O resgate do caçador de Bruxas: Vasco Leitão da Cunha - Ana Clara Costa (Piauí)

Correções da História 

O RESGATE DO CAÇADOR DE BRUXAS

Um diplomata quer reescrever a história do chanceler da ditadura

Ana Clara Costa 

PIAUÍ, Edição 205, Outubro 2023

Vasco Leitão da Cunha era considerado um diplomata brilhante quando assumiu interinamente o Ministério da Justiça, em 1942, auge do Estado Novo, e deu voz de prisão ao poderoso chefe da polícia de Vargas, Filinto Müller, que torturava opositores com choque elétrico. Esse ato de coragem marcou a biografia de Leitão da Cunha, mas acabou obscurecido por sua atuação como chanceler do marechal Humberto Castello Branco, cargo que assumiu logo depois do golpe de 1964.

Sob seu comando, o Itamaraty abandonou os preceitos da Política Externa Independente, em vigor desde 1961, para adotar o alinhamento automático com os Estados Unidos. Nos vinte meses em que permaneceu no cargo, Leitão da Cunha removeu de postos-chave dezenas de servidores considerados simpatizantes da esquerda e autorizou a cassação de quatro diplomatas: Antônio Houaiss, Jayme de Azevedo Rodrigues, Jatyr de Almeida Rodrigues e Hugo Gouthier de Oliveira Gondim.

Nas últimas décadas, pouco se falou de Leitão da Cunha. Até que, em 2019, o presidente Jair Bolsonaro colocou Ernesto Araújo à frente do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, que passou a promover pesquisas e debates sobre temas caros à direita. O diplomata Henri Carrières – genro do ex-astrólogo Olavo de Carvalho, o mentor de Ernesto Araújo – propôs um mergulho na até então pouco conhecida gestão de Leitão da Cunha na ditadura.

Com o apoio da Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (Funag), entidade de pesquisa ligada ao Itamaraty, Carrières percorreu os arquivos diplomáticos dos anos iniciais do regime. O seu objetivo era mostrar que o legado do diplomata ia além da colaboração com a ditadura. Por isso, a maior parte dos documentos reunidos por ele busca revelar as diretrizes da política externa nas relações com os Estados Unidos, a Europa Ocidental e os países do bloco socialista. Alguns de seus achados, no entanto, confirmam que Leitão da Cunha perseguiu colegas que não marchavam no passo do novo governo.

Carrières organizou A gestão de Vasco Leitão da Cunha no Itamaraty e a política externa brasileira, coleção de documentos diplomáticos inéditos dos anos de 1964 e 1965. Em dois volumes que somam 1 140 páginas, a obra foi publicada pela Funag em 2021. O chanceler de Castello Branco também foi o tema da tese que Carrières desenvolveu no Curso de Altos Estudos do Instituto Rio Branco, defendida neste ano, e para a qual ele teve acesso a escritos pessoais do ex-chanceler.

Na organização e nos comentários do livro, Carrières enaltece o trabalho de Leitão da Cunha na política externa, mas as orientações para o expurgo político que ele promoveu no Itamaraty também se revelam. Um relatório classificado como secreto e sem data, mas atribuído ao período de Leitão da Cunha, descreve o “comunismo no Ministério das Relações Exteriores”.

Segundo Carrières, o documento foi “possivelmente” elaborado pela Comissão de Investigações, um departamento criado pelo chanceler, na esteira do Ato Institucional nº 1, para perseguir opositores do regime. “O problema da esquerdização, no Itamaraty, não é recente. Data de alguns anos o indício da existência de uma célula com nítidos objetivos comunistas. Concretamente, o assunto alcançou grande evidência quando uma carta, de texto suspeito, atribuída ao cônsul João Cabral de Melo Neto […] motivou instauração de rigoroso inquérito.” Essa passagem do relatório referia-se a um grupo de diplomatas de esquerda – entre eles, o poeta João Cabral – conhecido no Itamaraty como “célula Bolívar”. No início dos anos 1950, os membros do grupo foram investigados e temporariamente afastados de seus cargos. Dois deles mais tarde seriam cassados pela ditadura: Houaiss e Almeida Rodrigues.

Outro documento secreto incluído no livro descreve as gestões de Leitão da Cunha sobre o governo uruguaio para controlar as atividades de João Goulart, deposto em 1964, e outros asilados políticos que viviam no país. Num ato mais generoso do chanceler, um telegrama secreto orienta a emissão de um salvo-­conduto a Miguel Arraes, governador cassado de Pernambuco, para que ele pudesse deixar o Brasil com destino à Argélia, na condição de asilado.

