet of demographic convergence. Among geographic regions, Africa and Europe are currently homes to the highest (4.3) and lowest (1.6) fertility rates, respectively.

If the population’s age structure is sufficiently weighted toward those in prime childbearing years, even a fertility rate of 2.1 can translate into positive population growth in the short and medium term, because low fertility per woman is more than offset by the number of women having children. This feature of population dynamics is known as population momentum and helps explain (along with migration) why the populations of 69 countries and territories are currently growing even though their fertility rates are below 2.1.

Cross-country migration is also relevant to population growth. The effects are quite important in some countries, such as Guyana, Samoa, and Tonga, where net emigration in the past 30 years has been appreciable. Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have had the highest rates of net immigration. Among the world’s 10 population super powers, migrants have the largest relative presence in the United States (15 percent in 2019). For most countries, though, international migration has not been a dominant demographic force, because more than 96 percent of the world’s population currently live in their countries of birth (see “Immigrant Swan Song” in this issue of F&D).

Age structure dynamics

The age structure of a population reflects mainly its fertility and mortality history. In high-mortality populations, improved survival tends to occur disproportionately among children. This effectively creates a baby boom. Eventually, the boom ends when fertility abates in response to perceptions of improved child survival and as desired fertility declines with economic development. But as the relatively large baby-boom cohorts proceed through adolescence and into their adult years, the population share at the peak ages for work and saving swells.

This enhances the productive capacity of the economy on a per capita basis and opens a window of opportunity for rapid income growth and poverty reduction. Events of the past decade, ranging from the Arab uprisings to more recent mass protests in Chile and Sudan, also show that countries that fail to generate sufficient jobs for large cohorts of young adults are prone to social, political, and economic instability.

The “demographic dividend” refers to the process through which a changing age structure can spur economic growth. It depends, of course, on several complex factors, including the nature and pace of demographic change, the operation of labor and capital markets, macroeconomic management and trade policies, governance, and human capital accumulation. Nonetheless, the demographic dividend model can account for much variation in past economic performance among different countries and regions (e.g., East Asia vs. Latin America vs. sub-Saharan Africa) and helps identify more- and less-promising country settings for future economic growth. For example, from 2020 to 2030, Nepal, Jordan, Bhutan, and Eswatini are projected to experience the largest gains among countries in the ratios of their working-age to non-working-age populations.

The dependency ratio—the inverse of the working age to non-working-age ratio—measures the economic pressure working-age individuals face to support, in addition to themselves, those who are not of working age. In 1990, the ratio in more developed regions was appreciably lower than in less developed regions (0.68 versus 1.04).

But by 2020, as a result of different patterns of fertility decline and population aging, the ratio had increased to 0.70 in more developed regions and decreased to 0.75 in less developed regions. And by 2050, the dependency ratio is projected to be greater in more developed regions (0.89) than in those that are less developed (0.77). This switch suggests that in the coming decades, demographics will be more favorable to economic well-being in less developed regions than in more developed regions. This will be especially true in Africa, the only region in which this ratio is projected to decline by 2050.

For countries that have yet to experience appreciable demographic transitions (like Chad, the Central African Republic, Somalia, and Sierra Leone), policies are appropriately oriented toward catalyzing those transitions. Such policies include investment that promotes infant and child survival, such as expanded vaccine coverage as well as wider access to well-provisioned and appropriately staffed primary health care systems.

For populations that have experienced health and survival gains, countries could benefit from policies to enable a decline in fertility, such as promoting girls’ education and access to reproductive health and family planning services.

And countries with relatively sizable portions of the population concentrated in the high-work and high-savings part of the life cycle need policies to realize the potential benefits of favorable demographics. Such policies include support for the operation of competitive labor and capital markets, equipping workers with human capital, building infrastructure, sound macroeconomic management, carefully designed trade policies, and good governance. Such policies are always desirable, but a large working-age population share raises the stakes.

In some countries, making investments in these various sets of policies could be challenging, as per capita income is currently lower in real terms than it was in some of today’s advanced economies when they were at a comparable demographic stage.

