Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, em viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas.
O que é este blog?
Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;
“ It is the end of the year and there are many articles, expert opinions, and simply personal conclusions about 2023, which is ending, as well as predictions for the next year, 2024, for Ukraine and the world.
Here are some of my thoughts about 2023:
The year 2023 was not the year of Victory for Ukraine and our allies, as many believed. Nor did I hope it would be. But it was not a year of defeat either. It was the year of the hardest marathon. A year of dragging out the war. A year of realism and hard work. Another year that Ukraine endured and withstood.
Ukraine didn't get enough aid for a counter-offensive and the war became positional, protracted, and of a trench type.
Then the conflict in the Middle East erupted. The focus of attention shifted and Ukraine practically disappeared from the agenda of global media. Ukraine started to receive not only less attention but also less aid.
Russia has made many conclusions this year, changed its tactics and its goals. Russia is learning. If earlier, in February 2022, they were counting on a blitzkrieg, in 2023 Russia has set itself up for a long war: it has completely put its economy on a wartime footing, pushed the military-industrial complex to the maximum, agreed on massive arms deliveries with its allied dictators, and these agreements are not hampered by bureaucracy and deliveries are taking place quickly and regularly.
Putin finally "cleaned up" his entourage after surviving Prigozhin's mutiny. He eliminated Prigozhin, as well as Wagner PMC leadership, and dealt with the generals involved in the mutiny.
Putin has become more aggressive, confident, and active. He is now permanently bound to the war and his power is directly tied to the war.
Russia openly states that this war is the beginning of the re-division of the world. It is a war not only with Ukraine but with the West and the US. Putin is building an empire.
Russia has not had any significant victories this year, but it has mobilized, regrouped, and is becoming increasingly dangerous.
This year Russia has waged the war on many frontlines: cyber wars, wars against civilian infrastructure, information wars (huge bot factories on all social networks), corrupting politicians, journalists, espionage, desecration, interfering in elections, attempting to disunite, sowing panic, sowing discord among allies. Russian propaganda may seem crude and primitive at first glance, but it is not. It has its audience not only in Russia and forms certain moods. The theses of Russian propaganda can be seen in many Western sources. Fighting the propaganda must continue!
Personally for me, this year was a year of heavy losses. My close friends died.
I shut down my emotions and became much less public.
In 2022, my main focus was to draw the world's attention to Russia's war crimes in Ukraine. I gave a huge number of interviews and spoke to diplomats, journalists, and philanthropists.
This year, I focused on improving Ukraine's defense capabilities and on charity projects.
I didn't believe the war would be over quickly. But I am not among those who think that this horror will last forever. All wars end and it is important for us that the conditions for Ukraine are the best possible.
This year, I've been focused on specific actions and specific things. Without inflated expectations. It's been a year of constant work. For the sake of all who are gone and for the sake of all who will live.
A little later I will write what I expect from 2024 and what we want to achieve. Thank you to everyone who is by our side, who is our friend, who supports Ukraine! I appreciate you all immensely and I am deeply grateful to you all!”
A Ucrânia quase não tinha nenhuma identidade nacional nos primeiros trinta anos de sua independência da finada URSS. A agressão russa deu a esse povo, dividido politicamente, religiosamente, até culturalmente, uma nova identidade, criou sua identidade, que é EUROPEIA agora, e que deve marcar sua reconstrução nas próximas décadas. Isso se fez ao longo de reformas institucionais e administrativas conduzidas depois da revolução Maidan, de 2013-14. Aqui um trecho desta análise:
"... l’ensemble des mécanismes de maillage territorialdu pays, combinés à l’influence mobilisatrice de la guerre ont contribué à créer en Ukraine une conscience nationale nouvelle au niveau de l’ensemble du pays. Par une multitude de liens, les citoyens, de la Ruthénie subcarpathique au Donbass, et de Kyiv à Odessa, ont appris à se connaître d’une région à l’autre et, ceci est nouveau, à comprendre à quel point leur destin était commun. Ils ont aussi, sous l’influence de ses provinces occidentales et des échanges intenses avec l’Occident, y compris les États-Unis, réalisé combien leur pays est différent de la Russie. Dans la perspective d’une reconstruction du pays, une fois le calme revenu, cette évolution constituera un atout considérable."
Comment l’Ukraine a-t-elle pu faire face à l’agression russe ?
Depuis 1995, Yves Plasseraud se consacre à la recherche et à la défense des droits de l’Homme et des minorités ethniques, culturelles et religieuses. Il fait à cet égard de nombreuses interventions et publie une dizaine de livres dont un « Atlas Européen des minorités » (Autrement). Les États baltiques, leur devenir et leurs problèmes minoritaires, feront aussi l’objet d’une dizaine de livres, souvent en collaboration avec son épouse Suzanne Pourchier. Autre sujet d’investigation, les Juifs de l’aire baltique à propos desquels il publie plusieurs ouvrages en collaboration avec Henri Minczeles. Ses deux plus récents ouvrages publiés sont : « Les pays baltiques, le pluriculturalisme en héritage », Armeline, 2019 et, en collaboration avec Suzanne Pourchier-Plasseraud, « Les Germano-baltes », Armeline, 2022.
Comment les Ukrainiens ont-ils réussi à résister à la Russie ? Beaucoup de pays européens se posent la question. Comment l’Ukraine arrive-t-elle à faire société et à développer une cohérence fonctionnelle face à l’adversité ? Beaucoup cherchent à comprendre la fameuse résilience ukrainienne. Y. Plasseraud apporte ici une partie des clés. L’ensemble des mécanismes de maillage territorial du pays, combinés à l’influence mobilisatrice de la guerre ont contribué à créer en Ukraine une conscience nationale nouvelle au niveau de l’ensemble du pays.
