O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

sexta-feira, 12 de fevereiro de 2021

A próxima revolução tecnológica - David Brooks (NYT)

 David Brooks traz notícias prometedoras na frente da inovação tecnológica e de ganhos de produtividade. Se tudo o que ele informa se materializar, será um desmentido formal às teses de Robert Gordon — em The Rise and Fall of American Growth, 1870-2014–, para quem, tudo o que merecia ser inventado já foi inventado De fato, para alguém que nasceu em 1900 e morreu em 1970, os progressos foram fantásticos; mas para quem nasceu em 1960, o mundo atual não mudou muito: a Coca-Cola e o chiclete continuam aí, embora tenha aparecido o iPhone. 

Mas parece que uma nova onda de inovações promete trazer progressos fantásticos num futuro breve: para os incluídos, a vida será muito melhor.

O problema, como sempre, é o que fazer com os órfãos da tecnologia, isso nos países avançados. Nos países pobres, o mundo vai continuar mudando de uma maneira exasperantemente lenta...

O Brasil vai estar em qual grupo?

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

The Coming Technology Boom

Politics is grim but science is working.

David Brooks

The New York Times, Feb 12, 2021


A few months ago, the economic analyst Noah Smith observed that scientific advance is like mining ore. You find a vein you think is promising. You take a risk and invest heavily. You explore it until it taps out.

The problem has been that over the last few decades only a few veins have really been paying off and changing lives. Discoveries in information technology have obviously been massive — the internet and the smartphone. Thanks in part to public investment, clean energy innovation has been fast and plentiful. The price of solar modules has declined by 99.6 percent since 1976.

But life-altering breakthroughs, while still significant, are fewer than they once were. If you were born in 1900 and died in 1970, you lived from the age of the horse-drawn carriage to the era of a man on the moon. You saw the widespread use of electricity, air-conditioning, aviation, the automobile, penicillin, and so much else. But if you were born in 1960 and lived until today, the driving and flying experience would be safer, but otherwise the same, and your kitchen, aside from the microwave, is basically unchanged.

In 2011, the economist Tyler Cowen published a prescient book, “The Great Stagnation,” exploring why scientific advance was slowing down. Peter Thiel complained that we wanted flying cars, but we got Twitter.


But this technological lull may be ending. Suddenly a lot of smart people are writing about many veins that look promising. The first and most obvious is vaccines. The amazing fact about Covid-19 vaccines is that Moderna scientists had designed the first one by Jan. 13, 2020. They had the vaccine before many people even thought the disease was a threat.


It’s not only a new vaccine but also a new kind of vaccine. The mRNA vaccines will help us teach our bodies to fight pathogens more effectively and could lead to breakthroughs in combating all sorts of diseases. For example, researchers have hope for mRNA cancer vaccines, which wouldn’t prevent cancer, but could help your body fight some forms.

In energy, geothermal breakthroughs are generating tremendous excitement. As David Roberts notes in an excellent explainer in Vox, the molten core of the earth is about 10,000 degrees Fahrenheit, roughly the same temperature as the sun. If we could tap 0.1 percent of the energy under the earth’s surface we could supply humanity’s total energy needs for two million years.

Engineers are figuring out how to mine the heat in the nonporous rock beneath the surface. As Roberts writes, “If its more enthusiastic backers are correct, geothermal may hold the key to making 100 percent clean electricity available to everyone in the world.”


This is not even to mention fusion. In one of those stories that felt epochal when you read it, my Times colleague Henry Fountain reported last September on how M.I.T. researchers had designed a compact nuclear reactor that should work. China currently has an experimental thermonuclear reactor that is reaching 270 million degrees Fahrenheit.

It feels like autonomous vehicles have been three years away for the last 10 years. But sooner or later they will arrive. Waymo has already started a driverless rides service in Phoenix — like Uber and Lyft, but with nobody in the front seat.

Meanwhile, in the electric car sector, Toyota is developing a vehicle that can go 310 miles on one charge and can charge from zero to full in 10 minutes.

One could go on: artificial intelligence; space exploration seems to be heating up; a variety of anti-aging technologies are being pursued; on Wednesday The Times reported on an anti-obesity drug. There’s even lab-grown meat. This is meat grown from animal cells that would enable us to enjoy steaks and Chicken McNuggets without actually slaughtering cows and chickens.

Obviously, all these veins are not going to pay off, but what if we gradually created a world with clean cheap energy, driverless cars and more energetic productive years in our lives?

On the plus side, global productivity would surge. What economists call total factor productivity has been grinding along with 0 to 2 percent increases for years. But a series of breakthroughs could keep productivity surging. Our economy, and world, would feel very different.

On the negative side, the dislocations would be enormous, too. What happens to all those drivers? What happens to people who work on ranches if labs take a significant share of the market? The political difficulties will be complicated by the fact that the people who will profit from these high-tech industries tend to live in the highly educated blue parts of the country, while the old industry workers who would be displaced tend to live in the less educated red parts.

We would be riding the tiger of rapid change. The economy would grow faster but millions of people would have trouble finding a place in it. Universal basic income would become a red-hot topic.


Government investment has spurred a lot of this progress. Government would have to come up with aggressive ways to mitigate the shocks. But it is better to face the challenges of dynamism than the challenges of stasis. Life would be longer and healthier, energy would be cleaner and cheaper, there would be a greater sense of progress and wonder.

In a week of political gloom, I thought you’d like some good news.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of lettersto the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

Follow The New York Times Opinion section on FacebookTwitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram.

David Brooks has been a columnist with The Times since 2003. He is the author of “The Road to Character” and, most recently, “The Second Mountain.” @nytdavidbrooks

A version of this article appears in print on Feb. 12, 2021, Section A, Page 23 of the New York edition with the headline: The Coming Tech Boom.



A paranoia obsessiva dos EUA com a China está ficando ridícula - Foreign Affairs

 Estes dois autores, assim como o Council on Foreign Affairs, estão ridiculamente errados: querem fazer com que os EUA fiquem mais parecidos com a China, ou seja, ao desenvolver um programa estatal gigantesco em P&D, ao passo que a China fica cada vez mais parecida com os EUA: grande parte da inovação é agora conduzida por empresas privadas.

