A Lista de Schindler: livro e filme - Marcos de Queiroz Grillo

A Lista de Schindler: livro e filme 

Marcos de Queiroz Grillo

... Com o avanço das forças aliadas e o recuo dos nazistas, o Reich decide fechar Campos de Concentração e acelerar a exterminação em massa dos judeus. Inicialmente, começam a incinerar os judeus mortos na própria Cracóvia. Posteriormente, passam a enviar diariamente 60 mil seres humanos aos fornos de Auschwitz. No período de 1939 a 1945, foram assassinados 6 milhões de judeus espalhados pelos vários campos de extermínio nos países europeus dominados pelo III Reich...

... O livro apresenta duas realidades inteiramente díspares. De um lado, os judeus poloneses sendo violentados em suas vidas pelos nazistas (transferidos para ghetos e depois para campo de concentração, sem qualquer solidariedade de seus compatriotas poloneses). De outro, os nazistas vivendo e desfrutando de suas vidas com plena segurança e conforto...

... Oscar Schindler, além de empresário, era membro do Partido Nazista e muito bem relacionado nos círculos militares. Tendo conseguido capitalizar-se com o dinheiro dos judeus, faz lobby junto a nazistas poderosos, conquista contrato para fabricação de utensílios para o exército e é autorizado a utilizar mão-de-obra judia escrava. Tudo isso acontece na base da troca de favores e do toma lá dá cá. Schindler pagava comissões ao oficialato alemão pelo trabalho fabril de cada judeu empregado, o que para ele resultava ser mais barato do que a contratação de poloneses. Schindler era especialista em comprar favores de oficiais da SS e do exército alemão, tanto superiores como subalternos...

 

A lista de Schindler

 

Por MARCOS DE QUEIROZ GRILLO*, 

• 08/02/2025

Marcelo Guimarães Lima, Piranesi (VII) - I Carceri / As Prisões, desenho digital, 2023

Comentário sobre o livro de Thomas Keneally

1.

Romancista, dramaturgo e produtor, Thomas Keneally levou dois anos entrevistando 50 sobreviventes – Schindlerjuden (judeus Schindler) – em oito países: Austrália, Israel, Estados Unidos da América, Polônia, Alemanha Ocidental, Áustria, Argentina e Brasil. Baseado nesses depoimentos e nos testemunhos que se encontram na Seção de Lembrança de Mártires e Heróis do Museu Yad Vashem, em Jerusalém, ele realizou essa fabulosa recriação da história, narrada com a ênfase típica de uma ficção. Foi agraciado com o prêmio Booker, da Inglaterra.

Dentre os entrevistados o autor fez referência ao próprio Leopold Pfefferberg, ao juiz Mosh Bejski, da Suprema Corte de Israel, e Mieczyslaw Pemper – que além de transmitirem suas lembranças sobre o período, forneceram documentos que contribuíram para a exatidão da narrativa. Ainda constam da lista Emilie Schindler, Ludmila Pfefferberg, Sophia Stern, Helen Horowitz, Jonas Dresner, casal Henry Rosner, Leopold Rosner, Alex Rosner, Idek Schindel, Danuta Schindel, Regina Horowitz, Bronislawa Karakulska, Richard Horowitz, Shmuel Springmann, o falecido Jakob Sternberg, dentre muitos outros.

O livro fala da vida interrompida de milhares de judeus, que perdem suas identidades e não passam de carcaças esfomeadas marcadas com uma tatuagem numerada no antebraço. Eram apenas números, vidas insignificantes aos olhos nazistas e, como sempre dizia Himler, deveriam ser aniquiladas, para “o bem da Alemanha nazista”. Itzhak Stern, a Sra. Pfeffeberg, Hanukkah, Danka, Genia, Menasha Levartov, entre tantos outros, viveram anos de medo, dor de perder seus parentes, fome, frio, humilhações e privações por parte dos nazistas. Se escaparam, foi por sorte de encontrar pessoas como Oscar, que se arriscavam por eles.

O livro foi adaptado para o cinema pela Universal Pictures, que produziu o filme intitulado A lista de Schindler, dirigido por Stephen Spielberg, que ganhou diversos Oscars e prêmios (melhor filme, melhor diretor, melhor música e trilha sonora, melhor fotografia, melhor edição, entre outros) tendo sido considerado um dos maiores sucessos cinematográficos pela Associação de Críticos de Nova Iorque e Los Angeles.

2.

Trata-se de texto literário que documenta uma história real vivenciada durante a 2ª Guerra Mundial, retratando o drama daquela época de holocausto, construída em cima de depoimentos dos Schindlerjuden (judeus Schindler) e evita ficar somente na esfera de um documentário biográfico sobre Oscar Schindler.

Holocausto é um substantivo masculino que significa o sacrifício, praticado pelos antigos hebreus, em que a vítima era inteiramente queimada. Seus sinônimos são imolação, sacrifício, massacre.

Durante a ocupação nazista de quase toda Europa, o termo “holocausto” passou a significar o genocídio organizado pelos alemães nazistas, principalmente de judeus, durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Os judeus e qualquer outra minoria considerada inferior pelos nazistas eram sistemicamente agrupados, explorados até exaustão e, então, sumariamente executados. O Holocausto fez parte da “Solução Final”, um plano nazista que procurou eliminar os judeus da Europa, além de outras minorias, como ciganos, homossexuais e negros.

O livro apresenta duas realidades inteiramente díspares. De um lado, os judeus poloneses sendo violentados em suas vidas pelos nazistas (transferidos para ghetos e depois para campo de concentração, sem qualquer solidariedade de seus compatriotas poloneses). De outro, os nazistas vivendo e desfrutando de suas vidas com plena segurança e conforto.

Oscar Schindler, um empresário e lobista alemão, filiado ao Partido Nazista, consegue que alguns judeus ricos entreguem para ele o dinheiro que mantinham escondido. Eles se tornariam empregados “investidores” numa fábrica de utensílios (panelas). Receberiam, em troca, e a longo prazo, produtos que poderiam trocar no mercado negro, além de diminuírem o risco de irem para a Câmara de Gás. Era isso ou nada.

