The Washington Post se pergunta se o impeachment de DR constitui um soft coup

Em longa matéria sobre o impeachment no Brasil, o jornal Washington Post acha que o desrespeito da legislação fiscal é relativamente pequeno.
Não, não é, WP, e foi isso que precipitou a quebradeira econômica do Estado brasileiro e jogou toda a economia no buraco, pois isso vem no seguimento de várias outras medidas ilegais adotadas pelo partido no poder, que chamaram a atenção de toda a cidadania para o lado criminoso desse partido, e para a inépcia da presidente.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

The Washington Post, April 20, 2016
Is the impeachment trial of Brazil's Dilma Rousseff a coup?

Supporters of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, whom the Chamber of Deputies voted to impeach Sunday night, have been calling the proceedings a "coup." Héctor Perla suggested here on Saturday that they constitute a "soft coup." Is Sunday's vote actually a coup?
The short answer: No.
The long answer: No, but it's not exactly democratic either.
[Here's why some people think Brazil is in the middle of a 'soft coup']
Let's discuss what a coup (also known as a coup d'état) is. There are many definitions of coups out there. All have a few elements. (1) Coups seize executive power. (2) They are led by a small group of military officers or occasionally other social elites. (3) They use unconstitutional or "extralegal" means outside the bounds of the existing political system.
Following a constitutional procedure is better than a military overthrow
So if we think of 367 lawmakers as a "small group," what happened Sunday might fit the first and second components of the definition. It definitely doesn't fit the third component: the use of unconstitutional or "extralegal" means. The impeachment case against Dilma Rousseff has proceeded through constitutional channels, following the letter if not the spirit of the law. This is why experts can explain the series of procedures that will follow over the next several months.
Emphasizing constitutional procedure is not technical quibbling. It matters a lot for understanding Brazil today. Not so long ago, Latin American military and civilian elites alike felt confident entirely sidestepping the constitution if they strongly opposed current officeholders. Fifty or 60 years ago, a military and political coalition might have unceremoniously shown a president like Rousseff - one overseeing a severe recession and at loggerheads with parliament - the exit.
Today, threat of military intervention is low, and politicians can't simply muscle Rousseff out. They have to follow complicated, legalistic procedures with uncertain outcomes.
Yes, Rousseff's opponents - including dominant media outlets - are trying to manipulate public opinion. This is a political weapon of the democratic era. Yes, Federal Judge Sergio Moro improperly released bugged recordings of a conversation between Rousseff and former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in his investigation of the Operation Car Wash scandal. Impeachment itself is still constitutional.
In the 1990s, the influential political scientists Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan explained that democracy becomes "the only game in town" when "even in the face of severe political and economic crises, the overwhelming majority of the people believe that ... political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic procedures," and when everyone becomes "habituated" to political conflict being "resolved according to established norms."
[Do Americans still believe in democracy?]
The fact that Rousseff's supporters and opponents are both following the same rules is no small victory for the rule of law in Brazil.
But neither is it exactly democratic; it's a misuse of democratic procedure
The actual improprieties named in the impeachment charges - balancing the federal budget by reducing and delaying transfers of funds to a government-owned development bank - are relatively minor. Under most conditions, they wouldn't lead to impeachment. As legislators spoke one by one on Sunday night, though, they largely ignored the actual charges.
Perhaps the lowest point of the evening came when one legislator dedicated his pro-impeachment vote to the general who tortured Rousseff during Brazil's 1964-1985 military dictatorship.
Impeachment is not a popularity contest. In 1993, Brazil held an unusual constitutional referendum to decide whether to switch from a presidential to a parliamentary system of government. If the referendum had passed, Rousseff would have been a prime minister, and Brazil's parliament would have used a vote of no confidence to fire her Sunday. But the referendum didn't pass, and Brazil's president can be dismissed only for a limited number of offenses. Juan Linz famously argued that presidentialism can lead to democratic breakdown because presidents and parliaments don't have a way to fire each other when cooperation fails. By misusing the impeachment process, Brazil's parliament has solved this problem.
[It's not just Trump. Authoritarian populism is rising across the West. Here's why.]
Aníbal Pérez-Liñán shows that politics often affect the way Latin American legislatures handle impeachment charges. Sometimes legislatures fail to impeach the guilty, and other times they gang up on an executive against whom there is little proof. What happened Sunday is analogous to jurors ruling against a defendant based not on the charges, but because they think she is a bad person. This does not constitute a coup, but it is a misuse of democratic procedures.
So if the actual charges are minor, why do legislators want to impeach Rousseff?
The first reason for Rousseff's extreme unpopularity is thecountry's major recession. Arguably more important, though, is the ongoing and enormous Operation Car Washcorruption scandal. Even though there is no evidence Rousseff was directly involved, many people believe she must have known what was going on. Her predecessor and mentor Lula is being investigated. Rousseff attracted wrathwhen she attempted to offer Lula a cabinet post, a move that would have protected him from some forms of prosecution. Many elected officials implicated in the scandal appear to be pursuing her to deflect attention from themselves.
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All of this - combined with Rousseff's poor political skills - has led the PT's coalition of relatively small and unruly parties to fall apart. This makes her highly politically vulnerable.
Will impeaching Rousseff actually help legislators avoid scrutiny?
Latin American history provides little guide. Brazil's President Fernando Collor de Mello was impeached in 1992 in a relatively contained corruption scandal.Venezuela lawmakers in 1993 and Ecuadoran lawmakers in 1997 unsuccessfully attempted to contain widespread crises by impeaching presidents.
Still, the strategy may work this time, given the number of lawmakers implicated in Operation Car Wash. Surely it is not actually possible to throw all the bums out. By focusing popular ire on the executive first, at least some corrupt legislators will likely be able to outlast the current crisis.