Procurado pela piauí para comentar o resgate biográfico de Leitão da Cunha, Carrières não respondeu aos contatos da reportagem. O acesso à sua tese no Curso de Altos Estudos também foi negado. Considerado pelos seus pares como um servidor técnico, qualificado e com passagens bem-sucedidas pela Índia e pelo Reino Unido, Carrières é casado com Maria Inês de Carvalho, filha de Olavo de Carvalho. Trabalhou na assessoria internacional de Michel Temer. Quando todo o gabinete do emedebista foi exonerado na posse de Bolsonaro, Carrières saiu junto. Mas logo foi chamado de volta ao Palácio do Planalto para trabalhar na equipe de Filipe Martins, olavista convicto e assessor internacional de Bolsonaro, que conhecia bem o trabalho do diplomata. Depois, Carrières foi direcionado a um posto na Embaixada do Brasil em Washington, sob a batuta do embaixador Nestor Forster, outro reconhecido admirador de Olavo de Carvalho. Hoje, Carrières dá expediente na embaixada em Assunção, no Paraguai, onde vive com a mulher e os seis filhos. O casal é ultracatólico e educa os filhos em casa.

A trajetória profissional de Leitão da Cunha merece ser mais bem conhecida. Um dos maiores diplomatas de sua geração – nasceu em 1903, no Rio de Janeiro –, ele serviu na Argélia durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, como delegado brasileiro junto ao Comitê Francês de Libertação Nacional, e lá se tornou próximo do general Charles de Gaulle. Integrou a delegação brasileira na primeira Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas, em Londres, em 1947. Foi embaixador brasileiro em Cuba durante a revolução, pela qual chegou a ter simpatia – até compreender que Fidel Castro conduziria a ilha para o socialismo. Apesar de seu anticomunismo, Vasco Leitão foi embaixador em Moscou durante o governo João Goulart.

No entanto, a caça às bruxas que Vasco Leitão promoveu no Itamaraty salta aos olhos. Na contramão da releitura de Carrières sobre o personagem, o historiador Rogério de Souza Farias, da Universidade de Brasília, mergulhou em outros arquivos pouco explorados do período da ditadura e descobriu que as quatro cassações realizadas pelo chanceler não foram exigidas pelos militares. (Ele prepara um livro sobre seus achados, ainda sem previsão de lançamento.) Um exemplo: nas cinco oportunidades em que pôde deliberar sobre o caso de Azevedo Rodrigues, Leitão da Cunha defendeu a aplicação da penalidade mais severa. E não havia delito recente para justificar a punição dos outros três diplomatas – Houaiss, Almeida Rodrigues e Gondim –, que foi amparada em fatos antigos.

A pesquisa de Farias aponta que Houaiss foi aposentado por Leitão da Cunha em razão da alegada participação na “célula Bolívar”, já examinada no processo que se encerrara uma década antes. Até a consulta que o Itamaraty fez ao Departamento de Ordem Política e Social (Dops) em 1964 para saber se havia fatos desabonadores sobre Houaiss voltou vazia. Mesmo assim, o chanceler enviou a Castello Branco o pedido de cassação, sem que fosse analisada a defesa do diplomata. Farias também descobriu que parte dos depoimentos usados para embasar a cassação de Houaiss foi, na verdade, deturpada, pois eram originalmente em defesa do diplomata.

Em 1983, um ano antes de sua morte, Vasco Leitão da Cunha deu um depoimento ao Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC) da Fundação Getulio Vargas. Alegou que, longe de perseguir diplomatas de esquerda, sua gestão os salvou de um expurgo ainda mais drástico. “Pude fazer uma proteção em torno do Itamaraty. Uma trincheira”, disse. E, assim, aquilo que o ex-chanceler chamou de “punição revolucionária” teria ficado em “termos aceitáveis”. No mesmo depoimento, Leitão da Cunha elogiou Houaiss: “Ele é generoso. Fala comigo.”

https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/o-resgate-do-cacador-de-bruxas/?utm_campaign=a_semana_na_piaui_184&utm_medium=email&utm_source=RD+Station 

A novela do submarino nuclear continua, por mais 20 anos (FSP)

Governo Lula faz reunião sigilosa com França para complementar acordo sobre submarino nuclear 

FSP, 20/10/2023

Brasil pede mais transferência de tecnologia e apoio para finalizar projeto, cuja nova fase pode chegar a R$ 25 bilhões O Brasil negocia com a França uma complementação do acordo para a construção do submarino de propulsão nuclear. No dia 22 de setembro, o chefe do Estado-Maior da França, brigadeiro Fabien Mandon, esteve em Brasília e participou de uma reunião com o almirante Petrônio Aguiar, diretor-geral de desenvolvimento nuclear da Marinha, para discutir os termos do contrato e avançar na construção do submarino, que enfrenta atrasos. A reunião, que teve participação de integrantes do Itamaraty, do Planalto e do Secretariado-Geral da Defesa da França, órgão que autoriza a venda de armamentos e tecnologia sensível do país, foi mantida em sigilo. 

