Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, em viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas.
O que é este blog?
Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.
Uma reflexão histórico-sociológica sob a forma de uma dúvida existencial.
Dificilmente se pode dizer que temos, que tivemos, ou que possamos ter, uma elite, na acepção estrita do termo.
Na verdade, o que temos, o que tivemos, de mais frequente, são ou foram oligarquias diversas, que se sucedem, se alternaram no poder, com outras oligarquias que apareceram, ou algumas que voltam, sob outras formas.
Por exemplo: a oligarquia escravocrata no Império, a do café com leite no começo da República, a urbano-industrial com os militares modernizadores dos anos 1930 aos 80, novamente a do agronegócio desde então, junto com o próprio mandarinato estatal e o estamento político, e assim vai.
Elites mesmo, ou uma elite, são, e foram, entidades ou categorias inexistentes na história do Brasil.
Oligarquias, apenas oligarquias setoriais, são o que sempre tivemos, na mais pura acepção do conceito!
Isso é ruim?
Pode ser, e é, ao não se ter uma visão abrangente e unificada dos interesses nacionais, mas apenas interesses parciais, setorizados, de interesses grupais, tribais, corporativos, que, cada uma dessas oligarquias temporariamente dominantes, puxam a brasa para a sua sardinha, ou seja, fazem planos e desviam recursos para si próprias, em lugar de pensar no que falta para ultrapassarmos certas barreiras ao desenvolvimento econômico e social inclusivo e abrangente da nação (outra coisa que não tenho certeza que somos).
Por exemplo: nunca tivemos uma oligarquia que favorecesse a educação de massa de qualidade, apenas projetos setoriais para a qualificação educativa dos setores temporariamente dominantes em cada uma das fases acima mencionadas.
Em consequência, nossa produtividade do capital humano sempre foi medíocre, dada a ignorância que sempre grassou entre as massas. O Brasil, por exemplo, só atingiu o nível de escolarização (taxa de matrícula no primário, para a faixa etária dos 7 aos 11 anos) que os paises mais avançados — Estados Unidos ou Alemanha, entre outros — já exibiam no INÍCIO do século XIX quase ao final do século XX, ou seja, 150 anos depois (e isso unicamente do ponto de vista quantitativo, isto é ,o enrollment rate, a taxa de matrícula, sem mencionar a gigantesca defasagem do ponto de vista qualitativo.
Como é que se pode desenvolver um país— e retirá-lo das garras do populismo demagógico e excludente — sem educação de massa de qualidade?
Impossível!
Aliás, até hoje, 200 anos depois da independência, não conseguimos, as oligarquias não conseguiram, criar um sistema de educação de massa de qualidade: as “elites” temporariamente dominantes trataram apenas da qualificação educacional dos seus setores, das suas próprias famílias; o povão inculto continuou inculto.
Existe alguma chance de termos uma “oligarquia educacional” no Brasil?
Dificilmente. A oligarquia mais funcional que tivemos, a dos militares modernizadores dos anos 1930 aos 80, criou uma escola pública razoavelmente funcional, mas apenas para a classe média urbana, deixando a maior parte dos pobres urbanos e a imensa maioria das populações rurais de fora de qualquer sistema educacional decente. Quando esse restrito arquipélago de escolas republicanas começou a ruir, sob o peso da urbanização e da massificação democrática de meados dos anos 1960, a classe média emigrou para o sistema escolar privado, e deixou a massa dos pobres urbanos e rurais ao relento, senão no completo abandono. Os militares investiram mundos e fundos na educação dd terceiro grau e na pós-graduação, que era o que faltava para os filhos das oligarquias dominantes no último grande impulso modernizador, que tivemos dos anos 1950 aos 80.
Foi só: depois dos anos 1980 fomos dominados por oligarquias atrasadas, e cada vez mais tacanhas, o que deixou o Brasil entregue a um estamento político fragmentado em interesses setoriais exclusivis e excludentes. Os pobres continuaram ao relento, servindo apenas de massa de manobra eleitoral.
A classe média não teve força, capacidade ou tirocínio para formular um projeto de desenvolvimento abrangente que favorecesse sobretudo os mais pobres, inclusive porque estava principalmente ocupada em defender das ondas de hiperinflação criadas e exacerbadas pelo desenvolvimentismo nacionalista e protecionista favorecido pelas oligarquias militares, industriais e depois corporativas-sindicalistas ou do agronegócio, que assumiram o poder a partir dos anos 1960 e que se perpetuaram desde então.
Ainda estamos nisso, com oligarquias e corporações dominantes que se digladiam na luta pelos recursos públicos sempre exíguos, despojos do Estado cobiçados pelos diversos setores e categorias do estamento político, representantes atrasados, intelectualmente medíocres, que se apropriaram do Estado, junto com os próprios mandarins estatais nas últimas décadas. Dentre estes últimos ressalte-se a aristocracia do Judiciário, a mais voraz na captura de recursos públicos derivados do orçamento da República.