ON s’interroge souvent en Occident sur l’origine de la surprenante résilience [1] de la société ukrainienne depuis l’invasion russe du 24 février 2022. Alors que les « experts » s’accordaient pour envisager une résistance d’au plus quelques jours, comment un État réputé faible et divisé, est-il parvenu à trouver en lui-même les ressources pour résister aux multiples facettes de l’agression russe, visant notamment à le déstabiliser ? Comment les Ukrainiens sont-ils parvenus à gérer une guerre hybride qui s’attaque autant aux civils de toutes les régions du pays qu’aux soldats sur le front ? Comment ont-ils fait pour gérer la destruction systématique de leurs sources de produits alimentaires, d’énergie et particulièrement d’électricité ? Comment l’économie du pays a-elle continué à fonctionner ? Comment expliquer que le découragement n’ait pas gagné une population terrifiée, frigorifiée, dénutrie et souvent privée de sommeil ?
Yves Plasseraud
Plasseraud
Sans prétendre donner une réponse complète, les réflexions ci-dessous offrent quelques pistes.
Une société fragile et fracturée
Avant le déclenchement de la guerre, depuis quelques décennies, les critiques – souvent « influencés » par Moscou - de l’Ukraine ont glosé « ad nauseam » sur les prétendues fractures et tares invalidantes de la société ukrainienne. Rappelons-en quelques-unes ci-dessous.
1. Il existe historiquement trois Ukraine : l’occidentale, autour de Lviv, anciennement austro-hongroise, de culture ouest-européenne ; l’Ukraine centrale, autour de Kyiv, de culture centre-européenne ; et celle de l’Est, nettement est-européenne, très russe par sa langue et sa mentalité. Entre ces trois zones, et surtout entre la première et les deux autres, l’ignorance mutuelle et l’incompréhension seraient la règle.
2. Après des siècles de vie commune avec la Russie, l’Ukraine du XXI° siècle, profondément russifiée, n’aurait plus guère de spécificité voire d’identité distincte et son destin naturel serait de se fondre dans le « grand » peuple russe.
3. Au point de vue religieux, le pays serait profondément divisé entre 3 ou 4 églises orthodoxes, dont une, importante numériquement, fidèle au patriarche orthodoxe Kirill de Moscou [2].
4. Enfin, la société ukrainienne, corrompue et immature, serait peu susceptible de solidarité.
Dans l’ensemble, il faut le reconnaître, trois de ces observations contiennent une part de vérité. Quant à la deuxième - « le destin naturel de l’Ukraine serait de se fondre dans le « grand » peuple russe » - l’histoire de la première année de relance de la guerre russe contre l’Ukraine a suffi à lui enlever toute crédibilité.
Il faut ajouter à cela, surtout depuis l’élection du Président Volodymyr Zelensky en 2019, le déferlement permanent de désinformations, de « fake news » et autres « spams », véhiculés depuis la Russie et visant à « appuyer là où ça fait mal », afin de déstabiliser la société - encore largement russophone - d’un État décrit comme « nazi ».
Comment dans ces conditions le pays est-il parvenu à « faire société » et à développer une cohérence fonctionnelle face à l’adversité ? Plus de 500 jours après l’invasion russe, alors que 78% des Ukrainiens ont un proche qui a été tué ou blessé durant le conflit, la société ukrainienne a non-seulement « tenu » civilement économiquement et militairement, mais elle est même parvenue à mener à bien, diverses réformes sociétales importantes engagées plusieurs années auparavant [3], comme l’a confirmé le FMI au printemps 2023 [4].
La première explication tient au fait que, depuis 2013-2014, avec les évènements de Maidan - qualifiés en Ukraine de « Révolution de la dignité », la prise illégale de la Crimée et d’une partie du Donbass par les armées de Moscou, le sentiment national ukrainien, que l’on avait depuis quelque temps un peu tendance à oublier, est ressorti des oubliettes. Galvanisé par la brutalité russe, il a engendré un patriotisme civique actif et positif. L’histoire nationale ukrainienne, débarrassée de la vulgate russe, a - à l’occasion - effectué son grand retour, offrant un creuset intellectuel à la mobilisation.
Le deuxième élément important est le rôle moteur des organisations internationales occidentales et particulièrement de l’UE, du FMI et de l’OCDE, ainsi que des États-Unis. Le fait que le Président Zelensky ait demandé l’adhésion de son pays à l’UE cinq jours après l’invasion du 24 février 2022 a, après l’acceptation du principe par le Conseil européen, a constitué pour l’Ukraine un ferment d’espoir et de mobilisation remarquable. Cela ouvre une perspective pour l’après-guerre. Depuis le changement de statut de l’Ukraine de « voisin » de l’Union, à candidat officiel à l’adhésion en juin 2022, les objectifs à atteindre pour rejoindre l’Union ont amené le pays à « changer de braquet » en matière de réformes et se sont révélés très mobilisateurs.
La volonté politique constante et affirmée des autorités depuis 2015, mais plus encore depuis 2022, associés aux pressions internationales, s’est avec succès, largement appuyés sur l’outil informatique pour accroître la transparence des opérations concernées auprès des citoyens. Les demandes du FMI ont notamment été satisfaites. « Dans l’ensemble, la stabilité macroéconomique et financière a été maintenue, grâce à une politique prudente ainsi qu’à un soutien extérieur continu », déclare Gavin Gray, responsable de la mission du FMI en Ukraine qui « s’est dit satisfait de la législation en cours visant à mieux répertorier qui détient les actifs du pays. » « Cette loi permettra de lutter plus efficacement contre la corruption », a souligné le responsable du FMI. A ses yeux, les projets législatifs visant à mieux collecter l’impôt témoignent du fait que les autorités ukrainiennes font « leur part du travail ».
Grâce à une ferme volonté politique, à une justice plus efficace et à l’action du Bureau anti-corruption (NABU), la corruption a commencé à régresser depuis Maidan et plus encore depuis l’invasion de 2022. Si l’Ukraine est aujourd’hui encore souvent mentionnée à ce sujet, ce n’est pas qu’elle y soit plus intense qu’ailleurs, c’est surtout parce que la société ukrainienne en voie de démocratisation rapide permet mieux de l’identifier et de la stigmatiser.
Globalement, en dépit de l’affaiblissement entraîné par les nombreux départs à l’Ouest [5], la société s’est révélée capable pour l’heure de surmonter ses handicaps pour faire face à l’agression [6] et assurer le fonctionnement correct des principaux organes de la société et de l’État.