O almirante Petrônio viajará à França nos próximos dias para prosseguir com as conversas. França e Brasil negociam dentro do acordo de parceria estratégica assinado em 2008 que inclui o Prosub, o programa brasileiro de submarinos. Estimado em R$ 40 bilhões em valores atuais, o Prosub previa a construção de quatro submarinos convencionais (dois dos quais estão prontos) e um submarino convencional movido a propulsão nuclear, batizado de "Álvaro Alberto". O acordo assinado em 2008 com a França previa "apoio francês, no longo prazo, para a concepção e construção da parte não-nuclear do submarino". 

Na prática, até agora, foi um auxílio para o design do casco do submarino de propulsão nuclear –mas não a tecnologia para acomodar o reator (que o Brasil sabe fabricar) dentro do casco e fazer com que ele conecte e forneça energia até a propulsão. Apesar de o submarino ser prioridade do governo brasileiro, o projeto avança lentamente, porque o Brasil precisa de mais know-how e equipamentos da França e porque há inconstância orçamentária. Nesse acordo complementar, o Brasil negocia comprar dos franceses equipamentos para a turbina e o gerador, que usariam a energia gerada pelo reator, e não são fabricados no país. 

 O país também precisa de transferência de know-how para integrar o reator ao submarino e para finalizar o protótipo do submarino no Laboratório de Geração de Energia Nucleoelétrica, em Iperó, interior de São Paulo. A Marinha também precisa de treinamento para montagem e coordenação, de testes operacionais e racionalização industrial para redução dos custos de construção. Outra demanda do Brasil é ajuda para garantir a segurança do reator dentro do submarino, mas isso enfrenta resistência do lado francês, que não quer se envolver diretamente na parte nuclear. O objetivo seria chegar, nos próximos meses, a uma carta de intenções assinada pelo presidente Lula e pelo líder francês Emmanuel Macron. 

 A Marinha brasileira pretende avançar com as negociações para cumprir seu cronograma interno, que prevê a finalização do reator atômico em 2027 e a conclusão do submarino daqui a dez anos. Os entraves para o acordo com a França e as tratativas com agências internacionais de energia atômica fizeram a Marinha tratar com mais sigilo as negociações do Prosub desde agosto. Estima-se que, para essa nova fase, sejam necessários cerca de R$ 25 bilhões, entre compras de equipamentos da França e investimento brasileiro. Mas o governo brasileiro está negociando valores. "Esta nova negociação vai determinar de que maneira a França vai apoiar na continuação da construção do submarino de propulsão nuclear, quanto isso vai custar e se vão estender o acordo", diz o almirante Antonio Ruy Silva, membro do Grupo de Análise da Conjuntura Internacional (Gacint) da USP.

 Autoridades brasileiras e francesas já haviam conversado sobre o assunto em maio, na França, e em junho, em encontro de Lula com Macron, em Paris. A negociação é delicada porque os Estados Unidos se opõem à venda dos equipamentos e transferência de know-how para o Brasil. "Os Estados Unidos não querem que outra potência do hemisfério ocidental tenha essa capacidade bélica", diz Francisco Carlos Teixeira, professor de história contemporânea da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). Hoje, só os cinco membros permanentes do Conselho de Segurança da ONU —Estados Unidos, China, Rússia, França e Reino Unido— e a Índia, que não é signatária do Tratado de Não Proliferação Nuclear (TNP), detêm essa tecnologia. 

Todos eles têm bombas atômicas. Uma rusga geopolítica pode entrar no cálculo dos franceses na decisão de assinar o novo acordo com o Brasil. Em 2021, a Austrália cancelou um contrato de US$ 66 bilhões com a França para comprar uma frota de submarinos convencionais e anunciou que, em vez disso, iria adquirir submarinos de propulsão nuclear dos Estados Unidos e Reino Unido. O presidente Macron foi surpreendido e ficou enfurecido. 

Em março deste ano, EUA, Reino Unido e Austrália formalizaram o chamado acordo Aukus, com vistas à contenção da China. "Pode ser o momento de a França devolver o golpe que levou dos EUA", diz Teixeira. "Além disso seriam encomendas importantes para a indústria francesa, que sofreu com a perda dos contratos com a Austrália." Relatório do Senado francês em julho afirma que o desenvolvimento do Álvaro Alberto "representa um grande desafio para o Brasil" e que "vários interlocutores indicaram claramente que queriam um maior apoio da França". O relatório recomenda que se estude a possibilidade de "aprofundamento do programa Prosub na área nuclear", tendo em vista que "o acordo Aukus deverá levar à construção e entrega, pelos Estados Unidos, de submarino de propulsão nuclear à Austrália". 