Vamos conseguir ter uma elite nacional modernizadora, progressista, esclarecida, nos próximos anos? Desculpem, mas sou cético, moderadamente cético, ao contemplar o que temos no país e à nossa volta. Não por deformação étnica ou cultural, mas pelo peso das instituições que nós mesmos criamos, desde a independência, mecanismos de controle social e político tipicamente oligárquicos, não elitistas (no bom sentido do conceito).
A América Latina melhorou muito nos últimos 200 anos? Certamente, no plano absoluto das conquistas materiais de cunho quantitativo. No plano relativo das conquistas qualitativas avançamos muito pouco, e com isso fomos superados ou distanciados no confronto com outras sociedades ou nações.
Trata-se de uma maldição? Certamente que não! Apenas a falta de elites, ou de uma elite!
Vamos conseguir nos próximos anos?
Provavelmente não, apenas em mais algumas décadas.
É o tempo que levará para termos uma educação de massas de qualidade, pois é delas que poderá sair uma elite consciente das necessidades do país.
Este artigo revela uma situação assustadora para a França: o completo fracasso de suas elites em diagnosticar corretamente os problemas do país e, a partir de um bom diagnóstico indicar ao povo os caminhos da recuperação. Macron, que começou bem, desperdiçou seu capital de prestígio fazendo aquilo que todos os mandarins da República francesa (e do Ancien Régime também) sempre fizeram: reformar pelo alto, sem consulta à população. Macron tentou "libertar" a França dos combustíveis fósseis, e de forma politicamente correta, mas totalmente incorreto quanto aos métodos, aumentou o imposto sobre esses combustíveis, ao mesmo tempo em que os preços do petróleo se elevavam, levando a gasolina a novos patamares. Gerou protestos, assim como ocorreram protestos no Brasil contra os 20 centavos do preço dos transportes em 2013 (embora a história seja mais complicada do que isso, mas não vou contar agora o que deve ser contado, como a manipulação da esquerda sobre essas manifestações), o que sinalizou o início da crise para a queda do regime lulopetista em nosso país. De toda forma, as elites brasileiras, como as francesas, não estão sabendo diagnosticar, em primeiro lugar, os problemas do país, para depois aplicar os remédios corretos. Pode ser que dentro de mais algum tempo o Brasil também se descubra desamparado, e novos protestos comecem contra o governo. Mas quem tem culpa são as elites, todas elas, em primeiro lugar as elites políticas, depois as econômicas, em seguida os mandarins do Estado (judiciário em primeiro lugar, mas outras categorias também), as elites sindicais (elas sempre foram muito burras e notoriamente corruptas), e todas as demais corporações que pretendem viver às custas do Estado, ou seja, de todo o povo trabalhador. Não vai dar certo, e não vamos sair do lugar... Paulo Roberto de Almeida Brasília, 3 de março de 2019
The yellow vest protests have revealed the profound divide between the privileged class embodied by Emmanuel Macron and the rest of France
Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry
The Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2019 10:58 a.m. ET
One of Emmanuel Macron’s most endearing qualities is his unshakable faith in his own power to convince anyone of the truth of his beliefs. Last November, the youngest-ever president of France tried to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the 1918 armistice by touring small French towns situated on the former front line to talk about world peace. It did not go well. The ordinary citizens he encountered were less interested in the history of the Great War than in voicing their anger at his economic policies—especially a recently announced increase in gas taxes—and seemed only to get angrier the more he assured them that things would improve. A week later, some 300,000 people, mobilized over the internet, donned yellow safety vests and began to set up barricades on thoroughfares across France. It was the first step in what has turned out to be a roiling, monthslong political crisis.
Mr. Macron’s rise has been astonishing. Unknown to the general public until 2014 and never before elected to political office, he smashed his rivals to win the presidency in May 2017. His party, founded just a year earlier, swept the June 2017 legislative elections, granting him a solid majority and wrecking the center-left Socialists and center-right Republicans (the country’s two traditional governing parties).
Mr. Macron seemed to represent—to coin a phrase—hope and change: change from the generally mediocre political class that has governed France for 30 years, hope that France might embrace market-based reform and provide a model for combating the populist wave sweeping the West.
Today, the hope is on life support, and the change has yet to be seen. France’s economy seems as stubbornly stuck in neutral as ever, with unemployment around 9% (and youth unemployment at 21%), government spending at 56% of GDP and debt rising. Mr. Macron has had the second-fastest drop in popularity of any French President.
What happened?