Global graying

Population aging is the dominant demographic trend of the twenty-first century—a reflection of increasing longevity, declining fertility, and the progression of large cohorts to older ages. Never before have such large numbers of people reached ages 65+ (the conventional old-age threshold). We expect to add 1 billion older individuals in the next three to four decades, atop the more than 700 million older people we have today. Among the older population, the group aged 85+ is growing especially fast and is projected to surpass half a billion in the next 80 years. This trend is significant because the needs and capacities of the 85+ crowd tend to differ significantly from those of 65-to-84-year-olds.

Although every country in the world will experience population aging, differences in the progression of this phenomenon will be considerable. Japan is currently the world leader, with 28 percent of its population 65 and over, triple the world average. By 2050, 29 countries and territories will have larger elder shares than Japan has today. In fact, the Republic of Korea’s elder share will eventually overtake Japan’s, reaching the historically unprecedented level of 38.1 percent. Japan’s median age (48.4) is also currently the highest of any country and more than twice that of Africa (19.7). But by 2050, Korea (median age 56.5 in 2050) is also expected to overtake Japan on that metric (54.7).

Three decades ago, the world was populated by more than three times as many adolescents and young adults (15- to 24-year-olds) as older people. Three decades from now, those age groups will be roughly on par.

By income group, the sharpest growth in the numbers of older people will occur in countries currently classified as middle income. This is unsurprising, as these countries make up 74 percent of the world population. What may be surprising is that the older-population share in middle-income countries is increasing at a much faster rate than in their low- and high-income counterparts. Moreover, in comparison with high-income countries, today’s middle-income countries are projected to have appreciably greater real incomes when their older-population shares reach comparably elevated levels. This contradicts the common claim that developing economies are getting old before they get rich.

The challenge middle-income countries face is not predominantly insufficient income to take care of their older people. Rather, it is how well institutions and policies can promote economic and social security among older people in a financially sustainable way.

Population aging is sounding alarms worldwide. Whether increased longevity is associated with more or less of a person’s life lived in frailty is among the most salient unresolved questions public and private policymakers throughout the world face (see “The Long, Good Life” in this issue of F&D).

Economists continue to express concerns. These relate to downward pressure on economic growth due to labor and capital shortages and falling asset prices in the future as a growing and more aged cohort of older people seeks to support itself by liquidating investments. Another major issue has to do with fiscal stress. Government coffers will be strained by rising pension liabilities and the cost of health and long-term care associated with the expected growth in the incidence and prevalence of chronic diseases such as cancer, among others. These challenges will, however, be partially offset by the increasing, but typically neglected, value older people create through productive nonmarket activities like volunteer work and caregiving.

Without historical lessons from a world with such large numbers of older people, there is even more uncertainty about our collective future. However, adopting a business-as-usual approach to the challenges of population aging would be irresponsible.

Various responses could cushion the economic burden of population aging. These include policy reforms to promote the financial sustainability and intergenerational equity of health and pension financing. Raising the legal age of retirement, which has been relatively stable in nearly all countries for the past several decades (see “Getting Older but Not Poorer” in this issue of F&D) would also ease the burden. Pronatalist tax incentives are also a policy option for the long term, but their effect on fertility is thus far unproven.

Additional approaches include efforts to increase health systems’ emphasis on early detection and on prevention of disease through, for example, better awareness of the benefits of physical activity and subsidization of such activity. Relaxing the institutional and economic barriers to international immigration from regions with relatively large working-age populations could alleviate labor shortages.

Finally, technological innovations are likely to ameliorate the effects of population aging. New drugs to slow the process of aging and add healthy years to people’s lives and the invention and deployment of assistive devices such as robots are two among many such improvements. Institutional innovations like new models of home health care, public transportation systems, the design of urban layouts, and financial instruments are also on the horizon.

The bottom line

Global, regional, and country demographic indicators have changed dramatically since the early 1950s and are poised for equally dramatic changes in the coming decades. Population aging continues to displace population growth as the focal point of interest among global demographic phenomena. Nonetheless, both phenomena and their underlying drivers have had, and will continue to have, profound repercussions for myriad indicators and determinants of economic well-being and progress. Demographics are not, however, set in stone. Nor are their implications for individual and collective well-being.

DAVID E. BLOOM is a professor of economics and demography at Harvard University’s T. H. Chan School of Public Health.

