Venezuela: sanções impostas pelos EUA contra dirigentes do regime bolivariano...

U.S. Department of State. September 25, 2018. The United States Imposes Sanctions on Venezuelan Individuals and Entities

Washington, DC - Today, the United States imposed sanctions on four current or former officials of the Government of Venezuela: First Lady and Former Attorney General Cilia Adela Flores de Maduro, Executive Vice President Delcy Eloina Rodriguez Gomez, Minister of Communication and Information Jorge Jesus Rodriguez Gomez, and Minister of Defense Vladimir Padrino Lopez.

In addition, the United States has designated additional individuals and entities that are part of a network supporting Rafael Alfredo Sarria Diaz, a key front person for sanctioned Venezuelan President of the illegitimate Constituent Assembly, Diosdado Cabello Rondon. The United States designated both Sarria Diaz and Cabello on May 18. The individuals sanctioned today that form part of the network associated with Rafael Alfredo Sarria Diaz are: Jose Omar Paredes and Edgar Alberto Sarria Diaz. The entities sanctioned for being owned or controlled by, or have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of Sarria Diaz are: Quiana Trading Limited and AVERUCA, C.A. In addition, the United States has sanctioned Panazeate SL for being owned or controlled by, or have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, Edgar Alberto Sarria Diaz.

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these individuals and entities that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated persons.

U.S. sanctions need not be permanent; they are intended to change behavior. The United States would consider lifting sanctions for persons sanctioned under E.O. 13692 that take concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order, refuse to take part in human rights abuses and speak out against abuses committed by the government, and combat corruption in Venezuela.


Today’s action shows that the United States will continue to take concrete and forceful action against those who are involved in the destruction of democracy in Venezuela as well as those who are enriching themselves at the expense of the Venezuelan people. The United States will continue to use the full weight of American economic and diplomatic power to help create the conditions for the restoration of democracy for the Venezuelan people.

US TREASURY. September 25, 2018. Treasury Targets Venezuelan President Maduro’s Inner Circle and Proceeds of Corruption in the United States

Washington – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated four members of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s inner circle, including First Lady and former Attorney General and President of the National Assembly Cilia Adela Flores de Maduro.  OFAC also targeted a network supporting a key front man for designated President of Venezuela’s National Constituent Assembly (ANC) Diosdado Cabello Rondon, and identified as blocked property a $20 million U.S.-based private jet as belonging to Cabello’s front man.

“President Maduro relies on his inner circle to maintain his grip on power, as his regime systematically plunders what remains of Venezuela’s wealth. We are continuing to designate loyalists who enable Maduro to solidify his hold on the military and the government while the Venezuelan people suffer,” said Secretary of the Treasury Steven T. Mnuchin.  “Treasury will continue to impose a financial toll on those responsible for Venezuela’s tragic decline, and the networks and front-men they use to mask their illicit wealth.” 

VENEZUELA’S DECLINE

By the end of 2018, hyperinflation in Venezuela is projected to reach over one million percent.  Three million Venezuelans will have departed Venezuela for neighboring nations to escape widespread poverty and its attendant hardships.  The Maduro regime, meanwhile, continues to pursue failed policies and financing schemes to mask the regime’s corruption and gross mismanagement.  The United States has imposed sanctions on many who have profited during Venezuela’s decline — like former Executive Vice President Tarek El Aissami (El Aissami) and Cabello — as well as front-men like Rafael Sarria whose relative anonymity is used to the benefit of senior officials. 

The United States will continue to use every available diplomatic and economic tool to support the Venezuelan people’s efforts to restore their democracy.  U.S. sanctions need not be permanent; they are intended to change behavior.  The United States has made it clear that we will consider lifting sanctions for persons designated under E.O. 13692 who take concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order, refuse to take part in human rights abuses, speak out against abuses committed by the government, and combat corruption in Venezuela.

MADURO’S INNER CIRCLE

OFAC designated Nicolas Maduro on July 31, 2017.  Today’s designations target key current or former officials of the Venezuelan government.  Maduro has relied on key figures, such as previously designated Cabello and El Aissami, and those officials being designated today, to maintain his grip on power.  Maduro has also installed another member of his inner circle and lifelong member of the Venezuelan military, Vladimir Padrino Lopez, to help ensure the military’s loyalty to the Maduro regime.  Finally, Maduro has given Delcy Eloina Rodriguez Gomez and Jorge Jesus Rodriguez Gomez senior positions within the Venezuelan government to help him maintain power and solidify his authoritarian rule.

• Cilia Adela Flores De Maduro (Flores) is the wife of President Nicolas Maduro.  She resigned from her position as a National Assembly Deputy in mid-2017 to run as a candidate for the ANC.  Prior to this resignation, Flores was a principal for the Cojedes State in the Venezuelan National Assembly.  In February 2017, Flores was a member of the Presidential Commission responsible for the formation and operation of the ANC process.  From August 15, 2005 through January 5, 2011, Flores was the President of the Legislative Power (National Assembly).  In February 2012, now-deceased former President, Hugo Chavez, appointed Flores as the Attorney General of Venezuela. 
• Delcy Eloina Rodriguez Gomez (Delcy Rodriguez) was delegated the role and authorities of the Executive Vice President of Venezuela on June 14, 2018.  On August 4, 2017, Delcy Rodriguez was elected president of the new ANC, a position now held by Cabello.  In December 2014, Delcy Rodriguez was named the Minister of Popular Power for External Relations.
• Jorge Jesus Rodriguez Gomez (Jorge Rodriguez) was appointed to the position of Minister of Popular Power for Communication and Information in late 2017.  On November 23, 2008, Jorge Rodriguez was elected Mayor of Caracas, Libertador District, and held the position until he was appointed to the aforementioned Minister position.  On January 8, 2007, Jorge Rodriguez was sworn in as the Vice President of Venezuela.
• Vladimir Padrino Lopez (Padrino) was appointed the Sectoral Vice President of Political Sovereignty, Security, and Peace (Venezuelan Defense Minister) in June 2018.  He previously held a multitude of military posts, including Second Commander and Chief of the General Staff of the Bolivarian and Joint Chief of Staff of the Central Integral Defense Strategic Region.