Esta frase, por exemplo, é extraordinária pelo absurdo que revela: “Beijing is playing a more sophisticated game, using technological innovation as a way of advancing its goals without having to resort to war.”

Marx dizia a respeito da Alamanha, ao traçar um panorama realista do extraordinário desenvolvimento da Grã-Bretanha: De te fabula narratur. Tudo o que os autores dizem sobre a busca de supremacia absoluta pela China se aplica perfeitamente aos EUA. Mas eles não parecem se dar conta.

Esta obsessão anti-China demonstra uma fraqueza estratégica e uma falta de confiança espantosa para uma superpotência. Pode ser útil para o país todo esse esforço, mas se fará ao custo de escolhas burocráticas pagas com os recursos dos contribuintes, o que talvez represente uma deformação estatizante do modo inventivo de produção, que sempre foi a marca distintiva do modelo capitalista americano.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 


Foreign Affairs, Nova York – Março-Abril 2021

The Innovation Wars

America’s Eroding Technological Advantage

Christopher Darby and Sarah Sewall

 

Since the early days of the Cold War, the United States has led the world in technologyOver the course of the so-called American century, the country conquered space, spearheaded the Internet, and brought the world the iPhone. In recent years, however, China has undertaken an impressive effort to claim the mantle of technological leadership, investing hundreds of billions of dollars in robotics, artificial intelligence, microelectronics, green energy, and much more. Washington has tended to view Beijing’s massive technology investments primarily in military terms, but defense capabilities are merely one aspect of great-power competition today—little more than table stakes. Beijing is playing a more sophisticated game, using technological innovation as a way of advancing its goals without having to resort to war. Chinese companies are selling 5G wireless infrastructure around the world, harnessing synthetic biology to bolster food supplies, and racing to build smaller and faster microchips, all in a bid to grow China’s power.

In the face of China’s technological drive, U.S. policymakers have called for greater government action to protect the United States’ leadMuch of the conventional wisdom is sensible: boost R & D spending, ease visa restrictions and develop more domestic talent, and build new partnerships with industry at home and with friends and allies abroad.But the real problem for the United States is much deeper: a flawed understanding of which technologies matter and of how to foster their development. As national security assumes new dimensions and great-power competition moves into different domains, the government’s thinking and policies have not kept pace. Nor is the private sector on its own likely to meet every technological need that bears on the country’s security.

In such an environment, Washington needs to broaden its horizons and support a wider range of technologies. It needs to back not only those technologies that have obvious military applications, such as hypersonic flight, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence, but also those traditionally thought of as civilian in nature, such as microelectronics and biotechnology. Washington also needs to help vital nonmilitary technologies make the transition to commercial success, stepping in with financing where the private sector will not.

 

AMERICA’S INNOVATION CHALLENGE

 

In the early decades of the Cold War, the United States spent billions of dollars dramatically expanding its scientific infrastructure. The Atomic Energy Commission, formed in 1946, assumed responsibility for the wartime labs that had pioneered nuclear weapons, such as the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the headquarters of the Manhattan Project, and went on to fund academic research centers, such as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The Department of Defense, founded in 1947, was given its own massive research budget, as was the National Science Foundation, established in 1950. After the Soviets launched the Sputnik satellite, in 1957, Washington created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or NASA, to win the space race, as well as what would become the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which was tasked with preventing a future technological surprise. By 1964, research and development accounted for 17 percent of all discretionary federal spending.

Partnering closely with academia and companies, the government funded a large variety of basic research—that is, research without a specific end use in mind. The goal was to build a technological foundation, defined primarily as conventional and nuclear defense capabilities, to ensure the country’s security. The research proved astonishingly successful. Government investment spawned cutting-edge capabilities that undergirded the United States’ military superiority, from supersonic jets to nuclear-powered submarines to guided missiles. The private sector, for its part, got to capitalize on the underlying intellectual property, turning capabilities into products and products into companies. GPS-enabled technologies, airbags, lithium batteries, touchscreens, voice recognition—all got their start thanks to government investment.

Yet over time, the government lost its lead in innovation. In 1964, the U.S. government was spending 1.86 percent of GDP on R & D, but by 1994, that share had fallen to 0.83 percent. During that same period, U.S. corporate R & D investment as a percentage of GDP nearly doubled. The numbers tell only half the story. Whereas much of the government’s R & D investment was aimed at finding new, game-changing discoveries, corporate R & D was mostly devoted to incremental innovation. The formula for growing revenue, the private sector realized, was to expand on existing products, adding functionality or making something faster, smaller, or more energy efficient. Companies focused on nearer-term technologies with commercial promise, rather than broad areas of inquiry that might take decades to bear fruit.

Increasingly, the most innovative R & D was taking place not in the labs of large corporations but at nimbler, privately funded startups, where venture capital investors were willing to tolerate more riskModern venture capital firms—partnerships that invest in early-stage companies—first arose in the 1970s, leading to early successes such as Apple and Microsoft, but it wasn’t until the dot-com bubble of the 1990s that this style of investment really took off. If the first phase of R & D outsourcing was from government labs to corporate America, this was the second phase: away from big businesses and toward small startups. Large companies began to spend less on internal R & D and more on what they called “corporate development,” or acquiring smaller, venture-backed companies with promising technologies.

The rise of venture capitalism created a great deal of wealth, but it didn’t necessarily further U.S. interests. Venture capital firms were judged by their ability to generate outsize returns within a ten-year window. That made them less interested in things such as microelectronics, a capital-intensive sector where profitability arrives in decades more so than years, and more interested in software companies, which need less capital to get going. The problem is that the companies receiving the most venture capital funding have been less likely to pursue national security priorities. When the American venture capital firm Accel hit the jackpot by investing early in Rovio Entertainment, the Finnish video game company behind the mobile app Angry Birds, it may have been a triumph for the firm, but in no way did it further U.S. interests.