Oil industry and its consequences -IMF review Finance and Development

Dear Colleague, National oil companies (NOCs) are economic giants. They control at least $3 trillion in assets and produce most of the world’s oil and gas. They dominate energy production in some of the world’s most oil-rich countries, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, and they play a central role in the oil and gas sector in many emerging producers. But there's one problem. These companies are poorly understood because of their uneven and often opaque financial reporting practices. And because they are so large, shortcomings in their reporting pose several economic risks. It's time to peel back the curtain on Really Big Oil. In our latest issue of F&D, David Manley, David Mihalyi, and Patrick Heller of the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) pen a very thoughtful and researched look at exactly this challenge and how best to foster (and perhaps mandate) openness. NRGI's new report and accompanying database focuses on the failure to rigorously scrutinize NOCs and the policies their governments employ to manage them, and how this failure carries major risks for dozens of economies around the world that depend on these companies’ sound management of public resources. On average, the authors found that NOCs in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa disclosed the least amount of information. These findings reinforce the results of the institute’s Resource Governance Index, which revealed that 62 percent of the NOCs reviewed exhibited “weak,” “poor,” or “failing” performance in regard to public transparency. That's not so bad, is it? Well, some national oil companies carry huge debts that burden their national economies. Some have debts in amounts higher than 10 percent of their countries’ GDP. Venezuela’s troubled state oil company PDVSA has debt exceeding 20 percent of GDP. Many NOCs have required multibillion-dollar government bailouts in recent years, becoming a costly drain on public finances. At the peak of the oil price boom in 2013, there were at least 25 “NOC-dependent” countries—those where the NOC collects funds equivalent to 20 percent or more of government revenues (Chart 1). In most cases only a fraction of these resource revenues are then transferred to the governments, with the NOCs spending and investing the rest themselves. The median NOC in this sample transferred only 17 percent of its gross revenues to the state in 2015. The key here is that the fiscal health of many countries and their governments’ ability to use oil revenues for development depend heavily on how well the NOC is run, how much revenue it transfers to the state, and the quality of its spending. State-owned enterprises can weigh a country down or help propel growth, and in these countries, subpar governance of national resources perpetuates poverty and inequality.  You're right. This is a real problem. So how do we solve it? To start, NOCs and their governments should ensure that company strategies outline a sustainable vision for their futures. Such a vision can facilitate clear and effective rules on how much these companies are allowed to spend and borrow, and how much they must transfer to the government treasury. To ensure that these rules are followed, citizens and governments need better reporting from NOCs. Separating public relations from reality in company pronouncements about investments in renewables or boosting commercial efficiency requires consistent reporting on spending, production costs, and revenues. Like private oil companies, NOCs should also start assessing and disclosing how prepared they are for the coming energy transition. This should include an analysis of climate-related risks, and progress made in diversifying and mitigating those risks. Finally, in many countries, NOCs are not held sufficiently accountable, either because they don’t disclose enough information, or because formal oversight by government or informal oversight by civil society and the media is inconsistent. Under-scrutinized companies might perform poorly or become vessels for corruption. Increased transparency is a critical lever for holding company leadership accountable and encouraging strong returns on public investment. Drill deeper and read the full 1600-word article, which contains the latest data, charts and examples from around the world and how best to move forward. This piece is also available in pусский, español, français, 中文, and عربي. See you next week,

Rahim Kanani Digital Editor, F&D Magazine International Monetary Fund rkanani@imf.org P.S. I wanted to flag that in our June 2018 issue of F&D, Harvard's David Bloom et al wrote a very detailed and insightful piece on the economics of epidemics. _____ Make a colleague's day: forward this emailWas this newsletter shared with you? Sign up for future updates Update your profile for tailored content (new) Unsubscribe from F&D here

A ordem econômica de Bretton Woods: trabalhos de Paulo R. Almeida

A ordem econômica de Bretton Woods: trabalhos de Paulo R. Almeida

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

(www.pralmeida.org; http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

 [Objetivo: coletânea de textos; finalidade: retrospecto da produção intelectual]

Tendo sido convidado para fazer uma palestra para estudantes de graduação em Relações Internacionais, ofereci como tema o processo atual de desmantelamento da ordem econômica internacional criada em Bretton Woods, e aperfeiçoada em conferências multilaterais, encontros de organismos internacionais e em tratados e atos internacionais posteriores. O mundo caminha, aparentemente, para um retrocesso institucional, sob os auspícios dos antiglobalistas contemporâneos, em primeiro lugar o atual presidente dos EUA.