RAFAEL ALFREDO SARRIA DIAZ’S FRONT NETWORK

OFAC designated Rafael Sarria on May 18, 2018 for acting for or on behalf of Cabello as his front person and maintaining an illicit business relationship with Cabello since at least 2010.  During this time, Rafael Sarria owned several real estate properties in Florida that were registered under his name, but in reality he acted as the named representative for Cabello on these properties.  As of 2018, Rafael Sarria continues to advise and assist Cabello, profiting from the investment of Cabello’s corruptly obtained wealth. 

Today, OFAC identified a Gulfstream 200 private jet, tail number N488RC, located in Florida, as blocked property.  Rafael Sarria originally purchased the plane, but his beneficial ownership had been obfuscated through the following companies that act for or on his behalf:

• Agencia Vehiculos Especiales Rurales y Urbanos, C.A. (AVERUCA, C.A.): AVERUCA, C.A. is a Venezuelan company that currently operates the aforementioned aircraft, and for which Rafael Sarria is identified as the President.  As the President of AVERUCA, C.A., Rafael Sarria purchased the aircraft in 2008 for an approximate price of $20 million. 
• Jose Omar Paredes (Paredes):  Paredes is identified as the Chief Pilot of AVERUCA, C.A., and given this role, he is responsible for the operational control of the aircraft.
• Quiana Trading Limited (Quiana Trading):  Quiana Trading is a British Virgin Islands company for which Rafael Sarria, at the time of registration in 2009, was the President and sole shareholder.  Quiana Trading is the beneficial owner of the aforementioned aircraft through a trust agreement.
• Edgar Alberto Sarria Diaz (Edgar Sarria):  Edgar Sarria is identified as a Director of Quiana Trading.  Additionally, Edgar Sarria is the Chief Executive Officer and sole shareholder of Panazeate SL.
• Panazeate SL:  Panazeate SL is a company based in Valencia, Spain, which is owned or controlled by Edgar Sarria.

As a result of this action, all property and interests in property of those designated today subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.

FULL DOCUMENT: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm495

U.S. Department of State. September 25, 2018. United States Continues To Assist Venezuelans in Need

Washington, DC - Vice President Mike Pence announced today at the 73rd regular session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, NY, more than $48 million in additional humanitarian U.S. assistance for Venezuelans affected by the man-made crisis in Venezuela.

This funding will help provide affected Venezuelans with emergency food assistance, safe drinking water, hygiene supplies, shelter, protection from violence and exploitation, and work and education opportunities, in coordination with other NGOs and government partners. This funding includes contributions to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to meet the humanitarian needs of vulnerable Venezuelans throughout the region. This funding also supports the UN World Food Program’s emergency response efforts to help feed Venezuelans in Colombia as well as those who have recently arrived in Ecuador. It also supports non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are delivering humanitarian aid to Venezuelans and hosting communities in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and other countries throughout the region.

This additional $48 million brings total U.S. humanitarian assistance for vulnerable Venezuelans and for the neighboring communities hosting those who have fled to more than $95 million since the beginning of Fiscal Year 2017. This $95 million total in humanitarian assistance is complemented by $23.5 million in economic support and development assistance dedicated to Colombia to help boost its capacity to absorb incoming Venezuelans.

The United States remains concerned about the struggle Venezuelan citizens face every day to meet their families’ basic needs amid the chaos and repression unleashed by the Maduro regime, and urges increased support for the well-being of the Venezuelan people and the restoration of their democracy. Further, the United States calls on the Maduro regime to immediately allow international aid, including food and medicine, to reach Venezuela at a sufficient scale to meet growing humanitarian needs.

The United States greatly appreciates the generosity and compassion of countries throughout the hemisphere who are hosting hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans fleeing the crisis in their country. The United States commends the humanitarian contributions made by all donors, and encourages them to make additional funding available to meet the growing crisis.

A nova Guerra Fria mais ou menos quente: sanções americanas a oligarcas russos

US slaps new sanctions on Russian individuals, entities

Xinhua

Source: Xinhua   Editor: Wang Qingchu  

13:00 UTC+8, 2018-04-07       

AFP

In this file photo taken on May 26, 2015 Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev (L) looks at President Vladimir Putin during a meeting with the BRICS countries' senior officials in charge of security matters at the Kremlin in Moscow. The United States slapped a new round of sanctions on Russia on Friday, targeting Russian business elite and senior government officials. These include Nikolai Patrushev, the chief of Russia's security council who formerly succeeded Putin as head of the FSB security service.

The United States slapped a new round of sanctions on Russia on Friday, targeting Russian business elite and senior government officials, a move that may further damage the already soured ties between Washington and Moscow.

The US Treasury announced that it has imposed sanctions on seven Russian business leaders, who were referred to as "oligarchs," along with 12 companies owned or controlled by them.