Mr. Macron is unpopular today because he has never really been popular. He saw a brief surge of support right before his narrow victory in the presidential election, mainly driven by the scandals of his center-right challenger. Since then, according to the polling firm IFOP, his approval ratings have trended inexorably downward, settling in the mid-40s after the honeymoon that all newly elected French presidents enjoy. More recently, they have ranged from the mid-20s to the mid-30s.
‘Yellow Vest’ protesters in Tours, France hold a banner reading ‘Direct democracy, power to the people’ on February 2, 2019.Photo:GUILLAUME SOUVANT/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
In other words, about a third of the French population is primed to like Mr. Macron; most of the rest tend to dislike him. Mr. Macron, it seems, is popular mostly among people like himself. As the political analyst Jérôme Fourquet has noted, while income correlates very well with support for Mr. Macron, the variable that correlates best is education.
Mr. Macron is neither right-wing nor left-wing, because what he represents is not an ideology but a caste. His base is France’s meritocratic elite, the people who have benefited from the same global trends that have left most of the country behind. When Gilles Le Gendre, a senior politician from Mr. Macron’s party, was recently asked what the government should have done differently, his baffling response seemed to encapsulate Macronism: “We were probably too intelligent, too subtle.”
Mr. Macron—who has mused about the subconscious desire of the French for a king and has dismissed those who dislike him as “defiant Gauls”—represents a type: the brilliant technocrat, turned investment-banker multimillionaire, turned political appointee. It is a type that a great many French people detest and hold responsible for the country’s decline. As an adviser, speaking on background to French media, admitted in a striking moment of lucidity, “People viscerally reject who he is; the class-contempt stuff is not good.”
The rejection of Mr. Macron’s person and his policies are linked. The biggest misconception about his agenda, especially overseas, is that it is an ambitious program of pro-growth reforms, defying the status quo. But Mr. Macron’s earliest endorsements came from figures like the economists Jacques Attali and Jean Pisani-Ferry and the investment banker Alain Minc, who have advised virtually all center-right and center-left governments over the past 35 years. As Vincent Trémolet de Villers, an opinion editor at Le Figaro, pointed out, Mr. Minc is notorious for coining the phrase “the circle of reason” to describe supporters of his own orthodox centrism back in 1995. Those with the gall to challenge the views of this enlightened circle were not amused—and they still aren’t.
Far from the revolution that his campaign promised, Mr. Macron’s agenda has consisted of doing what every president in recent memory has done. Consider the labor market. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is no longer hard to fire employees in France. Since 2002, every government, left and right, has passed at least one labor-market reform bill. Each reform was mild, often watered down in the face of protests, but their cumulative effect means that the French labor market is now relatively flexible. Even though the infamous 35-hour workweek rule is still on the books, for example, so many exemptions have been added that it is almost impossible to find someone in the private sector on a work contract who works 35 hours a week. Mr. Macron’s own reform bill capped punitive damages linked to firings (whose unpredictability had deterred employment), but that’s about it.
Mr. Macron’s biggest-ticket item to fight unemployment—the number one concern of French voters—has been to plow billions of euros into worker retraining. It is an approach that French governments of both parties—indeed, governments all over the West—have tried in recent decades, with underwhelming results. Bill Clinton as a candidate in 1992 would easily recognize Mr. Macron’s employment agenda.
Meanwhile, Mr. Macron has shown no interest in challenging the eurozone’s austere monetary and budgetary policies, which most economists agree are a significant brake on growth. EU restrictions have curtailed France’s ability to borrow and to make the reforms necessary to cut its punishing payroll taxes, which are a much more serious drag on employment than labor-market regulation.
The “gilets jaunes” or “yellow vests” started out protesting fuel hikes in France’s rural communities. But their demonstrations evolved into a national movement against President Emmanuel Macron and his government. Image: Getty
Given how much economic and policy thinking has changed since the global financial crisis and euro debt crisis of a decade ago, why does Mr. Macron’s agenda read like something from the 1990s? Why is the country’s governing elite still fighting the last war?
The simplest answer is that they have become intellectually lazy. France’s École Nationale d’Administration, or ENA—the national school of public administration—produces the vast majority of the country’s top political and business leaders. Every nation has schools that groom an elite, but while Harvard enrolls some 1,600 undergrads every year and Oxford 3,200, ENA admits 40 to 60. There are fewer than 5,000 alumni in the world, total. They are commonly referred to asénarques, a word combining the school’s name with the suffix for a ruler, as in monarchy.
Even this undersells just how narrow a group this is, given that only the top 10 or 15 ranked graduates gain admittance to the truly elite civil-service tracks that enable someone to become, say, a managing director of an investment bank before turning 30, as Emmanuel Macron did. The smaller the group, the higher the likelihood of groupthink.