 O interesse dos franceses na venda, além de financeiro, é também se aproximar do Brasil e eventualmente ter o país como um novo fornecedor de urânio. A França, que compra do Níger 20% do urânio que consome, quer diversificar suas fontes, uma vez que o país africano teve um golpe de Estado e está sob grande influência da Rússia. Macron, com a crise no fornecimento de gás por causa da guerra na Ucrânia, anunciou a construção de novas usinas nucleares, o que vai aumentar muito a demanda pelo mineral. 

 O Brasil levaria cerca de três anos para conseguir aumentar a produção, e teria de mudar a legislação –hoje monopólio estatal. Mas já existe um lobby forte para isso. O deputado Júlio Lopes (PP-RJ), presidente da Frente Parlamentar da Tecnologia e Atividades Nucleares do Congresso, é um dos maiores defensores da adoção de pequenos reatores modulares e aumento da produção de urânio no país. "O governo francês está bem interessado no urânio brasileiro", disse. Além dos desafios tecnológicos, o Brasil enfrenta mais um obstáculo para o submarino nuclear: terá de negociar com a AIEA (Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica) um acordo de salvaguardas para garantir a segurança do combustível atômico –urânio enriquecido. A agência já manifestou resistência. 

A Austrália também negocia salvaguardas, mas, ao contrário do Brasil, aderiu aos protocolos adicionais do Tratado de Não-Proliferação Nuclear. O governo brasileiro vê os protocolos adicionais como excessivos e interferência sobre soberania. Procurada pela reportagem, a Marinha enviou nota afirmando que "a parceria estratégica com a França tem sido exibida exitosa nos últimos 15 anos" e que a Força "permanece empenhada em sua manutenção e mesmo no seu crescimento, gerando assim maiores sinergia e desenvolvimento para as duas nações".

 A Marinha disse buscar, no âmbito do Prosub, "o incremento da quantidade de equipamentos periféricos para o sistema de propulsão do futuro submarino". "São materiais especiais, que ainda não estão disponíveis no mercado nacional e, portanto, seria interessante a participação de nossos parceiros industriais franceses." Procurada, a Embaixada da França no Brasil não se manifestou. 

 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2023/10/governo-lula-faz-reuniao-sigilosa-com-franca-para-complementar-acordo-sobre-submarino-nuclear.shtml

Uma euforia completamente sem sentido: PIB global do BRICS e do G7 - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Uma euforia completamente sem sentido: PIB global do BRICS e do G7

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Ingênuos celebram a ultrapassagem do PIB global do G7 pelo do BRICS. Total ilusão numérica: as pessoas vivem no PIB global ou no PIB per capita?  A resposta é meridianamente clara.

O relevante, de fato, é o bem-estar das pessoas, não o tamanho do país ou o do bloco. Demografia acumulada não é desenvolvimento, é apenas uma constatação, sem descurar o fato de que mais de 60% do valor agregado conjunto do BRICS é feito na China.

Quanto mais países forem incorporados ao BRICS, mais o PIB total desse agrupamento heteróclito de vontades aumentará, mas sem qualquer coordenação das políticas econômicas dos membros, como ocorre no G7, todos membros da OCDE e altamente interdependentes. 

O BRICS não comporta NENHUM acordo econômico relevante, sequer em comércio. O NDB é apenas um banco emprestador: existem dezenas deles  com capital estatal e centenas, milhares de bancos privados que fazem o mesmo.

Por acaso, chineses e indianos vivem melhor do que os europeus e americanos? 

E quanto à produção científica (know-how) e tecnológica (patentes) à frente dos investimentos de empresas globais?

Contem outra!

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasília, 20/10/2023

Brazil’s isolation: a love affair - Bill Hinchberger (Global Finance)

 Brazil loves its isolation, says an ex-president. Is the country ready to play a larger role on the global stage?    

Global Finance magazine, SEPTEMBER 26, 2023

Author: BILL HINCHBERGER

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva seems to log more time on his souped-up Airbus than he does at the Alvarado Palace, the presidential mansion in Brasília.

His jet-setting started in November with the COP27 climate summit in Sharm El-Sheik, where the then president-elect was “welcomed like a rock star,” according to the French newspaper Le Monde. He promised to clean up after his predecessor, climate skeptic Jair Bolsonaro, who oversaw a notable uptick in deforestation in the Amazon.

Since his inauguration in January for a second stint (on top of two terms from 2003-2011), Lula has visited over a dozen countries, outpacing even his American counterpart Joe Biden for his presence on the global arena.