The blacklist also included 17 senior Russian government officials and the state-owned Russian weapons trading company, Rosoboronexport, and its subsidiary, Russian Financial Corporation Bank.

US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin accused the Russian government in the statement of engaging in "a range of malign activity" around the world, including its involvement in the Ukrainian and Syrian issues, and "attempting to subvert Western democracies, and malicious cyber activities."

The sanctions will freeze any assets the individuals or entities punished hold in the United States and prohibit US citizens from conducting business with them.

The punitive act was also believed to discourage international financial institutions from doing business with persons and entities on the list.

The Russian Embassy in the United States shot back on Friday by claiming that the new sanctions targeted Russian business leaders "who refused to play by Washington's rules."

"The US made another erroneous step to destroy the freedom of entrepreneurship and competition, integration processes in the world economy," said the embassy in a statement.

The latest move was among a series of the Trump administration's confrontations against "Russian activities that threaten our institutions, our interests, or our allies," said the White House in a statement on Friday.

On March 15, the US Treasury imposed sanctions on five entities and 19 individuals, including Russian intelligence services, for their alleged interference in the 2016 US elections and engagement in "malicious" cyber attacks.

At the end of January, Washington published a list of Russian officials and business tycoons eligible for sanctions for alleged meddling in the US presidential elections. The list incorporated 114 senior Russian political personages and 96 "oligarchs."

So far the Trump administration has punished 189 Russian-related people and entities with sanctions under various programs, said a senior US government official on the condition of anonymity at a briefing on Friday.

The new sanctions were seen as another blow on the already sinking ties between Washington and Moscow.

In March, the United States expelled 60 Russian diplomats and closed the Russian consulate in Seattle in a concerted action with Britain and other Western nations over a poisoning case involving a former Russian spy.

Washington's actions have been met with countermeasures from Russia, which categorically denies these allegations and demands solid evidence.

Meanwhile, Trump has kept from launching from direct verbal attack against Moscow over the poisoning attack.

Venezuela: sancoes financeiras americanas devem abalar o regime chavista - Lourival Sant'Anna

Agora vai? Talvez, mas com novos sofrimentos da população.

Sanções à Venezuela

Sanções implementadas pelos EUA serão eficazes para estrangular economia do país

Lourival Sant'Anna, 
 O Estado de S.Paulo, 17 Setembro 2017

Representantes do governo e da oposição da Venezuela se reuniram quarta e quinta-feira em Santo Domingo, para explorar a possibilidade de negociação. Um novo encontro foi marcado para o dia 27, também na capital dominicana. Deverão participar também México, Chile, Bolívia e Nicarágua – dois países críticos ao regime chavista e dois aliados, respectivamente.
Nos últimos dois anos, houve muitas reuniões com esse propósito, sem resultado. Desta vez pode ser diferente, como sugere o próprio formato da negociação, fora da Venezuela, com robusta intermediação internacional e a participação de dirigentes importantes de ambos os lados.

Chavistas fazem protestos em Caracas com cartazes ironizando os opositores Henry Ramos Allup e Lilian Tintori, chamados de 'vende pátria' Foto: EFE/MIGUEL GUTIÉRREZ

As sanções financeiras impostas pelo governo americano dia 25 começam a surtir efeito. Nenhum banco relevante quer transacionar com a Venezuela e com isso correr o risco de não poder mais ter negócios com os EUA.
 

Como o próprio presidente Nicolás Maduro se queixou, a Venezuela tem dinheiro depositado em bancos, mas não consegue sacá-lo para importar alimentos e remédios. Isso, num quadro já de brutal escassez de produtos básicos. Ao cobrir a eleição para a Assembleia Constituinte em 31 de julho, analistas me disseram que o que faria diferença seriam não sanções comerciais sobre a venda de petróleo, mas sanções financeiras como as que foram aplicadas. Embora os EUA sejam o maior comprador de petróleo da Venezuela, ela teria condições de reorientar suas vendas para outros compradores. Perderia receita, mas não ficaria tão asfixiada. Já com sanções financeiras, não há o que fazer. Não adianta vender, porque não recebe o pagamento; não adianta ter dinheiro, porque não consegue comprar. 
O Irã viveu esse drama entre 2008 e 2015, quando sanções financeiras e também medidas para monitorar os cargueiros iranianos causaram o estrangulamento de sua economia. Houve inflação e perda de poder aquisitivo da população. A teocracia iraniana se sentiu abalada a ponto de permitir a eleição do conservador moderado Hassan Rohani, em 2013. A retórica provocativa de Mahmoud Ahmadinejad deu lugar à atitude serena e pragmática de Rohani, educado em Glasgow, possibilitando o acordo nuclear de 2015. 
As eleições no Irã são controladas pelo líder espiritual Ali Khamenei, desde a seleção dos candidatos até a contagem dos votos, como ficou claro na fraude de 2009 que garantiu a reeleição de Ahmadinejad. Rohani foi reeleito este ano por ampla margem, derrotando o nacionalista Ebrahim Raisi, que poderia colocar em risco o acordo. Sua maior ameaça hoje é Donald Trump, que o denunciou durante a campanha como um “péssimo acordo”, mas até agora não moveu uma palha para rasgá-lo, apesar das pressões de Israel nesse sentido.
Há diferenças entre as situações do Irã e da Venezuela. O conflito venezuelano é interno. O programa nuclear iraniano tem um caráter não só de governo, mas de Estado. E chegou a unir uma parte da população em seu favor, embora houvesse críticas tanto na opinião pública quanto no interior do regime contra a retórica abrasiva de Ahmadinejad, que atraía as preocupações internacionais e com isso punha em risco o próprio programa. 