Over time, the U.S. government lost its lead in innovation.

Meanwhile, government funding of research continued its decline relative both to GDP and to R & D spending in the private sector. The Department of Defense retained the single biggest pot of federal research funding, but there was less money overall, and it became more dispersed across various agencies and departments, each pursuing its own priorities in the absence of a national strategy. As the best researchers were lured to the private sector, the government’s in-house scientific expertise atrophied. Once close relationships between private companies and Washington also suffered, as the federal government was no longer a major customer for many of the most innovative firms. U.S. agencies were rarely the first to buy advanced technology, and smaller startups generally lacked the lobbyists and lawyers needed to sell it to them anyway.

Globalization also drove a wedge between corporations and the government. The American market came to look less dominant in an international context, with the huge Chinese consumer market exerting a particularly powerful pull. Corporations now had to think of how their actions might look to customers outside the United States. Apple, for example, famously refused to unlock iPhones for the FBI, a decision that probably enhanced its brand internationally.

Further complicating matters, innovation itself was upending the traditional understanding of national security technology. More and more, technology was becoming “dual use,” meaning that both the civilian and the military sectors relied on it. That created new vulnerabilities, such as concerns about the security of microelectronic supply chains and telecommunications networks. Yet even though civilian technologies were increasingly relevant for national security, the U.S. government wasn’t responsible for them. The private sector was, and it was innovating at a rapid clip with which the government could barely keep pace. Taken together, all these trends have led to a concerning state of affairs: the interests of the private sector and the government are further apart than ever.

 

THE CHINESE JUGGERNAUT

 

The changes in American innovation would matter less if the world had remained unipolar. Instead, they occurred alongside the rise of a geopolitical rival. Over the past two decades, China has evolved from a country that largely steals and imitates technology to one that now also improves and even pioneers it. This is no accident; it is the result of the state’s deliberate, long-term focus. China has invested massively in R & D, with its share of global technology spending growing from under five percent in 2000 to over 23 percent in 2020. If current trends continue, China is expected to overtake the United States in such spending by 2025.

Central to China’s drive has been a strategy of “military-civil fusion,” a coordinated effort to ensure cooperation between the private sector and the defense industry. At the national, provincial, and local levels, the state backs the efforts of military organizations, state-owned enterprises, and private companies and entrepreneurs. Support might come in the form of research grants, shared data, government-backed loans, or training programs. It might even be as simple as the provision of land or office space; the government is creating whole new cities dedicated solely to innovation.

China’s investment in 5G technology shows how the process works in practice. Equipment for 5G makes up the backbone of a country’s cellular network infrastructure, and the Chinese company Huawei has emerged as a world leader in engineering and selling it—offering high-quality products at a lower price than its Finnish and South Korean competitors. The company has been buoyed by massive state support—by The Wall Street Journal’s count, some $75 billion in tax breaks, grants, loans, and discounts on land. Huawei has also benefited from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which provides generous loans to countries and Chinese companies to finance infrastructure construction.

Massive state investments in artificial intelligence have also paid off. Chinese researchers now publish more scientific papers in that field than American ones do. Part of this success is the result of funding, but something else plays a big role: access to enormous amounts of data. Beijing has fueled the rise of powerhouse companies that sweep up endless information about their users. These include Ali-baba, an e-commerce giant; Tencent, which developed the all-purpose WeChat app; Baidu, which began as a search engine but now offers a range of online products; DJI, which dominates the consumer drone market; and SenseTime, which provides facial recognition technology for China’s video surveillance network and is said to be the world’s most valuable artificial intelligence company. As a matter of law, these companies are required to cooperate with the state for intelligence purposes, a broad mandate that is almost certainly used to force companies to share data for many other reasons.

Washington has monitored China’s technological progress through a military lens.

That information increasingly involves people living outside China. Chinese companies have woven a global web of data-gathering apps that collect foreigners’ private information about their finances, their search history, their location, and more. Those who make a mobile payment through a Chinese app, for example, could have their personal data routed through Shanghai and added to China’s growing trove of knowledge about foreign nationals. Such information no doubt makes it easier for the Chinese government to track, say, an indebted Western bureaucrat who could be convinced to spy for Beijing or a Tibetan activist who has taken refuge abroad.

China’s hunger for data extends to some of the most personal information imaginable: our own DNA. Since the covid-19 pandemic began, BGI—a Chinese genome-sequencing company that began as a government-funded research group—has broken ground on some 50 new laboratories abroad designed to help governments test for the virus. China has legitimate reasons to build these labs, but it also has an ugly record of forcibly collecting DNA data from Tibetans and Uighurs as part of its efforts to monitor these minorities. Given that BGI runs China’s national library of genomics data, it is conceivable that through BGI testing, foreigners’ biological data might end up in that repository.

Indeed, China has shown great interest in biotechnology, even if it has yet to catch up to the United States. Combined with massive computing power and artificial intelligence, innovations in biotechnology could help solve some of humanity’s most vexing challenges, from disease and famine to energy production and climate change. Researchers have mastered the gene-editing tool crispr, allowing them to grow wheat that resists disease, and have managed to encode video in the DNA of bacteria, raising the possibility of a new, cost-effective method of data storage. Specialists in synthetic biology have invented a new way of producing nylon—with genetically engineered microorganisms instead of petrochemicals. The economic implications of the coming biotechnology revolution are staggering: the McKinsey Global Institute has estimated the value of biotechnology’s many potential applications at up to $4 trillion over the next ten to 20 years.

Like all powerful technologies, however, biotechnology has a dark side. It is not inconceivable, for example, that some malicious actor could create a biological weapon that targeted a specific ethnic group. On controversial questions—such as how much manipulation of the human genome is acceptable—countries will accept different degrees of risk in the name of progress and take different ethical positions. The country that leads biotechnology’s development will be the one that most profoundly shapes the norms and standards around its use. And there is reason to worry if that country is China. In 2018, the Chinese scientist He Jiankui genetically engineered the DNA of twin babies, prompting an international uproar. Beijing portrayed him as a rogue researcher and punished him. Yet the Chinese government’s disdain for human rights, coupled with its quest for technological supremacy, suggests that it could embrace a lax, even dangerous approach to bioethics.

