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Mostrando postagens com marcador economic reform. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador economic reform. Mostrar todas as postagens

domingo, 22 de março de 2015

Reformando o sistema financeiro internacional - book review (Carol M. Connell) - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O mais recente artigo publicado em Mundorama:


1164. “Reforming the World Monetary System: book review”, 
[Book Review of Carol M. Connell: Reforming the World Monetary System: Fritz Machlup and the Bellagio Group (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2013. xii + 272 pp.; ISBN 978-1-84893-360-6; Financial History series n. 21, $99.00; hardcover)], em  
Mundorama (n. 91, 22/03/2015; ISSN: 2175-2052
Relação de Originais n. 2705.


Review of “Reforming the World Monetary System” of Carol M. Connell, by Paulo Roberto de Almeida


global-economies

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This book appears in a Financial History series of the Pickering & Chatto, which has already published as diverse studies in this area as one on Argentina’s parallel currency, another on the federal banking in Brazil, with most of titles being about banking and finance in the North Atlantic world, from the colonial times to the 20th century. Carol Connell is Professor of Finance and Business Management at the School of Business, Brooklyn College, City University of New York, where she is very well rated by her students; and she is now directing a new monograph series on Modern Heterodox Economics, also being published by Pickering & Chatto. Connell prepared this very well researched work benefitting from a fellowship research grant from the Earhart Foundation, a private charitable institution that funds scholarly research; one of its early beneficiaries was Friedrich von Hayek, who wrote The Road to Serfdom (1944).
Some scenarios and arguments presented in this book were first made public in academic publications, such as the Journal of Management History and the Journal of the History of Economic Thought, and Connell’s interest in Fritz Machlup career and work arose when she was researching about one of his students, the growth theorist Edith Penrose. Besides the preeminent presence of Machlup, the book also deals with the contributions for the discussion and reform of the international financial and monetary system by luminaries such as Robert Triffin, William Fellner, and Milton Friedman.
In the introduction the author states very clearly that her objective was the study of the complex reform process that, from the Sixties up to the Seventies, led to the adoption of a flexible exchange rate – instead of the fixed parity established at the Bretton Woods conference (1944) – and the introduction of the special drawing rights as the main “currency” of the International Monetary Fund (p. 1). Based on archival and published sources, the book follows, in thirteen extensively annotated chapters, the itinerary of the Bellagio Group, established under the leadership of Fritz Machlup, and integrated by 32 non-government academic economists, working in intimate contact with policy makers and IMF officials, between 1963 and 1977. Bellagio Group’s primary documents are everywhere referenced, but there are also 299 secondary sources in the bibliography, among them (besides the four big economists), Charles Kindleberger, Edith Penrose, Fred Bergsten, and John Williamson.
Trying perhaps to emphasize the current appeal of her study to contemporary policymakers and researchers, Connell states in her Introduction that there could be in Machlup’s approach something similar to the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G20), which is clearly a non performing analogy, essentially because of the independence of views of the former vis-à-vis the narrow interests of today’s governments. Notwithstanding, Bellagio Group worked in close contact and cooperation with the Group of Ten, launched simultaneously within the IMF. The intention of the Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon was to devise a monetary reform in an already stressed arrangement, in a context when the ten most important countries tried to control and minimize the imbalances of the world economy, the growing liquidity crises, and the volatility in the price of gold (partially circumvented by the introduction of swap facilities and the creation of the General Arrangements to Borrow).