Une politique de décentralisation originale
Mais il est sans doute une explication plus pertinente et a priori moins évidente à ce sursaut ukrainien. Il s’agit de l’introduction dans le pays d’une forme originale de fédéralisme. La question de la décentralisation fait depuis longtemps débat en Ukraine. Lors de l’indépendance, la RSSU (République socialiste soviétique d’Ukraine) était divisée en 24 régions (oblasts). Chaque région était elle-même composée de 480 districts (Rayoni). Il existait par ailleurs 10 961 municipalités au niveau local (villes, bourgades et villages). Le centralisme bureaucratique appelé officiellement « démocratique ») à la soviétique y prospérait et la corruption, favorisée par l’opacité du système, y trouvait un terrain favorable, comme c’est toujours le cas en Russie.
Pour améliorer la qualité de l’administration de l’État, l’archaïsme du système et l’hétérogénéité culturelle et ethnique du pays plaidaient pour la mise en place d’une décentralisation poussée assortie d’une transparence renforcée. Or la décentralisation peut prendre des formes diverses. Quel modèle choisir ?
Un système fédéral à l’allemande apparaissait a priori intéressant. Mais, avec une partie Est du pays, largement russophone et en proie à l’agitation et le contexte international que l’on sait, ce choix était risqué. On se souvient que l’application des « Accords de Minsk » de 2014 avait d’ailleurs buté sur une éventuelle autonomie élargie du Donbass, alors réclamée par le Parti des régions du Président Viktor Ianoukovytch (2010-2014) et par Moscou, mais ressentie à Kyiv comme l’antichambre d’une annexion russe. Il fallait donc trouver autre chose.
C’est dans le cadre du système d’autonomie des collectivités locales, préconisé par le Conseil de l’Europe avec sa Charte européenne de l’autonomie locale (1988) [7] chère à Jacques Chaban-Delmas, que les responsables ukrainiens et leurs conseils européens, ont décidé d’inscrire leur démarche. Mais, la série de réformes territoriales entamées en avril 2014, ont tourné le dos à la création de grandes régions auto-administrées, menant le pays vers la fédéralisation. Au contraire, en choisissant d’accroitre considérablement les pouvoirs des autorités locales à l’échelon inférieur, communes ou petites communautés territoriales, ces textes ont posé les bases d’un système original de décentralisation-démocratisation par la base.
Cette première réforme a été complétée par un regroupement volontaire de 10 000 conseils locaux existants en moins de 1500 « Hromadas » (municipalités et communautés territoriales), les « Amalgamated Territorial Communities »(ATC) - de leur nom anglais, couramment utilisé. Ces personnes morales ont en outre simultanément, grâce à une profonde réforme fiscale, pu disposer de plus de ressources (notamment 60% du montant des impôts sur le revenu) permettant ainsi d’améliorer sensiblement la qualité des services publics. Cette réforme, a généré une confiance nouvelle de la population dans ses autorités municipales et locales et corrélativement modifié les relations avec les administrations centrales. Elle devrait prochainement être complétée par une autre loi introduisant une nouvelle procédure de nomination du chef des services fiscaux de l’État et l’introduction d’un audit annuel des services fiscaux de l’État.
Cette initiative, saluée en son temps par la Commission européenne, a très vite donné des résultats probants. De 2015 à 2019, la part de la population vivant en dessous du revenu de subsistance a diminué de plus de moitié, passant de 52 % à 23 %. En outre l’accès à Internet a augmenté de 30% entre 2015 et 2019, même si cette progression a été plus prononcée en ville que dans les régions rurales. Confrontés à la lourdeur et à la faible réactivité de l’administration d’un État central encore post-soviétique, les administrations régionales et municipales, appliquant systématiquement le « principe de subsidiarité », ont de ce fait joué un rôle fondamental dans la restructuration de la société.
Faire face à la guerre et à l’occupation, une « gouvernance collaborative »
Depuis la relance de l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie en février 2022, un nouveau bond en avant a été effectué par Kyiv en matière de décentralisation. Certaines pratiques démocratiques – en matière d’élections et d’information notamment - ayant été limitées par l’instauration de la Loi martiale, les procédures administratives se sont trouvées accélérées à la grande satisfaction des administrés.
Les structures mises en place à partir de 2015 ont rapidement été réorientées pour faire face à une situation de guerre. Dans ce contexte, une collaboration tous azimuts entre partenaires sociaux (administrations locales, institutions sociales, entreprises et contributeurs étrangers, eux-mêmes souvent locaux : on parle de relations « Peer to Peer ») s’est instaurée. Les « Hromadas »de l’ensemble du pays se sont mises à partager entre elles expériences, informations et ressources. Dans ce nouveau cadre [8], les édiles ont aussi reçu (ou se sont saisis) de nouvelles responsabilités en matière de sécurité [9]. Les Administrations Militaires Régionales (AMR), composées de troupes régulières et de recrues locales, normalement chargées de la défense territoriale, se voyant elles-mêmes confier des tâches variées en matière de services sociaux. Une situation radicalement nouvelle par rapport à l’ère soviétique - mais aussi bien différente de celle d’avant 2022 - à laquelle l’ensemble du pays parait aujourd’hui adhérer, même si elle est loin de fonctionner encore partout de manière optimale.
C’est dans ce contexte que, dès les premiers mois de la relance de la guerre, les responsables locaux de cinq municipalités pionnières d’Ukraine : Chernivtsi, Kharkiv, Kropyvnytskyi, Lviv et Odessa, ont réfléchi aux moyens de « mailler » l’ensemble des entités territoriales du pays afin d’accroître la résilience et la réactivité de celui-ci. Ils ont ainsi eu l’idée mettre en place des réseaux thématiques décentralisés (on parle d’ « e-governance ») entre les diverses entités administratives, sociales, associatives et économiques, afin de pouvoir faire face rapidement aux problèmes locaux multiples entraînés par l’agression russe (bombardements, désinformation…) et renforcer la solidarité nationale. De même ces communautés sont à l’origine de la création d’un certain nombre d’ « IT Clusters »(Groupements de technologie de l’information) réunissant des partenaires informatiques complémentaires – en premier lieu des communes et des entreprises - autour de projets communs. Ces structures pionnières ont rapidement fait école dans l’ensemble du pays, y compris dans les zones libérées.