 

THINKING BIGGER

 

Washington has monitored China’s technological progress through a military lens, worrying about how it contributes to Chinese defense capabilities. But the challenge is much broader. China’s push for technological supremacy is not simply aimed at gaining a battlefield advantage; Beijing is changing the battlefield itselfAlthough commercial technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology will undoubtedly have military applications, China envisions a world of great-power competition in which no shots need to be fired. Technological supremacy promises the ability to dominate the civilian infrastructure on which others depend, providing enormous influence. That is a major motivation behind Beijing’s support for high-tech civilian infrastructure exports. The countries buying Chinese systems may think they are merely receiving electric grids, health-care technology, or online payment systems, but in reality, they may also be placing critical national infrastructure and citizens’ data in Beijing’s hands. Such exports are China’s Trojan horse.

Despite the changing nature of geopolitical competition, the United States still tends to equate security with traditional defense capabilities. Consider microelectronics. They are critical components not only for a range of commercial products but also for virtually every major defense system, from aircraft to warships. Because they will power advances in artificial intelligence, they will also shape the United States’ future economic competitiveness. Yet investment in microelectronics has fallen through the cracks. Neither the private sector nor the government is adequately funding innovation—the former due to the large capital requirements and long time horizons involved and the latter because it has focused more on securing current supplies than on innovating. Although China has had a hard time catching up to the United States in this area, it is only a matter of time before it moves up the microelectronics value chain.

Another casualty of the United States’ overly narrow conception of security and innovation is 5G technology. By dominating this market, China has built a global telecommunications network that can serve geopolitical purposes. One fear is that Beijing could help itself to data running on 5G networks. Another is the possibility that China might sabotage or disrupt adversaries’ communications networks in a crisis. Most U.S. policymakers failed to predict the threat posed by Chinese 5G infrastructure. It wasn’t until 2019 that Washington sounded the alarm about Huawei, but by then, there was little it could do. U.S. companies had never offered an end-to-end wireless network, instead focusing on manufacturing individual components, such as handsets and routers. Nor had any developed its own radio access network, a system for sending signals across network devices that is needed to build an end-to-end 5G system like that offered by Huawei and a few other companies. As a result, the United States found itself in an absurd situation: threatening to end intelligence cooperation if close allies adopted Huawei’s 5G technology without having an attractive alternative to offer.

 

Para acessar a íntegra do artigo:

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-10/technology-innovation-wars



quinta-feira, 11 de fevereiro de 2021

O “inventor” do BRIC reflete sobre os efeitos da pandemia - Jim O’Neill

 Straits Times, Singapura – 11.2.2021

Reflections on a Plague Year

It may be too soon to draw firm conclusions about which pandemic-induced changes are likely to prove long-lasting. But some of the most significant could include enhanced vaccine development, increased government spending, accelerated digitalization, and the continued rise of China.

Jim O’Neill

 

London -  It is probably premature to offer an assessment of the COVID-19 pandemic’s possible consequences, not least because there may well be many more twists and turns to come. And once we defeat the coronavirus, some of the pandemic-induced changes to our lives might turn out to have been temporary. But with these caveats in mind, it is possible to begin drawing some conclusions.

First, it seems reasonably clear that once a new, highly infectious and dangerous virus appears, it pays to act aggressively to stamp it out as soon as possible, rather than wait and hope that we learn moreMore than a year after the initial COVID-19 outbreak in China, many of the (mostly Asia-Pacific) countries that took the most aggressive steps to tackle the coronavirus seem to be in a much stronger position than the West.

Recently, for example, Western Australia reacted to a single COVID-19 case by locking down the city of Perth for five daysHere in the United Kingdom, by contrast, the clamor to reopen resurfaces as soon as there is evidence that current hospital admissions and reported deaths have passed a peak, even though the daily rate of new infections is well above 15,000. Ending lockdown is obviously desirable, but as the UK has learned, any easing of restrictions will be temporary unless the number of active cases declines dramatically.

Second, some countries are vaccinating their populations faster than others. Early leaders include the UK, which partly explains the loud calls to ease the lockdown. Initial evidence suggests that the COVID-19 vaccines are not only helping to reduce the scale of serious illness, but also reducing transmission. This could turn out to be spectacular news, and – if stronger signs of the vaccines’ efficacy emerge – mark the beginning of the pandemic’s end. But if governments lift lockdowns too soon, the risk of new coronavirus mutations resistant to current vaccines will increase.

Third, although the first approved COVID-19 vaccines were adapted from research already underway for other purposes, the pandemic may well permanently improve the entire vaccine development process, from research to clinical trials and regulatory approval procedures. If so, this should help us to combat future variants as well as new pandemics.

The pandemic may also boost the pharmaceutical sector’s overall efficiency and productivity (as opposed to its profitability). So, perhaps drug firms will also be able to develop new antibiotics far sooner than conventional wisdom would have us believe.

Fourth, the COVID-19 crisis has shown that governments can spend a lot more money without upsetting markets than most people thought.Although high and increasing levels of government debt have raised huge questions, the fact that financial conditions have remained so benign – with bond markets, in particular, seemingly untroubled – raises the possibility that governments can be more fiscally ambitious than many believed.

This could have profound consequences for economic-policy debates, ranging from whether the eurozone should scrap its fiscal rule limiting government debt to 60% of GDP to whether governments should maintain a permanent presence in some sectors where they previously were absent.

For example, it seems obvious to me that we need a major overhaul of government expenditure accounting that results in a clear distinction between investment and consumption (or maintenance) spending. If government investment spending is a source of future private-sector economic growth, especially in areas with a large positive multiplier, this crisis has demonstrated the silliness of treating all government spending equally. This applies to aspects of health and education in particular, but to many other areas, too – including how governments try to tackle climate change.

Crucially, governments must also play a bigger role in ensuring that all citizens have access to digital technologies (in the same way that they should ensure universal access to education and health care). Unless everyone has access to technology, major national initiatives, such as COVID-19 test-and-trace schemes, are unlikely to succeed.

