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Mostrando postagens com marcador sistema financeiro internacional. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador sistema financeiro internacional. Mostrar todas as postagens

domingo, 22 de março de 2015

Reformando o sistema financeiro internacional - book review (Carol M. Connell) - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O mais recente artigo publicado em Mundorama:


1164. “Reforming the World Monetary System: book review”, 
[Book Review of Carol M. Connell: Reforming the World Monetary System: Fritz Machlup and the Bellagio Group (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2013. xii + 272 pp.; ISBN 978-1-84893-360-6; Financial History series n. 21, $99.00; hardcover)], em  
Mundorama (n. 91, 22/03/2015; ISSN: 2175-2052
Relação de Originais n. 2705.


Review of “Reforming the World Monetary System” of Carol M. Connell, by Paulo Roberto de Almeida


global-economies

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This book appears in a Financial History series of the Pickering & Chatto, which has already published as diverse studies in this area as one on Argentina’s parallel currency, another on the federal banking in Brazil, with most of titles being about banking and finance in the North Atlantic world, from the colonial times to the 20th century. Carol Connell is Professor of Finance and Business Management at the School of Business, Brooklyn College, City University of New York, where she is very well rated by her students; and she is now directing a new monograph series on Modern Heterodox Economics, also being published by Pickering & Chatto. Connell prepared this very well researched work benefitting from a fellowship research grant from the Earhart Foundation, a private charitable institution that funds scholarly research; one of its early beneficiaries was Friedrich von Hayek, who wrote The Road to Serfdom (1944).
Some scenarios and arguments presented in this book were first made public in academic publications, such as the Journal of Management History and the Journal of the History of Economic Thought, and Connell’s interest in Fritz Machlup career and work arose when she was researching about one of his students, the growth theorist Edith Penrose. Besides the preeminent presence of Machlup, the book also deals with the contributions for the discussion and reform of the international financial and monetary system by luminaries such as Robert Triffin, William Fellner, and Milton Friedman.
In the introduction the author states very clearly that her objective was the study of the complex reform process that, from the Sixties up to the Seventies, led to the adoption of a flexible exchange rate – instead of the fixed parity established at the Bretton Woods conference (1944) – and the introduction of the special drawing rights as the main “currency” of the International Monetary Fund (p. 1). Based on archival and published sources, the book follows, in thirteen extensively annotated chapters, the itinerary of the Bellagio Group, established under the leadership of Fritz Machlup, and integrated by 32 non-government academic economists, working in intimate contact with policy makers and IMF officials, between 1963 and 1977. Bellagio Group’s primary documents are everywhere referenced, but there are also 299 secondary sources in the bibliography, among them (besides the four big economists), Charles Kindleberger, Edith Penrose, Fred Bergsten, and John Williamson.
Trying perhaps to emphasize the current appeal of her study to contemporary policymakers and researchers, Connell states in her Introduction that there could be in Machlup’s approach something similar to the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G20), which is clearly a non performing analogy, essentially because of the independence of views of the former vis-à-vis the narrow interests of today’s governments. Notwithstanding, Bellagio Group worked in close contact and cooperation with the Group of Ten, launched simultaneously within the IMF. The intention of the Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon was to devise a monetary reform in an already stressed arrangement, in a context when the ten most important countries tried to control and minimize the imbalances of the world economy, the growing liquidity crises, and the volatility in the price of gold (partially circumvented by the introduction of swap facilities and the creation of the General Arrangements to Borrow).
After explaining her research questions and original hypothesis, and informing where Machlup’s and Triffin’s papers are located (Hoover and Yale), Connell opens Chapter 1 by describing the crisis of confidence that arouse in early Sixties, leading to the various exercises of academic debates and institutional brain-storming that mobilized the most important economist of that decade. Late in the Fifties, Robert Triffin was already predicting a forthcoming crisis, and calling for a radical reform of the monetary system in his Gold and the Dollar Crisis (1960). Feeling challenged by the convening by Dillon of an IMF Studies Group, within the Group of Ten, and excluding academic economists, Machlup, Triffin and Fellner decided to “embark on their own study, involving economists of widely divergent views and with no problem or proposal considered ‘out of bounds’. Hence the idea for a series of alternative conference was born” (p. 18), and that was the Bellagio Group, which first met at this Italian resort of the Lake of Como. A brief chronology of the monetary system events from 1944 and 1977 and a synthetic table on the various exchange rate policies and regimes (from gold standard to flexible) close this chapter.