Afin de mettre en place cette « gouvernance collaborative [10] », des spécialistes des technologies de l’information (IT) sont spontanément venus apporter leur aide aux Fournisseurs d’Identité (IDP [11]) afin de permettre aux habitants de développer, en toute sécurité, un système original de communications informatiques interpersonnelles (« Chatboxes »), faisant ainsi des citoyens de véritables partenaires - et non plus comme auparavant des « clients » - des entreprises ou des services publics. Cette solution polycentriste, empruntant aux doctrines d’autogestion, en permettant de répondre rapidement aux situations de crises les plus diverses a notamment rendu possible une coopération industrielle décentralisée entre les divers opérateurs économiques du pays. Il faut souligner ici le rôle essentiel des dirigeants d’entreprises qui ont souvent fait preuve d’une grande solidarité et d’un patriotisme remarquable. En dépit du fait que le PIB ait reculé de 30% en 2022, que le chômage ait grimpé à 26% et l’inflation à 30%, les transports routiers et ferroviaires fonctionnent correctement, le système financier est opérationnel et les magasins sont approvisionnés. En fait l’économie a fait preuve de la même résilience que l’armée. [12] Tout ceci est manifestement dû à l’efficacité de la gouvernance collaborative évoquée ci-dessus.
Les illustrations de ce type de travail collaboratif sont nombreuses, notamment en matière d’assistance aux personnes déplacées en interne (IDP) - plus de 4 millions, dans le pays. Citons quelques-unes de ces expériences. Ce système a notamment rendu possible la coordination des réactions en cas de panne des réseaux mobiles ou d’interruption de la fourniture d’électricité (Plateforme « viche » à Novoiarychiv dans la région de Lviv). De même, la plateforme « Smart Village »(Nemishaievo) a permis d’organiser des évacuations d’habitants dans les meilleures conditions de sécurité et de rapidité grâce à l’instauration d’un système de « taxis sociaux ». Autre exemple : dans la région de Chernihiv, les autorités locales des communes de Kiptiv et de Ponornytsia ont décidé de faire du pain pour les communes des régions voisines, occupées par les forces russes.
Les municipalités utilisent les Centres de services administratifs, créés dans le cadre des réformes de décentralisation, pour enregistrer les personnes contraintes de se déplacer à l’intérieur du pays, leur donner accès aux prestations sociales et coordonner l’aide humanitaire qu’elles reçoivent. De même, les entreprises réfugiées en territoire libre ont été accueillies et la moitié d’entre-elles ont pu recommencer à fonctionner. Autre exemple, l’ « IT Cluster » de Lviv, rassemblant 260 entreprises et trois universités a élaboré un plan intitulé « Projet Victoire », en commun avec l’administration militaire de la région de Lviv, afin de moderniser le système régional de défense aérienne. Enfin, dernier exemple, les « cartes interactives » crées à Ternopil ont permis aux résidents d’être immédiatement informés de l’emplacement - variable dans le temps pour des raisons de sécurité - des abris contre les bombardements aériens.
Conclusion
Ainsi, l’ensemble des mécanismes de maillage territorial du pays, combinés à l’influence mobilisatrice de la guerre ont contribué à créer en Ukraine une conscience nationale nouvelle au niveau de l’ensemble du pays. Par une multitude de liens, les citoyens, de la Ruthénie subcarpathique au Donbass, et de Kyiv à Odessa, ont appris à se connaître d’une région à l’autre et, ceci est nouveau, à comprendre à quel point leur destin était commun. Ils ont aussi, sous l’influence de ses provinces occidentales et des échanges intenses avec l’Occident, y compris les États-Unis, réalisé combien leur pays est différent de la Russie. Dans la perspective d’une reconstruction du pays, une fois le calme revenu, cette évolution constituera un atout considérable.
Mais, ces évènements ont produit d’autres « effets collatéraux » importants au plan des relations internationales. L’Ukraine – contrairement à ce qui était le cas auparavant - est désormais connue et reconnue dans le monde comme un État européen [13] à part entière. Ses multiples partenaires dans les domaines les plus divers (commerciaux, humanitaires, militaires), ayant pu apprécier la fiabilité de ses responsables et le courage de ses citoyens en temps de guerre, seront dans l’avenir plus enclins à poursuivre la collaboration avec l’Ukraine dans un contexte pacifié.
NDLR : Il reste à évaluer dans les prochaines années et décennies combien de temps le « prix du sang » conduira la société civile à contraindre le microcosme politique et économique à rester en direction de l’État de droit et de la démocratie qui font partie du projet de l’Union européenne tant réclamé.
Cette évolution constitue une belle illustration de l’adage selon lequel « nécessité fait loi ». Si l’Ukraine n’avait pas, depuis 2014 (Crimée, Donbass puis 2022) été confrontée à une monstrueuse agression russe, il est vraisemblable qu’elle ne serait pas parvenue à mener à bien les réformes qui, aujourd’hui lui permettent de tenir face à l’ennemi et espérons-le, demain, de se reconstruire.
[1] NDLR : Le Dictionnaire de l’Académie française définit la résilience comme une « Aptitude à affronter les épreuves, à trouver des ressources intérieures et des appuis extérieurs, à mettre en œuvre des mécanismes psychiques permettant de surmonter les traumatismes. »
[2] NDLR : Le 27 mai 2022, l’Église orthodoxe ukrainienne déclare son indépendance du Patriarcat de Moscou.
[3] KEUDEL, Oleksandra, GRIMES, Marcia, HUSS, Oksana, Political Will for Anti-Corruption Reform. Op. cit. in Biblio.
[6] En juillet 2023, 87% des Ukrainiens croient à la victoire finale de leur pays sur les forces russes.
[7] Ouverte à la signature le 15 octobre 1985 et entrée en vigueur le 1er septembre 1988.