Fifth, whatever the post-pandemic norm for remote work may be, work habits are set to become more flexible. This will have a host of positive consequences, including much less time wasted commuting, less pressure for conventional transport infrastructure upgrades, larger and more “liquid” labor markets, and perhaps even a rise in productivity.

Sixth, the crisis has accelerated the shift toward technologically enhanced tools, especially for consumers, thereby casting doubt on the future of many brick-and-mortar retailers. Policymakers will therefore presumably need to rethink some aspects of taxation, including finding new sources of revenue from online businesses. This might allow many traditional retailers at least to have a fairer chance of playing a continuing role in our shopping habits.

Seventh, the function of urban real estate, especially perhaps in large conurbations, will need to adapt. This will require new ideas about the spatial relationships between offices, shops, and homes, as well as about transport. The idea of flexible and shared office spaces may well become embedded into the next generation of workers.

Finally, the COVID-19 crisis has accelerated Asia’s global rise in terms of relative economic growth, with China driving the region’s ascent. The contrast between China’s governance structure and that of Western democracies – in terms of both global governance arrangements and managing bilateral relations – will thus become an even bigger issue for many leaders than it already is.(P.S.)

 

Jim O’Neill, a former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management and a former UK treasury minister, is Chair of Chatham House.

As novas fronteiras do desenvolvimento brasileiro - Brian Harris (FT)

 O editor chefe do Financial Times no Brasil relata o impulso extraordinário conhecido nas novas fronteiras do crescimento econômico— não só agrícola — do Brasil, as frandezas e misérias dos novos bandeirantes, e os desafios à frente. Vale a pena ler: esse é o Brasil real, que alguns adoram, pelos progressos materiais, e outros detestam, por se dar em meio a tanta miséria moral e cultural a que estamos assistindo atualmente.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brazil’s new frontier is transforming its fortunes — but at what cost?

The western state of Mato Grosso is riding an agricultural boom, driven by China, faith and Bolsonaro

Bryan Harris


Financial Times, 11/02/2021


 

Rodrigo Pozzobon smiles like he can’t quite believe his good fortune. It’s the toothy, giddy grin of a man who has just stumbled across treasure. 

In a way, he has. More than 1,000km west of Brazil’s big coastal states — closer, as the crow flies, to the Pacific Ocean than to Rio de Janeiro — the 35-year-old is riding a boom that has garnered little attention among his fellow citizens and even less across the wider world. Pozzobon is one of Brazil’s soyabean kings. 

Dressed in suede loafers and a crisp T-shirt, he could easily pass as a Faria Limer — one of the São Paulo elite who live, work and play around the city’s financial district. But Pozzobon was born and bred in Brazil’s far-western state of Mato Grosso and his roots go deep. His father worked the land for a co-operative in the 1980s before setting up his own farm. Today, Pozzobon junior has two farms and two houses. São Paulo is only useful for the occasional weekend trip. 

“I cannot imagine living in any other place,” he says in English before switching to Portuguese as his enthusiasm overtakes his linguistic ability. “The profits here are too good.” 

During the past 20 years, Mato Grosso, a state nearly twice the area of Spain, has become one of the world’s leading producers of a crop so lucrative that the locals call it “green gold”. It is a boom that has been spurred by shifting geopolitics, from the rise of China, with its insatiable demand for food stuffs, to the arrival of populist leaders such as Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, an idol to many in Mato Grosso.

It has also been fuelled by the kind of environmental destruction and rough-and-tumble resource extraction that has marred Brazil’s international image in recent years.Mato Grosso — in Portuguese it means “thick forest” — is now dominated by vast, flat agricultural plantations reminiscent of the American Midwest. In its northern reaches, where this landscape meets the Amazon rainforest, the state has become a flashpoint for illegal deforestation. 

These are not subjects that weigh heavily on Pozzobon’s mind. Wealth and progress are the order of the day, and he is feeling bullish. “We could go over to China and slap them in the face and they would still come and buy our soyabeans because they don’t have another option,” he says. “They have nowhere else to buy.” 

Coastal states such as Rio de Janeiro and Bahia dominated Brazil for centuries. In the 20th century, the rise of industrial São Paulo and the construction of Brasília as the political centre moved the focus of Latin America’s largest nation inland. 

Now it is shifting again, further into areas that were once regarded as inaccessible. Far removed from the prolonged economic slumps that have sapped vitality from places like Rio and São Paulo, Mato Grosso represents an expansive frontier territory that is playing a crucial role in shaping the nation’s future. ‘

Its rise is also changing the very idea of Brazil. The euphoria of the first decade of the millennium — when the breakneck growth of the commodities boom turned the country into an international darling — has long since passed. Crime and poverty have soared. 

Corruption remains entrenched and democratic institutions fragile. Bolsonaro — an often vulgar former army captain — has plenty of support at home but his rhetoric on the environment and human rights is slowly but steadily turning the country into an international pariah. 

With the nation troubled by an identity crisis, those who live and work in Mato Grosso champion a different narrative. Their frontier land offers a story of hope and opportunity. It is, says Francisco Olavo Pugliesi de Castro of Famato, a group that represents agricultural producers in the state, “a new Brazil that even Brazilians don’t know about”. 

The BR-163 bisects Brazil, running, with few interruptions, from south to north. Within Mato Grosso, the road cuts straight, so driving should be a simple matter. It is not. An endless flow of articulated lorries jockey for automotive supremacy with a fleet of white pickup trucks — a symbol of success for the region’s rich landowners. The drivers know the locations of the few speed cameras in the area and in between them anything goes. Imagine a kind of agricultural Mad Max.

Strikingly, the din dies down just minutes from the highway. Turn off to the east or west and you will find yourself subsumed in yawning farmland, flat for hundreds of kilometres. In the remote corners of the state live indigenous communities, in demarcated lands that are eyed greedily by those they call kajaiba (the “white man”). 