Chapter 2 introduces the life and thought of Fritz Machlup, who had been working and publishing in the area of monetary reform for many years before the convening of his “child”, the Bellagio Group. Born (1902) in a pre-1914 Europe (Austria) with “ten currencies, all with fixed gold parities and fixed exchange rates”, Machlup soon afterwards (1920) was presented to a continent with “twenty-seven paper currencies, none with a gold parity, none with fixed exchange rates and several of them in various stages of inflation or hyperinflation” (p. 23). From 1923 to 1962 Machlup studied and published extensively on monetary problems, particularly the gold standard, but also dealt with patents, industrial organization, production of knowledge and theory of the firm. His 1923 dissertation on the gold-exchange standard at the University of Vienna was supervised by Ludwig von Mises; a decade later he was already residing in the U.S. and teaching at the University of Buffalo; at that time, “he was already the first economist to frame the discussion of balance of payments problems in terms of payments adjustment, liquidity and confidence” (p. 27). John Williamson, a former student, “attributed Machlup’s belief in the importance of the confidence to the role it had played in the collapse of the gold-exchange standard during the Great Depression” (p. 29). The same would occur thirty years later, with the U.S. involvement with and expenditures for the Vietnam’s War, and European countries distrust of America’s capacity to honor its commitments under Bretton Woods. Machlup anticipated the scenario with his lengthy essay “Plans for Reform of International Monetary System”, first published in 1962 and reissued in 1964, significantly updated (p. 32).
Chapter 3 is dedicated to Robert Triffin – a Belgian who worked for the Federal Reserve and the IMF, and professor at Yale from 1951 to 1977 – and to the 1959 Triffin Plan, proposing the replacement of gold and foreign-exchange reserves by gold-guaranteed deposit accounts at the IMF, within a more flexible system. But, at that time, as argued by Charles Kindleberger, even if many economists proposed the idea, “few central bankers recommended flexible exchange rates as a means of eliminating … all the problems of adjustment, liquidity and confidence” (p. 42). Even if Triffin’s solution could be first-best economically, it was politically out of question. The head of the Group of Ten at IMF, Otmar Emminger, “found the Triffin Plan unacceptable because nations were not prepared to hand over so much responsibility and financial power to an international body” (p. 42). At that juncture, confidence, not liquidity, was the problem that made Triffin and Machlup to come together intellectually (p. 47).
Chapter 4 deals with Budapest born (1905) William Fellner, a fugitive from the Nazis, like the two others; professor at Berkeley in 1939, he worked mainly at the intersection of macro and microeconomics, researching and writing about inflation, regulation, growth and balance of payments problems, including in cooperation with the other two in monetary and exchange questions, both in theory and policy. In 1963, he was dealing with budgetary deficits and their consequences, which led to adjustments efforts, and also to the confidence question. Differently from the planned equilibrium advocated by Triffin, Fellner “recommended instead letting free-market processes perform more of the equilibrating function”(p. 57). In many papers, he proposed a limited exchange-rate flexibility system. In fact, both Machlup and Fellner were committed to freely floating exchange-rates, but were aware of the responsibility of national governments, which led them to explore a myriad of possible solutions.
The title of Chapter 5, Why Economists Disagree, takes its name from Machlup’s speech before the American Philosophical Society, in November 1964, five months after the fourth Bellagio Group conference. He explained then his decision to invite 32 economists from eleven countries, most of them from divergent schools of thought, to explore solutions for the problems of the international monetary system of the 1960s. They had to consider hybrid or compromise solutions for the identified problems. This chapter presents each one of the participants, their background and works. The sources of disagreement are very well abridged in a table dealing with the four major policy proposals for reform: semi-automatic gold standard, centralized international reserves, multiple currencies and/or flexible exchange rates (p. 76-78). All proposals were carefully examined at a series of scenario-planning exercises through various Bellagio conferences, allowing the economists to evaluate the “relative impact on payments, liquidity and confidence of the four basic exchange regimes, given any one or combination of them might have been adopted” (p. 80).
Chapters 6 and 7 deal, respectively, with the hypothesis of multiple reserve currencies and Milton Friedman’s arguments for fixed versus flexible exchange rates, in a paper he presented in 1953, making the case for a floating regime. This regime, for him, “has the advantage of monetary independence, insulation from real shocks, and a less disruptive adjustment mechanism in the face of nominal rigidities than it is the case with pegged exchange rates” (p. 99). These two chapter are of a more theoretical and historical nature, despite the fact that all questions discussed in them had a very practical impact on each devised solution for the problems plaguing the international monetary system.
Chapter 8, Collaboration With the Group of Ten, makes the bridge between the two groups, the IMF technocrats and government officials, for one side, the independent academic economists, for the other. Machlup pressed hard on his team, achieving a detailed report, International Monetary Arrangements: The Problem of Choice, two months before (in June 1964) the Group of Ten and the IMF staff could prepare theirs. He also frankly explained, at the first joint meeting, later that year, the differences between the two approaches. This led to the assignment of Group of Ten chairman, Otmar Emminger, to the Bellagio Group, inaugurating a thirteen-year collaboration. The tasks for the groups were the same, but working methods, and freedom of opinion, made them very different, as well as purposes: Bellagio emphasized disagreements among the proposals, and the nature of their differing impact on the problems dealt with. Friedman, in 1965, criticized the report for not offering one unified  solution for the crisis, but Machlup pointed out that a consensus was achieved on the consequences of each solution proposed by his group: governments and the IMF had food for thought.