Embora não compactuasse com a ideologia do partido, de ‘limpar’ a Alemanha dos ‘malditos judeus’, ele lucrava com sua fábrica de esmaltados, e contribuía com o Partido.

Oscar Schindler, além de empresário, era membro do Partido Nazista e muito bem relacionado nos círculos militares. Tendo conseguido capitalizar-se com o dinheiro dos judeus, faz lobby junto a nazistas poderosos, conquista contrato para fabricação de utensílios para o exército e é autorizado a utilizar mão-de-obra judia escrava. Tudo isso acontece na base da troca de favores e do toma lá dá cá. Schindler pagava comissões ao oficialato alemão pelo trabalho fabril de cada judeu empregado, o que para ele resultava ser mais barato do que a contratação de poloneses. Schindler era especialista em comprar favores de oficiais da SS e do exército alemão, tanto superiores como subalternos.

Em princípio Schindler utiliza mão-de-obra escrava judia dos guetos. Posteriormente, quando os guetos são desmontados e os judeus transferidos para o Campo de Concentração da Cracóvia, consegue continuar utilizando a mesma mão-de-obra. Aproveita-se da situação de pavor dos judeus, que se sentem mais protegidos com ele, e delega toda a operação da fábrica para o contador judeu Stern, de quem busca aproximação.

Schindler sempre defende seus empregados por ocasião das vistorias dos soldados alemães, quando havia o risco de serem presos ou mortos, fingindo não se importar com seus destinos, mas que seria de grande prejuízo para sua fábrica e para o país o desperdício de ‘mão-de-obra especializada’ já treinada naquela indústria.

Apesar do trabalho escravo, os judeus preferem trabalhar na fábrica de Schindler pois, assim, diminuem o risco de trabalhos forçados mais pesados ou, o que era pior, de serem enviados para a Câmara de Gás.

Fruto da relação de infância de Schindler com Amon Göet, oficial da SS e Chefe do Campo de Concentração, na Cracóvia, seus funcionários têm menos riscos do que os demais judeus de serem assassinados a esmo e a sangue frio, esporte preferido daquele assassino bipolar. Ainda assim, algumas vezes isso acontece.

Com a produção de panelas com baixo custo de mão-de-obra para atender os contratos conquistados com o exército, Schindler acumula um patrimônio significativo, que o permite levar uma vida nababesca e pautada por orgias. Vive longe de sua mulher e tem várias amantes, sendo considerado uma pessoa de atração irresistível pela sua elegância, educação e charme.

Contudo, sua produção industrial não teria sido possível sem o concurso do contador Stern, que é a pessoa que, de fato, toca a fábrica e lidera as pessoas que lá trabalham, todas irmanadas pelo espírito de sobrevivência.

3.

Com o avanço das forças aliadas e o recuo dos nazistas, o Reich decide fechar Campos de Concentração e acelerar a exterminação em massa dos judeus. Inicialmente, começam a incinerar os judeus mortos na própria Cracóvia. Posteriormente, passam a enviar diariamente 60 mil seres humanos aos fornos de Auschwitz. No período de 1939 a 1945, foram assassinados 6 milhões de judeus espalhados pelos vários campos de extermínio nos países europeus dominados pelo III Reich.

Gradativamente, Schindler se apega mais ao contador Stern e aos seus demais funcionários judeus, a quem, anteriormente, considerava como meras peças de sua propriedade. Do ponto de vista pessoal, Schindler experimenta uma mudança na sua percepção de mundo e de vida, tornando-se mais humanista.

Ao constatar que o Campo de Concentração da Cracóvia, na Polônia, está em vias de ser desmobilizado e do desinteresse do exército na continuidade da compra de utensílios, Schindler conquista, junto ao exército alemão, um novo contrato, desta vez, para a produção de munição. Essa decisão fez parte de sua ideia de salvar seus funcionários da exterminação nas Câmaras de Gás de Auschwitz.

Investe quase todo seu patrimônio na compra de 1.200 judeus pagando o preço negociado com Amon Göet, oficial da SS e Chefe do Campo de Concentração da Cracóvia e obtém autorização para transferi-los para um novo Campo de Concentração, em Zwittau – Brinnlitz, na antiga Tchecoslováquia (sua cidade natal dos tempos do Império austro-húngaro), onde inicia a produção de munição, em nova fábrica.

Constrói às pressas, com o contador Stern, a lista dos judeus, para cujo preço total dispunha de recursos próprios suficientes.

Por ocasião da transferência deles, os homens e as mulheres são enviados em trens separados. Inadvertidamente, o trem das mulheres segue para Auschwitz. Schindler vai pessoalmente negociar com o oficial nazista a devolução das mulheres, negócio que foi pago em diamantes. Novo êxito logrado por um Oscar Schindler diferente, mais humanizado e já comprometido a salvar vidas.

Durante todos esses anos Schindler enfrenta grandes obstáculos nas suas negociações com seus pares nazistas, no perigoso toma lá dá cá, na tentativa de convencimento de oficiais sobre os quais não tem influência, correndo o risco de ser preso; uma verdadeira luta pela sobrevivência, de início, pensando no seu negócio e, depois, somente em proteger seus funcionários.

Schindler continua a proteger as vidas de seus trabalhadores evitando fuzilamentos sumários que eram impetrados com a maior normalidade pelos nazistas.

As munições produzidas por eles não passavam pelo controle de qualidade do exército e, por essa razão, Schindler passa a comprar com seu próprio dinheiro munições no mercado paralelo para honrar seu contrato com o exército alemão.

Reconquista a sua mulher e deixa de lado suas amantes e as orgias. A fábrica funciona aos trancos e barrancos até a rendição da Alemanha, em 1945.

Com a rendição da Alemanha, a ordem superior era de fuzilarem todos os judeus. Schindler convence os alemães que controlam o Campo de Concentração a não fuzilarem os judeus trabalhadores de sua fábrica, em desobediência às ordens do Reich. Em virtude do avanço das tropas soviéticas e dos pedidos de Schindler, os alemães abandonam o Campo, sem matar os judeus.