After explaining her research questions and original hypothesis, and informing where Machlup’s and Triffin’s papers are located (Hoover and Yale), Connell opens Chapter 1 by describing the crisis of confidence that arouse in early Sixties, leading to the various exercises of academic debates and institutional brain-storming that mobilized the most important economist of that decade. Late in the Fifties, Robert Triffin was already predicting a forthcoming crisis, and calling for a radical reform of the monetary system in his Gold and the Dollar Crisis (1960). Feeling challenged by the convening by Dillon of an IMF Studies Group, within the Group of Ten, and excluding academic economists, Machlup, Triffin and Fellner decided to “embark on their own study, involving economists of widely divergent views and with no problem or proposal considered ‘out of bounds’. Hence the idea for a series of alternative conference was born” (p. 18), and that was the Bellagio Group, which first met at this Italian resort of the Lake of Como. A brief chronology of the monetary system events from 1944 and 1977 and a synthetic table on the various exchange rate policies and regimes (from gold standard to flexible) close this chapter.
Chapter 2 introduces the life and thought of Fritz Machlup, who had been working and publishing in the area of monetary reform for many years before the convening of his “child”, the Bellagio Group. Born (1902) in a pre-1914 Europe (Austria) with “ten currencies, all with fixed gold parities and fixed exchange rates”, Machlup soon afterwards (1920) was presented to a continent with “twenty-seven paper currencies, none with a gold parity, none with fixed exchange rates and several of them in various stages of inflation or hyperinflation” (p. 23). From 1923 to 1962 Machlup studied and published extensively on monetary problems, particularly the gold standard, but also dealt with patents, industrial organization, production of knowledge and theory of the firm. His 1923 dissertation on the gold-exchange standard at the University of Vienna was supervised by Ludwig von Mises; a decade later he was already residing in the U.S. and teaching at the University of Buffalo; at that time, “he was already the first economist to frame the discussion of balance of payments problems in terms of payments adjustment, liquidity and confidence” (p. 27). John Williamson, a former student, “attributed Machlup’s belief in the importance of the confidence to the role it had played in the collapse of the gold-exchange standard during the Great Depression” (p. 29). The same would occur thirty years later, with the U.S. involvement with and expenditures for the Vietnam’s War, and European countries distrust of America’s capacity to honor its commitments under Bretton Woods. Machlup anticipated the scenario with his lengthy essay “Plans for Reform of International Monetary System”, first published in 1962 and reissued in 1964, significantly updated (p. 32).
Chapter 3 is dedicated to Robert Triffin – a Belgian who worked for the Federal Reserve and the IMF, and professor at Yale from 1951 to 1977 – and to the 1959 Triffin Plan, proposing the replacement of gold and foreign-exchange reserves by gold-guaranteed deposit accounts at the IMF, within a more flexible system. But, at that time, as argued by Charles Kindleberger, even if many economists proposed the idea, “few central bankers recommended flexible exchange rates as a means of eliminating … all the problems of adjustment, liquidity and confidence” (p. 42). Even if Triffin’s solution could be first-best economically, it was politically out of question. The head of the Group of Ten at IMF, Otmar Emminger, “found the Triffin Plan unacceptable because nations were not prepared to hand over so much responsibility and financial power to an international body” (p. 42). At that juncture, confidence, not liquidity, was the problem that made Triffin and Machlup to come together intellectually (p. 47).
Chapter 4 deals with Budapest born (1905) William Fellner, a fugitive from the Nazis, like the two others; professor at Berkeley in 1939, he worked mainly at the intersection of macro and microeconomics, researching and writing about inflation, regulation, growth and balance of payments problems, including in cooperation with the other two in monetary and exchange questions, both in theory and policy. In 1963, he was dealing with budgetary deficits and their consequences, which led to adjustments efforts, and also to the confidence question. Differently from the planned equilibrium advocated by Triffin, Fellner “recommended instead letting free-market processes perform more of the equilibrating function”(p. 57). In many papers, he proposed a limited exchange-rate flexibility system. In fact, both Machlup and Fellner were committed to freely floating exchange-rates, but were aware of the responsibility of national governments, which led them to explore a myriad of possible solutions.