A perda de qualidade de vida causada pelas sanções mudou o humor dos iranianos com relação ao sonho nuclear, tornado pesadelo. Na Venezuela, a população já estava sofrendo antes das sanções, com desabastecimento e hiperinflação, além da truculência do regime. E os chavistas já haviam posto em prática uma estratégia bem-sucedida de permanência no poder, garantindo o apoio dos generais, que lucram com a distribuição dos produtos. Agora a situação vai se deteriorar na Venezuela, empurrando para um limite a capacidade até mesmo das forças de segurança de conter a insatisfação da população e de setores do próprio regime.

Programa Nuclear Iraniano: a despeito do acordo de Genebra, Congresso USA ainda pensa em sancoes

Inside the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2013

Harvard Blog "Iran Matters", December 19, 2013

By Gary Samore

News broke yesterday that three prominent senators—Menendez (D-NJ), Kirk (R-IL), and Schumer (D-NY)—may introduce legislation this year that would impose new sanctions against Iran with a “deferred trigger.” That is, the new sanctions can be averted only if the Obama administration provides specific and difficult certifications every 30 days including that Iran is implementing the terms of the November 24 Joint Plan of Action and negotiating “in good faith” toward a final deal. Based on an advance copy of the “Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2013,” I summarize the substance of the draft legislation, including both the new proposed sanctions and the complicated set of presidential certifications and notifications to waive existing sanctions and suspend the additional sanctions.  In a second post, I examine the current legislative state of play and the likely administration objections to the draft legislation.

. . .

What new sanctions are being proposed?

The additional sanctions in the Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act of 2013 do not differ greatly from those in House Resolution 850 (“The Nuclear Iran Prevention Act”), which cleared the House of Representatives by a vote of 420–20 in July 2013. Similarities include:

• Expansion of blacklisted sectors to include Iran’s mining, construction, and engineering industries;
• Penalties against foreign financial institutions that conduct transactions with Iran’s blacklisted entities using foreign currencies;
• Penalties against foreign persons who conduct transactions with Iran’s Central Bank or other blacklisted Iranian banks; and
• Expansion of the number of senior officials in Iran subject to sanctions.

Key differences include:

• A slightly less strict approach to reducing Iranian oil exports (while H. R. 850 aims to reduce Iran’s exports by one million barrels/day within one year—to practically zero—the Senate legislation requires buyers of Iranian oil to reduce purchases to just an undefined “de minimis” level within two years);
• A more expansive list of Iranian officials subject to sanctions, including senior officials in the defense, justice, and interior ministries, prison system, and courts; and
• Considerably less focus on terrorism or human rights violations (H. R. 850 broadens sanctions against Iranians connected to human rights abuses and suggests designating the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps a Foreign Terrorist Organization).

The essence of the sanctions remains the same: to reduce Iranian oil exports, expand the list of blacklisted sectors, and reduce Iran’s access to foreign currencies.

How does the deferred trigger for new sanctions work?

The primary new contribution of the Menendez-Kirk-Schumer bill is its language outlining conditions the Obama administration must meet to suspend or delay execution of the new penalties and to continue to waive existing sanctions under the terms of the Joint Plan of Action.   The bill outlines four key circumstances. 

First, under the Joint Plan of Action signed in Geneva on November 24, the U.S. agreed not to impose new nuclear-related sanctions for six months, “acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress.” The new legislation authorizes the president to suspend the application of new sanctions for 180 days if he makes a set of certifications to Congress every 30 days during that period.  The 180-day period begins on the date of the act’s enactment or when the president notifies Congress that Iran has agreed to measures to implement the Joint Plan of Action, whichever comes first.

Several of the certifications relate to Iran’s compliance with the terms of the Joint Plan of Action and its implementation arrangements. Beyond that, the president must also certify every month that:

• Iran is “proactively and in good faith engaged in negotiations toward a final agreement or arrangement to terminate its illicit nuclear activities, related weaponization activities, and any other nuclear activity not required for a civilian nuclear program”;
• The U.S. is “working toward a final agreement or arrangement that will dismantle Iran’s illicit nuclear infrastructure to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capability and permit daily verification, monitoring, and inspections of suspect facilities in Iran so that an effort by Iran to produce a nuclear weapon would be quickly detected.”
• Iran or its proxies have not directly or indirectly committed an act of terrorism against the United States; and
• Iran has not conducted a test of a ballistic missile with a range exceeding 500 kilometers.

What will happen to sanctions if negotiations continue beyond six months?

The second set of circumstances addresses the likely scenario in which the P5+1 and Iran agree to extend the six-month negotiations for a final agreement, which, under the terms of the Joint Plan of Action, can be renewed by the mutual consent of the parties. The bill stipulates that new sanctions can only be suspended past six months for two additional periods of 30 days each if the president certifies (in addition to the above certifications) that a final accord is “imminent” and that under such an agreement Iran will “dismantle its illicit nuclear infrastructure to preclude a nuclear breakout capability and other capabilities critical to the production of nuclear weapons.” In other words, the Menendez-Kirk-Schumer bill effectively sets a deadline of 240 days (the initial 180-day period, plus two 30-day extensions), or eight months, for a final agreement to be signed.

What certifications are required for sanctions relief in the interim deal?