Schindler, amargurado por não ter podido salvar mais pessoas, despede-se dos seus empregados ocasião em que recebe uma carta explicativa de suas peripécias humanistas, assinada por todos eles. Na despedida também recebe um anel, feito com ouro extraído de um dente de um dos judeus, que aceitou dá-lo voluntariamente, com a seguinte inscrição do Talmud: “Quem salva uma vida, salva o mundo inteiro”.

Na convivência com seus empregados judeus Schindler evolui como pessoa e esforça-se para parar a roda do holocausto. Schindler foge da Tchecoslováquia com sua mulher Emilie, ambos trajando uniformes de judeu.

Ocorre a ocupação da Tchecoslováquia pelo exército soviético. Os judeus são liberados para seguirem seus caminhos, sendo desaconselhados a retornarem à Polônia.

Schindler enfrenta muitas dificuldades para escapar, lidando com americanos, franceses e suíços. Nesse processo, suas últimas posses são confiscadas. Finalmente, na França, quando consegue provar sua inocência, sua mulher e ele não tinham nada mais do que a roupa do corpo. Mas, tinham a proteção dos Schindlerjuden, que eram agora sua família. Vão viver por um tempo em Munique, na Alemanha, e decidem, depois, cruzar o Atlantico para morar na Argentina. Foram com ele uma dúzia de judeus amigos.

Em 1949 fizeram-lhe um pagamento ex gratia de USS 15.000 e deram-lhe uma referência (“A Quem Possa Interessar”) assinada por M.W. Beckelman, vice-presidente do Conselho Executivo da organização: “O Comitê Americano da Junta de Distribuição investigou minuciosamente as atividades do Sr. Schindler no período da guerra e da ocupação… A nossa recomendação irrestrita é que as organizações e pessoas, a quem o Sr. Schindler possa procurar, façam todo o possível para ajudá-lo, em reconhecimento pelos seus eminentes serviços…

Sob o pretexto de administrar uma fábrica nazista de trabalhos forçados, primeiro na Polônia e depois na Tchecoslováquia, o Sr. Schindler conseguiu recrutar como seus empregados e proteger judeus e judias destinados a morrer em Auschwitz e em outros infames campos de concentração… Testemunhas relataram ao nosso Comitê que o “campo de Schindler em Brinnlitz era o único, nos territórios ocupados pelos nazistas, em que nunca foi morto um judeu, ou mesmo espancado, mas, ao contrário, sempre tratado como um ser humano.”

Agora, quando ele vai iniciar uma nova vida, devemos ajudá-lo, como ele ajudou os nossos irmãos.

Durante dez anos dedicou-se à produção rural, mas terminou falindo. Talvez, como comentavam alguns, porque não tivesse um Stern para ajudá-lo. Retornou à Alemanha. Sua mulher Emilie permanece na Argentina. Vai viver em Frankfurt onde funda uma fábrica de cimento, que também não tem êxito. Todos os anos é convidado para visitar Israel para homenagens. Entrevistas em Israel, republicadas na Alemanha, não lhe ajudam em nada. Em Frankfurt é vaiado, insultado e apedrejado.

Os Schindlerjuden continuam mantendo-o sob proteção moral e financeira. Schindler morre em 9 de outubro de 1974. Em atenção ao seu desejo, é enterrado em cemitério católico de Jerusalém.

 

*Marcos de Queiroz Grillo é economista e mestre em administração pela UFRJ.

Referência

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Thomas Keneally. A lista de Schindler. 

Tradução: Tati Moraes. Rio de Janeiro, Record, 2021, 424 págs. [https://amzn.to/41aujtS]

 

Acordo Mercosul-UE: enterrado por mais alguns anos. Vai ser difícil retomar a liberalização nos próximos anos

 Adeus, firewell, auf wiedersehn, adiós, adieu au traité Mercosud-UE:

https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2024/11/15/michel-barnier-reaffirme-son-opposition-au-traite-de-libre-echange-du-mercosur-avant-des-mobilisations-agricoles_6395228_3234.html

Michel Barnier réaffirme son opposition au traité de libre-échange du Mercosur, avant des mobilisations agricoles
A l’occasion du G20 qui se tient à partir de lundi à Rio de Janeiro, la FNSEA et les Jeunes Agriculteurs ont appelé à une mobilisation pour s’opposer au traité de libre-échange entre l’Union européenne et des pays sud-américains.
Le Monde avec AFP, 16/11/2024, 14h37

Quelques jours avant une mobilisation nationale des agriculteurs, prévue pour lundi 18 novembre, le premier ministre, Michel Barnier, a de nouveau marqué son opposition vendredi au traité de libre-échange entre l’Union européenne et le Mercosur. « Il faut le refuser », a-t-il notamment lancé sur France Bleu, affichant son « inquiétude de voir un traité de libre-échange provoquer la destruction de pans entiers de notre agriculture ».
Ce texte, qui serait l’accord le plus important conclu par l’Union européenne, vise à faciliter les échanges commerciaux entre l’Europe et l’Amérique du Sud en supprimant progressivement la quasi-totalité des droits de douane appliqués aux échanges entre les deux blocs.
« Des dizaines de milliers de tonnes de bœuf rentreront avec des conditions d’élevage qui ne sont pas du tout les mêmes que celles que nous imposons à nos propres agriculteurs au titre de la santé publique », a déploré vendredi l’ancien ministre de l’agriculture, qui y voit une « concurrence déloyale ». A la veille d’un déplacement d’Emmanuel Macron en Amérique latine, où il sera notamment question de ce traité de libre-échange, Michel Barnier estime que « ni le président de la République ni le premier ministre que je suis n’accepterons cet accord en l’état actuel des choses ». « Le Mercosur, en l’état, n’est pas un traité qui est acceptable », avait réaffirmé à la mi-octobre Emmanuel Macron.
Des mobilisations dans les Bouches-du-Rhône
Cette interview de M. Barnier a lieu trois jours avant une mobilisation des agriculteurs à l’appel de l’alliance syndicale majoritaire de la FNSEA et des Jeunes Agriculteurs à partir de lundi, au moment où les membres du G20 se réuniront à Rio de Janeiro. Mais dès vendredi des paysans ont manifesté dans les Bouches-du-Rhône. A Tarascon, une trentaine d’agriculteurs, arrivés vers 6 h 30, ont déversé des déchets d’exploitations (fumier, bâches plastiques, etc.) à l’aide d’engins agricoles devant le centre des impôts, dont la plaque avait été recouverte d’un drapeau brésilien, sur lequel était inscrit « ambassade du Brésil ».
« Notre mobilisation s’inscrit en préambule du G20 qui se tient au Brésil pour dire notre opposition à un accord avec le Mercosur. Cet accord ferait entrer sur le territoire des produits qui sont interdits chez nous depuis des années », a expliqué à l’Agence France-Presse (AFP) Romain Blanchard, président de la FDSEA (syndicat majoritaire) des Bouches-du-Rhône.
« Ils veulent nous envoyer leurs déchets, on leur envoie les nôtres ! », a-t-il ajouté. A une vingtaine de kilomètres de là, à Châteaurenard, des agriculteurs de la FDSEA et des Jeunes Agriculteurs ont muré à l’aide de parpaings et de ciment l’accès du public au centre des impôts, avant de déverser en fin de matinée du lisier devant le bâtiment. « Le droit de manifestation existe, dans le respect des personnes, des biens privés, mais je suis aux côtés des agriculteurs », a fait savoir Michel Barnier au micro de France Bleu.
Le Monde avec AFP