Chapter 9, Adjustment Policies and Special Drawing Rights: Joint Meetings of Officials and Academics, is a continuation of this kind of collaboration, now assuming other forms of joint exercises, as the deputies of the Group of Ten start to met regularly with the Bellagio Group, and did so from 1964 to 1977, resulting in the creation of special reserve assets, later called the Special Drawings Rights (due to the French Finance minister, Valery Giscard D’Estaing, insistence on considering them a credit, not an owned reserve). The three Bellagio main economists were the organizers of those meetings, which assumed a kind of a NGO feature. “From 1970 to 1977, discussions would focus on the increasing liberalization of the international capital market and the wisdom of special drawing rights for developing countries” (p. 128). This period also corresponds to the U.S. going off the gold and to the floating of the Deutsche mark: main questions became managed floating and international liquidity. A Basle meeting in 1977 was the last meeting of a Joint Academic and Officials meeting, and the first allocation of SDRs was held in 1970. A new time, no less challenging, had arrived for and within the international monetary system.
Chapter 10, From the Bellagio Group to the Bürgenstock Conferences, explores the continuation of the semi-academic discussions under a new format, this time dealing with floating exchange regimes in various guises, but always under the influence, and the intellectual guidance, of Fritz Machlup, who intended to prepare a well conceived book out of the exercise: this came at light in 1970, as a Princeton University Press publication, Approaches to Greater Exchange Rate Flexibility: The Bürgenstock papers. The analysis takes ground on the Austrian background of Machlup’s thought, which also gave light to planning methods based on Delphi scenarios. A first meeting, with a large number of officials, academic people but also representatives from banks and corporations, was held in Long Island, in January 1969, followed by a second meeting in June, in Bürgenstock, Switzerland, where five more meetings were organized.
Chapter 11, follows the lead, dealing with de facto successor of the Joint Meeting of Officials and Academics, which was an extended Bellagio Group, the Group of Thirty, which included members from all the current G20 financial group. The Group of Thirty meet twice a year at the beginning of the 1980s, and was broader than the Bellagio Group, including industrialists and private bankers, and preferred not to commission papers from academics, establishing instead an agenda for discussion comprising issues of capital movements and less developing countries assets, international banking supervision, and energy (the issue of the moment). But Fritz Machlup was still on the party, with a minor group of academics. A so-called Bellagio Group met again in 1996, under the leadership of the general manager of the Bank for International Settlements, and has been meeting once a year at the Italian resort, under the intellectual guidance of professor Barry Eichengreen, from Berkeley, and always financed by the BIS.
Chapter 12 is dedicated to Reassessing the Bellagio Group’s Impact on International Monetary Reform; Carol Connell affirms that there are “significant parallels between the calls for monetary system reform in the 1960s and those for reform following the financial crisis of 2008-9” (p. 185). This comparison seems off the mark, as the current financial G20 has achieved nothing comparable, besides pressures for the negotiation and implementation of a more stringent set of Basel prudential rules for the banking sector. The outcry about the dollar crisis has been responded by nothing else than the confirmation of its centrality for the current financial and monetary “non-system”. Initial rumors – at its monnaie unique début – about the strength of the euro were replaced by recent fears of its demise.
Notwithstanding this, Connell presents a clear historical synthesis about the importance of the Bellagio Group for the understanding of the most crucial problems of the international monetary system as devised at Bretton Woods: all of the group members came from G-10 countries, the same as the suppliers of the General Arrangements to Borrow (now expanded, and with the New GAB). At least, the academics convinced the central bankers that floating exchange regimes could work, and that flexible currencies could cushion external shocks; that is not a minor intellectual achievement. And, the same problems they tackled, adjustment, liquidity, and confidence, continue to be at the center of the nightmares of the central bankers and finance officials alike (together with new preoccupations, on the fiscal side, as demography imposes its burdens over all). It seems that liquidity is no more an issue today, as governments create real tsunamis of new financial assets, pushing national debts to new higher peaks.
In the bright side, this Chapter 12 finishes with an impressive list of publications of the Princeton Finance Section under Fritz Machlup’s leadership, from 1960 up to 1971, no less than 98 titles authored by many of the most well-known names of the economics trade, and certainly some of Nobel-worth distinction in this profession.
Chapter 13, finally, is a beautiful piece of scholarly work: The Impact of the Bellagio Group on International Trade and Finance Scholarship from the 1960s to the Present, which could also be called something like “the sons and daughters of Machlup, Triffin and Fellner” (and now their grandsons and grand-daughters, like Connell herself). She lists some disciples of the mentors: Edith Penrose, Stephen Hymer, Charles Kindleberger, James Tobin, Andrew Crockett, Edwin Truman, and many others.
Conclusions, at last, summarizes the lessons drawn from each chapter, before returning to the initial hypothesis. Great Depression and World War II influenced how economists thought about policy, inflation, interest rates, deficits and government intervention. Machlup, Triffin and Fellner were the intellectual masters behind much of the conceptual thinking about the great challenges emerging from a world order devised with some improvisation, and no practical guidance, at the end of the II World War. With some Austrian ingenuity and innovative and creative thinking of their own, they are at the core of the adjustments and arrangements that were made, in the Sixties and the Seventies, for the current, certainly limited and incomplete, international monetary system (or non-system, at discretion). One of her hypothesis, that of the centrality of the Bellagio Group for the reform of the international monetary system, is largely confirmed and deserves proper acknowledgment: they have had a real impact on practical policies, and in the reconfiguration of the multilateral financial organizations. And their influence on scholarship and empirical research over a so large community of academic and applied economists is beyond recognition of traditional prizes and honors.

