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Mostrando postagens com marcador South China Morning Post. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador South China Morning Post. Mostrar todas as postagens

sábado, 10 de setembro de 2022

China: da política de portas abertas a um retorno ao protecionismo? - Wang Xiangwei (SCMP)

 Estaria a China revertendo às posturas isolacionistas e às políticas protecionistas e introvertidas das antigas dinastias Ming e Qing, afastando-se das doutrinas de portas abertas e de livre comércio dos últimos 40 anos?

Um artigo de história, falando do passado, desperta um intenso debate na China e no exterior, como argumenta este artigo no South China Morning Post, o principal jornal de Hong Kong.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 


SCMP Columnist

China Briefing by Wang Xiangwei

Is China closing its doors? Its leaders say no, but actions speak louder than words – and more clarity is needed

  • An otherwise run-of-the-mill academic article on imperial isolationist policy commissioned by a state-affiliated institution has sparked fierce debate
  • It shows the unease being felt at home and abroad over the once-unthinkable: that China’s open-door policy of more than 40 years is now in question

Will China open up more to the wider world, as its leaders have repeated tirelessly in public, or is it about to close its doors, as many have privately feared, because of uncertainties at home and abroad?

These two seemingly contradicting questions have been simmering for nearly three years now, as China has largely isolated itself from the outside world through its tough zero-Covid policies and as tensions with the United Stateshave escalated dramatically.

They matter even more now as China’s Communist Party enters the final stretch of preparations for its 20th congress next month, where Xi Jinping is widely expected to cement his status as the country’s most powerful leader in recent decades by securing a norm-busting third term as party chief.

People walk past a screen showing Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Museum of the Communist Party of China in Beijing. Xi is expected to cement his status as paramount leader at next month’s party congress. Photo: AFP
People walk past a screen showing Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Museum of the Communist Party of China in Beijing. Xi is expected to cement his status as paramount leader at next month’s party congress. Photo: AFP

All this helps explain why a recent academic article on the country’s past closed-door policies has caused such a stir in China and overseas, as it brings into the open concerns about Beijing’s broad policy direction.

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The article, whose title can be roughly translated as “A Fresh Look at the Isolationist Policy in the Ming and Qing Dynasties”, argues that China’s feudal rulers from the 16th to the 19th centuries did not pursue a policy of complete isolation, as is widely believed, but one of “self-restriction” designed to protect the country’s national interests and sovereignty, and ward off Western invasion and colonisation.

It concluded that voluntary restrictions on border openings made historical sense, even though those policies contributed to China’s decline because its rulers refused to accept advanced Western technology and weaponry.


The 15,000-word article was first published in an obscure journal called “Historical Research” in June and would have likely remained only of interest to a small circle of academics, had it not been shared on social media by the state-affiliated Chinese Academy of History, which commissioned the article.


Since then, it has gone viral, sparking an intense online debate over not only what the article really means to say, but also China’s commitment to reform and opening up.

For many critics, the article is a brazen revisionist attempt to upend the prevailing official narrative that the feudal rulers of the Ming and Qing dynasties had deliberately pursued closed-door policies, which were responsible for China’s waning status and resulted in it being forced to open up by way of the opium wars and their aftermath.


Some went even further by suggesting that the publication of the article was a sign that the Chinese authorities planned to use historical revisionism to signal that they may have had second thoughts about China’s open-door policy at a time when the party has strengthened authoritarian controls at all levels of society and is faced with a hostile international environment that’s unprecedented in recent times.


Proponents of this theory point to the Chinese Academy of History’s status as a high-level institute formed in 2019 with the top leadership’s blessing.

They argue that China’s extreme zero-Covid policy, which has largely closed the country off from the rest of the world for approaching three years now, could be viewed as an experiment to test the resilience of the Chinese economy.


But other commentators have dismissed those criticisms and worries as people making mountains out of molehills and argued that the article was merely an academic exercise in studying the country’s past.

This author tends to agree with the latter view. In fact, the article in question is well researched and well balanced, succinctly and convincingly articulating the reasons behind and highlighting the failures of those feudal policies. But the worrying sentiment emanating from the debate should not be dismissed out of hand.

As tensions rise, China pivots inwards

The fact that this academic article could elicit such strong reactions at home and abroad is truly remarkable, providing serious food for thought.


Until recently, it was almost unthinkable that China’s open-door policy, adopted by Deng Xiaoping more than 40 years ago, could be called into question. After all, the policy of reform and opening up paved the way for China’s economic lift-off. Now the country has the world’s second-largest economy and is the largest goods-trading nation.

China’s top leaders including Xi and Premier Li Keqiang have repeatedly offered reassurances that the country will not close its doors. They have in fact said it will open up wider to the outside world.

But in recent years, their vows have been met with increasing scepticism. Xi has constantly stressed self-reliance and self-sufficiency when it comes to economic and technological development, while pushing for a dual circulation economy which would rely less on foreign technology and consumption.

China’s inward economic shift has come amid rising geopolitical and trade tensions with the US, which has started to impose restrictions on exports of critical components including semiconductors.


The inward pivot is also accompanied by an array of domestic policies, including the common prosperity campaign and regulatory crackdowns on sectors from technology to private education, mainly targeted at non-state enterprises.

Moreover, China’s tight zero-Covid policies have reduced interactions with the international community to a bare minimum.

All these developments have helped conjure up a frightening perception that China is retreating into isolation.

China’s top leaders are under growing pressure to counter this perception. On Wednesday, Li Zhanshu, China’s third-ranked leader, visited Russia, becoming the country’s most senior official to travel abroad since the earliest days of the pandemic. Xi is reportedly set to attend the G20 leaders summit in Bali in November.