Minha relação, abaixo registrada, consiste apenas numa pequena parte de minha produção intelectual sobre essa temática, construída apenas com base num busca, em meus trabalhos registrados, sob os conceitos de “Bretton Woods”, “FMI” e “ordem econômica”. Alguma repetição é inevitável, pois integrei esses materiais em dois ou três livros publicados desde os anos 1990, e como tal, coloco os livros em primeiro lugar, na medida em que eles consolidam os artigos parciais produzidos ao longo do tempo aqui consignado.

Espero que possa servir aos interessados, embora muitos dos artigos selecionados não estejam imediatamente disponíveis (ou os links se tornaram inoperantes). Vou providenciar uma atualização da disponibilidade desse material em tempo hábil.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 17/09/2019

Livros:

Relações internacionais e política externa do Brasil: a diplomacia brasileira no contexto da globalização (Rio de Janeiro: LTC, 2012, 309 p.; ISBN 978-85-216-2001-3).

Os primeiros anos do século XXI: o Brasil e as relações internacionais contemporâneas (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2002).

621. O Brasil e o multilateralismo econômico, Brasília, 25 maio 1998, 219 p. Livro sobre as instituições multilaterais e a inserção internacional do Brasil, elaborado com base nas aulas de comércio exterior e de integração e nos trabalhos sobre a estrutura institucional do multilateralismo econômico brasileiro. Publicado pela Livraria do Advogado, de Porto Alegre, em 1999. Relação de publicados nº 235.

Artigos:

209. “De Bretton Woods a Bretton Woods: a longa marcha da URSS de volta ao FMI”, Montevidéu, 27 agosto 1991, 15 p. Artigo sobre a participação da URSS na conferência de Bretton Woods. Publicado na Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (Rio de Janeiro: Ano XXXIV, n. 135-136, 1991/2, p. 99-109). Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (17/12/2011l link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2011/12/russia-de-bretton-woods-1944-bretton.html). Relação de Publicados n. 71.

427. “O Fim de Bretton-Woods?: a longa marcha da Organização Mundial do Comércio”, Paris, 4 maio 1994, 27 p. Ensaio sobre o contexto histórico da OMC, desde as conferências de Bretton-Woods e de comércio e emprego de Havana, até a assinatura da Ata Final da Rodada Uruguai em Marrakech. Publicado na revista Contexto Internacional (Rio de Janeiro: vol. 16, n. 2, julho-dezembro 1994, p. 249-282). Relação de Publicados n. 168.

532. “A crescente irrelevância das instituições de Bretton Woods: o Banco Mundial manda na política econômica dos países?”, Brasília, 14 agosto 1996, 6 p. Artigo de caráter jornalístico.

710. “FMI e Banco Mundial: mudança ou ajuste conceitual?”, Washington, 6 outubro 1999, 3 p. Artigo sobre a nova orientação “social” das instituições de Bretton Woods, para divulgação na imprensa.

778. “Bretton Woods, modelo de”, Washington, 23 fev. 2001, 8 p. Verbete para o “Dicionário da História Política do Século XX (CEC-UERJ; http://sites.uol.com.br/nec-uff/Projdict.html; (Grupo II: 10 mil car.).

797. “O Brasil e as crises financeiras internacionais, 1929-2001”, Washington, 5 ago. 2001, 46 p. Reformulação do capítulo 10 do livro sobre relações internacionais contemporâneas, atualizando a análise até os desenvolvimentos da crise argentina e o novo acordo brasileiro com o FMI. Revisto novamente em final de setembro, para incluir uma seção sobre as “consequências econômicas do terror”, em função dos ataques terroristas de 11 de setembro em Nova York e Washington. Publicado no livro Os primeiros anos do século XXI: o Brasil e as relações internacionais contemporâneas (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2002). Relação de Publicados n. 313.

864. “O FMI e as condicionalidades: Debate na lista de relações internacionais”, Washington, 9 fev. 2002, 3 p. Observações críticas a artigo de jornalista sobre as condicionalidades do FMI, em debate na lista de relações internacionais.