Yet “Brazil remains closed,” states veteran Brazilian businessman Roberto Teixeira da Costa in a new book, “Is Brazil Afraid of the World? Discussing Brazilian Foreign Affairs and Challenges.” Of the world’s 15 largest economies, Brazil has ranked “among the lowest” when it comes to the importance of international trade to its economy, he said in the book. This even before Bolsonaro turned Brazil into a “pariah,” says the author, who founded and served as the first president of the Brazilian Security and Exchage Commission (CVM) and is currently chairman of the Arbitrage Chamber of the São Paulo Stock Market (Bovespa).

Relative to its size, Brazil scores lower than one would expect on international participation in all realms, including trade and historic incoming and outgoing FDI. Teixeira da Costa doesn’t blame foreign bullies for blocking Brazil. Instead, he quotes former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso: “Nothing makes Brazilians happier than isolation.”

Part diagnosis, part prescription, Teixeira da Costa’s book may serve as a primer for those who wonder why a continent-size nation of 215 million is often marked down as absent during important international roll calls. For Brazilians, it poses a series of Socratic questions designed to fuel debate, concluded reviewer Marcelo Consentino in the daily Estado de São Paulo.

“The thesis of the book is that Brazil fails to recognize the role it should play in international relations, and instead accepts a secondary role,” Teixeira da Costa says. “Brazil should become a protagonist.”

Many well-informed, well-meaning, and experienced Brazilians remain unconvinced, at least when it comes to the “just do it” modus operandi. “Brazil’s capacity is modest,” says Paulo Roberto de Almeida, a diplomat and director of international relations at the Institute of History and Geography of the Federal District University in Brasília. “First, because of its level of economic development, the average strength of its military force, and the limited resources devoted to international cooperation.”

National pride matters, as it does everywhere, but practical considerations loom large—including a longing to put to rest an old joke. Granted a permanent visa by President Getúlio Vargas during World War II, exiled Austrian writer Stefan Zweig published a book titled, “Brazil, Land of the Future.” Cynical Brazilians began to quip, “Land of the future, and always will be.”

Teixeira da Costa believes that greater international integration can help Brazil address sticky domestic problems, notably poverty and inequality, and help muffle that ostensibly antiquated joke. Brazil perennially ranks near the bottom on the Gini Coefficient, which measures economic inequality. At 12.4% in December 2022 (CEIC Data), Brazil’s low domestic savings rate means that it cannot go it alone. “We have to attract [foreign] investment,” said Teixeira da Costa.

Based on historical data, one would expect inflows from the United States and Europe. These traditional partners must shore up supply chains, given weaknesses revealed by Covid-19 restrictions and fallout from the Russian war in Ukraine. Brazil shores might seem to offer safe ports.

Reticence could be traced in part to the now infamous Custo Brasil (Brazil Cost), which Teixeira da Costa defined in the book as: excessive bureaucracy; high and complicated taxes; high labor costs; high social security costs; frequent regulatory changes; excessive legislation; and conflicts among federal, state and local governments. One example: As a technologically advanced, post-lockdown world adopts more flexible and creative working relationships, Brazilian labor laws remain mired in a model designed for early-20th century factories. “All of this insecurity messes things up,” says Lika Takahashi, head of equity strategy at Fator Asset Management in São Paulo, while referring to a few recent debates over big issues in Congress.

Abrupt alterations and intergovernmental conflicts create uncertainty. This inconsistency is particularly evident in the foreign policy realm.

Of the post-dictatorship presidents since 1985, Teixeira da Costa points to Cardoso and Lula as “particularly active abroad.” (He could have included Fernando Collor de Mello. Before his impeachment on corruption charges, Collor cut tariffs, facilitated foreign investment, hosted the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, and signed the Mercosur regional pact with Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.)

Look at the contrasts between the Cardoso and Lula administrations. Cardoso proved “more balanced,” as Teixeira da Costa said in our interview, whereas Lula focused on South-South relations and what some would call “Third World-ist” policies. Now consider what the book calls the “Bolsonaro administration’s blind march toward Donald Trump’s America.” Add to that the lack of reliable foreign policy interlocutors in Congress or the business community. You can understand why outsiders might get weirded out.

One external actor appears willing to wade through the weirdness: China. As with the United States, Teixeira da Costa devoted an entire chapter to Brazilian-Chinese relations. Even under the watch of Trumpista Bolsonaro, “In the first half of 2020, for every dollar Brazil exported to the United States, US$3.4 went to China,” states the book.

Given his South-South proclivity and enthusiasm for the BRICS+, Lula might be expected to lean more firmly into China for FDI. With 11 members, the new BRICS+ accounts for over one-third of global GDP and nearly half of world population, though it is top-heavy with China on both accounts.