Meanwhile, the party congress, which is scheduled to begin on October 16, is expected to hear a policy address from Xi that will outline China’s priorities for the next five years or even longer.

Unless China’s leaders provide much-needed clarity and match their promises with concrete actions, unease and worry emanating from the debate on past isolationist policies will continue unabated.






quinta-feira, 26 de agosto de 2021

A política externa dos EUA em luta contra moinhos de vento - Fu Ying (South China Morning Post)

 South China Morning Post, Hong Kong – 26.8.2021

America’s China policy is based on an imaginary enemy

The US Congress is now on the front line of formulating China containment policies, but its efforts are misguided. The recent Innovation and Competition Act of 2021 is typical in containing policy suggestions that are based on wrong or outdated information about China

Fu Ying

 

More legislative documents concerning China have passed through Capitol Hill offices in recent months than ever before, mostly suggesting countering or restrictive policies on China and the Chinese people.

On June 9, the US Senate passed the Innovation and Competition Act of 2021. A combination of several China-related bills – including the Endless Frontier Act, the Strategic Competition Act of 2021, and the Meeting the China Challenge Act of 2021 – the Innovation and Competition Act covers a wide swathe of issues and demonstrates a bipartisan consensus for the US to engage in long-term strategic competition with China.

Capitol Hill is now on the front line of formulating US containment strategy against China. But its credibility is in serious doubt, as its policy suggestions in the act are drawn from conclusions based on misinformation and personal imagination.

There is nothing wrong with the act’s purpose, which is to stimulate American rejuvenation, as any country may choose to motivate itself through external competition. However, it’s irresponsible or even dangerous to make China an imaginary enemy, even a science and technology bogeyman, which will only rouse antagonism between the two peoples.

Here are some of the flaws in the act. Sections 3002 and 3401 claim that China lacks intellectual property (IP) protectionYet China has made rapid improvement over the past decade in IP protection for the sake of innovation.

One notable legislative move, among many, is the Foreign Investment Law of 2020 that safeguards the legitimate rights and interests of foreign investment against IP infringement. The law also prohibits using administrative means to force the transfer of technology.

Further, several IP-related laws are being amended, with punitive compensation for wrongdoing raised fivefold. Major cities including Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou have established special IP courts and, in 2020, there were 3,176 technology-related IP cases reported, with 2,787 of them concluded.

The American Chamber of Commerce in China, in the 2021 edition of its white paperon China’s business environment, also acknowledged China’s improvement on IP protection. Capitol Hill needs to be reminded that its so-called new findings are outdated.

Section 3252 holds that the Chinese government intends to strengthen its control by collecting citizens’ private data via technology companies. This claim cannot be supported by reality in China, either.

China’s civil codeand e-commerce law both prohibit the over-collection of individual data and require the relevant authorities to take the necessary measures to protect the security of the data and information provided by e-commerce businesses.

Chinese men use their smartphones on the streets of Beijing on August 22. China’s legislature has recently passed the Personal Information Protection Law, placing legal restrictions on how personal data can be collected, used and managed after it comes into effect on November 1. Photo: AP

Section 3252 further claims that China is exporting a governance model based on a data monitoring system. On the political front, it has been China’s consistent policy not to impose its ideology and political system on other countries, just as it would not accept having one imposed on it. The US can learn from China and stop interfering in other countries’ internal affairs and imposing its own model and values.

Sections 3002 and 3401 of the act accuse the Chinese government of encouraging and empowering the theft of critical technologies and trade secrets from foreign enterprises. However, cyberattacks are prohibited in China.

Chinal launched the Global Initiative on Data Security last September calling on nations to oppose surveillance, cyberattacks and information theft against other countries. China itself has been a victim of hacking attacks.

According to the National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team/Coordination Centre of China, a total of 5.31 million attacks against Chinese hosts from 52,000 foreign programs was recorded in the first half of 2020. As indicated, among the foreign malware capture, the number of foreign distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, and back doors implanted into Chinese websites, the US was actually the most common source.

Data and internet security is a global challenge and both China and the US are fighting cybercrime. The two countries should exchange information and work together to crack down on these crimes instead of making enemies of each other, which will only exacerbate the problem.

Why China is tightening control over cybersecurity

On China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Sections 3235 (a) and 3401 (11) of the act claim it “expands the power projection capabilities for the People’s Liberation Army” and threatens the security of the US and its strategic partners. They also claim the initiative excludes US and European participation.

This view counters the reality. The belt and road features infrastructure projects with no military component whatsoever. For every infrastructure project, security matters are the responsibility of the sovereign states concerned.

China has only one foreign military base, in Djibouti, the role of which is to supply the Chinese navy on UN missions in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia waters.

The belt and road incorporates some 140 countries and over 30 international organisations. Some US companies have also joined to provide equipment, management experience and financial services. Though the US-led Build Back Better World initiative is seen as a rival to the Belt and Road Initiative by some media, if set in motion, the two could complement rather than undermine each other.

Generally, the act is riddled with unreliable and unverified information regarding China which cannot serve as a sound policy foundation. As the new Chinese ambassador to the US Qin Gang told the press, China hopes for a “rational, stable, manageable and constructive” relationship with the US.

To achieve such an objective, the two countries first need to take a cool-headed and realistic measure of each other and avoid being misguided by unreliable stories and information. On China’s part, it should make a greater effort to communicate with the world, including with American society, to reduce misunderstanding.

It’s also important that China and the US act as examples and cooperate to address global challenges, including those mentioned in the act, to benefit the people of both countries and the world.

If we are to compete, it is necessary to steer the competition in a fair and positive direction. As noted by China’s President Xi Jinping, US-China competition should be more like a race on the track and less like a fight in the wrestling arena.

 

Fu Ying is the chair of the Centre for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University and former vice-foreign minister of China