The single-carriageway road is a vital — if creaky — piece of infrastructure that allows Brazil’s soy kings to get their product to the outside world. It connects Mato Grosso’s growth towns such as Sinop, Sorriso and Nova Mutum with Cuiabá in the south and Amazonian river arteries almost 1,000km further north. 

I meet Pozzobon in Lucas do Rio Verde, a neatly planned boom town that is ranked among Brazil’s most developed municipalities. Lucas, as it is better known by locals, has successfully parlayed its breakneck growth in recent years into investments in education and municipal services. The challenge for local authorities is to spend tax revenues fast enough to keep pace with surging population growth.

“It is another Brazil here,” says Pozzobon, who tells me Mato Grosso is the only state that has grown during the coronavirus pandemic (in fact, it is forecast to have contracted by 1 per cent last year, though this is still one of the best performances among Brazil’s 27 states). The reason is simple, he says: “In the pandemic you stopped doing a lot of things, but you did not stop eating.” 

Accounting for 22 per cent of gross domestic product, the success of agriculture is a rare bright spot in a country whose industrial and services sectors are still struggling to recover from a devastating recession five years ago. 

Fernando Tadeu de Miranda Borges, professor of economics at the Federal University of Mato Grosso, sees no signs of a slowdown. “Mato Grosso will drive Brazil’s economic development,” he says, though he warns that success hinges on maintaining diplomatic and trading relationships, particularly with Beijing, which Bolsonaro has riled with jibes and barbs. 

Agricultural booms have been a feature of Brazilian history since the arrival of the first Portuguese explorers in 1500. First came sugar, then coffee and cacao. There was also a gold rush in the state of Minas Gerais, where the influx of miners was at one point so rapid that it triggered a famine, killing the newly arrived prospectors. 

However, these booms mostly occurred in lush lands already prime for farming and in areas relatively close to the country’s coastline with access to shipping and logistics. Mato Grosso can claim neither. 

Until late in the 20th century, the vast Cerrado savanna that dominates most of Mato Grosso, almost forming a southern perimeter around the Amazon rainforest, was considered too rough for agriculture. This changed with technological advancements including the genetic modification of crops and new methods of soil fertilisation, which opened up the land to the production of wheat, corn, cotton and soyabeans. 

In turn, this process was propelled by the rise of China. As demand for meat has soared in the world’s second-largest economy, so too has demand for the raw materials, such as soyabeans, needed to feed the animals for slaughter. In the past 10 years, Brazil has boosted its output of soyabeans — which are also used for oils — from 75 million tonnes to more than 130 million tonnes in 2020, surpassing the US to become the world’s largest producer. Corn production has almost doubled to 105 million tonnes. 

Yet for the denizens of Brazil’s big cities, Mato Grosso remains a distant idea, known more for its sweltering climate than as the emerging engine of the nation’s economy. After a recent announcement by carmaker Ford that it was shutting production in the country, the governor of Bahia lamented the decline of industry, saying, “Brazil is intent on becoming a big farm.”  

For some locals in Mato Grosso, there is quiet indignation that their state of 3.5 million people has not received due recognition for its achievements. “We are already bigger than São Paulo in terms of agricultural GDP,” says Mauro Mendes, the state’s governor, from his office in the capital of Cuiabá. What’s more, he adds, “there are still new frontiers to explore”. 

Two hours north of Lucas on the BR-163 lies the town of Sinop. With a growing population of more than 150,000, Sinop is the region’s flagship for urban development, with broad avenues and manicured parks. “We still don’t have what you have in São Paulo with theatres and entertainment, but we are just happy to see progress and development,” says Angelo Carlos Maronezzi, who runs an agricultural research centre. “Living here is very gratifying because you have so much opportunity — to work, to grow, to develop ideas.”  

Fifty years ago, this swath of Mato Grosso was dominated by a mix of forest and scrubland, and was mostly devoid of people. Encouraged by the military governments, which were obsessed with the development of Brazil’s far-flung territories, successive waves of migrants from the south of the country began arriving in the 1970s and 1980s. Often the descendants of German, Italian and eastern European migrants to Brazil, their arrival quickly began to transform the ethnic make-up of the region’s indigenous and mixed-race population. 

It is a history promoted at every turn in Sinop. At the city hall there are portraits of these 1970s “colonisers”, alongside black-and-white images of bulldozers tearing down native forest. Replicated today, these scenes would cause uproar. “We took a state that was worthless, a land that was worthless and we tamed it with technology and new methods of fertilisation,” says Maronezzi, who moved to Mato Grosso in 1992 from the south of Brazil. 

Positivity is commonplace among the residents I meet on my trip through the state, particularly in Sinop and Sorriso, where the streets are dominated by large gated houses, evoking Miami more than middle-of-nowhere Brazil. Complaints are few and far between though, when pushed, Ícaro Francio Severo, a city councillor from Sinop, says the municipality suffers from problems with its sewerage systems as well as an excess of bureaucracy. Few city councillors elsewhere in Brazil would even consider these problems. “

When we arrived, everything was happening, everything was growing. We were enchanted,” says Glaucia Regina Santos, the owner of a truckstop restaurant off the BR-163. At first glance, Santos appears an unlikely spokesperson for this new Brazil. When we meet in her dusty pitstop, she is sitting firmly in front of a large fan, barely moving, attempting to cool herself in temperatures nudging 40C. Two staff nearby are equally motionless, only budging to take payment for coffee and cigarettes from a trickle of incoming truckers. 

But she springs to life when asked about Mato Grosso. “Mato Grosso means success,” she says, highlighting opportunities for the young to work and study in the region’s numerous universities (Sinop has seven). “Whoever works will earn,” Santos tells me. “Whoever comes with courage will earn.” 

It is a startling optimism, particularly for visitors, such as me, who are more familiar with the woes of Brazil’s coastal states. Rio, for example, has been broke for years — its decline all too evident in the crumbling facades of its once glittering art deco buildings. Despite overflowing with natural resources, Minas Gerais is also bankrupt. São Paulo has wealth but it is unevenly distributed, split between a modern, developed city and a vast ring of favelas on its periphery. 