The title of Chapter 5, Why Economists Disagree, takes its name from Machlup’s speech before the American Philosophical Society, in November 1964, five months after the fourth Bellagio Group conference. He explained then his decision to invite 32 economists from eleven countries, most of them from divergent schools of thought, to explore solutions for the problems of the international monetary system of the 1960s. They had to consider hybrid or compromise solutions for the identified problems. This chapter presents each one of the participants, their background and works. The sources of disagreement are very well abridged in a table dealing with the four major policy proposals for reform: semi-automatic gold standard, centralized international reserves, multiple currencies and/or flexible exchange rates (p. 76-78). All proposals were carefully examined at a series of scenario-planning exercises through various Bellagio conferences, allowing the economists to evaluate the “relative impact on payments, liquidity and confidence of the four basic exchange regimes, given any one or combination of them might have been adopted” (p. 80).
Chapters 6 and 7 deal, respectively, with the hypothesis of multiple reserve currencies and Milton Friedman’s arguments for fixed versus flexible exchange rates, in a paper he presented in 1953, making the case for a floating regime. This regime, for him, “has the advantage of monetary independence, insulation from real shocks, and a less disruptive adjustment mechanism in the face of nominal rigidities than it is the case with pegged exchange rates” (p. 99). These two chapter are of a more theoretical and historical nature, despite the fact that all questions discussed in them had a very practical impact on each devised solution for the problems plaguing the international monetary system.
Chapter 8, Collaboration With the Group of Ten, makes the bridge between the two groups, the IMF technocrats and government officials, for one side, the independent academic economists, for the other. Machlup pressed hard on his team, achieving a detailed report, International Monetary Arrangements: The Problem of Choice, two months before (in June 1964) the Group of Ten and the IMF staff could prepare theirs. He also frankly explained, at the first joint meeting, later that year, the differences between the two approaches. This led to the assignment of Group of Ten chairman, Otmar Emminger, to the Bellagio Group, inaugurating a thirteen-year collaboration. The tasks for the groups were the same, but working methods, and freedom of opinion, made them very different, as well as purposes: Bellagio emphasized disagreements among the proposals, and the nature of their differing impact on the problems dealt with. Friedman, in 1965, criticized the report for not offering one unified  solution for the crisis, but Machlup pointed out that a consensus was achieved on the consequences of each solution proposed by his group: governments and the IMF had food for thought.
Chapter 9, Adjustment Policies and Special Drawing Rights: Joint Meetings of Officials and Academics, is a continuation of this kind of collaboration, now assuming other forms of joint exercises, as the deputies of the Group of Ten start to met regularly with the Bellagio Group, and did so from 1964 to 1977, resulting in the creation of special reserve assets, later called the Special Drawings Rights (due to the French Finance minister, Valery Giscard D’Estaing, insistence on considering them a credit, not an owned reserve). The three Bellagio main economists were the organizers of those meetings, which assumed a kind of a NGO feature. “From 1970 to 1977, discussions would focus on the increasing liberalization of the international capital market and the wisdom of special drawing rights for developing countries” (p. 128). This period also corresponds to the U.S. going off the gold and to the floating of the Deutsche mark: main questions became managed floating and international liquidity. A Basle meeting in 1977 was the last meeting of a Joint Academic and Officials meeting, and the first allocation of SDRs was held in 1970. A new time, no less challenging, had arrived for and within the international monetary system.
Chapter 10, From the Bellagio Group to the Bürgenstock Conferences, explores the continuation of the semi-academic discussions under a new format, this time dealing with floating exchange regimes in various guises, but always under the influence, and the intellectual guidance, of Fritz Machlup, who intended to prepare a well conceived book out of the exercise: this came at light in 1970, as a Princeton University Press publication, Approaches to Greater Exchange Rate Flexibility: The Bürgenstock papers. The analysis takes ground on the Austrian background of Machlup’s thought, which also gave light to planning methods based on Delphi scenarios. A first meeting, with a large number of officials, academic people but also representatives from banks and corporations, was held in Long Island, in January 1969, followed by a second meeting in June, in Bürgenstock, Switzerland, where five more meetings were organized.