Polônia e Alemanha: acordo de resolução pacífica de controvérsias de 1934: cinco anos depois Alemanha invadia a Polônia

Meu amigo José Antonio de Macedo Soares mantém, desde alguns anos, uma "Folhinha do Futuro", na qual ele nos informa sobre fatos do passado. O futuro se deve apenas que ele antecipa em um mês, as datas comemorativas que ocorrerão no mês seguinte. Em 26 de janeiro deste ano, segundo a Folhinha recebida no final de dezembro de 2023, se deveria "comemorar"os 90 anos desse acordo "memorável", pelo qual Alemanha e Polônia renunciavam à guerra e prometiam regular e pautar suas relações por métodos pacíficos, de acordo ao Pacto Briand-Kellog de 1928.

Ele alimentou minha curiosidade sobre a data enviando o teor do acordo bilateral, cuja implementação seria o eixo central "de uma paz geral na Europa". Cinco anos depois, a Alemanha nazista invadia brutalmente a Polônia, trazendo uma guerra geral na Europa. Não só na Europa, pois desde 1937 já havia guerra na Ásia e o conflito se estendeu ao mundo todo, até 1945.

A Rússia pós-soviética assinou, nos anos 1990, pactos desse tipo com seus vizinhos, enfim libertos da opressão da URSS, o que não impediu Putin de invadir a Ucrânia em 2014 e 2022. Putin é o novo Hitler; ainda não sabemos se isso será o início de uma guerra geral na Europa.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

TEXT OF GERMAN-POLISH AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 26, 1934

(From: Yale University documentary records)

The German Government and the Polish Government consider that the time has come to introduce a new phase in the political relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding between State and State. They have, therefore, decided to lay down the principles for the future development of these relations in the present declaration.

The two Governments base their action on the fact that the maintenance and guarantee of a lasting peace between their countries is an essential pre-condition for the general peace of Europe.

They have therefore decided to base their mutual relations on the principles laid down in the Pact of Paris of the 17th August, 1928, and propose to define more exactly the application of these principles in so far as the relations between Germany and Poland are concerned.

Each of the two Governments, therefore, lays it down that the international obligations undertaken by it towards a third party do not hinder the peaceful development of their mutual relations, do not conflict with the present declaration, and are not affected by this declaration. They establish, moreover, that this declaration does not extend to those questions which under international law are to be regarded exclusively as the internal concern of one of the two States.

Both Governments announce their intention to settle directly all questions of whatever sort which concern their mutual relations.

Should any disputes arise between them and agreement thereon not be reached by direct negotiation, they will in each particular case, on the basis of mutual agreement, seek a solution by other peaceful means, without prejudice to the possibility of applying, if necessary, those methods of procedure in which provision is made for such cases in other agreements in force between them. In no circumstances, however, will they proceed to the application of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such disputes.

The guarantee of peace created by these principles will facilitate the great task of both Governments of finding a solution for problems of political, economic and social kinds, based on a just and fair adjustment of the interests of both parties.

Both Governments are convinced that the relations between their countries will in this manner develop fruitfully, and will lead to the establishment of a neighbourly relationship which will contribute to the well-being not only of both their countries, but of the other peoples of Europe as well.

The present declaration shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Warsaw as soon as possible.

The declaration is valid for a period of ten years, reckoned from the day of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

If the declaration is not denounced by one of the two Governments six months before the expiration of this period, it will continue in force, but can then be denounced by either Government at any time on notice of six months being given. Made in duplicate in the German and Polish languages.

Berlin, January 26, 1934.
For the German Government:
FREIHERR VON NEURATH.
For the Polish Government
JOSEF LIPSKI.

A Polônia parece estar perto de se livrar de seu governo de direita liberal dos últimos dez anos - Ishaan Tharoor (The Washington Post)

After election, Poland may turn the illiberal tide

Ishaan Tharoor

The Washington Post, Oct 18, 2023

Donald Tusk, leader of the largest opposition grouping Civic Coalition, gestures after the exit poll results are announced in Warsaw on Sunday. (Kacper Pempel/Reuters)

Poland’s nationalist ruling party won the most votes in Sunday’s election, but it’s heading for defeat. A bloc of opposition parties collectively secured a comfortable majority of ballots cast, as counting neared completion Monday. Rounds of parliamentary wrangling are expected to follow, with analysts suggesting a new government may not emerge until around Christmas. But results point to a dramatic ousting of the right-wing Law and Justice party, known by its Polish acronym PiS, which had hoped to extend its rule into a second decade.

