What History
Tells Us about the Prospects for Brazil–U.S. Rapprochement under Bolsonaro
Brazil Institute (Wilson Center), January 4, 2019 By Nick Burns
Hopes are running high for the United States and
Brazil. There is the prospect of a personal rapport between the apparent
kindred spirits now occupying the presidencies of both countries, Donald Trump
and Jair Bolsonaro. There is the promise of policy alignment on issues like the
location of their embassies in Israel and their economic attitudes towards
China. And there is also a rare and widespread optimism — however cautious —
among the international business and financial communities regarding the
potential opening of Brazil’s historically closed economy. Phrases previously
seldom heard regarding the sometimes frosty Brazil-U.S. relationship are now
commonplace: many speak of a unique opportunity, a great moment. Ernesto
Araújo, the new Brazilian foreign minister, even went so far as to declare, “The sky is the
limit” for the United States and Brazil.
The current moment is unusual indeed, as a brief dip
into the history of Brazil-U.S. relations illustrates. Since the Second World
War, setbacks and disagreements have characterized relations between the two
most populous nations in the Americas, despite a handful of opportunities for
improvement. Two competing theories aim to explain the estrangement: an older
argument points to inevitable and perpetual misunderstanding between the
countries as part of an “emergent rivalry”; while a more contemporary one
suggests past disagreements were the fault of historical circumstance, personal
differences, and bad luck, which need not define the relationship going
forward.
Yet which theory best predicts the future of
Brazil-U.S. relations? Comparing what the two theories say about a previous
moment of hope for the bilateral relationship — namely, Henry Kissinger’s
failed 1970s bid for a strategic partnership with Brazil — can help us gauge
how much concrete progress to expect from today’s high hopes and declarations
of goodwill.
Brazil and the United States: Natural Rivals?
The notion that Brazilian and U.S. interests are
hopelessly divergent derives from the work of the leftist Brazilian
intellectual Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira. In the late 1980s, Moniz Bandeira
provocatively suggested that Brazil-U.S. relations were characterized by a
rivalidade emergente, or “emergent rivalry.” He based this on a realist
analysis of the relationship, writing,
“The material interests of the nation are the principle to which all others in
international relations subordinate themselves.”
For the United States and Brazil, this principle boded
ill. The material interest of Brazil as a nation lay in industrialization,
modernization, and the achievement of an independent policy that would reduce
its dependence on commodity exports to the United States and other countries.
The material interests of the United States, after the Second World War, lay in
maintaining a strong influence over the Americas, which would preclude a
robustly independent policy for Brazil. For proponents of this school of
thought, it was no surprise that spats plagued the relationship despite both
governments’ strong anti-communist stance during the Cold War: ideology could
not cover up the problems caused by opposing material interests.
We can see how Moniz Bandeira’s theory applies to
moments of potential bilateral breakthrough by examining his treatment of Henry
Kissinger’s bid for a Brazil–U.S. strategic partnership during the 1970s.
Kissinger, the chief architect of U.S. foreign policy during this period, had
conceived of a new strategy to maintain U.S. global influence in the face of
its waning ability to project force directly. As Vietnam showed more painfully
with each passing year, direct military intervention was costly in terms of
blood, treasure, and political capital. The United States needed partners.
Brazil was chosen as a potential “key country” that could help the United
States maintain stability in the world and prevent the spread of communism. At
the same time, Antônio Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil’s foreign minister, hoped
for a “special relationship” with the United States to help Brazil gain
preeminence in South America on its own terms. It seemed as though there was
room for a solid partnership between the United States and Brazil — but it was
not to be.
For Moniz Bandeira, the “emergent rivalry” dynamic
predetermined this failure to build closer relations with Brazil. All of the
Brazilian decisions that helped torpedo the bid over the next few years were
direct consequences of Brazil’s international ambition: the decision to work
with West Germany to develop a nuclear program, to become the first to
recognize left-wing governments of former Portuguese colonies in Africa, to
reach out to Arab countries staunchly opposed to the United States. There was
never any real chance of a breakthrough, but rather only empty talk of
goodwill.
Moniz Bandeira doubted Brazil-U.S. mutual distrust
would dissipate going forward. Despite the end of the Cold War and the
re-inauguration of democracy in Brazil, the United States preserved an interest
in maintaining its hegemony over the world in the face of nations like China
and Russia, which seemed to be catching up. Thus, there was still no place for
a Brazil that had a truly free hand.