882. “O Brasil e o sistema de Bretton Woods: instituições e políticas em perspectiva histórica, 1944-2002”, Washington, 28 mar. 2002, 36 p. Ensaio histórico sobre a evolução do sistema de Bretton Woods, tanto do ponto de vista de seu desenvolvimento institucional, como no plano das medidas e recomendações de políticas econômicas feitas aos países membros no quadro dos acordos de assistência financeira negociados. Ênfase particular é dada à experiência brasileira de relacionamento com o FMI, com discussão das principais questões envolvidas nos acordos negociados desde os anos 1950. Revisão em 10/07/2002; nova revisão em 4/09/2002, 38 p. Colaboração a livro coletivo coordenado por Valério Mazzuoli e Roberto Luiz Silva, O Brasil e os acordos econômicos internacionais: perspectivas jurídicas e econômicas (São Paulo: Editora Revista do Tribunais, 2003, ISBN: 85-203-2318-9, p. 30-64). Disponível no site pessoal, link: www.pralmeida.org/05DocsPRA/882BrasilBrettonWoods.doc. Relação de Publicados n. 394.

927. Relações internacionais e política externa do Brasil: história e sociologia da diplomacia brasileira, Washington, 19 jul. 2002, 403 p. Revisto em 20/08, com o novo capítulo acima indicado. Encaminhado à Editora da UFRGS, de Porto Alegre, que, no entanto, tardou sua publicação. Revisto totalmente em 2003, com atualização dos capítulos sobre as campanhas presidenciais e sobre as relações com o FMI. Ver Relação de Trabalhos n. 1029.

933. “O Brasil e o acordo com o FMI: reflexões diplomáticas”, Washington, 9 ago. 2002, 6 p. Minuta de Informação sobre o significado do acordo do Brasil com o FMI, de 07/08/2002, cobrindo o significado e as implicações diplomáticas para o Brasil do acordo com o FMI e contendo reflexões a partir de Washington.

955. “Uma longa moratória, permeada de ajustes?: a lógica da dívida externa brasileira na visão acadêmica”, Washington, 3 out. 2002, 7 p. Comentários ao artigo “A dívida externa brasileira, moratória e FMI: uma lógica que está fazendo 100 anos...”, das professoras Albene Miriam F. Menezes e Regina Martinez, publicado no mesmo número de Meridiano 47 que trouxe meu artigo. Meridiano 47 (Brasília: ISSSN 1518-1219, n. 28-29, novembro-dezembro 2002, p. 18-21; link: http://www.mundorama.info/Mundorama/Meridiano_47_-_1-100_files/Meridiano_28_29.pdf). Relação de Publicados n. 369.

1000. “O Brasil e o FMI: meio século de idas e vindas”, Washington, 22 jan. 2003, 3 p. Resumo do capítulo preparado para o livro O Brasil e os acordos econômicos internacionais. Publicado no Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: 27 jan. 2003, seção Opinião); no Colunas de RelNet (n. 7, jan/jun. 2003); e no Meridiano 47 (Brasília: IBRI, n. 32-33, março-abril 2003, p. 17-18; link: http://www.mundorama.info/Mundorama/Meridiano_47_-_1-100_files/Meridiano_32-33.pdf). Relação de Publicados n. 395, 399 e 402.

1004. “O Brasil e o FMI de 1944 a 2002: um relacionamento feito de altos e baixos”, Washington, 7 fev. 2003, 30 p. Versão resumida do capítulo (Trabalho n. 881) preparado para o livro organizado por Valério de Oliveira Mazzuoli e Roberto Luiz Silva, O Brasil e os acordos econômicos internacionais: perspectivas jurídicas e econômicas à luz dos acordos com o FMI (São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2003). Publicado na Cena Internacional (Brasília: Rel-UnB, a. 4, n. 2, dez. 2002; ISNB: 1518-1200; p. 87-112; link: http://www.mundorama.info/Mundorama/Cena_Internacional_files/Cena_2002_2.pdf); e na Revista História Hoje: revista eletrônica de História (v. 1, n. 1, jul. 2003, ANPUH; ISSN: 1806-3993; link: http://www.anpuh.uepg.br/historia-hoje/vol1n1/brasil.htm ). Relação de Publicados ns. 387 e 433.