Book review:

  • Carol M. Connell: Reforming the World Monetary System: Fritz Machlup and the Bellagio Group (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2013. xii + 272 pp.; ISBN 978-1-84893-360-6; Financial History series n. 21, $99.00; hardcover)
Paulo R. de Almeida, University Center of Brasilia-Uniceub, and Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (pralmeida@me.com)


sábado, 13 de julho de 2013

Tobin Tax: oh, como era mentiroso o meu Frances (antiglobalizadoresfuriosos com esses socialistas capitalistas e neoliberais)

Después de pasar cinco años defendiendo desde la derecha, el centro y la izquierda la necesidad de aprobar una tasa a las transacciones financieras —llamada Tasa Tobin en honor del economista James Tobin, que la formuló en los años setenta—, y cuando once países de la Unión Europea, entre ellos Alemania, Italia y España, se habían puesto de acuerdo para aplicarla, Francia ha dado marcha atrás y ha exigido a la Comisión Europea que rebaje el alcance de una imposición que considera “excesiva”.
El ministro de Economía, Pierre Moscovici, afirmó el jueves que el proyecto ultimado por Bruselas, tal y como está planteado hoy, puede resultar perjudicial “para el futuro industrial de la plaza financiera de París” y para “la financiación de la economía francesa”, y ha exigido al comisario europeo de política fiscal, Algirdas Semeta, que “mejore y suavice” sus propuestas iniciales.
Moscovici se erige así en portavoz de la patronal, la banca, las aseguradoras y la Bolsa francesas, que el pasado 2 de abril enviaron una carta conjunta al ministerio en la que manifestaban su temor a que la Tasa sobre las Transacciones Financieras (TTF) pactada por Alemania, Francia, Italia, España, Austria, Portugal, Bélgica, Estonia, Grecia, Eslovaquia y Eslovenia, pueda suponerles un coste “superior a 70.000 millones de euros”. Según la banca gala, la tasa solo serviría para “destruir riqueza”.
El comisario Semeta ya ha dado a entender que el proyecto de la Comisión será revisado a la baja, y el Ejecutivo comunitario ha hecho saber que está dispuesto a enmendar el texto entero antes de que entre en vigor.
Según fuentes conocedoras de la negociación, Francia ha ido virando de rumbo a lo largo de la opaca negociación técnica, que comenzó en mayo pasado, y su delegación ha exigido constantes rebajas en el alcance de la TTF, de forma que París ha pasado de ser el gran valedor de la TTF (Nicolas Sarkozy y François Hollande la defendieron con similar obstinación) a convertirse en su principal enemigo.
En un artículo publicado hoy en el diario francés Le Monde, Dominique Plihon —portavoz de Attac France— y Peter Wahl —presidente de la ONG alemana WEED— alertan de que Francia se ha unido sobre la marcha al “campo de los adversarios de la TTF”. Ambos explican que París está exigiendo —“entre bambalinas y a puerta cerrada, en una negociación sin alguna transparencia ni legitimidad democrática”— “unas excepciones que, tomadas de forma conjunta, convertirían a la tasa en una farsa sin efecto regulador que generaría unos ingresos ridículamente bajos”.
En este momento, nadie parece apostar un euro por un impuesto que buena parte de la ciudadanía ve cómo el símbolo de que los gobiernos y la política exigen de algún modo una contrapartida a las entidades financieras que originaron la crisis de 2008 y que en muchas ocasiones han sido rescatadas con dinero público.
Según Plihon y Wahl, si París mantiene sus posiciones, eso significará que “ha capitulado ante la presión de la patronal y de los bancos”, y la TTF “acabará siendo una caricatura de la propuesta de la Comisión”.

terça-feira, 25 de junho de 2013

O (Nao) Sistema Financeiro Internacional, Fritz Machlup e o fim de Bretton Woods - book review

 EH.NET BOOK REVIEW ------
Title: Reforming the World Monetary System: Fritz Machlup and the Bellagio Group

Published by EH.Net (June 2013)
Carol M. Connell, Reforming the World Monetary System: Fritz Machlup and the Bellagio Group.  London: Pickering & Chatto, 2013.  xi + 271 pp. $99 (hardcover), ISBN: 978-1-84893-360-6.

Reviewed for EH.Net by Herbert Grubel, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.