During the prior eight years in office, PiS has taken Polish democracy down an illiberal path. Through a series of controversial reforms, it sought to bend the judiciary under its control, prompting unprecedented E.U. censure. Buoyed by staunch support among Poland’s conservative Catholics, PiS curtailed abortion rights and demonized the country’s LGBTQ+ community. It bullied and co-opted leading media outlets and even altered electoral laws ahead of this weekend in a bid to boost chances for reelection. Analysts had cast Poland’s trajectory in line with the democratic erosion in Hungary and Turkey, where illiberal demagogues now preside over de facto electoral autocracies.

And that’s for good reason. “Sunday’s vote was certainly not fair and barely free,” noted the Financial Times, explaining how the ruling faction had “marshalled all the resources of a heavily politicized state apparatus” to secure reelection. “The PiS authorities increased the number of polling stations in its rural heartlands but failed to update boundaries to give more seats to Poland’s liberal cities in line with population growth.”

But the Polish opposition, led by former Polish prime minister and former European Council president Donald Tusk, defied the odds, thanks to a mobilized anti-PiS coalition and the organic strength of Poland’s civil society.

Though PiS won the plurality with about 35.4 percent of the vote, it is left without a path to a governing coalition. The opposition Civic Platform, led by Tusk, came in second with about 30.7 percent but has two likely coalition partners — the Third Way and the Left party — which would give it a majority.

“We still have a democracy in Poland, but it’s thanks to our civil society, nongovernmental organizations and local government that the opposition is relatively strong,” Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski told my colleagues. “We can argue that it’s still democratic. But, of course, it’s also completely unfair.”

Now, the shock of the opposition’s success may ripple elsewhere. “Even if you don’t live in Poland, don’t care about Poland, and can’t find Poland on a map, take note: The victory of the Polish opposition proves that autocratic populism can be defeated, even after an unfair election,” the Atlantic’s Anne Applebaum wrote. “Nothing is inevitable about the rise of autocracy or the decline of democracy.”

Bucking trends seen in elections elsewhere, Polish voters heeded the opposition’s grandstanding over threats to the country’s democratic future and sided with political forces more associated with Europe’s mainstream establishment. Tusk is a traditional center-right liberals. The opposition was also buoyed by significant turnout in the country’s cities. The election had the highest turnout Poland has seen since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

“The opposition portrayed this election as the last, best chance to forestall Poland’s descent into autocracy,” my colleagues reported. “Exit polls suggested opposition support relied heavily on younger voters, highly educated urban dwellers and Poles living in the industrialized western half of the country, which has deeper historical ties to the rest of Europe.”

Their energy proved stronger than the staunch loyalties of PiS’s more rural, conservative base. “The Polish middle class has mobilized to keep us a European democracy,” tweeted Radek Sikorski, a current Polish member of the European Parliament and former Polish foreign minister under Tusk. (Sikorski also happens to be Applebaum’s spouse.) “Huge turnout in metropolitan areas, demotivated traditionalist South-East. In these dark times forces of light need a break and it looks like Poland might provide it.”

In Brussels and other European capitals, there were sighs of relief. Liberal democracy in one of the continent’s biggest states appears to be making a comeback. “What it means for Europe is a major shift,” Rosa Balfour, director of Carnegie Europe, a Brussels think tank, told my colleagues. “If we get a government without Law and Justice, the relationship between Warsaw and Brussels, which has deteriorated steadily, would change. It also shows that Polish society can make independent decisions even if the media is government controlled.”

An E.U. diplomat, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive internal matters, told Politico: “The result should lead to better functioning of the E.U. where the E.U. truly reflects its values and principles, particularly solidarity and responsibility. The rejection of far-right policies should serve as an example to other people, and this should hopefully lead to the E.U. becoming stronger in the face of geopolitical threats.”

But first, PiS has to concede defeat, and it seems far away from doing so. Parallel to Tusk’s declaration of victory Sunday, PiS’s leadership also hailed their electoral success. Polish President Andrzej Duda, a PiS loyalist whose term lasts until May 2025, may give his former party the first chance to form a government, even though it looks unlikely to be able to do so.

Once the opposition is able to take power, they face a complicated task of unwinding eight years of hardening illiberalism in the Polish state. “A deeply entrenched populist system, a president loyal to the Law and Justice party, a puppet Constitutional Tribunal and Supreme Court — these are just a few of the problems a new government would face,” Polish analysts Jaroslaw Kuisz and Karolina Wigura wrote. “That’s before we get to the opposition itself, whose members, spanning the political spectrum from right to left, are by no means in agreement.”

Though Tusk is a political veteran, a future government featuring him and his allies will be navigating “uncharted territory,” wrote Piotr Buras of the European Council on Foreign Affairs. The continent has a long history of countries consolidating democracy after decades of authoritarian rule, but no experience of restoring democracy after the disruptions and constitutional chicanery of elected illiberal governments, which stacked various state institutions with loyal apparatchiks.

“The current opposition will face a task that no one has ever had to face before: it will attempt to dismantle an illiberal system that was established in the last eight years by seemingly democratic means,” Buras wrote.

In that endeavor, many political observers elsewhere will be watching closely. 

How Poland became the new ‘center of gravity’ in Europe: na linha de frente contra o novo imperialismo russo - Ishaan Tharoor (WP)

 