The third set of circumstances outlines conditions for continuing to waive existing sanctions under the Joint Plan of Action, which includes U.S. commitments to suspend existing sanctions on gold and precious metals, Iran’s petrochemical exports, and Iran’s automobile industry. Under the act, these sanctions must be immediately reinstated during the eight-month period if the president does not make the certifications required every 30 days to suspend the application of new sanctions. However, the bill also sets out a procedure for the president to waive the reinstatement of existing sanctions in 30-day increments for up to one year after enactment of the act through another set of certifications.

What happens to sanctions in a final nuclear deal?

Finally, the proposed bill sets out conditions for the president to suspend sanctions for one year if the president certifies to Congress that the United States has reached a final agreement with Iran that will:

• “Dismantle Iran’s illicit nuclear infrastructure, including enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and facilities, the heavy water reactor and production plant at Arak, and any nuclear weapons components and technology”;
• Bring Iran into compliance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions;
• Resolve issues related to IAEA concerns about past weaponization activities;
• Permit continuous on-site inspection and monitoring of all “suspect facilities” in Iran;
• Require full implementation of IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol; and
• Require additional verification measures related to Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing facilities, including raw materials and components, and uranium mines and mills.

The one-year suspension of sanctions in the event of a final agreement can then be renewed for additional one-year increments if the president certifies to Congress that Iran is complying with the terms of the final agreement, in accordance with the above certifications. (The president’s one-year suspension of sanctions can be overturned by a Joint Resolution of Disapproval by both houses of Congress, and the bill sets out expedited procedures for consideration of such a resolution modeled on the fast-track procedures for free trade agreements. Of course, the president can veto any Joint Resolution of Disapproval, and Congress can override the president’s veto with a two-thirds majority in each house.)

Gary Samore is executive director for research at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. From 2009–13, he was President Obama's White House coordinator for arms control and weapons of mass destruction.

Iran: novas sancoes EUA ao programa nuclear; vai funcionar?

Sending Message to Iran, House Approves Tougher Sanctions

By RICK GLADSTONE

The New York Times: July 31, 2013

The House overwhelmingly approved legislation on Wednesday that would impose the toughest sanctions yet on Iran, calling the measure a critical step to cripple the country’s disputed nuclear program and brushing aside calls for restraint by critics who said the Iranian president-elect should first be given a chance to negotiate.

Timeline on Iran’s Nuclear Program

The 400-to-20 vote to approve the legislation, known as the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act, came four days before the inauguration of Iran’s President-elect Hassan Rouhani, a moderate cleric who won on a tide of dissatisfaction with the conservative hard-liners who have been in power in Iran for the past eight years. Mr. Rouhani, a former nuclear negotiator, has said he will seek to ease tensions with the United States.

“Iran may have a new president, but its march toward a nuclear program continues,” Representative Ed Royce, a California Republican who was a main sponsor of the bipartisan legislation, said after the vote. “The economic and political pressure on Tehran must be ratcheted up.”

There had been little doubt that the bill, which now goes to the Senate for consideration in September after the Congressional summer recess, would be approved, given the widespread antipathy in Washington for Iran’s government since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

But the timing of the vote had raised alarm among some lawmakers who contended it would be viewed in Iran as a blatantly hostile signal at a delicate time. Experts in Iranian politics said they feared the vote could embolden Iran’s hard-liners and weaken Mr. Rouhani’s ability to ease the estrangement with the United States.

“They have a strong case to make that they can’t trust us,” said Gary G. Sick, an Iran expert who teaches at Columbia and served on the National Security Council under the Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations, which included the break with Iran. “What the Congress is trying to do is confirm that.”

Mr. Royce and other supporters of the bill rejected that view, arguing that Mr. Rouhani will have limited power under Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who deeply mistrusts the United States. “Cngressional efforts to impose new sanctions should not be based on the Iranian political calendar,” Mr. Royce said.

There appeared to be a cold reception to a letter, signed by 16 representatives, that had urged a delay in the vote. “I hope the recent election makes a difference in Iran, but the only way to ensure it doesn’t is to tell the Iranian people, ‘We don’t care what you do,’ ” said Representative Earl Blumenauer, an Oregon Democrat who signed the letter.

The legislation, if enacted and fully enforced, would theoretically devastate what remains of Iran’s ability to export oil, its most important product, by threatening customers with heavy penalties if they do not find other suppliers. It would also eliminate Iran’s already diminished ability to access money in overseas accounts, and would expand the American sanctions blacklist to include Iran’s automotive, mining, construction and engineering industries. Anyone doing business with those industries would be penalized in the American market, effectively ostracizing them internationally.

The National Iranian American Council, a group that has faulted Iran’s government but opposes sanctions as a negotiation strategy, said the House vote risked squandering a major chance to engage with Iran.

A version of this article appeared in print on August 1, 2013, on page A6 of the New York edition with the headline: Sending Message to Iran, House Approves Tougher Sanctions.

A inocuidade das sancoes contra a Guarda Revolucionaria Iraniana

Muitas vezes, sanções acabam enriquecendo aqueles mesmos aos quais elas são tidas como fator de enfraquecimento. É o que siz, em síntese, o texto abaixo...