Carol Connell is Professor of Finance and Business Management at Brooklyn College.  Her book’s main focus is on the achievements of Fritz Machlup, a legendary personality who was a member of a group of economists who fled Austria during the 1930s and who for many years taught economics at Princeton University.  The material in the book is based on the study of Machlup’s letters and other documents archived at Stanford University.  The author writes with exemplary clarity in a superb analytical framework.
Machlup was keen on research methodology, which is one of Connell’s professional interests as it applies to decision making in business.  As a result she discusses in some detail how Machlup imposed his methodological ideas on the deliberations of groups of academics, officials and business leaders concerning the problems faced by the international monetary system starting in the late 1950s.  He insisted that conference participants present their views on current problems and spell out the assumptions they used reaching them.  He then encouraged participants to discuss and challenge each other’s views and assumptions, expecting the group to arrive at a clear understanding of the problems faced by the international monetary system at the time.  Out of this understanding was expected to emerge a solid set of recommendations for changes in policy and institutions.
These discussions started in 1964 at meetings held in Bellagio, at a Villa owned by the Rockefeller Foundation, overlooking beautiful Lake Como in Italy.  The leading personalities and intellectual driving forces behind the initial Bellagio group meetings besides Machlup were Robert Triffin and William Fellner, who both had great influence on my professional development and interests as my teachers at Yale (1958-62).  Connell meticulously lists all of the participants at the Bellagio group meetings and a number of other groupings of individuals that emerged later.  The list of participants reads like a Who’s Who of the international economics establishment of the period 1950-80.
The problems of the international monetary system in the 1950s had their roots in the decision made at Bretton Woods in 1944 to create a collective institution that centered on fixed exchange rates in an effort to avoid a repeat of the chaos caused by competitive devaluations during the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
In this system, dollars convertible into gold provided the world central banks with liquidity needed to deal with temporary payments imbalances.  Triffin in a 1960 book argued that this system resulted in a dilemma.  The supply of liquidity depended on continuous U.S. deficits, which were unsustainable as they decreased the ratio of the country’s gold holdings over the dollar obligations held by foreigners.  If the U.S. stopped running deficits, the supply of reserves would dry up.  If the price of gold were raised, countries would no longer be willing to hold dollars because of the risk that future price increases would result in financial losses.
The solutions needed to deal with this dilemma in principle were identified by Machlup’s groups as “adjustment, liquidity and confidence.”   The specific recommendations surrounding adjustment involved a wide range of ways in which exchange rates could be made flexible.  Milton Friedman was the dominant proponent of totally freely floating rates.  Adjustable pegs with and without bands, crawling pegs and other variants were advocated by different people. 
The solution to the liquidity problem similarly elicited many different suggestions involving such arrangements as multiple currency reserves, ex ante agreements among central banks to provide liquidity to each other and the expansion of IMF resources in the form of Special Drawing Rights.  No solutions were offered to speculative capital flows in the wake of confidence lost in countries’ ability to maintain an official exchange rate.  After she presents the gist of all of these ideas for reform, Connell concludes “These were exciting days to be an economist.”
The author considers what influence the work Machlup and his committees had on public policy.  She provides quotes from prominent economists and officials suggesting that the influence was substantial.  However, the professional consensus about the need for greater exchange rate flexibility was also driven by a paradigm shift away from reliance on all-knowing policy makers to the increased use of market signals and from Keynesian demand management and the Philips Curve concept to monetarism and its emphasis on price stability.
There is no doubt that the present international monetary system works better than it did in the period when Machlup did his work, not because of the adoption of any one of the grand reform schemes discussed in many of the meetings he had organized.  It works better for the practical reasons that the world has accepted the non-convertibility of dollars into gold and that if a country no longer wishes to accumulate dollar reserves, it can always use national policies to stop running payments surpluses.  The United States in essence is pursuing the policy of “benign neglect” proposed by Gottfried Haberler at the height of the international financial crisis in the late 1960s.  The IMF is a useful forum for discussion and source of intelligence, but the system works acceptably well without its exercise of power over national policies envisaged by utopian planners in the past.
The flexible exchange rate system has allowed countries the freedom to pursue domestic economic policies without external restraints, but it has given rise to the most pressing problems of our era – irresponsible politicians running unsustainable budget deficits. 

Herbert Grubel, Professor of Economics (Emeritus) at Simon Fraser University, is the editor of World Monetary Reform: Plans and Issues, Stanford: Stanford University Press (1963) and of The International Monetary System: Efficiency and Practical Alternatives, Penguin Books (first edition 1969, fourth and final edition 1987).
Copyright (c) 2013 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (June 2013). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://www.eh.net/BookReview

Geographic Location: General, International, or Comparative
Subject: Financial Markets, Financial Institutions, and Monetary History
Time: 20th Century: WWII and post-WWII

segunda-feira, 8 de agosto de 2011

Debate no Senado Federal sobre sistema financeiro internacional - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Um relato muito conciso de um jornalista do Senado a respeito da audiência de que participei, esta noite.
Minha apresentação está neste link:
Sistema financeiro internacional desde Bretton Woods ( pptx Senado)

Permito-me, em primeiro lugar, corrigir meu cargo: não sou professor de Relações Internacionais no Uniceub, e sim professor de Economia Política no programa de mestrado e doutorado em Direito do Uniceub.
Por outro lado, a concisão do relato impediu o jornalista de dizer que eu rebati o discurso do senador Requião em todos os pontos relevantes.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Governo está atento à crise internacional, dizem participantes de audiência sobre sistema financeiro
Marcos Magalhães
Agência Senado, 8/8/2011 19:14