Chapter 11, follows the lead, dealing with de facto successor of the Joint Meeting of Officials and Academics, which was an extended Bellagio Group, the Group of Thirty, which included members from all the current G20 financial group. The Group of Thirty meet twice a year at the beginning of the 1980s, and was broader than the Bellagio Group, including industrialists and private bankers, and preferred not to commission papers from academics, establishing instead an agenda for discussion comprising issues of capital movements and less developing countries assets, international banking supervision, and energy (the issue of the moment). But Fritz Machlup was still on the party, with a minor group of academics. A so-called Bellagio Group met again in 1996, under the leadership of the general manager of the Bank for International Settlements, and has been meeting once a year at the Italian resort, under the intellectual guidance of professor Barry Eichengreen, from Berkeley, and always financed by the BIS.
Chapter 12 is dedicated to Reassessing the Bellagio Group’s Impact on International Monetary Reform; Carol Connell affirms that there are “significant parallels between the calls for monetary system reform in the 1960s and those for reform following the financial crisis of 2008-9” (p. 185). This comparison seems off the mark, as the current financial G20 has achieved nothing comparable, besides pressures for the negotiation and implementation of a more stringent set of Basel prudential rules for the banking sector. The outcry about the dollar crisis has been responded by nothing else than the confirmation of its centrality for the current financial and monetary “non-system”. Initial rumors – at its monnaie unique début – about the strength of the euro were replaced by recent fears of its demise.
Notwithstanding this, Connell presents a clear historical synthesis about the importance of the Bellagio Group for the understanding of the most crucial problems of the international monetary system as devised at Bretton Woods: all of the group members came from G-10 countries, the same as the suppliers of the General Arrangements to Borrow (now expanded, and with the New GAB). At least, the academics convinced the central bankers that floating exchange regimes could work, and that flexible currencies could cushion external shocks; that is not a minor intellectual achievement. And, the same problems they tackled, adjustment, liquidity, and confidence, continue to be at the center of the nightmares of the central bankers and finance officials alike (together with new preoccupations, on the fiscal side, as demography imposes its burdens over all). It seems that liquidity is no more an issue today, as governments create real tsunamis of new financial assets, pushing national debts to new higher peaks.
In the bright side, this Chapter 12 finishes with an impressive list of publications of the Princeton Finance Section under Fritz Machlup’s leadership, from 1960 up to 1971, no less than 98 titles authored by many of the most well-known names of the economics trade, and certainly some of Nobel-worth distinction in this profession.
Chapter 13, finally, is a beautiful piece of scholarly work: The Impact of the Bellagio Group on International Trade and Finance Scholarship from the 1960s to the Present, which could also be called something like “the sons and daughters of Machlup, Triffin and Fellner” (and now their grandsons and grand-daughters, like Connell herself). She lists some disciples of the mentors: Edith Penrose, Stephen Hymer, Charles Kindleberger, James Tobin, Andrew Crockett, Edwin Truman, and many others.
Conclusions, at last, summarizes the lessons drawn from each chapter, before returning to the initial hypothesis. Great Depression and World War II influenced how economists thought about policy, inflation, interest rates, deficits and government intervention. Machlup, Triffin and Fellner were the intellectual masters behind much of the conceptual thinking about the great challenges emerging from a world order devised with some improvisation, and no practical guidance, at the end of the II World War. With some Austrian ingenuity and innovative and creative thinking of their own, they are at the core of the adjustments and arrangements that were made, in the Sixties and the Seventies, for the current, certainly limited and incomplete, international monetary system (or non-system, at discretion). One of her hypothesis, that of the centrality of the Bellagio Group for the reform of the international monetary system, is largely confirmed and deserves proper acknowledgment: they have had a real impact on practical policies, and in the reconfiguration of the multilateral financial organizations. And their influence on scholarship and empirical research over a so large community of academic and applied economists is beyond recognition of traditional prizes and honors.