Smugglers for the State
Sanctions can’t touch the Revolutionary Guards’ black-market empire.
by Babak Dehghanpisheh
Newsweek, July 10, 2010

The grizzled Iranian skipper strides barefoot along his wooden ship’s bulwarks, taking inventory of his cargo. There are crates of blankets and canned pineapple slices, Chinese tires, even a stack of water-purification machines waiting to be loaded, all bound for the Iranian port of Bandar Genaveh, roughly 500 miles away near the north end of the Gulf. His dhow is hauling other goods, too, but they’re best kept out of sight, whether they’re taxed or forbidden under Iranian law or banned under U.N. sanctions. The skipper doesn’t worry either way. “We can take almost anything to Iran,” he says with a grin. Cell phones and other electronics are his most profitable contraband these days, he adds. What happens if the Revolutionary Guards catch him? “They charge a ‘fee,’ ” he says—about $3,000 or $4,000—but they won’t confiscate his goods. They just want their cut.
He’s hardly an isolated case: dozens of wooden ships like his are bobbing in Dubai Creek’s waters, just across the Gulf from Iran. Thanks to the dwindling traffic of big container ships from Dubai to the Islamic Republic, business is booming for the Iranian skipper and a whole fleet of smugglers like him—as well as for the group that dominates Iran’s black market: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The latest U.N. sanctions were designed to punish the Revolutionary Guards for running Tehran’s covert nuclear program. But the trouble with sanctions is that they squeeze out legitimate businesses and leave the field wide open for the IRGC, which has spent decades mastering the art of sanctions-busting. “You’re using pinpoint sanctions against the very entity that’s best positioned to evade those sanctions,” says Matthew Levitt, a counterterrorism expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. An Iranian businessman in Dubai, asking not to be named because of the subject’s sensitivity, puts it succinctly: “You’re enriching the people the sanctions are trying to target.”

The size of Iran’s smuggling industry has been estimated at $12 billion a year, and the IRGC is believed to control much, if not all, of it. The charge is impossible to confirm, of course, but only the Revolutionary Guards have the resources to run such a massive operation—and the influence to keep it from being shut down. Analysts say the organization has the structure of a mafia network, with dozens of seemingly legitimate front businesses that mask illicit enterprises or serve as money laundries. “[They’re] extremely creative [with] front organizations, which they’ll open and shut regularly,” says Levitt. The IRGC’s business operations began more than 20 years ago, at the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Fearful of potential unrest among newly unemployed young men flooding back from the front lines, then president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani approved a plan for the IRGC to open companies and bid on government contracts.
The IRGC’s involvement in smuggling began about the same time, when Rafsanjani established free-trade areas in Kish and Qeshm, two islands across the Gulf from Dubai. On paper, the islands’ duty-free goods were tightly controlled; to thwart profiteers, a national ID was required for each purchase. But the IRGC gamed the system using a list of its members’ ID numbers to import scarce household appliances and resell them on the black market. The IRGC had its own private jetties, recalls Mohsen Sazegara, one of the group’s founders, who now lives in exile in Virginia: “I saw the Qeshm one personally. The Customs officer wouldn’t dare go near them. All the years [when] importing household goods—like radios, TVs, refrigerators—was prohibited, the shops in [Tehran’s] Jomhouri Street were stocked full. [Shop owners] would say that travelers had brought the items in from duty-free, but in reality the Revolutionary Guards were bringing it all in from Qeshm.”

Traffic only expanded from there. In 2002 Parliament Speaker Mehdi Karrubi revealed the existence of illegal ports in southern Iran. One of his aides later estimated that more than half the country’s black-market trade passedthrough some 60 “invisible jetties,” as they came to be known. He also claimed that 25 gates at Tehran’s airport were handled by the Guards, outside of Customs’ control. “They have their hands in everything,” says Sazegara. “There were Kurds who helped them smuggle things from Iraq. They even used to buy Saddam’s oil during the days of sanctions.” (The New York Times reported last week that tanker trucks are hauling huge quantities of oil into Iran from Iraqi Kurdistan.)

The IRGC’s smuggling infuriates legitimate traders, who say they’re being punished while the sanctions’ real targets easily sidestep the obstacles. “Sanctions have affected us in a profound way,” says shipping-company owner Morteza Masoumzadeh,the deputy president of the Iranian Business Council in Dubai. “In the past two years we’ve lost almost 70 percent of our commercial business.” He estimates that nearly 400 legitimate Iranian businesses have closed down in Dubai since Washington imposed unilateral sanctions in 2007.

German businessman John Schneider-Merck, 70, is likewise frustrated. He’s done business in Iran for 30 years, and his company still makes upward of $20 million a year there, but he fears it may not last much longer. One of his regular exports to Iran was a synthetic rubber O-ring used in Mercedes and Volvo cars. But it could also be used in military rockets so now it’s listed as a dual-use item, and the German government demands an end-user certificate for every one he sells. “How can I ask some bazaari in Tehran for an end-user certificate?” he asks. “Even toilet paper can be classified as dual-use if it’s headed for the Army.”
That’s an exaggeration,but not by much. And as Schneider-Merck points out, shady IRGC companies can easily fake the paperwork they need. One Iranian in Dubai, who asked for anonymity because he ships Xboxes and other supposedly banned goods to Iran, pulls out a cargo manifest listing a woman in Iran as his official importer. She lives in a small coastal town, he says with a chuckle, “and before her we used another lady for about six months.”

As Western firms pull out in disgust, even the IRGC’s legitimate companies are benefiting. Royal Dutch Shell and Spain’s Repsol withdrew from negotiations to develop the giant South Pars gas field in May, after nearly a decade of talks. The Iranian government then handed $21 billion worth of development contracts to a consortium of local firms, including the Guards’ construction wing.