By Ishaan Tharoor with Sammy Westfall   Email

How Poland became the new ‘center of gravity’ in Europe Poland's Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky shake hands at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister on Wednesday in Warsaw. (Omar Marques/Getty Images) “Glory to Ukraine,” chanted the Polish crowd gathered outside Warsaw’s Royal Castle. “Glory to the heroes,” responded Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, smiling in gratitude. His Wednesday visit to the Polish capital marked a meeting of close friends and allies, whose bonds have only grown tighter since the onslaught unleashed by Russia last year. Earlier in the day, President Andrzej Duda awarded his Ukrainian counterpart Poland’s highest honor, the Order of the White Eagle, while Zelensky voiced thanks for the active role Poland has played in marshaling support for Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invasion and in welcoming more than 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees. “You have not abandoned Ukraine, you stood with us shoulder to shoulder, and we are grateful to you. We believe this is a historic relationship,” Zelensky said at a joint appearance with Duda. “Your personal attitude to our people, millions of Ukrainians who have found shelter in Poland, who feel at home here — I want to thank the entire Polish nation for all of this and for those first days and weeks when we needed this help so much.” It’s not just Zelensky who appreciates the help. Over the course of the past year of war, Poland has emerged as a key bulwark in the West’s confrontation with Russia. Beyond accommodating Ukrainian refugees, it has been a major conduit of aid and supplies to Ukraine, a vocal advocate for Kyiv’s initiatives to join both NATO and the European Union and a vociferous critic of Western Europe’s perceived softness toward the Kremlin. That political conviction has been reinforced with steel: While many NATO countries still struggle to boost their defense funding to the mandated 2 percent of their GDP, Poland’s defense spend is slated to reach 4 percent. Before other European nations, it rushed some of its inventory of German-made Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine and, most recently, became the first country to pledge fighter jets to Kyiv’s war effort. The United States, in conjunction with NATO, recently established a new permanent military garrison in Poland, alongside a gigantic new arms and weapons depot, bristling with hundreds of U.S. tanks and infantry vehicles. Poland, said a U.S. commander recently, is “a linchpin of regional security.” President Biden at the Royal Castle Gardens in Warsaw on Feb. 21 to deliver a speech marking the first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Evan Vucci/AP) On the threat of Russia, Poland’s hawkish nationalist government sees itself vindicated. “We’re seeing again today what the people of Poland, and the people across Europe, saw for decades,” President Biden acknowledged during a speech delivered in Warsaw in February, referring to the ambitions of the autocratic regime in the Kremlin. Indeed, the war in Ukraine has ushered in a kind of geopolitical shift in Europe, moving “NATO’s center of gravity” — as Chels Michta, a U.S. military intelligence officer and nonresident fellow at the Center of European Policy Analysis, recently put it — away from its traditional anchors in France and Germany and eastward to countries such as Poland, its Baltic neighbors and other nations once under the Iron Curtain. In Central and Eastern Europe, wrote Le Monde columnist Sylvie Kauffmann, “the weight of history is stronger … than in the West, the traumas are fresher and the return of tragedy is felt more keenly.” Almost four decades ago, Norman Davies, the great British historian, wrote of Poland as a nation at the “heart of Europe,” not simply because of its geographic centrality, but because it seemed the crucible of all the political currents coursing through the continent. The current moment has surfaced a deeper cultural animus too, as Neal Ascherson, veteran journalist of the Soviet world, observed last month: “The sense that Poland is actually more European than anybody else — through its old myth-role as ‘the bastion of western Christian civilization’ against the barbarian east — is still alive.” “There is a sense of moral superiority, which is very strong at the moment,” Piotr Buras, director of the Warsaw office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, told the New York Times magazine’s Elizabeth Zerofsky. “That we have been right on Russia, we have been right on energy security, we have been right in warning against getting so much dependence on Russia. And we have been ignored — by the Germans and by the others. We have been proven right, and now we want to show it.” But, as Zerofsky charts in her commendable, lengthy piece, there’s also an inherent tension in this position of “moral superiority.” Prior to the Russian invasion, Poland’s illiberal, right-wing government was an outlier in Europe and the target of official European Union censure for an overhaul of its judiciary that critics argue undermined the rule of law and democracy in the country. The top officials of the ruling Law and Justice party, known by its acronym PiS, are among the most outspoken critics of technocratic Brussels. “We proved from last year that we are reliable, that we were right, that German policy was bad for Europe,” Sebastian Kaleta, a deputy minister of justice, told Zerofsky, referring to Berlin’s overreliance on Russian energy imports. “And now we are punished for that by the European Union.” Poland's Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki delivers a speech at Germany's Heidelberg University on March 20. (Uwe Anspach/AP) Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki delivered a major speech last month at Germany’s Heidelberg University, where he declared Europe was at a “historic turning point.” That language has been used by others, too, in the context of the Ukraine war, not least by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. But in Morawiecki’s telling, the moment now ought to shake up the status quo further west, and dissuade those in Brussels who would “create a super-state government by a narrow elite” — a popular theme among right-wing nationalists in Europe. “In Europe nothing can safeguard the nations, their culture, their social, economic, political and military security better than nation states,” Morawiecki said. “Other systems are illusory or utopian.” Morawiecki’s view, such as it is, is at odds with “his Western counterparts who believe that only stronger integration and more effective decision making are the way forward,” observed Monika Sus, an associate professor at the Polish Academy of Sciences. Beyond smirking at countries such as France and Germany, and sheltering a bit closer beneath the American security umbrella, it doesn’t offer much as far as a vision for an independent European agenda. That may not matter much for a lot of reasons, not least because Morawiecki may be out of his post if Poland’s ruling party and its allies do not return to power after elections later this year. Polls suggest a tight race with the opposition. Whatever the outcome, though, it’s unlikely the country’s position on Ukraine will change. “Putin has fastened Poland tightly into the West,” wrote Ascherson. “If this autumn’s elections replace PiS with a liberal opposition, the bond will be even stronger.”

Reparações de guerra: o difícil cálculo de quem deve pagar quanto - exemplo da Polônia, nunca ressarcida - Arkadiusz Mularczyk

Quanto os russos deverão pagar aos ucranianos?

A Segunda Guerra Mundial foi a mais devastadora de todas, em vítimas humanas e em destruição material. Praticamente toda a Europa central e oriental, com, poucas exceções, sofreu o peso dos exércitos inimigos, uma devastação raras vezes vista na história da humanidade em tal escala.

Mas, o tirano de Moscou também está devastando a Ucrânia, matando seu povo, sendo o responsável pela fuga de milhões de ucranianos de suas casas.

Quem vai pagar a destruição? A Rússia deveria ser obrigada a fazê-lo, mas será uma longa batalha jurídica. As reservas russas congeladas em cofres ocidentais não cobrirão todas as necessidades, e antes seria preciso calcular exatamente quanto a Rússia deve pagar.

Os poloneses afinaram uma metodologia para isso e seria o caso de os ucranianos se consultarem com essa  organização citada na carta abaixo para começar a calcular a conta para os sucessores do Putin, ou seja, todo o povo russo.