Book review:

  • Carol M. Connell: Reforming the World Monetary System: Fritz Machlup and the Bellagio Group (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2013. xii + 272 pp.; ISBN 978-1-84893-360-6; Financial History series n. 21, $99.00; hardcover)
Paulo R. de Almeida, University Center of Brasilia-Uniceub, and Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (pralmeida@me.com)


sábado, 24 de maio de 2014

India: an economic regime change? Unlikely - Deepak Lal

Deepak Lal: A change in economic regime?

At a panel discussion on "The economic agenda of the next government: is an economic regime change necessary and possible?" at the Indian School of Business in Mohali, I answered that such a change was necessary but not likely. This column elaborates on these answers.

The 1991 reforms ended the Nehruvian licence permit raj, removing major policy-induced distortions in the commodity markets, but failed to do so in the markets for labour and land. Most of these distortions go back to Indira Gandhi's leftward turn after she won her "Garibi Hatao" election in 1971, with the nationalisation of banks and coal, the attempt to nationalise the wholesale grain trade, and the tightening of the  for establishments employing more than 100 workers. These and other dirigiste measures still cripple the Indian economy. , her son, loosened the licence permit raj, but , his widow - by promoting various "rights-based" subsidies in her decade-long reign - has saddled India with a premature European-style welfare state. My suggestion at the panel, that it would be best for India's future economic performance if the incoming government rescinded all the economic Acts passed during the Indira and Sonia reigns, got loud cheers from the assembled students. My answer to the second question was that such a change was unlikely, since the intellectual hegemony of Nehruvian  was still in place, though the coming crisis of the demographic dividend turning into a demographic bomb might at last induce a change.

A little personal history might be in order to explain these answers. In 1972-73, I was working as an advisor in 's Planning Commission when Indira Gandhi's left turn was evident. Like my peers, I was still largely a Nehruvian social democrat. The commission was torn between ' voice of economic rationality and  's Marxist voice. Witnessing their heated debates and the absurdity that was Indian planning led to my Damascene conversion to.

After I returned to London, at events at the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), I got to know Friedrich A Hayek and other leading classical liberals such as Milton Friedman, Peter Bauer and Alan Walters. This was also the period when  was converted to classical liberalism by her mentor, Keith Joseph. Many years later, when we became friends, Joseph told me that he had been shocked in the late 1960s when he met Walters, an old friend, on the street outside Parliament, who refused to shake hands, and instead wagged a finger exclaiming, "you are an inflationist". This shook Joseph, then part of the statist intellectual social democratic political consensus known as Butskellism. He got a reading list of classical liberal writings from Ralph Harris at the IEA. This was his Damascene conversion. He set up a think tank with Thatcher: the Centre for Policy Studies developed the classical liberal programme, which Thatcher implemented when she came to power in 1978. She would fling a copy of Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty at her colleagues, telling them they needed to read it to restore Britain's economic fortunes.

Her success in restoring Britian's economy and standing in the world led to a shift in the climate of opinion; the Labour Party under Tony Blair came to embrace Thatcherism. When his successor, Gordon Brown (much like the second term of the United Progressive Alliance, or UPA), tried to use the burgeoning tax proceeds of the ensuing economic prosperity to expand entitlements, he suffered a crushing defeat.

I wrote a book for the IEA, The Poverty of Development Economics (1983), in which I applied classical liberal ideas to the economics of developing countries. This was revised and updated, rebutting many of the fashionable arguments against classical liberalism, in my Reviving the Invisible Hand (2006). On my frequent visits to India, I found that these ideas had fallen on stony ground. Even after the 1991 economic liberalisation, after growth accelerated with the easy economic pickings from ending the licence raj, the same old social democratic mindset - reminiscent of Butskellism - prevailed. There were no think tanks in India - like the IEA, or the American Enterprise Institute, Cato Institute or the Heritage Foundation in the United States - to propagate the case for classical liberalism. With the demise of the Swatantra Party in the 1971 Indira wave, no leading politician supporting classical liberalism was left in politics. When the unreconstructed Left denounced even the limited 1991 reforms as hurting the interests of the poor, the stage was set for Sonia Gandhi to use the rising tax proceeds from growth to expand the entitlement economy.

What of the opposition by the Bharatiya Janata Party, which has just won a stunning and well-deserved election victory? Do its election slogans - "development, not doles", "maximum governance, minimum government", constantly reiterated by its incoming prime minister - mean that he and his party are shorn of the Nehruvian social democratic mindset? Note that during its reign, the UPA did not vote against various "rights-based" entitlements enacted at the behest of Sonia Gandhi's jholawalas in the . Moreover, in the 1980s, the BJP was burning effigies of Arthur Dunkel, former head of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (). Though its tune changed in the 1990s, the continuing hold of "Gandhian socialism", as Atal Bihari Vajpayee called it, is still evident in the party's support for "swadeshi", its backsliding on foreign direct investment in retail, and its purported support for public sector enterprises, instead of their privatisation, as in Thatcher's flagship programme. Maybe this will change with a Thatcherite Damascene conversion of Mr Modi and his party.