Iran’s neighbors are worried that the standoff could ultimately spin out of control. In response to the latest U.N. sanctions, which call for the boarding and inspection of ships in the Gulf, the IRGC’s naval chief threatened to block its mouth, the Strait of Hormuz. “The Persian Gulf is the center and the most sensitive place in the world,” Adm. Ali Fadavi warned. “And we can, at any time, and as much as we want, squeeze this strait.” There’s one consolation: that would probably hurt Iran even worse than it would the United States.

Brasil-Iran-EUA: um triangulo pouco amoroso

A coisa tem tudo para dar errado: ameaça degringolar num festival de acusações mútuas, possibilidade de retaliações cruzadas e deterioração geral das relações bilaterais.
Mal comparando, creio que foram mexer num vespeiro: algumas pessoas podem sair picadas. Não foi por falta de aviso...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Em recado a Brasil, texto de sanções dos EUA ao Irã inclui menção a etanol
Por Patrícia Campos Mello (corresponde em Washington)
Estado de São Paulo, 26.06.2010

A lei de sanções contra o Irã, aprovada pelo Congresso americano quinta-feira, inclui pela primeira vez restrições à venda de etanol a Teerã, em um claro recado para o governo brasileiro. Enterrada no meio do texto do projeto de lei de 41 páginas, que deve ser assinada pelo presidente Barack Obama nos próximos dias, há uma ordem explícita para que o governo americano monitore as exportações de etanol para o Irã.
Segundo o texto, o presidente americano fica obrigado a entregar um relatório para o Congresso 90 dias após a publicação da lei de sanções, sobre os investimentos no setor de energia do Irã, que incluam “uma estimativa do volume de recursos energéticos, incluindo etanol, que o Irã importou durante o período”, além de uma “lista de todos os projetos, investimentos e parcerias fora do Irã que envolvam entidades iranianas em parceria com entidades de outros países, incluindo identificação das entidades dos outros países.” Isso vai valer para qualquer negócio feito a partir de janeiro de 2006
Durante deliberações que levaram à provação do projeto de lei no Legislativo, o deputado democrata Eliot Engel, líder da Subcomissão de Hemisfério Ocidental da Câmara dos Representantes, deixou claro que o texto tinha endereço certo.
“Quero manifestar meu apoio à seção 110 da lei, que exige um relatório sobre exportações de energia para o Irã; Os EUA e o Brasil são os maiores produtores de etanol do mundo e fiquei feliz de ouvir dos produtores brasileiros que eles não têm planos de fornecer etanol para o Irã”, disse Engel. “É por isso que a lei é importante, precisamos continuar monitorando essa área, já que exportações de etanol podem enfraquecer as sanções contra o setor de energia do Irã.”
Segundo uma fonte do Congresso, o estabelecimento do relatório é o primeiro passo para uma emenda que pode incluir o etanol na lista dos produtos cuja venda para o Irã estará proibida.
Desta forma, se a Petrobras resolvesse revender etanol brasileiro para os iranianos, poderia ser alvo de retaliação de Washington. Procurada pelo Estado, a estatal brasileira, por intermédio de sua assessoria, assegurou não ter planos imediatos de negociar o produto com o Irã.

“Sem discriminar”
O governo americano já havia indicado claramente que se opõe ao possível interesse brasileiro de fornecer etanol para os iranianos. “Qualquer iniciativa que burle as sanções prejudica nosso objetivo, então não é uma boa ideia”, disse um alto funcionário da Casa Branca ao Estado.
Diferentemente do reforço das medidas unilaterais que os EUA pretendem impor ao Irã, nas sanções aprovadas pela ONU - apesar da oposição de Brasil e Turquia - não há restrição explícita ao setor energético ou ao etanol.
O Congresso americano havia aceitado o pedido do presidente Obama para adiar a votação de sua lei unilateral de sanções até que a ONU aprovasse sua iniciativa. Agora, Obama deve sancionar o projeto, transformando-o em lei.
Na época, o governo brasileiro afirmou foi explícito: “Não vamos discriminar ninguém na hora de exportar etanol. Vamos exportar etanol para qualquer país que queira, nossa prioridade é abrir mercados”, tinha declarado, no início do mês, uma fonte do governo.
A possibilidade de o Brasil suprir parte das necessidades de combustível do Irã com etanol foi levantada pelo ministro do Desenvolvimento, Miguel Jorge, em visita a Teerã, em abril.
Jorge afirmou que o Irã está interessado em comprar etanol brasileiro, por causa dos problemas que enfrenta para comprar gasolina diante dos bloqueios comerciais que sofre. Mas os empresários brasileiros afirmam não ter intenção de correr o risco de ser sancionados pelos EUA.
Assim como a assessoria da Petrobrás, Adhemar Altieri, porta-voz da Unica, entidade que representa os produtores de etanol, disse que não há projeto nem de curto nem de longo prazo para exportar etanol para o Irã.

Para entender
As sanções aprovadas na quinta-feira pelo Congresso americano são ações unilaterais, aplicadas apenas pelos EUA - diferentemente das medidas multilaterais adotadas pelo Conselho de Segurança da ONU, no dia 9, que devem ser seguidas por todos os membros da organização. As punições contra nas Nações Unidas são mais brandas porque, para aprová-las, era preciso o apoio de chineses e russos, que têm interesses comerciais e são contra medidas muito duras contra Teerã. Um caso semelhante ocorreu com o regime do apartheid, na África do Sul. A ONU adotou suas primeiras sanções contra os segregacionistas nos anos 60. As medidas, porém, eram amenas e foram facilmente burladas pelo governo branco. O sistema de segregação racial só começou a ruir anos 80, depois que EUA e Grã-Bretanha adotaram duras sanções unilaterais contra a África do Sul.