Most economists point out that growth in Brazil has historically happened in cycles. Zoom in closer and it is also acutely geographical. In Jorge Amado’s sublime novel Gabriela, Clove and Cinnamon, progress is the buzzword of the day for his characters running cacao plantations in 1920s Bahia. Today, the state is one of Brazil’s poorest. 

 Rio de Janeiro, meanwhile, rode the commodities wave to its crest in the past decade. But since the crash it has struggled to find a raison d’être beyond tourism, which has itself been hammered by the city’s twin epidemics: Covid-19 and crime. Even São Paulo — an industrial and manufacturing hub — is struggling to keep pace with global peers. The investment is simply not there. Santos, who came to Mato Grosso from São Paulo more than a decade ago, says she has no plans to return: “It is just a shame I didn’t come [here] when I was younger.” 

Local pride is not the only thing uniting the strivers of Brazil’s frontier lands. They also believe in Bolsonaro. 

The Brazilian president achieved electoral victory in 2018, after riding a wave of popular discontent over corruption. Since then, his administration has been marked by tentative attempts at economic reform, constant political infighting and international spats, particularly over the destruction of the Amazon rainforest. To outside observers, Bolsonaro bears similarities to Donald Trump in his use of populist politics and inflammatory language. But whereas Trump’s message resonated largely with economically marginalised swaths of the US, Bolsonaro finds sympathy among wealthier producers and communities, who applaud his hands-off attitude to business following years of leftwing governance.

 Bolsonaro won 66 per cent of the vote in Mato Grosso in the 2018 presidential polls. But his support along the booming agricultural belt north of the capital Cuiabá is markedly higher. More than 77 per cent of Sinop’s residents backed the man they call “Mito” — the myth. Sorriso, the self-styled “capital of Brazilian agriculture”, reported similar figures. 

The president’s face is ubiquitous on billboards across the region, erected by devoted local groups. When he visited Sorriso and Sinop recently, he was mobbed by fans. “You should have seen him at the event here. He went immediately into the crowd to embrace them. He’s very populist like that,” says Severo, the Sinop councillor. “And he values agribusiness. He has removed a lot of the bureaucracy, sped up investments and directed money to agribusiness. He has also appealed to farmers by defending them on the environment issue, protecting them from those on the left who say they are destroying the Amazon.” 

It’s not just financially that Bolsonaro connects with the region’s residents: he also shares their faith. Like most of rural Brazil, Mato Grosso remains deeply religious but the composition of its worshippers has been changing. For the past two decades — in parallel with its economic renaissance — the state has been at the forefront of a phenomenon that has swept through Brazil: the rise of evangelical churches. 

Bolsonaro himself officially remains a Catholic, but he won the support of the evangelical movement when he was baptised by a pastor in the river Jordan in Israel two years before he ran for the presidency. It was an astute move. If current trends continue, a majority of Brazilians are expected to identify as evangelical Christians by 2030. 

These shifts are already abundantly clear in Mato Grosso. In 2000, evangelicals represented 16 per cent of the state’s population — a figure that jumped to 25 per cent in 2010. The census for 2020 was postponed due to the pandemic, but regional surveys suggest considerably more than 30 per cent of Mato Grosso residents are now evangelical. 

 “What makes Sorriso thrive is religion. Ninety per cent of the prosperity comes from religion,” says Cristiane Silva Paulino Rodrigues, a resident of the city, echoing the “prosperity gospel” that has resonated across Brazil. According to this reading of the Bible, worshippers should tithe 10 per cent of their income to the church and, in return, God will provide material wealth. 

Bruno Mendes dos Santos, a pastor at the World Church of God’s Power in Sorriso, says churches are important in maintaining a sense of community and responsibility in these frontier cities. “Religion is the union,” he says when I ask him about the role of faith in places such as Sorriso. “It helps with everything.” 

If the urban middle class of Brazil’s big cities struggle to understand why Bolsonaro remains so popular, the residents of its agro-country can’t comprehend why he is so hated elsewhere. “I just like his way,” says Madalena Euclides dos Santos, who sells religious clothing from a store in Sinop. “He is a politician who tells it like it is. Brazilians are used to the sweet little lies. But he doesn’t hide when it comes to telling us the hard truths.” 

Bolsonaro has also earned brownie points in the region for zeroing in on what it needs most from the federal government: investment in infrastructure. Last year, his administration succeeded in asphalting the BR-163 as far as the Amazonian port of Miritituba, meaning Mato Grosso’s farmers can use the rainforest’s gushing rivers to transport their product to the world. He also advocates the construction of rail links that would cross Mato Grosso from north to south and east to west. 

The plans have been met with opposition from indigenous groups, which stand to lose portions of their supposedly protected lands to the projects. But for the region’s farmers, this is the inevitable next stage of development. For all the importance of the BR-163, Brazil’s distances are just too great for trucking to make economic or environmental sense. It is cheaper for exporters to ship their products from Brazil’s ports to China than to move it from interior states like Mato Grosso to the ports themselves

“Once I was in the US visiting a producer in Iowa and he was angry he had to take his soya 16 miles to the nearest train,” Pozzobon says. “I told him I wish I could be angry about that — we have to take ours 2,100km by truck to the nearest port [of Paranagua].” 

With the world’s population expected to reach 10bn in the next 30 years, Mato Grosso’s farmers are poised for even greater returns. But the proliferation of Brazil’s super-farms comes at a price. Between 2009 and 2019, almost 14,000 sq km of native forest was destroyed in Mato Grosso — an area the size of Connecticut and the second-highest rate of deforestation within Brazil after the Amazonian state of Pará. 

“The state of Mato Grosso made commitments to reduce deforestation during the Paris [climate change conference] in 2015 and the state government has increased the number of inspections and the enforcement of embargoes, which is positive,” says Cristiane Mazzetti of Greenpeace in Brazil. But even so deforestation in Mato Grosso increased again in 2020. “The federal government routinely signals that environmental crime will be tolerated. And to make matters worse, the government still foresees significant cuts in the budget this year for inspections and combating fires and deforestation,” she says. 