1093. “FMI: políticas e condicionalidades”, Washington, 7-15 ago. 2003, 9 p. Respostas a questões colocadas em 6 e 13/08 pelo jornalista Julio Lobato, para a revista Ciência Hoje On-line (chonline@sbpcnet.org.br). Publicado no site eletrônico da revista Ciência Hoje (www.ciencia.org.br), em 22/08/2003, com referência ao artigo da revista História Hoje. Reformatado, em forma de “diálogo”, em 30/08, sob o título de “Um diálogo sobre o Fundo Monetário Internacional: desfazendo mitos e equívocos sobre os programas e as condicionalidades do FMI” (12 p.); encaminhado às revistas eletrônicas La Insígnia (redaccion@lainsignia.org; www.lainsignia.org/) e RelNet.

1113. “O governo Lula, o FMI e a transição de paradigmas: comentários”, Washington, 15 set. 2003, 4 p. Comentários breves a matéria homônima no boletim Periscópio n. 29, set. 2003, da Fundação Perseu Abramo (e-mail: periscopio@fpabramo.org.br).

1155. “O primeiro acordo a gente nunca esquece: O novo Brasil e primeiro acordo soberano com o velho FMI”, Brasília, 13 dez. 2003, 6 p. Comentários sobre o novo acordo do Brasil com o FMI, sob a forma de diálogo unilateral com os opositores desse tipo de política e propugnadores de uma economia alternativa. Publicado na Revista Espaço Acadêmico (a. III, n. 32, jan. 2004; http://www.espacoacademico.com.br/032/32pt_pra.htm; ISSN: 1519-6186). Relação de Publicados n. 460.

1237. “A construção econômica do mundo contemporâneo: o Brasil e o moderno sistema de relações econômicas internacionais”, Brasília, 2 abr. 2004, 40 p. Texto-base (a) para palestra no curso de mestrado lato sensu de Direito Internacional das Relações Econômicas e do Comércio, da Escola de Direito de São Paulo – Fundação Getúlio Vargas, em São Paulo, em 19/04/2004 (GVLaw, das 19:15 às 22:30 - Rua Bela Cintra, 756, em São Paulo, SP), a convite do Coordenador, Prof. Rabih Nasser (Albino Advogados Associados). Reelaborado como “O Brasil e a construção da ordem econômica internacional contemporânea” e submetido à revista Contexto Internacional (www.puc-rio.br/iri). Aceito para publicação em 13/04/2004. Publicado na Contexto Internacional (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Relações Internacionais da PUC-RJ; v. 26, n. 1, jan/jun. 2004, p. 7-63; ISSN: 0102-8529). Disponível no link: http://contextointernacional.iri.puc-rio.br/media/Almeida_vol26n1.pdf e no site pessoal, link: www.pralmeida.org/05DocsPRA/1237ConstrOrdEconCI.pdf. Relação de Publicados n. 477.

1422. “Brasil: histórico do relacionamento com o Fundo Monetário Internacional, 1944-2005”, Brasília, 21 abr. 2005, 2 p. Revisão, ampliação e atualização da tabela sobre acordos do Brasil com o FMI, constante do capítulo “Diplomacia financeira: o Brasil e o FMI, de 1944 a 2003” in Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Relações internacionais e política externa do Brasil: história e sociologia da diplomacia brasileira (2. ed. Porto Alegre: Editora da UFRGS, 2004. p. 175).

1426. “Entrevista sobre Política Externa no Governo Lula”, Brasília, 7 mai. 2005, 4 p. Resposta a questionário encaminhado por Aline Berleze (aberleze@hotmail.com), aluna do curso de Direito em Santa Maria, RS, contendo quatro questões sobre OMC, FMI, política externa do atual governo e sua comparação com a do anterior. Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (30/06/2012; link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2012/06/politica-externa-de-lula-um-texto-de.html).

1522. “Think Again (1): Independência financeira?”, Brasília 4 de janeiro de 2006, 3 p. Considerações sobre o pagamento antecipado dos empréstimos do FMI pelo Brasil e pela Argentina, argumentando em relação ao custo comparativo com empréstimos do setor comercial. Publicado no Blog PRA, item n. 110 (http://paulomre.blogspot.com/2006/01/110-think-again-1-independncia.html).

2347. “O FMI vai à Europa, e decepciona keynesianos equivocados”, Brasília, 26 dezembro 2011, 8 p. Comentários a artigo de João Sicsu no site Carta Maior, “O FMI chegou a Europa” (24/12/2011; link: http://www.cartamaior.com.br/templates/colunaMostrar.cfm?coluna_id=5373&boletim_id=1085&componente_id=17323), contestando todas e cada uma de suas afirmações ridículas; divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (26/12/2011; link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2011/12/economistas-malucos-uma-especie-de.html).