[8] Le 16 juillet 2021, anticipant les évènements à venir, la Rada, le Parlement ukrainien avait voté la Loi sur les fondamentaux de la résistance nationale. Celle-ci est entrée en vigueur le 1er janvier 2022.
[9] Dans certains des territoires occupés, les mairies sont même souvent parvenues à poursuivre leur fonctionnement selon le droit ukrainien et ont parfois pu s’opposer à l’organisation de référendums russe « d’autodétermination » comme à Kherson.
[11] Service qui stocke et vérifie l’identité des utilisateurs.
[12] NDLR. L’économie de défense a cependant peiné à se réformer selon E. Grynszpan, « En Ukraine, la mutation tardive de l’industrie de défense », Le Monde, 26 août 2023 .
[13] NDLR : Quel qu’il soit – Norvège, Suisse, France ou Ukraine – parler d’un État européen est une formule qui ne permet pas de préciser s’il s’agit de l’Europe géographique, ce qui est le cas des quatre exemples cités, ou membre de l’Union européenne, ce qui est ici le cas d’un seul.
O presidente Lula, sempre tão preocupado com a fome no mundo, em especial a segurança alimentar dos povos africanos, poderia pedir a seus assessores diplomáticos uma informação sobre as ações criminosas de Putin no Mar Negro e suas consequências sobre o mercado de alimentos no mundo inteiro. Aqui estão alguns dados:
Russia's Actions: Potential Impacts on Global Food Security, Ukraine, and Western Relations.
Center for Defense Studies, July 20, 2023
Russia is poised to starve millions of people in the developing world as it pursues the destruction of Ukraine and undermine the West. Russia pulled out from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), threatened to target any cargo ships bonded to or from the Ukrainian ports, mined the sea routes, and stepped up targeting grain and other Ukraine's port and commodity-related infrastructure.
If Russia had succeeded in invading Ukraine, it would have the potential to emerge as a significant agricultural superpower, thereby gaining additional leverage to pursue its geopolitical goals. With 17% of world wheat exports in 2021 (33 million tons), Russia ranked first, surpassing the E.U. (16% or 31 million tons). Along with Ukraine (ranked 5th with 10% of exports or 19 million tons), it could have amassed a 27% share of global wheat exports — equivalent to the combined export share of the E.U. and the U.S. On top of that, before the all-out Russian invasion, Ukraine ranked first in exports of sunflower oil and millet; third in corn, barley and rapeseed; fifth in walnut and honey; and sixth in the export of soy.
Unable to achieve its initial neo-colonial objectives, Russia resorted to dismantling the Ukrainian economy and infrastructure. This strategy aimed to weaken the Ukraine’s ability to resist the invasion immediately and hinder its capacity to recover, rebuild, and allocate resources for defense and security in the long run.
Agriculture accounted for 10% of Ukraine's GDP in 2021 and was severely affected by Russia's illegal occupation and combat in Ukraine's Eastern and Southern oblasts, which are crucial agricultural regions. Russian forces intentionally targeted agricultural infrastructure, looting equipment and machinery, and "exporting" stolen grain and other products to foreign markets.
Ukraine is now among the most heavily mined countries globally, with up to a third of its territory contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance. The estimated time required for demining the territory, including crop fields, varies from thirty to sixty years. Russia's destruction of the Kakhovka dam also caused the irrigation system's collapse on which key regions depended (Kherson - 94%, Zaporizhzhia - 74%, and Dnipropetrovsk - 30%).
After another instance of withdrawing from the grain deal, Russia has escalated its attacks on Ukrainian ports and agriculture-related infrastructure for several consecutive days. These actions constitute war crimes and will have lasting damaging implications for Ukraine's economy and worsen global food security for years to come.
The Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) comprises two distinct agreements: one between Turkey, Ukraine, and the U.N. for exporting food from Ukraine and Turkey, and another between Russia, Turkey, and the U.N. for exporting food and fertilizers.
Russia has consistently disregarded the agreements it entered from the start of it. Just barely 12 hours after signing a deal on July 22, 2022, Moscow initiated a missile barrage against Odesa, targeting Ukraine's main port and infrastructure. It had frequently threatened to withdraw from the deal or decline its extension routinely. Moreover, it deliberately misused the monitoring mechanism to create shipment hurdles and disrupt their flow.
In October 2022, the Kremlin declared the suspension of its participation in the deal. However, it had to eventually rejoin the agreement due to the continued determination of Ukraine, Turkey, and the U.N. to proceed with the outflow of food under the terms of the deal.
The BSGI allowed Ukraine to export some 30 million tons of its food to foreign markets through the Black Sea, while enhancing alternative transportation routes. The railway is capable of exporting more than a million tons monthly, road transport could handle more than 600 thousand tons, and the Danube River ports might handle over two million tons, potentially reaching up to three million tons. However, alternative export routes can't substitute the sea trade for many reasons, including increased costs, logistical difficulties, the necessity for big-ticket and long-time infrastructure investments, etc.
While its sea trade remains unimpeded, Russia has managed to claim control over the North-West part of the Black Sea, even though it did not succeed in occupying it, and faced no repercussions for doing so under the Law of the Sea. Instead of making Russia obey the Law of the Sea, ensuring freedom of navigation, the international community talks about prolonging the BSGI.
The U.N. State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023 Report highlights that one in ten people worldwide faces hunger, and a staggering 3.1 billion individuals cannot afford a nutritious diet. Due to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, an alarming 23 million people have been pushed into hunger. The Russian authorities have been utilizing these vulnerable populations as leverage against the West. The Kremlin has been widely disseminating narratives in the Global South, attributing the surge in food prices and food scarcity to the Western sanctions imposed on Russia.
In June, a delegation of African leaders led by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa visited Kyiv and Moscow, advocating for their peace initiative, which involved facilitating food exports. Prior to that, in May, Senegalese President Macky Sall, acting as the African Union chief, visited Moscow and Paris (bypassing Kyiv), urging the West to lift sanctions against Russia. It's worth noting that there are currently no sanctions on Russian food and fertilizer exports, and these exports have been particularly lucrative, bringing Russia a 70% increase in revenue due to the surge in prices. Furthermore, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres recently emphasized that "Russian grain trade has reached high export volumes."