To an extent, this notion may have become a
self-fulfilling prophesy. A generation of diplomats in Brazil’s foreign
service, beginning in the late 1980s, saw truth in Moniz Bandeira’s notion that
the United States and Brazil were inevitably opposed — an influence that is
unlikely to have been salutary to bilateral prospects. With the changing of the
guard, however, this idea has lost some currency, and perhaps accordingly has
become less predictive.
Criticizing 'Emergent Rivalry': A Historical Approach
A more recent theory seeks to overthrow the “emergent
rivalry” narrative in favor of an approach that focuses more on historical
contingency — things like chance events, personal rapports, and global context.
To expound his critique of the “emergent rivalry” theory, Matias Spektor, a
professor at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) and Wilson Center fellow in
2012, made a case
study of Kissinger’s unsuccessful 1970s attempt to improve
Brazil–U.S. relations.
The partnership may have failed, Spektor argues, but
it was never doomed from the start. A need for Brazil’s help on the part of the
United States, and Brazil’s genuine desire for a substantial relationship with
the Cold War great power, made the possibility of partnership a real one. “International
politics is not predestined,” he writes,
describing how the partnership unraveled thanks to personality clashes between
Kissinger and Silveira, distrust in the ranks of Itamaraty (Brazil’s foreign
ministry), and splits caused by world events that had nothing to do with the
internal affairs of the United States or Brazil.
Brazil’s unconsidered decision to become the first
country to recognize Angolan independence, for example, angered the United
States and contributed to an overall worsening of relations that continued
through the end of the decade and beyond, scotching plans for partnership.
However, with different figures in government, Brazil’s changed status as a
democracy, and a different global context since the end of the Cold War, it is
no foregone conclusion that history will repeat itself. We might call this
approach to Brazil–U.S. relations the “compatibility and context” approach.
The Lessons of History
The question of whether to take recent declarations
that “the sky’s the limit” with enthusiasm or skepticism depends in large
measure on whose version of the history of Brazil-U.S. relations you believe.
In Moniz Bandeira’s version, Brazil’s desire to reduce its dependence on
commodities and consolidate a place on the world stage through
industrialization has not changed, and will lead to eventual conflict with the
United States despite any personal goodwill on the part of Bolsonaro and his
administration. In Spektor’s version, however, personal rapport, ideological
common ground, and global context matter much more; and it seems clear that
these forces are, at least for the moment, drawing the United States and Brazil
together much more than apart. It is important to keep in mind, however, that
Donald Trump’s current mandate only lasts another two years, and should he fail
to secure reelection in 2020, his replacement would not likely be nearly as
friendly to Bolsonaro and his agenda.
Depending on how one is inclined to read history, the
last few decades in Brazil-U.S. relations can fit either a Spektor or a Moniz
Bandeira approach. The 1990s saw hopes rise again for the United States and
Brazil with the development of a rapport between then-presidents Bill Clinton
and Fernando Henrique Cardoso. More compatible agendas and temperaments seemed
to make a breakthrough possible over U.S. companies’ use of the Brazilian
launch center at Alcântara, conveniently located near the Equator. But when the
succeeding Brazilian administration took office, the agreement failed to
advance through the Brazilian Congress and was quickly forgotten. Was the
failure inevitable, a direct consequence of competing national interests, or
was it instead just a hard-luck result of the change in administrations?
In some ways, the relationship may have moved beyond
both “compatibility and context” and “emergent rivalry.” More collaboration
between U.S. and Brazilian companies, such as a new deal
signed between aerospace giants Boeing and Embraer; and also between U.S. and
Brazilian universities and, crucially, intellectuals — a key part of
Bolsonaro’s rise to power — represent just a handful of the ways the bilateral
relationship has diversified and gained momentum in recent years. This does not
necessarily raise the odds of a breakthrough, but it does provide a higher
floor in case bilateral fortunes take a turn for the worse.
The safest approach to gauging the likely success of a
Brazil-U.S. rapprochement is most likely a balanced one: while temperamental
and contextual factors will do much to cheerlead progress between Brazil and
the United States, it is wise to look out for the resurgence of old bugbears.
If there are to be woes, they are as likely to be logistical as to be
structural: Bolsonaro and his team will likely have little leeway to maneuver,
vis-à-vis the United States or otherwise, if they do not manage to secure
long-awaited pension reform in the early months of the administration. In other
words, the sky may well be the limit, but only so long as the ground remains
stable underfoot.
TAGS: Cold War,
Diplomatic
History, History
Nick Burns is an intern at the Brazil Institute.