 The razing of the state began decades ago, when the generals’ guiding policy of “developmentalism” sought to unite Brazil by building towns and roads, including the BR-163. But the destruction continues under Bolsonaro, whose rhetoric in support of farmers, gold miners and loggers has been taken as a green light to chop down forests. 

For defenders of the agricultural sector, environmental groups have misread the situation. “If it weren’t for us, how would the world feed itself?” says Famato’s Francisco Olavo Pugliesi de Castro. “How many days can the world be without food from Brazil? The day the rest of the world begins to see Brazil as an ally, as a country that is producing food for the world, everything will change. Each country has its own vocation. China is the industrial centre. The US rules the capitalist and democratic world. And the vocation of Brazil is to produce food.” 

Renato Farias, director of the Centre of Life Institute, a sustainability group based in Mato Grosso’s northern Amazonian reaches, says the discussion of illegal deforestation is a sensitive one — it is like “going up against one’s own heritage”. Farias embraces an idea winning favour with Brazilian politicians and agriculturalists, who say that with new technologies and sustainable techniques, Brazil can double its agricultural yield without having to raze more forest. Yet despite the idea’s appeal, for now the destruction of the environment continues.

 In the long run, environmental issues may prove Mato Grosso’s undoing. Climate volatility has already begun to impact harvests. Moreover, scientists believe if the deforestation of the Amazon rainforest continues past a certain “tipping point”, the weather patterns that underpin agriculture — and industry — in South America will change dramatically and rapidly. 

On the political side, too, Mato Grosso faces risks. For now, its wild west frontier spirit is shielded, even nurtured, by Bolsonaro. But the populist president is up for re-election next year and — as the coronavirus pandemic rages — there is no certainty he won’t be ousted and replaced by a Brazilian Joe Biden, who is more concerned with the environment. Bolsonaro’s testy relationship with China also presents a clear and present danger. Beijing has already signalled displeasure with the administration in Brasília; few doubt it could retaliate economically if its interests — or honour — were tarnished. 

For now though, in the office above his home, Sinop councillor Severo is relishing his next big project, which he says is “almost finalised”. The city wants to build a shopping mall, which would attract brand names to the wealthy farming community. Moreover, it would signify Sinop had reached a new stage in development, making it even more attractive to would-be migrants from Brazil’s coastal cities. 

“We have to do a lot of things to be better, to transform the city into a big city, a more organised city,” he says. “But if you took a photo five years ago, you would not believe the difference now. The growth is too much. It doesn’t stop.” 


Bryan Harris is the FT’s Brazil bureau chief


How insensitive? - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 How insensitive? 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida


As “notícias” (ou o que passa por) da mídia (hostilizada a partir de cima, por quem quer que se julgue poderoso o suficiente para tanto) sobre os comportamentos individuais nas esferas “superiores” dos TRÊS poderes no Brasil são, a cada dia, tão deprimentes e tão depressivas que eu me pergunto como é possível a um observador isento — um simples cidadão bem informado, como este escrevinhador — continuar contemplando tranquilamente um país que se afunda voluntariamente no lodo, na decadência, sempre mais e mais?


Como tolerar o constante rebaixamento de padrões de conduta ética por parte daqueles que foram eleitos pelo povo, ou que foram indicados e aprovados por esses representantes, para defender interessses coletivos da sociedade, mas que se empenham, de modo contínuo, em promover seus próprios privilégios de casta, de estamento, de corporação?


Como conviver com tais manifestações de soberba, arrogância, indiferença, ambições insaciáveis e mesquinhez por parte desses senhores de baraço e cutelo, por parte desses defensores do patrimonialismo mais descarado?


Desculpem usar o título de uma das canções mais famosas da Bossa Nova — imortalizada internacionalmente na voz de Astrud Gilberto — para uma nota de pura desesperança na possibilidade de que o país possa escapar do fatídico itinerário de declínio incontornável, que já vitimou outras sociedades fracassadas — pelo menos durante algum tempo — ao redor do mundo, no registro histórico.


Tudo isso me parece insuportável. E no entanto temos de continuar suportando esse cenário execrável, sabendo que temos a obrigação moral, para com nossos familiares da geração mais jovem, para com toda a comunidade que nos cerca, para com a nação em seu conjunto, de fazermos tudo o que é humanamente possível de ser feito para deixar um legado positivo para todos aqueles que nos cercam e que nos sucederão, deixar um país e uma sociedade melhores, para nossos filhos e netos, melhores do que o mundo que recebemos de nossos pais e avós. 


Todo o sentido da comunidade da espécie humana deveria ter essas marcas da bondade, da solidariedade, da fraternidade ou da simples humanidade para com nossos semelhantes, independentemente de raça, cor, nacionalidade, crenças políticas ou credos religiosos.


Nem sempre foi assim, evidentemente, pois ódios, vinganças, guerras, violência, discriminação, indiferença ao sofrimento dos mais humildes sempre acompanharam a trajetória de diversas comunidades ao redor do mundo, em quaisquer épocas e lugares. A miséria humana, a degradação dos sentimentos mais elementares e o desprezo pela vida e situação de outros também andaram de par com exemplos magníficos de desprendimento e amor ao próximo. 


Uma pequena reflexão matinal sobre a infinita escala da grandeza e da miséria humana talvez não ajude a começar o dia num tom otimista, mas como evitar tais sentimentos ao ser bombardeado ao início da manhã por notícias tão deprimentes que nos chegam pela mídia, no mais perfeito cumprimento de seu dever em nos manter bem informados?


Como ser tão insensível a tanta insensatez? Mil desculpas por esta pílula de amargor, mas é a sensação que tenho ao ler tanta notícia, como canta outro famoso compositor. 

Queixar-me às rosas?

Mas as rosas definitivamente não falam!

Ah, insensatez, que nos oferecem, todos os dias, os poderosos do momento, de todos os momentos que nos é dado contemplar no miserável noticiário de todos os dias. Estamos numa trajetória de self-destruction?

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasília, 11/02/2021