The building of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (National School of Administration) in Strasbourg, France, 2013.Photo:PATRICK HERTZOG/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Every year, after reading candidates’ essays and conducting interviews, the ENA admissions committee puts out a report. The one for 2017 was typical of recent years: The general intellectual level of applicants is “good, even very good,” but the overwhelming majority have trouble thinking for themselves. They “recite talking points” and are unable to “offer true reflection or a personal point of view.” The committee said that it had to “hunt down originality as if it were a rare treat.”
In 2009, only 12% of students admitted to ENA came from a working- or middle-class background, according to the economic review Alternatives économiques. Early in his political career, Mr. Macron described himself as an up-by-his-bootstraps outsider to France’s ruling class because he grew up in the medium-size city of Amiens. In fact, his father is a neurology professor at the city’s teaching hospital and his mother a physician, and they sent him to the top local private school and then an elite school in Paris before he won admission to ENA. It is no mystery why so many French people think their elites are out of touch.
France’s crisis is now eating at the very core of the social fabric, with predictable consequences for trust in institutions and rising levels of anger.
Though the agenda of theénarqueshas failed to deliver benefits for the average French person, it has certainly delivered benefits to people like Mr. Macron. ENA used to be the golden ticket for a senior bureaucratic job and political office, but with the wave of privatization of government services in the 1980s, it also became a path to riches. Some of the schemes provided a necessary dose of market competition, but many more were solutions in search of a problem, and they created a lucrative revolving door between government and the corporate sector.
For example, starting in the early 2000s, at the instigation ofénarquesin the French finance ministry, governments left and right privatized France’s world-class highways. The government’s independent auditor later found that the bidders may have underpaid by as much as 40%; tolls have since increased by 20% on average, with no corresponding increase in quality, according to the report. Most of the bidders were large French conglomerates whose business depends on government contracting and who routinely hire ex-civil servants.
France does need market reform, buténarque-driven reform has tended to have little market competition and lots of cronyism. The cohort that came of age in that decade is often calledla génération fric: “the cash-grab generation.”
French President Emmanuel Macron listens during a meeting with youths in Etang-sur-Arroux, France, February 7, 2019.Photo:Ludovic MARIN/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
It is no wonder that yellow safety vests became the banner of Mr. Macron’s middle- and working-class opposition. All car owners must have such gear because of a much-grumbled-at 2008 government mandate meant to ensure the visibility of drivers in distress at roadside. For France’s exurban middle and working classes, who have been priced out of France’s glamorous city centers, having a car has become a necessity for getting by. They are what sociologist Christophe Guilluy, in a best-selling book, calls “peripheral France”—the rough equivalent of what some Americans call “flyover country.”
The yellow vest demonstrations have captured the country’s attention not because they are protests, with the requisite violent fringe—a regular feature of political Kabuki here—but because they consist overwhelmingly of those who never protest: middle and working-class people who go to work every day, are overtaxed and see their social and economic horizon darkening.
Another way in which France’s elite has benefited at the expense of ordinary citizens is immigration, which has lowered the wages of low-skilled workers even as it has provided cheap labor to the better-off. And the toll has been social and cultural too. In 2016, Institut Montaigne, a corporate-funded centrist think tank, trumpeted findings of a survey showing that “only” 28% of French Muslims have Islamist views dramatically at odds with France’s democratic values.
Given France’s sluggish economy, it is no surprise that many immigrants fail to integrate, becoming more likely to turn to crime or to embrace radical Islam. This dynamic has deepened tensions between many native French and second-generation immigrants, adding cultural and ethnic strife to the already volatile environment created by socioeconomic malaise. Gérard Collomb, then Mr. Macron’s interior minister, a reasonable center-left figure, was recently revealed to have said in private that France risked a civil war unless immigration, legal and illegal, was sharply curtailed within the next five years, an assessment that would turn Marine Le Pen’s cheeks pink.
France’s less-privileged classes have also suffered socially from the dislocation and despair of recent years. When Florence Aubenas, a reporter for Le Monde, visited the makeshift roadside camps set up by the yellow vests, she encountered people who had finally found community. When one middle-aged woman invited fellow protesters she has gotten to know for dinner, she noted that it was the first time she or her husband has had nonfamily members over for dinner at their house. France’s crisis is now eating at the very core of the social fabric, with predictable consequences for trust in institutions and rising levels of anger.
France’s identity has been shaped by the fact that, uniquely among Western nations, it is a state that built a nation and not a nation that eventually built a state. This means that its elites have an outsize impact on the country’s destiny. More often than not, elite failure has led not just to crisis but to collapse. The national collapses—1789, 1940—were always preceded by a generation of elite stupidity, cowardice and greed. Whatever their faults, the yellow vests have correctly identified France’s biggest problem.
Mr. Gobry, who lives in Paris, is a fellow of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, D.C.