Poucas horas depois do anúncio das maiores quedas de bolsas de valores dos últimos meses – mais de 8% no Brasil e de 5% nos Estados Unidos – dois representantes da equipe econômica do governo procuraram demonstrar, no Senado, que o país está atento aos riscos da crise internacional. Em debate sobre a saúde do sistema financeiro mundial, na Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional (CRE), ambos apontaram o aumento das exportações e a dimensão das reservas internacionais.
- Nosso país está bem preparado para enfrentar a crise mundial. Temos grandes reservas internacionais, capacidade de injetar liquidez na economia, se necessário e câmbio flutuante. Temos acompanhado com atenção redobrada riscos de cenário internacional e estamos buscando as melhores soluções possíveis – disse o diretor de Assuntos Internacionais do Banco Central, Luiz Awazu Pereira da Silva, na audiência pública intitulada “O Sistema Financeiro Internacional: do Pós-Guerra aos dias de hoje”, dentro do ciclo de debates “Os Rumos da Política Externa Brasileira”.
Por sua vez, a secretária de Comércio Exterior do Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior, Tatiana Prazeres, informou que as exportações brasileiras têm crescido mais do que a média do comércio mundial. Ela registrou ainda o “crescimento acelerado” de exportações e importações brasileiras de janeiro a julho deste ano, em relação ao ano passado.
- Em sete meses já exportamos tanto quanto em 2006 – afirmou.
A dimensão da crise atual, porém, foi ressaltada pelo diplomata Paulo Roberto de Almeida, professor de Relações Internacionais do Uniceub. Ele previu que o crescimento econômico dos países avançados continuará lento e levará cerca de quatro a cinco anos para recuperar os padrões de antes de crise.
- A dívida cresceu enormemente, a dos Estados Unidos subiu o Everest e será um problema que chegará a mais duas gerações. Haverá uma lenta diversificação de reservas, mas os Estados Unidos ainda são a economia mais flexível do mundo e vão continuar atraindo capitais pelo futuro previsível. Mas o dólar vai diminuir de valor, no momento em que placas tectônicas estão se movimentando e o Atlântico Norte perde espaço para o Pacífico Norte – comparou.
Esses movimentos, na opinião do diretor para o Brasil do Banco Mundial, Makhtar Diop, estarão também relacionados ao aumento do peso político dos países considerados de renda média. Em sua opinião os próximos anos ainda serão de muitas indefinições.
- Existe hoje uma grande incerteza, e o mundo vai necessitar de um papel maior dos países de renda média – afirmou.
Após ouvir as exposições dos participantes do debate, o senador Roberto Requião (PMDB-PR) disse que a mesa havia falado sobre “outro país”. Ele ressaltou a queda de 40% nas exportações industriais brasileiras nos últimos 30 anos e queixou-se da “primarização de nossa economia”, com ênfase para a exportação de minérios e produtos agrícolas. Ele alertou para o risco de queda das cotações de commodities, no caso de os Estados Unidos entrarem em nova recessão e afetarem em consequência a China, grande compradora de produtos primários brasileiros.
O senador Cristovam Buarque (PDT-DF), que presidiu o debate, também ressaltou a necessidade de maiores investimentos em tecnologia e disse que o Brasil “não tem futuro se continuar apenas exportando ferro”. Por sua vez, o senador Luiz Henrique (PMDB-SC) disse estar preocupado com a adoção de medidas para garantir “consistência atuarial” ao sistema de previdência social, com o aumento da expectativa de vida.

segunda-feira, 4 de julho de 2011

Notas de leitura: A financeirizacao e o retrocesso mental (livro)

Estou lendo este livro:

Luiz Cláudio Marcolino e Ricardo Carneiro (organizadores):
Sistema financeiro e desenvolvimento no Brasil: do Plano Real à crise financeira
(São Paulo: Publisher Brasil e Editora Gráfica Atitude Ltda., 2010, 264 p.; ISBN: 978-85-85938-64-2)