2636. “O FMI e o Brasil: encontros e desencontros em 70 anos de história”, Hartford, 30 julho 2014, 24 p. Itinerário histórico do FMI, desde Bretton Woods, e seguimento dos acordos feitos pelo Brasil, com ênfase nas diferentes fases das políticas econômicas. Encaminhado para número especial da revista FGV-Direito (revistadireitogv@fgv.br), sob o título de “O Brasil e o FMI desde Bretton Woods: 70 anos de História”. Revisto, ampliado, com mais bibliografia, introdução e conclusões, 36 p. em 26/11/2014; encaminhado novamente. Nova revisão, com novos acréscimos, em 15/12/2014, final: 32 p., em nova formatação; nova revisão, final, em 20/02/2015. Publicada na Revista Direito GV (vol. 10, n. 2, 2014, p. 469-495; ISSN: 1808-2432; link: http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/revdireitogv/article/view/48690/47074). Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (28/04/2015; link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2015/04/o-brasil-e-os-70-anos-de-bretton-woods.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1160.

2656. “A América Latina na ordem econômica mundial, de 1914 a 2014”, Hartford, 17 agosto 2014, 29 p. Colaboração ao livro Retratos sul-americanos: perspectivas sobre a história e a política externa, organizado por Camilo Negri e Elisa Ribeiro Pinchemel; enviado em 17/08/2014; em fase de publicação.

2685. “Livre mercado e políticas econômicas”, Hartford, 4 outubro 2014, 13 p. Subsídios apresentados ao Partido Novo por um crítico dos mercados livres. Aproveitada a parte sobre os acordos com o FMI para postagem no Blog Diplomatizzando (link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2014/10/eleicoes-2014-o-brasil-quebrou-3-vezes.html).

2687. “O Brasil quebrou três vezes sob FHC? Mentira da candidata!”, Hartford, 5 outubro 2014, 5 p. Respostas às alegações mentirosas da candidata oficiosa, sobre os acordos efetuados entre o Brasil e o FMI, entre 1998 e 2002. Postado no blog Diplomatizzando em 5/10.2014 (link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2014/10/eleicoes-2014-o-brasil-quebrou-3-vezes.html) e novamente em 13/10/2014, uma vez que a candidata continua a mentir (link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2014/10/o-brasil-nao-quebrou-tres-vezes-mentira.html).

2756. “Fundamentos de uma nova ordem econômica internacional: Bretton Woods”, Hartford, 21 janeiro 2015, 7 p. Décimo capítulo, provisório, da segunda parte do livro “A Ordem Internacional e o Progresso da Nação: as relações econômicas internacionais do Brasil na era republicana (1889-1944)”.

2758. “A ordem econômica internacional: meio século de ‘progressos’?”, Hartford, 22 janeiro 2015, 16 p. (com base no trabalho: Washington, 772: 04.02.2001). Novo terceiro capítulo, provisório, da primeira parte do livro “A Ordem Internacional e o Progresso da Nação: as relações econômicas internacionais do Brasil na era republicana (1889-1944)”. Submetido à RBPI sob o título “Transformações da ordem econômica mundial, do final do século 19 à Segunda Guerra Mundial” em 24/01/2015, pelo sistema Scielo online (https://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/rbpi-scielo); manuscript ID: RBPI-2015-0017; aceito em 18/03/2015; textos auxiliares de divulgação: trabalho n. 2809. Publicado na RBPI (vol. 58 (1) 127-141; link da revista: http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_issuetoc&pid=0034-732920150001&lng=en&nrm=iso; DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201500107; link do artigo: http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rbpi/v58n1/0034-7329-rbpi-58-01-00127.pdf).  Relação de Publicados n. .

2809. “How many world economic orders existed, from the late 19th century up to the Second World War?; Changes and continuities”, Hartford, 11 Abril 2015, 5 p. Textos suplementares, em inglês, ao trabalho n. 2758, para fins de divulgação no sistema da RBPI. Publicado, sob o título de “The world economy, from belle Époque to Bretton Woods”, em Mundorama (21/10/2015, link: http://mundorama.net/2015/10/21/the-world-economy-from-belle-epoque-to-bretton-woods-by-paulo-roberto-de-almeida/).