For me, this would be signalled if Mr Modi does battle with the "insiders" of the industrial labour aristocracy, who have kept the massive number of semi-skilled workers willing to work for much lower wages, as "outsiders" in the manufacturing sector. There seems to be widespread acceptance of the industrial caste system India has created, with its segmentation through distortions of the industrial labour market. As the experience of China and of the other Asian Tigers has shown, it is impossible to jump the labour-intensive industrialisation phase and move into a post- industrial service economy. It is not top-down skill development that India needs, but removing all the colonial labour market restrictions that prevent freedom to hire and fire labour, as China - an ostensibly socialist economy - has done. This requires rescinding the colonial-era labour laws (see my The Hindu Equilibrium, 2005) and the 1947 Industrial Disputes Act. Without this, India's demographic dividend will turn into a demographic nightmare, even as the millions of unemployed, semi-skilled and sex-starved youth increasingly disturb social order. Perhaps only then will India's continuing dirigiste intellectual mindset change.

quinta-feira, 9 de setembro de 2010

Obama tenta estimular a economia, a maneira antiga...

True keynesians, como os que trabalham para os governos um pouco em todas as partes, acreditam nas virtudes regeneradoras do dinheiro público. Eles se esquecem de perguntar de onde vem esse dinheiro.
Como o governo não produz dinheiro -- a não ser pela via inflacionária -- mas tem de recolher os recursos para os seus gastos da sociedade, resulta que seria bem mais recomendável que ele deixasse o dinheiro com quem sabe gastar, ou investir, ou seja, os consumidores e os empresários.
A economia estaria melhor se o governo deixasse o mercado corrigir os desequilíbrios que os burocratas do governo acusam o mercado de provocar, o que aliás já é uma inverdade. Desequilíbrios de mercado quem provoca, de fato, é o governo, com suas regras muito rígidas. O mercado, com sua dinâmica contínua, com seus altos e baixos, corrige naturalmente os supostos desequilíbrios, já que obriga os agentes a se adaptarem rapidamente aos novos sinais do próprio mercado.
São os governos que, ao pretenderem corrigir "desvios" do mercado, alimentam bolhas e criam as condições para as crises.
Creio que o artigo abaixo discute bem essas ideias, bem melhor do que eu o faria.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Stimulus? Yet Again?
by Robert P. Murphy
Mises Dailies, September 9, 2010

This week the Obama administration lays out its plans to further "stimulate" the economy. In particular, the president unveiled his proposals for $50 billion more in infrastructure spending, and a $100 billion extension to a tax credit on research and development.

Unfortunately these ideas range from misguided to downright harmful. If the federal government really wants to promote economic recovery, it should cut spending and taxes in general, and basically get out of the way.

Government Spending and Job Creation
As explained in this CNN story, in his Labor Day speech in Milwaukee, "Obama unveiled a $50 billion infrastructure plan to try and create jobs over the long-term by rebuilding 150,000 miles of roads, 4,000 miles of rail, and 150 miles of airport runways." The rationale behind the plan is the simple Keynesian notion that government spending can "fill the gap" in aggregate demand when private businesses and individuals are unwilling to spend enough to keep everyone employed.

There are several problems with this common approach. In the first place, it confuses a low unemployment rate with "a healthy economy." Now, it's true that a high unemployment rate goes hand in hand with a sick economy. But the unemployment rate is a symptom of the underlying structural problem. Government efforts to "reduce unemployment" are, at best, like putting ice cubes on a thermometer to treat a fever.

For example, most pundits accept the claim that "World War II got us out of the Depression." And it's true that the official unemployment rate dropped like a stone with US entry into the war. But as economic historian Bob Higgs points out, FDR had hardly "fixed" the economy: all he did was force millions of American men to leave the conventional workforce and jump into a slaughterhouse. By the same token, if President Obama made it mandatory for five million Americans to cross the ocean and paint the Great Wall of China, it's possible that the official unemployment rate would drop.