Deve servir para outros conflitos igualmente, inclusive não apenas no plano das guerras desse tipo, mas em caso de criminalidade interna também.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

PS.: Grato a Fernando Werneck pelo envio da Economist.

Documentos da RFA sobre a imediata queda do muro e a implosão da União Soviética, 1991: contra a expansão da OTAN - Der Spiegel

 Der Spiegel, Hamburgo – 3.5.2022

Bonn-Moscow Ties

Newly Released Documents Shed Fresh Light on NATO's Eastward Expansion

In 1991, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl wanted to prevent the eastward expansion of NATO and Ukrainian independence, according to newly released files from the archive of the German Foreign Ministry. Was he trying to assuage Moscow?

Klaus Wiegrefe

 

Usually, only experts take much note when another volume of "Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany" is released by the Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History. They tend to be thick tomes full of documents from the Foreign Ministry – and it is rare that they promise much in the way of reading pleasure.

This time around, though, interest promises to be significant. The new volume with papers from 1991 includes memos, minutes and letters containing previously unknown details about NATO’s eastward expansion, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Ukraine. And already, it seems that the documents may fuel the ongoing debate surrounding Germany’s policies toward the Soviet Union and Russia over the years and up to the present day.

In 1991, the Soviet Union was still in existence, though many of the nationalities that formed the union had begun standing up to Moscow. Kohl, though, felt that a dissolution of the Soviet Union would be a "catastrophe" and anyone pushing for such a result was an "ass." In consequence, he repeatedly sought to drum up momentum in the West against independence for Ukraine and the Baltic states.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been annexed by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin in 1940, with West Germany later never recognizing the annexation. But now that Kohl found himself faced with the three Baltic republics pushing for independence and seeking to leave the Soviet Union, Kohl felt they were on the "wrong path," as he told French President François Mitterrand during a meeting in Paris in early 1991. Kohl, of course, had rapidly moved ahead with Germany’s reunification. But he felt that Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania should be more patient about their freedom – and should wait around another 10 years, the chancellor seemed to think at the time. And even then, Kohl felt the three countries should be neutral ("Finnish status"), and not become members of NATO or the European Community (EC).

He felt Ukraine should also remain in the Soviet Union, at least initially, so as not endanger its continued existence. Once it became clear that the Soviet Union was facing dissolution, the Germans were in favor of Kyiv joining a confederation with Russia and other former Soviet republics. In November 1991, Kohl offered Russian President Boris Yeltsin to "exert influence on the Ukrainian leadership" to join such a union, according to a memo from a discussion held between Kohl and Yeltsin during a trip by the Russian president to the German capital of Bonn. German diplomats felt that Kyiv was demonstrating a "tendency toward authoritarian-nationalist excesses."

When over 90 percent of Ukrainian voters cast their ballots in favor of independence in a referendum held two weeks later, though, both Kohl and Genscher changed course. Germany was the first EC member state to recognized Ukraine’s independence.

Nevertheless, the passages could still cause some present-day eyebrow raising in Kyiv, particularly against the backdrop of the ongoing Russian invasion.

Germany’s policies toward Eastern and Central Europe also raise questions. The Warsaw Pact collapsed during the course of 1991, and Genscher sought to employ a number of tricks to prevent countries like Poland, Hungary and Romania from becoming members of NATO – out of consideration for the concerns of the Soviet Union.

The momentum of Eastern and Central European countries toward joining the NATO alliance was creating a volatile mixture in Moscow of "perceptions of being under threat, fear of isolation and frustration over the ingratitude of former fraternal countries," reported the German ambassador as early as February 1991.

Genscher was concerned about fueling this situation further. NATO membership for Eastern-Central Europeans is "not in our interest," he declared. The countries, he noted, certainly have the right to join the Western alliance, but the focus should be on ensuring "that they don’t exercise this right."

Was his position born merely of prudence and a desire to ensure peace for the good of Europe? Or was it a precursor to the accommodation with Moscow "at the expense of other countries in Eastern Europe" that Social Democratic (SPD) parliamentarian Michael Roth recently spoke of? The chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the German parliament, Roth is in favor of establishing a committee of inquiry to examine failures in Germany and within his own party when it comes to Ostpolitik. He believes that Germany "de facto denied the sovereignty" of its neighboring countries.

Roth is referring specifically to Berlin’s policies in recent years. But should the analysis perhaps take a look further into history? All the way back to the era of Kohl and Genscher?

“Initially, the former Warsaw Pact countries pursued the intention of becoming NATO members. They have been discouraged from doing so in confidential discussions.”

German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in 1991

Curiously, Germany’s Ostpolitik – both in the period leading up to German reunification and since then – has today become the focus of criticism from all sides. Russia, too, is among the critics, accusing the West of having broken its word with the eastward expansion of NATO.

Some of the documents that have now been declassified may even be reframed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his acolytes as weapons in the ongoing propaganda war. Because in several instances, Genscher and his top diplomats refer to a pledge made during negotiations over German reunification – the Two Plus Four negotiations – that NATO would not expand into Eastern Europe.

Russian politicians have been claiming the existence of such a pledge for decades. Autocrat Putin has sought to use the argument to justify his invasion of Ukraine. Yet Moscow approved the eastern expansion of NATO in the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, if only grumblingly.

 

Many of the documents that have now been made public seem to support the Russian standpoint:

* On March 1, 1999, Genscher told the U.S. that he was opposed to the eastward expansion of NATO with the justification that "during the Two Plus Four negotiations the Soviets were told that there was no intention of expanding NATO to the east."

* Six days later, the policy director of the German Foreign Ministry, Jürgen Chrobog referred in a meeting with diplomats from Britain, France and the U.S. to "the understanding expressed in the Two Plus Four process that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the West cannot be used for our own advantage."

* On April 18, Genscher told his Greek counterpart that he had told the Soviets: "Germany wants to remain a member of NATO even after reunification. In exchange, it won’t be expanded to the east ..."