O apresentador, jornalista Luís Nassif, começa seu Prefácio dizendo que “Desde o século 19, trava-se uma luta intestina, dentro do capitalismo, entre o capital financeiro e o industrial” (p. 7).
Apenas esta frase poderia servir para caracterizar um empreendimento que apresenta boas colaborações sobre o sistema financeiro brasileiro, mas que vem eivado desse tipo de contradições que embotam sua validade para uma análise isenta da realidade financeira, e econômica, brasileira.
O apresentador identifica as funções complementares dessas duas vertentes do capitalismo; por exemplo, ele acha que na “economia real vicejam os empreendedores, aqueles que identificam oportunidades de negócio, montam suas empresas e galgam com suas próprias pernas os degraus do crescimento, de forma lenta e sistemática”. Na outra ponta, existiria a economia financeira, ou seja, “os gestores de recursos, trabalhando em geral com capital de terceiros, de capitalistas ou do público, enxergando os negócios exclusivamente pelo prisma do preço. A meta é comprar ativos baratos e vende-los caros”.
Ele acha que em “economias maduras, através do mercado de capitais, convivem de forma harmoniosa as empresas da economia real e o capital financeiro”, mas que os problemas “surgem nos grandes ciclos de financeirização, como ocorreu nas três últimas décadas do século 19 e do século 20”. Ele então considera que “Aí o capital financeiro tomas as rédeas nos dentes [sic] e deixa de ser funcional”.
Incrível divisão artificial a desse apresentador, como se o capitalista empreendedor, o homem da economia real, não tomasse dinheiro dos bancos e como se ele também não especulasse, quando podia, na vertente da economia financeira. Ele também partilha da teoria conspiratória da história, pois acha que o capital financeiro, “Controlando a política monetária, a economia financeira controla todo o preço dos ativos” (p. 8), que para ele é o centro do capitalismo.
Tudo está, segundo ele, na teoria, ou numa certa teoria, a de que “criando condições favoráveis ao capital especulativo, o desenvolvimento se faria por si só, com os capitais arbitrando os preços, transbordando para os emergentes [sic], auxiliando-os a chegar ao patamar dos desenvolvidos”.
Curioso que ao arvorar esse tipo de concepção, típica dos que atualmente determinam a política econômica no Brasil, ele faz um prognóstico sobre o que não seria desejável de acontecer:
“Um deles [dos mitos criados ao longo dos anos de chumbo da ortodoxia econômica no Brasil] – que ainda persiste – está baseado na lógica de que o desenvolvimento se daria permitindo a concentração econômica em grandes grupos nacionais – amparados por benevolência no Direito Econômico e financiamentos do BNDES. Caberia a esses novos grupos aplainar o caminho do desenvolvimento brasileiro”. (p. 8)
“Toda a lógica da financeirização servia a esse propósito”, segundo o autor, mas isso felizmente acabou. “A reconstrução da nova política, a recuperação do papel proativo do Estado e o aproveitamento virtuoso do mercado de capitais exigem uma espécie de exumação do cadáver do neoliberalismo das últimas décadas” (p. 9).
Ele então elogia este livro, que “permitirá uma reflexão cuidadosa sobre as razões que levam tantos, durante tanto tempo, a se iludirem com miragens e a usarem com tanta sem-cerimônia o conceito de interesse nacional para acobertar interesses óbvios do capital financeiro”.
Seria cômico, se não fosse trágico, pois parece que ele está falando do governo Lula e do governo Dilma, quando ele na verdade quer referir-se exclusivamente aos neoliberais da era FHC.

Um dos organizadores, Luiz Cláudio Marcolino, assina, com Juvândia Moreira Leite [na verdade, o primeiro é economista, a segunda bacharel em direito, mas ambos, respectivamente, presidente e secretária geral do Sindicato dos Bancários e Financiários de São Paulo, Osasco e Região], uma introdução, “Perspectivas do sistema financeiro brasileiro” (p. 17-32), na qual confirmam que “a despeito do expressivo crescimento após 2003, o sistema financeiro brasileiro tem se caracterizado por fraco desempenho e por uma contribuição pouco significativa ao desenvolvimento econômico do país” (p. 17).
Eles dizem então que “Ao longo dos últimos anos, esse desempenho só não foi mais negativo por conta da presença de um sistema público de financiamento, do qual fazem parte instituições de peso como o BNDES, o Banco do Brasil e a Caixa Econômica Federal; fundos públicos com origem parafiscal, como o FGTS e o FAT, e as exibilidades sobre o passivo bancário. Foi esse sistema de direcionamento do crédito que permitiu financiar o investimento, bem como algumas atividades específicas de maior risco ou prazo de maturação como agricultura, habitação, exportações e microcrédito.
Parece incrível que os autores, como vários outros no livro, não percebam as óbvias conexões entre o excesso de dominação estatal sobre o sistema de crédito, como de resto sobre todo o sistema de poupança compulsória no Brasil – acima descritas, justamente –, e as disfunções do mercado de capitais no Brasil, gerando a tal de “desarmonia” entre os capitalismos financeiro e “real”, seja lá como caracterizar essa divisão artificial na economia.