O Imperio condescende com os bolivarianos detratores - Editorial Washington Post

Venezuela gets a lifeline from the United States

By Washington Post Editorial Board

The Washington Post, June 11th, 2013

Nicolas Maduro, the former bus driver chosen by Hugo Chávez to lead Venezuela after his death, has been struggling to consolidate his position since being declared the victor in a questionable presidential election in April. With the economy stalling, inflation spiking and shortages spreading, the new president appears at a loss about how to respond, other than to blame domestic and foreign enemies. Nor has he been able to overcome a serious split in the Chavista movement between his own, Cuba-backed clique and another based in the military.

Perhaps most alarming for Mr. Maduro, an energized opposition has refused to accept the election outcome; its capable leader, Henrique Capriles, has been gaining sympathy around the region. The president of neighboring Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, met with Mr. Capriles on May 29, prompting paroxysms of rage from Mr. Maduro and his aides. Other Latin American governments, while avoiding a confrontation with Caracas, have made it clear they regard the new leader's legitimacy as questionable; the regional group Unasur called for an audit of the election results.

One government, however, has chosen to toss Mr. Maduro a lifeline: the United States. Last week Secretary of State John F. Kerry took time to meet Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua on the sidelines of an Organization of American States meeting, then announced that the Obama administration would like to "find a new way forward" with the Maduro administration and "quickly move to the appointment of ambassadors." Mr. Kerry even thanked Mr. Maduro for "taking steps toward this encounter" - words that the state-run media trumpeted.

What did Mr. Maduro do to earn this assistance from Mr. Kerry? Since Mr. Chávez's death in March, the Venezuelan leader has repeatedly used the United States as a foil. He expelled two U.S. military attaches posted at the embassy in Caracas, claiming that they were trying to destabilize the country; he claimed the CIA was provoking violence in order to justify an invasion; and he called President Obama "the big boss of the devils." A U.S. filmmaker, Timothy Tracy, was arrested and charged with plotting against the government - a ludicrous allegation that was backed with no evidence. Though Mr. Tracy was put on a plane to Miami on the day of the Kerry-Jaua encounter, Mr. Kerry agreed to the meeting before that gesture.

There's nothing wrong, in principle, with diplomatic meetings or even in dispatching an ambassador to a country such as Venezuela. The State Department has also been meeting with senior opposition leaders and has yet to say it recognizes the presidential election results. But Mr. Kerry's words amounted to a precious endorsement for Mr. Maduro - and the Obama administration appears bent on cultivating him regardless of his actions. Perhaps the increasingly desperate new leader has secretly promised concessions to Washington on matters such as drug trafficking. But with senior government and military officials involved in the transhipment of cocaine to the United States and Europe, he is unlikely to deliver.

In short, this looks like a reset for the sake of reset, launched without regard for good timing or the cause of Venezuelan democracy.