* On October 11, Genscher met with his counterparts from France and Spain, Roland Dumas and Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, respectively. Minutes from that meeting recorded Genscher’s statements regarding the future of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) as follows:

"We cannot accept NATO membership for CEEC states (referral to Soviet reaction and pledge in 2 + 4 negotiations that NATO territory is not to be expanded eastward). Every step that contributes to stabilizing situation in CEEC and SU is important." SU is a reference to the Soviet Union.

As such, Genscher wanted to "redirect" the desires of CEEC to join NATO and was on the lookout for alternatives that would be "acceptable" to the Soviet Union. The result was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, a body within which all former Warsaw Pact countries would have a say.

"Initially, the former Warsaw Pact countries pursued the intention of becoming NATO members," said Genscher. "They have been discouraged from doing so in confidential discussions."

For a time, the Germans were even in favor of NATO issuing an official declaration that it would not expand eastward. Only after the German foreign minister visited Washington in May 1991 and was told that an expansion "cannot be excluded in the future" did he quickly back off and say that he was not in favor of a "definitive declaration." De facto, however, it appears that he wanted to avoid expanding NATO to the east.

In Bonn, the initial capital of newly reunified Germany, the mood was one of self-confident optimism. The Cold War was over, Germany had been unified and Kohl and Genscher were pushing forward the consolidation of the EC into the European Union.

The chancellor also saw an historic opportunity when it came to relations with the Soviet Union. "Perhaps we will now be able to make right some of what went wrong this century," he said. After World War II with its millions of deaths and the partitioning of Germany that resulted, Kohl was hoping to open a new chapter in relations with Moscow.

The Soviet Union at the time was under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, an idealistic, pro-reform communist who the Germans loved since he had acquiesced to the end of East Germany. "If the Germans are prepared to help the Soviet Union, it is primarily out of gratitude for the role played by Gorbachev in Germany’s reunification," was Kohl’s description of the situation. The fact that Gorbachev was vehemently opposed to expanding NATO into Central and Eastern Europe was of no consequence when it came to the esteem in which he was held in Germany.

Later, the chancellor would say in public that he had been Gorbachev’s "best advocate." The two leaders used the informal term of address, passed along greetings to their wives and gossiped over the phone.

Kohl sought to drum up support around the world for "Misha" and his policies. He helped secure an invitation for the Kremlin leader to attend the G-7 summit and under Kohl’s leadership, Germany sent by far the most foreign aid to Moscow.

Kohl was deeply concerned that Gorbachev detractors in the Soviet military, secret services or state apparatus could seek to overthrow him. And an attempted putsch only just barely failed in August 1991. A group surrounding Vice President Gennady Yanayev detained Gorbachev, but mass demonstrations, the widespread refusal to obey orders in the military and resistance from Boris Yeltsin, who was president of the republic of Russia at the time, doomed the attempted overthrow to failure. Gorbachev remained in office.

It is hard to imagine what might have happened if the Soviet military had ended up under the command of a revanchist dictator at the time. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers were still stationed in what had been East Germany and additional units were still waiting to be pulled out of Poland and Czechoslovakia. The German Foreign Ministry files make it clear that the withdrawal of the troops was a "central priority" of German policy.

And then there were the roughly 30,000 Soviet nuclear warheads, which represented a significant danger. The "nuclear security on the territory of Soviet Union has absolute priority for the rest of the world," the Foreign Ministry in Bonn stated.

From this perspective, any weakening of Gorbachev was out of the question, and the same held true for the Soviet Union as a whole, which Gorbachev was trying to hold together against all resistance.

Kohl and Genscher believed in a kind of domino theory, which held that if the Baltic states left the Soviet Union, Ukraine would then follow, after which the entire Soviet Union would collapse, and Gorbachev would fall as well. And that is roughly what happened throughout the year of 1991. Kohl, though, had his doubts as to whether such a dissolution would be peaceful. He felt that a kind of "civil war" was possible, of the kind that was soon to break out in Yugoslavia.

Gorbachav’s longtime foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, even warned the Germans. During a Genscher visit to Moscow in October 1991, Shevardnadze, who was no longer in office by that time, prophesied that if the Soviet Union were to fall apart, a "fascist leader" could one day rise to power in Russia who may demand the return of the Crimea.

Putin annexed the Crimea a little over two decades later.

In 1991, Kohl even felt it was possible that the poisonous form of nationalism that appeared in Eastern Europe following World War I could make a reappearance. He believed that if the Baltic countries were to become independent, "the clash with Poland will start (anew)." Poland and Lithuania fought against each other in 1920.

The conclusion drawn by the German chancellor was that "the dissolution of the Soviet Union cannot be in our interest ..."

Ultimately, the Baltic countries and Ukraine went on to gain independence. And it likely won’t ever be possible to determine conclusively if Kohl’s analysis of the situation was erroneous or whether the Latvians and Lithuanians were simply lucky that their path to independence was more or less peaceful.

Many Western allies, in any case, tended to side with the Germans in their analysis of the situation. French President Mitterrand, for his part, complained about the Baltics, saying "you can’t risk everything you have gained (with Moscow – eds.) just to help countries that haven’t existed on their own in 400 years." Even U.S. President George H. W. Bush, a cold realist, complained about the forcefulness of the Baltic politicians as they pushed for independence.

Germany’s friendship with the Kremlin even led Chancellor Kohl to overlook a criminal offense on one occasion. On Jan. 13, 1991, Soviet special forces in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius were unleashed on the national independence movement there, storming the city’s television tower and other buildings. Fourteen unarmed people were killed and hundreds more injured.

The protests from Bonn were tepid at best.

Just a few days after the violence, Kohl and Gorbachev spoke on the phone. The diplomat listening in on the call noted that the two exchanged "hearty greetings." Gorbachev complained that it was impossible to move forward "without certain severe measures," which sounded as though he was referring to Vilnius. Kohl’s response: "In politics, everyone must also be open to detours. The important thing is that you don’t lose sight of the goal." Gorbachev concluded by saying that he "very much valued" the chancellor’s position. The word Lithuania wasn’t uttered even a single time, according to the minutes.

Gorbachev’s role in the violent assault remains unclarified to the present day.