Russia has strategically utilized the BSGI to undermine the Western sanctions directly or, in the event of failure, to shift the blame for the food crisis onto the West. The Kremlin's objective is to create a looming food crisis that could trigger waves of refugees, destabilizing social and political situations in European countries. The Russian hope is that this instability would pave the way for pro-Russian political forces to displace the current ones, consequently weakening support for Ukraine and disrupting Trans-Atlantic unity concerning Russia.
Ukraine has been proactively seeking a solution to restore its freedom of navigation and ensure a stable food supply to countries in need. Kyiv has urged its partners to create a naval demining coalition, either as a standalone initiative or as a first step towards enabling protected cargo convoys under the escort of a joint naval force. This coalition may involve assets from littoral states and, hopefully, from nations beyond the Black Sea region. In either scenario, the pivotal role of Turkey is crucial, as it possesses the largest Navy in the Black Sea.
Since the beginning of the all-out Russian invasion of Ukraine, Turkey has invoked the Montreux Convention of 1936 provisions, which restricts Russia and non-Black Sea nations from deploying naval assets to the Black Sea. Ankara is hesitant to proceed with shipments via cargo vessels under its flag, as it fears potential attacks as Turkey is a significant military power and a NATO member.
The unique dynamics in the relationship between Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could act as a buffer against further escalation. In 2015, Turkey downed a Russian jet that had violated its airspace, leading to a tense moment in bilateral relations. However, it did not escalate into a full-blown military response from Moscow.
An alternative approach that appears more feasible is chartering sea lines of communications from Ukrainian ports toward the Straits within the territorial waters of the littoral states (Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey). However, this approach would require these nations to confront the risks of a direct attack, regardless of how insignificant it may be, and find solutions to the mine issue in the region.
In addition, legal actions under international law and Ukraine's domestic laws are crucial to hold Russia accountable for its actions. Ukraine's current military capabilities are insufficient to deter the Kremlin from transforming the Northern part of the Black Sea into a "Russian lake." The deployment of anti-ship missiles and modern Western fighter jets could play a significant role in restraining Moscow's actions in the region.
As Russia continues to cause increasing damage to Ukraine, it has effectively deterred the West from taking more assertive actions against its exports. Notably, the Russian ports on the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea have remained sanctions-free. In fact, Russia has even escalated its exports of oil and oil products from the Black Sea ports, including instances that breach the prohibition of direct shipments to Europe.
Before the E.U.'s 11th package of restrictive measures was announced, crude oil exports from Russia witnessed a significant surge, increasing by 14.55% in June alone. Among the 42 tankers transporting Russian oil from the Black Sea last month, 15 belonged to companies from E.U. countries, with 14 belonging to Greek shipowners and one to a Latvian company. Russia is gradually shifting its grain exports to Baltic Sea ports in response to capacity challenges.
To compel the Kremlin to reconsider its actions, it is imperative to enforce existing sanctions and target Russian ports in the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, and the Baltic Sea. Additionally, Ukraine and its allies must intensify efforts to engage with developing countries to counter Russia's propaganda.
Anyone who watched Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin over the past few months knows that he had grown progressively unhinged in the run-up to his mutiny, just as his political position had become increasingly untenable.
Prigozhin was furious at the leaders of Russia’s Ministry of Defense, whom he repeatedly accused of sending tens of thousands of Russian soldiers to certain death through their corruption, incompetence, and cowardice. Over 20,000 of his own fighters were killed in the bloody battle for Bakhmut – a town of only 70,000 inhabitants before the war. He publicly blamed Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov for Russia’s casualties and battlefield struggles.
Notably, Russian President Vladimir Putin had largely allowed him to voice his criticism – a remarkable show of tolerance in a country that punishes “discrediting” the army with 5-15 years of jail time. Prigozhin got this dispensation in no small part because it was Wagner’s seasoned troops that had achieved Russia’s most notable battlefield victories in an otherwise sputtering invasion. In part, it was because Prigozhin had always been extremely careful not to criticize Putin directly.
This started to change a couple of weeks ago when the Defense Ministry announced that all paramilitary forces fighting in Ukraine would have to sign contracts directly with the ministry by July 1, ending their autonomy and absorbing them into the regular armed forces. Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov said he and his troops would comply; Prigozhin said Wagner would not, claiming his men didn’t want to fight alongside poorly trained conscripts or under the command of Shoigu and Gerasimov.
Then, at a rare public meeting with military bloggers, Putin reiterated the order, backing the ministry over Prigozhin. You’d think that would’ve been the end of it, but instead of taking the loss, Prigozhin doubled down on his refusal to give up control of Wagner – an unprecedented act of direct insubordination against Putin.
At that point, Prigozhin knew the clock was ticking for him. Knowing he was a dead man walking from the moment he disobeyed Putin’s order, he opted to roll the dice in a last-ditch attempt to force the president to reconsider and salvage his position (and possibly his life) – a decision that smacked more of desperation than of rational calculation.
Why did Prigozhin stop before getting to Moscow?
I think both starting and stopping the mutiny can be understood as desperate acts of self-preservation. This will be one for historians to debate, but I’m inclined to believe Prigozhin probably didn’t set out to overthrow Putin in the first place, as he had neither a plan nor the allies to do so. All he wanted was to prevent Wagner from being disbanded and himself from losing his power.
The biggest reason why I believe this is that Prigozhin couldn’t possibly have thought that an outsider like himself could topple the regime with fewer than 5,000 men. Let’s keep in mind that Prigozhin was a creature of Putin: He was built up by, loyal to, and entirely dependent on the Russian president. He was not a security council insider. He did not have a power base in Moscow. He had no one in or near the Kremlin who was prepared to side with him against Putin.
That’s surely one reason why as his Wagner column drew close to Moscow, we saw no defections in the military, the government, or among the elites. And it’s why when he got thrown a lifeline just as he and his men were about to face certain death at the hands of troops reporting to Putin himself (rather than the Ministry of Defense), he grabbed it with both hands.