2846. “Transformações da ordem econômica mundial: liberalismo, intervencionismo, protecionismo, neoliberalismo, crises financeiras; Respostas a questões colocadas pela RBPI, a propósito da publicação do artigo: “Transformações da ordem econômica mundial, do final do século 19 à Segunda Guerra Mundial” (RBPI: 1/2015), n. Hartford, 24 julho 2015, 13 p. Publicado, sob o título de “Transformações da ordem econômica mundial, do final do século 19 à Segunda Guerra Mundial – Entrevista com Paulo Roberto de Almeida”, Boletim Mundorama (n. 97, setembro 2015; ISSN: 21-75-2052; link: http://mundorama.net/2015/09/30/transformacoes-da-ordem-economica-mundial-do-final-do-seculo-19-a-segunda-guerra-mundial-entrevista-com-paulo-roberto-de-almeida/), transcrito no blog da RBPI-IBRI, em 30/09/2015 (link: http://ibri-rbpi.org/2015/09/30/transformacoes-da-ordem-economica-mundial-do-final-do-seculo-19-a-segunda-guerra-mundial-entrevista-com-paulo-roberto-de-almeida/) e no Diplomatizzando (01/10/2015; link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2015/10/transformacoes-da-ordem-mundial-do.html). Citação do material:  GOMES, D. C. A economia internacional, da Belle Époque a Bretton Woods. SciELO em Perspectiva: Humanas. [viewed 05 December 2015]. Available from: http://humanas.blog.scielo.org/blog/2015/11/25/a-economia-internacional-da-belle-epoque-a-bretton-woods/. Relação de Publicados n. 1195.

3077. “A economia política das relações econômicas internacionais do Brasil: paradigmas e realidades, de Bretton Woods à atualidade”, Mendoza, 22 janeiro 2017, 4 p. Resumo de proposta de trabalho apresentada ao GT-4: Política Externa, Inserção Internacional e Integração Regional do II Encontro de Economia Política Internacional (PEPI-UFRJ) Rio de Janeiro, 10 a 12 de maio de 2017 (IE-UFRJ, Praia Vermelha). Encaminhado ao e-mail do evento. Recebida confirmação em 24/01/2017. Data de entrega: 30 Abril (Inscrição). Trabalho elaborado sob o n. 3109.

3081. “Bretton Woods: o aprendizado da economia na prática”, Brasília, 7 fevereiro 2017, 4 p. Colaboração a obra coletiva sobre Roberto Campos, organizada por Paulo Rabello de Castro e Ives Gandra Martins. Publicado no livro organizado pela Resistência Cultural Editora. Publicado in: Ives Gandra da Silva Martins e Paulo Rabello de Castro (orgs.), Lanterna na Proa: Roberto Campos ano 100 (São Luís, MA: Resistência Cultural Editora, 2017, 344 p; ISBN: 978-85-66418-13-2), p. 52-56. Reproduzido no blog Diplomatizzando (05/08/2017; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2017/08/bretton-woods-o-nascimento-da-atual.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1257.

3109. “A economia política das relações econômicas internacionais do Brasil: paradigmas e realidades, de Bretton Woods à atualidade”, Brasília, 30 abril 2017, 20 p. Trabalho apresentado ao GT-4: Política Externa, Inserção Internacional e Integração Regional do II Encontro de Economia Política Internacional (PEPI-UFRJ); Rio de Janeiro, 10 a 12 de maio de 2017 (IE-UFRJ, Praia Vermelha); Enviado em formato Word para inclusão nos Anais do encontro em 26/07/2017. Publicado nos Anais do II Encontro de Economia Política Internacional do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia Política Internacional da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, II ENEPI; organizadores: Bernardo Salgado Rodrigues; Laura Emilse Brizuela; Mario Afonso Lima (Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ, 2017; p. 1348-1369; ISSN: 2594-6641; disponível link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EX3XDKFNYnMxhzm5W8xBj_8waB6fiqRE/view; acesso em 29/11/2017). Serviu de base a apresentação no Ipea, em 2/06/2017; disponível em Academia.edu (https://www.academia.edu/s/cbb5ae9c50/the-political-economy-of-international-economic-relations-of-brazil-1944-2016). Relação de Publicados n. 1275.