When it comes to prescriptions, Teixeira da Costa can seem exceedingly nitpicky and refreshingly specific. Do problems exist at all levels of government and business? Yes. And they can all be addressed. Poor language skills and understanding of the world? More and better education in those realms. If your company is big enough, the board should be required to examine opportunities abroad. Navel-gazing industrial associations should lift their heads and look around.

The 20th century Brazilian composer and poet (and career diplomat) Vinicius de Moraes, perhaps best known for his collaborations with Tom Jobim and other Bossa Nova personages, wrote the song “Medo de Amar (Afraid to Love).” A quarter of a century after de Moraes was expelled from the foreign service by the military dictatorship, it might be time for Brazil to overcome its fear of the global stage.

Or maybe it is time for Brazil to just get down and dirty. In the book, Teixeira da Costa recalls a comment he made in the 1990s to Bill Clinton’s special envoy to the Americas, Mack McLarty: “He who does not make dust, eats dust!” According to the Brazilian, they still get a laugh out of that one.

Why the Israel-Gaza war represents a broader crisis for the Global Justice - Adam Taylor (The Washington Post)

Why the Israel-Gaza war represents a broader crisis for the Global Justice

Adam Taylor

The Washington Post, October 19, 2023

https://www.washingtonpost.com//world/2023/10/20/israel-hamas-war-crimes-gaza-justice-genocide-international-criminal-court/?utm_campaign=wp_todays_worldview&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F3b85c45%2F65320227b55654324faa000f%2F596b79f3ade4e24119b43ed3%2F11%2F65%2F65320227b55654324faa000f