Essa mesma visão acadêmica sobre uma tal de “financeirização” do sistema econômico brasileiro, e sua dominação sobre o resto da pobre economia brasileira, sujeita à perversidade da especulação, externa e interna, domina quase todo o livro, com poucas exceções.
O capítulo 1, por exemplo, “Dinâmica e crise do capitalismo com dominância financeira” (p. 33-54), do outro organizador, Ricardo Carneiro [professor da Unicamp e cotado para ser o principal assessor econômico do PT, caso a coordenação econômica da campanha de Lula, em 2002, tivesse continuado sob as mãos de Celso Daniel, depois assassinado misteriosamente], afirma a mesma deformação que se instalou após a crise do regime de Bretton Woods, ou seja, a dominância financeira nas economias capitalistas, restaurando as características de um capitalismo desregulado. O ideal, para os anti-financeiros, seria que o capitalismo fosse inteiramente regulado, obviamente, para que os financistas não predominassem sobre os capitalistas “reais”. A solução, também obviamente, seria uma nova forma de regulação, capaz de reduzir a instabilidade e a propensão a crises, típicas do capitalismo. Para que isso seja feito, é óbvio, também, que se deve limitar a mobilidade de capitais no plano internacional e a “lógica do investimento de portfólio que a sustenta”. Em seu lugar entraria o DES, como unidade de conta e meio de troca, facilitando o comércio e o investimento produtivo. Os gênios da nova finança só não dizem quem vai emitir, e quanto será emitido da nova “moeda”, uma reedição do velho Bancor proposto por Keynes em Bretton Woods, ou seja, um sistema de compensações automáticas pelo qual os superavitários financiariam, sob certas condições, os deficitários, permitindo ajustes mais adequados aos desequilíbrios entre as economias nacionais. Se tudo fosse assim tão fácil, bastaria que as economias nacionais se juntassem à mesa para discutir esse padrão, e que os empresários privados consentissem em ficar dependentes de governos nem sempre realistas ou sensatos.
O capítulo 2, “A abertura financeira no Brasil: um balanço crítico”, de André Martins Biancarelli, também professor da Unicamp, partilha da mesma visão que a supremacia financeira resulta num balanço negativo, fase iniciada na gestão anterior a FHC e continuada sob o governo Lula, já que a inserção econômica brasileira teria sido muito mais baseada nas finanças do que no comércio, não sendo portanto capaz de diminuir nossa fragilidade financeira externa. Inevitavelmente, a demanda é por controle e restrições, para alcançar maior liberdade econômica e de autonomia nas políticas macroeconômicas. Ele pretende que “a literatura mostra que países de menor grau de abertura ou que de alguma forma instituíram controles temporários possuem não só um histórico de maior estabilidade monetária como também de melhor desempenho econômico”: a solução, portanto, são controles na entrada e quarentena para os capitais puramente especulativos, bem como a regulação no mercado de derivativos.

Todo o livro possui essas características de demonização do capital financeiro, típicas da academia, e essencialmente desse suprassumo da metafísica econômica que é a UniCamp. Não surpreende que não se tenha, propriamente, uma visão equilibrada do sistema financeiro no Brasil e do mercado de créditos. Quanto tudo é culpa da tal de financeirização, e quando o Estado sempre age racionalmente, sabiamente, em favor da economia real, sendo que a presença do Estado não é só necessária como urgente para restabelecer a sanidade do sistema financeiro, não se pode mesmo pretender uma análise equilibrada da economia brasileira, que forma um todo, financeira ou real.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 4 de julho de 2011.

quarta-feira, 7 de julho de 2010

Reforma do Sistema Monetario Internacional - Relatorio da Chattam House

Divulgando uma recomendação, mas confesso que ainda não li, por falta de tempo. Registro, justamente, para ler depois...

Reform of the International Monetary System
Press Releases, Chatham House, 18 March 2010

Reform of the international monetary system has never been more urgent, says this new report.

Beyond the Dollar: Rethinking the International Monetary System maps out proposals for a new international monetary order and look at ways in which monetary authorities and political leaders can help prepare the ground for a new system and facilitate the transition.

The report features contributions by prominent experts and practitioners, including Dr DeAnne Julius, former member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, and Jim O' Neill, Head of Global Economics, Goldman Sachs and creator of the acronym BRICs.

In his chapter, 'A Twenty-First Century International Monetary System', Jim O' Neill says:

'Within 20 years, the combined size of the so-called BRIC economies will possibly equal those of the United States and European Union together. What kind of international monetary system will be necessary for such a world, and can we start to devise one today for such an eventuality?'

While the theme of reform may not be new, the authors conclude that the need has never been more urgent.

Key recommendations include:

* A multicurrency reserve system for a multipolar world economy
* Develop a multicurrency reserve system that is appropriate for a world of regional trading blocs - Europe, Asia, the Americas - alongside a still pre-eminent dollar.
* Encourage a more extensive use of Special Drawing Rights as a supranational currency alongside international reserve currencies that are issued by sovereign states.
* Promote dialogue and policy coordination to provide stability, confidence and balanced adjustment
* Encourage international dialogue between countries issuing a reference currency and individual or groups of countries using the reference currency.
* Strengthen the role and legitimacy of international institutions
* The surveillance role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can be reinforced to address more effectively the problem of exchange rates and payments disequilibrium.
* Steps must be taken to safeguard the system against over-reliance on a weakened dollar, including expansion of the Special Drawing Rights.
* The shape of the international monetary system for the 21st century will be significantly influenced by the interests and the requirements of the emerging powers
* The dollar-based monetary system is no longer adequate for a larger and more integrated world economy. Prominent developing economies are increasingly demanding to be included in any multilateral dialogue that aims to shape the new economic order.

Notes to Editors

Read Beyond the Dollar: Rethinking the International Monetary System - Executive Summary

The report is edited by Dr Paola Subacchi and John Driffill, with contributions from Paul Collier, Dr DeAnne Julius, Jim O'Neill and others.

Press Office:
Nicola Norton: +44 (0)20 7957 5739; +44 (0)7917 757 528
Sara Karnas: +44 (0)20 7314 2787; +44 (0)7958 669 785
pressoffice@chathamhouse.org.uk