Beyond this fundamental confusion, there is another problem with government "stimulus" spending. Simply put, the money has to come from somewhere, and it's not at all obvious that the net result leads to job creation, even if we accept jobs as indicators of a healthy economy.

I have written from an Austrian perspective on the problems with government efforts to "create jobs." But even mainstream economists have challenged the Keynesians on their own turf. Using standard econometric techniques, many prominent economists have found little evidence that government spending boosts economic output, even if we accept the standard government figures at face value.

Some readers may be surprised to see this, because self-described progressive pundits often claim that only a Neanderthal could possibly doubt the scientific case for government stimulus spending. Yet, as Jim Manzi explained when The New Republic's Jonathan Chait made such a claim,

Robert Barro, Professor of Economics at Harvard, John Cochrane, Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago, and Casey Mulligan, Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, have each separately argued that it is somewhere between plausible and likely that the multiplier for stimulus spending under relevant conditions is indistinguishable from zero (i.e., that stimulative spending will not materially increase economic output). According to surveys of professional economists reported by Greg Mankiw, about 10 percent of economists do not agree with the statement that "Fiscal policy (e.g., tax cut and/or government expenditure increase) has a significant stimulative impact on a less than fully employed economy." Both the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times have run opinion columns expressing the view that a multiplier of zero is a plausible to likely theory.

I have not been afraid to call out influential conservative activists when I believe they are engaging in crank refusal to accept a scientific finding. But in a genuinely scientific field which has accepted a predictive rule as valid to the point that there is a true consensus — such that the only reason for refusal to accept it is crankery or, in Chait's terms, "politics" — you don't usually see: several full professors at the top two departments in the subject, when speaking directly in their area of research expertise, challenge it; 10 percent of all practitioners in the field refuse to accept it; and the two leading global general circulation publications in field running op-eds questioning it.

The context for Manzi's argument with Chait was the embarrassing predicament that Keynesians had gotten themselves into after the first Obama stimulus package. The Obama team had famously predicted that, with the package, unemployment would not break 8 percent — a projection that of course turned out to be rather optimistic.

The Keynesian response, of course, has been that the economy was worse than people realized at the start of the Obama presidency. And it's true that we can't prove that the original $800 billion stimulus package made things worse. But my point is, there are plenty of theoretical arguments — both Austrian and mainstream — questioning the Keynesian claims, and recent history suggests a prima facie confirmation of these doubts.

To sum up, if the $800 billion stimulus didn't work out as planned, why should we raise the stakes by putting up another $50 billion?

Tax-Credit Plan Still a Form of Government Control
Even Obama's call for the tax-credit extension leaves much to be desired. I am always for a tax cut, period. It returns resources to the private sector, which I favor for reasons of both ethics and efficiency.

However, not all tax cuts are created equal. By giving a tax credit for "research and development" — as opposed to an across-the-board reduction in tax rates — the government is still dictating how businesses use the money that the government refrains from explicitly taking. The difference is analogous to getting $100 in cash versus a nontransferable $100 gift certificate to the Broccoli Warehouse. Most teenagers would opt for the former as a birthday present.

Conclusion
The Obama administration's newly unveiled plans for "helping" the economy merely attack the symptoms rather than the cause. Yet even on their own terms, the plans are ill-designed to reduce the unemployment rate. The best remedy would be for the government to stop interfering and let the market process work.

Robert Murphy is an adjunct scholar of the Mises Institute, where he will be teaching "Principles of Economics" at the Mises Academy this fall. He runs the blog Free Advice and is the author of The Politically Incorrect Guide to Capitalism, the Study Guide to Man, Economy, and State with Power and Market, the Human Action Study Guide, and The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Great Depression and the New Deal. Send him mail. See Robert P. Murphy's article archives.

Addendum:
Comentário efetuado pelo economista Alfredo Marcolin Peringer:

Discordo, apenas, que o multiplicador keynesiano, citado pela mainstream, seja "0". Ele é negativo...e é fácil esse reconhecimento. Quando o governo tira 100 unidades monetárias da economia, há dois efeitos: a) a do dinheiro que a iniciativa privada deixa de investir e; b) a do custo da intervenção causado no mercado... e esse custo é bastante alto...