The bloody Hamas-led attack on Israel and the subsequent bombardment of Gaza have led to rival accusations of war crimes and calls for the International Criminal Court to do something. But what can The Hague-based court actually do? Few know the answer better than Luis Moreno Ocampo. Close to four decades ago, the then-32-year-old Argentine lawyer was thrust into the global spotlight as the deputy prosecutor of the “Trial of the Juntas,” beating Argentina’s former military dictatorship in the courts — a landmark case that was made into an Oscar-nominated film released last year. He went on to have a long and storied career in global justice, becoming the inaugural chief prosecutor for the nascent ICC in 2003. There, he indicted both Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi and Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir, though neither lived to face trial. Now 71, Moreno Ocampo finished serving at the ICC 11 years ago. However, he is still active in the world of international humanitarian law and has been closely watching the war in Israel-Gaza. He spoke to Today’s WorldView this week, not long after the office of current ICC prosecutor Karim Khan confirmed that the court had jurisdiction over the conflict in Israel-Gaza. International Criminal Court prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo listens to testimony at the Organization of American States in Washington on Sept. 14, 2017. (Jim Watson/AFP/Getty Images) The conversation took place the same day as the strike on al-Ahli Hospital, though he said it was too early to talk “with precision about this specific incident because we don’t know the facts.” Moreno Ocampo spoke on the phone from Brazil, where this month he took up a new academic role. “I’m in São Paulo because I spent six years at Harvard,” he said later. “American thinks of America solutions. That was the Second World War. Now the world is different.” The following transcript has been edited for length and clarity. Links have been added where appropriate. Today’s WorldView: First off, given what you’ve been seeing and your own time as chief prosecutor of the ICC, how likely is it that we’ll see the ICC open prosecutions in the Israel-Gaza war? Moreno Ocampo: Well, that is absolutely at the discretion of the prosecutor. And he can also decide where to investigate, what crimes to investigate and when to present charges. What is clear is that after a long process, starting in my time, Palestine became a state party in 2015. In 2021, the court’s judges confirmed to the prosecutor, that Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, are part of the territory of Palestine. Therefore, that means that any genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes committed in that territory could be investigated by the ICC and the investigation is open. Q: And this means the ICC can prosecute Palestinians, too, for crimes committed outside of those territories, right? A: Absolutely. The [Oct. 7] Hamas attack was absolutely committed from Gaza, so it’s absolutely under the jurisdiction of the court. It’s absolutely clear that the ICC could say, okay, we’ll start with the crimes committed by Hamas. The prosecutor could choose for his first case to be the Hamas case. Q: In terms of potential crimes that the ICC would investigate — crimes against humanity and war crimes — what have you seen so far that stands out? A: Well, the Hamas attack is clearly a crime against humanity, meaning a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population. Taking hostages is also a war crime. It’s also possibly genocide because Hamas has the intention to destroy Israelis. The problem is that the response from Israel … it’s complicated. Just the blockade of Gaza — just that — could be genocide under Article 2(c) of the Genocide Convention, meaning they are creating conditions to destroy a group. There’s forced displacement, another problem. Here, it’s more complicated. Israel has the right to defend itself, even to attack those who attack Israel from a different territory. I agree with that. But Israel has a right to kill Hamas members. It cannot kill civilians and it cannot forcibly displace civilians from that. And that’s a problem. I think, of course, Hamas is using the Palestinians as shields. Therefore, it’s very difficult to discriminate between civilians and combatants. But that does not give [Israel] permit to kill combatants and civilians at the same time. You have to discriminate. Israel cannot pretend it’s just destroying Hamas because in the meantime it is killing masses of civilians. That is a crime for a crime. These are war crimes, possibly a crime against humanity. And then there’s the starvation in Gaza, also possibly a genocide. Q: How could Israel avoid these accusations? A: Well, the most important part is to stop the crimes. That’s complicated because Western politicians are not talking about stopping the crimes, they are talking about opening a humanitarian corridor. That’s not the problem. This is not a natural disaster. This is because of the decision of Israeli officers. So they should put pressure on Israeli officers to not commit crimes. And look, it’s not just because its illegal or legal. History should teach us but humanity is not learning. When Americans were attacked in the twin towers, if we didn’t attack Afghanistan, they could have had prosecutions. Send the troops to arrest Bin Laden, arrest his people and then prosecute them. That is legal. But instead, President Bush decides war. Because war sounds more powerful — but it’s not. Afghanistan is a great example, because 20 years later the Taliban is back in power. Al-Qaeda has allies around the world now. Stanley McChrystal, the head of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, said that when you kill massively, you create retaliation. It’s “insurgency math” — you have 10 terrorists, you kill two and you end up with 20. You multiply the fighters. And obviously, that will happen here. Q: What role can global institutions like the United Nations or the ICC play? A: The U.N. Security Council is divided because of Ukraine, so they will do nothing here. The case is showing how primitive our global institutional system is. We saw the same in [Nagorno-Karabakh] just two weeks ago. Azerbaijan committed genocide against Armenia and nothing happened. We really need to adjust our institution and invent new things. Right now, the only invention is the ICC. And the only one who can investigate today is the ICC. But even if they do, it will be too late. We have to prevent the crimes. We need to oppose the cycle of violence. That is the missing part. Q: What practical issues do you think that the ICC will face in any investigation into the conflict? Israel isn’t a party to the Rome Statute that founded the court. And Gaza is controlled by Hamas, who don’t seem likely to cooperate either. A: It’s not just about the court itself, it’s about how states support courts. There are Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, for example. If the Arab countries agreed, they could push these leaders to surrender themselves to the court, to argue their cases. If you are willing to die, you should be willing to face justice. Q: But do you think that could happen? And even if that happened, would Israel cooperate? A: No. Look, I’m telling you what should happen. When I was a prosecutor, for three years I was involved in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Eventually, I ruled that when Palestine becomes a state recognized by the U.N., it could come back. During that time, I had a conversation with a high-ranking Israeli official because they were pissed off it took me three years to make their decision. He told me: Look, we believe that you are impartial. We believe in your impartiality. The problem for us is that we don’t like impartiality. We like partiality. I have the life of my kids at risk. I don’t like to put the life of my kids in the hands of an impartial person. I like a partial person. That idea, that its just me against the others, has created this impossible conflict. The Palestinians feel the same. Q: There’s a lot going on it the world now for the ICC. Outside of Israel-Gaza, there’s the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. There’s the prosecution of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine. There’s plenty of other situations where the ICC might get involved, such as the war in Ethiopia. A: Yes, Yes. There’s Sudan, India and Pakistan … Q: There’s so many. How can the ICC possibly do everything it should do? How will it have the bandwidth? A: Well that’s the point. We need more. We need to keep evolving and creating other systems to create solutions to conflicts. We did nothing else [after the ICC]. Because there are no global solutions, the world has become more tribal. Everywhere, tribal leaders are flourishing. They promise to protect their own people and people need protection. The lack of global solutions is moving the world toward tribal solutions. The problem is politicians have a different mandate. So we’ve got a problem. And the Gaza-Israel conflict is just a very bad example of a problem.

1,000 Words Portraits of Israelis killed, missing or abducted in the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks, are placed on auditorium seats at Tel Aviv University. (Ahmad Gharabli/AFP via Getty Images) Tents for Palestinians seeking refuge in Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip on Thursday. (Mahmud Hams/AFP via Getty Images) At least 1,400 people in Israel have been killed and more than 4,500 injured since the unprecedented cross-border Hamas attack on Oct. 7, Israeli authorities said. Hamas is also holding 203 hostages, according to the IDF. Palestinian officials said 3,785 people in Gaza have been killed and more than 12,400 wounded in strikes.