Prigozhin likely never had a shot of taking the Kremlin – and he and everyone else knew it all along. What he did have was a modest amount of leverage, which explains why he didn’t get killed and why he thought he could pull the stunt off in the first place. The “march for justice” was an ill-advised bargaining tactic to force Putin to cave on the issue of Wagner’s autonomy.
Why did Putin negotiate a surrender instead of just killing Prigozhin?
I think this is mostly a matter of timing.
The war in Ukraine is at a critical juncture for Russia. The Ukrainian counteroffensive is only just getting started, with fewer than three of Ukraine’s 11 battle-ready divisions positioned to attack currently involved in the fighting. Ukraine has yet to attempt to breach any of Russia’s three defensive lines, instead biding its time while conducting shaping operations and probing attacks on the first line of defense. By contrast, the Russian military is already heavily committed to trying to hold back Ukraine’s counteroffensive, and Putin is highly reluctant to order another mobilization.
A battle against Wagner on Russian soil would have distracted – potentially fatally – from Russia’s defense of its front lines, handing Ukraine a unique window of opportunity to strike while Wagner troops, the Russian army, and Kadyrov’s forces were occupied elsewhere.
Plus, by backing down and refraining from killing Prigozhin immediately, Putin lost little that he hadn’t already lost when Prigozhin initially defied him and marched toward Moscow. At the end of the day, Putin got everything he could’ve wished for: Shoigu and Gerasimov are still in their positions, Wagner is coming under Defense Ministry control, and Prigozhin is defanged and in exile. All without televised bloodshed, and without sacrificing much in terms of warfighting effectiveness given that Wagner had already been rotated out of the front.
The only concession Putin made was allowing Prigozhin, whom he called a “traitor” and “terrorist,” to live – for now. But Prigozhin is (reportedly) in Belarus, essentially a non-sovereign vassal of Russia chock-full of Russian spies, soldiers, and assassins. Putin is free to renege on the deal and kill or arrest him at a time of his choosing. I’d be very surprised if Prigozhin is still a free man by the end of the year.
What are the implications for Putin and Russia going forward?
This was by far the most serious threat to Putin’s 23-year rule.
On the one hand, you’re not supposed to be able to defy Putin in Russia this way and get away with it. Yet the men who shot down and killed an estimated 13 Russian pilots on their way to Moscow were pardoned. And the man who openly defied Putin’s orders, discredited his rationale for the war in Ukraine, and whom Putin declared a traitor on public television, is still alive (even if not for long). Putin has jailed and killed people for a lot less, so this makes him look weak before the Russian public and the elites.
On the other hand, Putin’s regime was tested over the weekend, and the regime ultimately held together. Yes, there were a lot of people who didn’t fire to stop Wagner troops from advancing, but there were virtually no defections inside the Russian government, the military, or among elites. The government is still functioning normally, and the war in Ukraine is going the way it did before the mutiny. Putin is more vulnerable on the back of it, but that’s more a long-term than an immediate issue.
In a way, this feels a bit like an extreme version of Jan. 6 in the United States (pardon the comparison): an event that was previously unthinkable, that shook people’s faith in the system, that exposed a structural weakness in domestic institutions, but that changed little in the country the day after.
The likelihood of regime change in Russia remains near zero … until it happens. But these events show that the tail risks are fatter than we thought.
What does this mean for the war in Ukraine?
The Ukrainians will try to take advantage of Russia’s domestic turmoil to make gains in their counteroffensive. Indeed, just in the last two days, they’ve reportedly seen progress in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions (although the significance of these gains so far is marginal).
However, I don’t see the events of the weekend dramatically improving Ukraine’s odds on the battlefield in the near future. With the Wagner threat dissolved, Russia won’t need to shift troops from Ukraine to Russia to deal with them. Likewise, Wagner was not operating in the south where the Ukrainian counteroffensive is focused. So in terms of the actual fighting, beyond the effect that the mutiny might have on Russian morale, the overall military impact at this point is limited.
That said, the incident is a problem for Putin’s credibility with elites and the Russian public, and this political vulnerability could make him more sensitive to major battlefield losses in the coming months. If we get to a point later in the summer or fall where Ukraine starts to threaten Crimea or the land bridge, the risk of a major Russian escalation (such as blowing up the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant or using a tactical nuclear weapon) in response would go up. The only thing more dangerous than a strongman is a weak strongman.
The one lesson from this episode is that when push comes to shove, Putin is singularly focused on his own survival, and he is willing and able to accept any outcome to ensure it. This is an important revealed preference because it speaks to the credibility of his stated goals and so-called “red lines” in Ukraine, which in turn matters for how Ukraine and NATO countries think about escalation.
It means that Putin may be willing to tolerate more aggressive behavior from NATO and Ukraine than we imagined if he thinks retaliation would lower his chances of survival. It also means that Putin could consider any outcome for the war, including negotiations, as long as he thinks he can survive it.
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Military briefing: how Russia is fortifying its frontline for Ukraine’s counteroffensivering an o
While Kyiv spent months preparing an operation to liberate occupied territory, Moscow has been digging inperatio.to liberate occupied territory, Moscow has been digging in
Financial Times, May 25, 2023.
Ukraine’s months-long preparation for its next counteroffensive to try to wrest back occupied territory has allowed Russia to fortify its positions along the almost 1,000km frontline. Satellite images reviewed by the Financial Times and analysed by military experts revealed a multi-layered Russian network of anti-tank ditches, mazes of trenches, concrete “dragon’s teeth” barricades, steel “hedgehog” obstacles, spools of razor wire and minefields. “Russian forces really seemed to realise . . . that a lot of the terrain they had control over was going to be difficult to defend without entrenched positions,” said Brady Africk, an open-source intelligence researcher and analyst at the American Enterprise Institute who is tracking and mapping Russia’s defensive build-up.
In preparation for Ukraine’s looming counter-offensive, Russia has spent months significantly fortifying the almost 1,000km frontline across the roughly 100,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory it currently occupies.
Russia’s most heavily fortified frontline area is in southern Zaporizhzhia province, where Ukraine is expected to try to break through and sever the “land bridge” connecting Russian territory with occupied Crimea.