Irã diz que sanções da ONU ao programa nuclear são ‘ilegais e inválidas’

O CSNU certamente não é um cenáculo de juristas ou de sábios cultores do direito internacional. Tampouco seus membros são legisladores universais, nem mesmo com um imaginário mandato expresso na Carta da ONU. Suas decisões e resoluções são eminentemente políticas, não jurídicas. Mesmo assim, se trata do único órgão internacional dotado de legitimidade intrínseca para tomar decisões no campo da paz e da segurança internacionais.
Não se trata, portanto, de saber se o que se decidiu ali é legal, ou não, ou válido, do ponto de vista de um país, mas de saber que suas resoluções são normas obrigatórias que os países têm o dever de cumprir, mesmo os que votaram contra, como o Brasil.
O não cumprimento implica em mais sanções, eventualmente até o recurso à força, se tal se revelar necessário, como foi o caso da "expulsão" do Iraque do Kuwait, em 1991, ou do ataque ao Afeganistão, em 2001. São coisas desagradáveis, mas sempre se deve assumir responsabilidade pelos seus atos. O Irã vai tentar escapar ao controle sobre seu programa nuclear: se escapar, teremos mais um proliferador no planeta, o que certamente não tornará o mundo mais seguro ou pacífico. Esse fato a comunidade internacional precisa decidir o que pretende fazer en relação a ele. O Brasil já disse o que quer: mais diálogo, e não sanções. Só precisa ver se isso funciona com o Irã.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Irã diz que sanções da ONU ao programa nuclear são ‘ilegais e inválidas’
Estado de S.Paulo, 18/06/2010

O Irã disse nesta sexta-feira, 18, que as sanções do Conselho de Segurança da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) contra seu programa nuclear são ilegais e deveriam ser revogadas.

Em um comunicado divulgado pela agência oficial de notícias IRNA, o Conselho de Segurança Nacional do Irã, que coordena a defesa nacional e a política de segurança, disse que “a entrada do Conselho de Segurança da ONU nas atividades nucleares pacíficas da República Islâmica do Irã é ilegal e inválida.”

As sanções, aprovadas pelo Conselho de Segurança da ONU no dia 10 de junho, e seguidas logo depois por medidas mais rígidas por parte da União Europeia e dos EUA, violam um artigo da Carta da ONU assim como as regras da Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica (AIEA), disse o comunicado. “O Conselho (de Segurança da ONU) deveria tomar rapidamente medidas para corrigir os erros do passado”, dizia.

As sanções têm como objetivo frear o enriquecimento de urânio pelo Irã, que segundo o país é pacífico, mas o Ocidente suspeita poder levar à produção de armas nucleares.

As sanções da ONU são direcionadas aos bancos iranianos suspeitos de terem ligações com programas nucleares ou de mísseis. Elas também abrangem embargo de armas e um pedido para um regime de inspeção de carga.

Politica Nuclear do Iran (3): Brasil promete denunciar EUA

Mais um capítulo, de uma história que promete se arrastar por algum tempo...

Contra sanções ao Irã, Brasil promete denunciar EUA
Terça-feira, 18 Mai, 08h05

O Itamaraty não escondeu hoje a sua indignação com a atitude dos Estados Unidos de ignorar o acordo extraído pelo Brasil e a Turquia do governo iraniano e enviar uma proposta de novas sanções contra o Irã ao Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas. Como reação, os chanceleres do Brasil e da Turquia encaminharão nesta semana uma carta a cada membro do Conselho. No texto, que na prática funcionará como uma denúncia da posição dos EUA e aliados, Brasil e Turquia defenderão que o acordo traz exatamente os termos exigidos por essas potências e censurarão o fato de Washington não ter dado um prazo para que o Irã pudesse colocá-lo em marcha antes de colocar a máquina das sanções em ação.
"O acordo (de Teerã) é o acordo que eles propuseram. Nós (Brasil e Turquia) apenas estávamos viabilizando uma maneira de chegar ao acordo que estava sobre a mesa. Todas as dificuldades foram superadas", afirmou o ministro das Relações Exteriores, Celso Amorim.
Segundo o chanceler, as negociações conduzidas pelas delegações turca e brasileira no último final de semana permitiram eliminar todas as resistências e novas exigências do Irã em relação à proposta de acordo de outubro do ano passado. Conforme argumentou, o governo iraniano aceitou o depósito de 1.200 quilos de urânio levemente enriquecido na Turquia em um prazo de 30 dias e o recebimento, um ano depois, dos elementos combustíveis para o reator de Teerã.
Segundo Amorim, o governo iraniano também se dispôs a informar a Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica (AIEA) em uma semana sobre o acerto e a dar continuidade às negociações para a recuperação da confiança internacional na finalidade pacífica de seu programa nuclear. Da mesma forma, acatou a presença de inspetores da AIEA - imposição implícita no texto do acordo e que significa uma garantia clara de que o Irã não enriquecerá urânio a 20%.
Na avaliação de Amorim, o acordo de Teerã pode ser considerado um "passaporte para uma solução negociada e pacífica". Nesse sentido, o mínimo esperado dos EUA e de seus aliados seria uma manifestação de boa vontade, que poderia ser traduzida no prazo de pelo menos um mês para que o Irã cumprisse os termos iniciais do acordo. "Ignorar o acordo é desprezar a busca de uma solução pacífica e negociada", declarou Amorim.