There, Russian forces have created a multi-layered defence composed of anti-tank ditches, zig-zag trenches, concrete “dragon’s teeth” barricades, steel “hedgehog” obstacles, razor wire and minefields.
Russia has paid special attention to the Berdyansk airfield near the Sea of Azov. The airfield is known to be a hub for Russian military aircraft.
The northern border of Crimea, which Russia has occupied since 2014, has also been heavily fortified with a combination of trenches and tank traps.
The defences stretch from Armyansk in the north to Dzhankoi in the north-west. Both are crucial transport hubs and gateways to the peninsula.
The towns of Tokmak, Polohy, Bilmak and Ocheretuvate, which sit at important road junctions, have been completely encircled by defences.
Russia constructed layers of “dragon’s teeth”, trenches and other obstacles across an extensive swath of occupied territory near the eastern cities of Severodonetsk, Lysychansk and Popasna, after capturing them in May and June 2022. A Ukrainian breakthrough there would face significant challenges.
Russia also erected a strong defensive line along the border of eastern Luhansk province to the north, where Ukrainian forces are thought to want to break through somewhere around the town of Kupyansk.
Russia began digging in “in earnest” in November and when its troops took new territory they worked quickly to entrench themselves, he said, adding that Russian forces had “ramped up” work on their fortifications recently. “There was a brief lull in winter, likely due to [the] ground freezing and it becoming more difficult to dig,” Africk said. “But since the ground has softened, we’ve seen the digging of fortifications escalate dramatically, particularly in the past few months.” Military analysts said these fortifications would not be enough to stop Ukrainian troops from advancing, but were likely to slow the offensive.
The stakes for Ukraine are high. A successful operation could give it significant momentum as it tries to drive out Russian troops, convince western partners to continue their military support, and give Kyiv leverage in any future negotiations with Moscow. It would also help keep morale high among Ukraine’s defiant but fatigued population, which has endured the horror of Russia’s full-scale invasion for 15 months. There is also much at stake for Russia. If Ukraine can take back control of the provinces of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia — which Russian president Vladimir Putin claimed to have annexed last September — or of the Crimean Peninsula, which the Kremlin seized in March 2014, it could deal a significant blow to a military already showing signs of exhaustion and infighting.
Early signs of Ukraine’s counteroffensive can already be seen in what military experts refer to as “shaping operations” — common tactics used ahead of a large-scale attack. Over the past two weeks, Ukraine’s forces have carried out missile strikes and sabotage on Russian command and control centres, weapons depots and artillery systems. Drone attacks and explosions targeting military facilities in Russia, and even the Kremlin itself, also suggest Ukrainian involvement, according to analysts, despite Kyiv’s denials. Before Moscow claimed to have captured the embattled eastern city of Bakhmut this weekend, Ukrainian troops had attacked Russian forces on their northern and southern flanks, recapturing a few square kilometres of territory — their first gains in the area in months. But observers are yet to see a massive thrust along the lines of the Ukrainian counteroffensive last autumn, when Kyiv’s forces swept through the north-eastern Kharkiv region and recaptured the southern city of Kherson.
Breaking through Russia’s multi-layered defensive lines without sustaining heavy losses would be extremely difficult, said Mykola Bielieskov, a research fellow at the Kyiv-based National Institute for Strategic Studies. Success would require synchronising different units deploying armoured vehicles, artillery, mine-clearing and air defence, he added. “On their own, obstacles don’t stop advancing forces. They will only [be effective] if manned properly and complemented with artillery fire, aviation and manoeuvre of reserves.” Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, an American think-tank, said Russia’s fortifications were designed to funnel Ukrainian troops towards areas where they would come under intense fire. “If you have multiple lines of defence, even if Ukraine punches through the first one successfully, then Russia should have enough time to reinforce a second or third,” he said.
The south is likely to be the main focus for Ukrainian forces — something not lost on Moscow even as Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his military leaders have kept operational plans a closely guarded secret, experts say. “Around November and certainly continuing into the new year, [Russian forces] ramped up construction, particularly in southern Ukraine,” Africk said. “The topography there is a lot flatter and there are wide open fields. It became a priority for Russian forces to make sure they had defensive lines [there].” Satellite images show Russia’s most heavily fortified section of the frontline is in the southern Zaporizhzhia province, where Ukraine is expected to try to break through and sever the “land bridge” connecting Russian territory with occupied Crimea. The connection is crucial for Russian military logistics and supplies.
Russia has constructed an elaborate maze of anti-tank ditches, trenches, concrete and steel obstacles, razor wire and minefields in the area. The Berdyansk airfield near the Sea of Azov, a hub for Russian military aircraft, has been surrounded by deep trenches and three lines of concrete “dragon’s teeth”. Melitopol and Berdyansk were “obvious” locations for Russian fortifications, Lee said. If Ukraine took either, it would gain significant ground and enable its forces to carry out onward campaigns more effectively, he added.
The northern border of Crimea has also been heavily fortified. The defences stretch from Armyansk in the north to Dzhankoi in the north-west. Both are crucial transport hubs and gateways to the peninsula. Dzhankoi also hosts a Russian military airfield. Ukraine is likely to utilise the size of the battlefield to try to catch its enemy off guard. Despite Russia’s extensive defences, the sheer length of the frontline meant the Kremlin’s forces would be stretched, experts said. “The length of the frontline works to our advantage,” said Andriy Zagorodnyuk, chair of the Ukrainian Centre for Defence Strategies and a former defence minister of Ukraine. “[Russian troops] are scattered around this frontline and we will always be able to find areas where they don’t expect us.” Dara Massicot, a senior policy researcher at the Rand Corporation, a US global policy think-tank, said Russia’s performance would depend on several factors, including whether its frontline was manned by “exhausted or maltreated, inadequately trained personnel”.
“The morale of Russian soldiers is variable, from tired to bad — it matters,” she said. Lee said other factors included whether Russia had exhausted its munitions trying to capture Bakhmut — the longest and bloodiest battle of the past year — and whether its newly mobilised forces were ready for the coming fight. “They don’t necessarily have that much combat experience. A lot of them have been just holding trenches. Will they stay in the fight, or will they run?”