What a difference a week makes: the new and the old Middle East - Ishaan Tharoor, Sammy Westfall (The Washington Post)

The Washington Post, October 18, 2023 

By Ishaan Tharoor with Sammy Westfall   Email

Welcome to the new, ‘new’ Middle East Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu holds his map of the “The New Middle East” as he addresses the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 22. (Richard Drew/AP) In late September, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took his turn at the dais of the U.N. General Assembly. It’s a familiar spot for the long-ruling politico, whose previous appearances in New York included a memorable stunt in 2012 where he drew a red line through part of a cartoon bomb indicating his fears about Iran’s ongoing nuclear enrichment. This time, Netanyahu had a different image as a prop — a map titled “The New Middle East,” depicting a section of the region shaded in green. That included all of Israel from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, with no delineations showing occupied Palestinian territory, as well as countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. These were Arab states that either had already normalized ties with Israel or, as in the Saudi case, were locked in talks to establish formal relations with the Jewish state. Netanyahu took out his red marker and drew a diagonal line from Dubai along the Persian Gulf, through Israel and toward the ports of southern Europe. He hailed the supposed advent of a “corridor” of prosperity that threaded together these Arab countries and Israel at the heart of a new axis of global trade connecting Asia to Europe. “A few years ago, I stood here with a red marker to show the curse, a great curse, the curse of a nuclear Iran,” Netanyahu said. “But today, I bring this marker to show a great blessing. The blessing of a new Middle East, between Israel, Saudi Arabia and our other neighbors.” Videos from the unfolding Israel-Gaza war. (Video: The Washington Post) While perhaps unique in his capacity for posturing on the world stage, Netanyahu was hardly alone in voicing this vision of a “new” Middle East. Before the explosion of war this past week between Israel and Palestinian militant group Hamas, based in Gaza, many analysts had noted how the geopolitical tectonic plates of the region were steadily shifting. The Abraham Accords — the U.S.-backed deals forged between Israel and a clutch of mostly Arab monarchies — signaled a political desire to move out of old paradigms that had defined the Middle East’s febrile status quo. Saudi Arabia and Iran’s tentative rapprochement pointed to a welcome lowering of temperatures within the region’s most heated rivalry. The fact that it was brokered, in part, by China highlighted another reality: As the United States explicitly tried to disentangle itself from the quagmires and conflicts of the region, other powers in an increasingly “multipolar” world were shouldering their way in. U.S. retrenchment was only one factor in the realignment underway. Others included the exhaustion of the so-called Arab Spring, with Islamist and pro-democracy political movements petering out after a decade of strife, instability and counterrevolution. The reactionary Arab states that had worked to undermine them — especially, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia — were pivoting away from ideological battles to a more pragmatic agenda. That was spurred by the growing need for the region’s petrostates to diversify their own economies as the world fitfully attempts to decarbonize. Saudi Arabia’s crown prince looked starry-eyed at the dynamism of Israel’s tech sector; Dubai became a magnet for Israeli tourists. In the preceding months, the Biden administration has placed a lot of its regional eggs in the basket of Saudi-Israel normalization. A deal was not close, but the White House was convinced of its strategic immensity: If Israel had the Arab world’s most geopolitically potent state formally on its side, underwritten by significant U.S. security guarantees, it would mark a turning of the page in the Middle East. Close Israeli ties with the Saudis could create a deterrent axis against Iran that would allow Washington to better focus on its competition with China and the historic challenge of the war in Ukraine. People carry children as they flee the aftermath of an Israeli strike in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip on Oct. 15. (Mohammed Abed/AFP/Getty Images) But it turns out the “old” Middle East was impossible to bury. Hamas’s brutal, deadly Oct. 7 rampage in southern Israel has been followed by a relentless, ongoing Israeli offensive that has killed at least 2,670 Palestinians in Gaza and displaced more than 600,000 people in a matter of days. It has seen an outpouring of support for the Palestinian cause across the Arab world, as well as in majority-Muslim countries further afield. It has frozen any talk of imminent Saudi-Israeli rapprochement. “The starting point for the new Middle East will be an Israeli reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, not an Israeli Embassy in Riyadh,” wrote Steven Cook in Foreign Policy. Netanyahu’s apparent hope that the Palestinians could be sidelined in a broader regional tableau looks more naive than ever, especially as Israel’s neighbors see in the mounting violence evidence of the root cause — the absence of a process to give Palestinians their own state or equal political rights. “The events of Oct. 7 may temporarily close the door to the New Middle East, and its reopening may depend on the path Israel chooses regarding the Palestinian issue,” concluded Murat Yesiltas in Daily Sabah, a Turkish pro-government publication. “Hamas declared in the most clear, painful, and murderous way possible,” wrote Meron Rappaport in the left-leaning, Hebrew-language publication Local Call, “that the conflict that threatens Israelis’ lives is the conflict with the Palestinians, and the idea that they can be bypassed via Riyadh or Abu Dhabi, or that the 2 million Palestinians imprisoned in Gaza will disappear if Israel builds a sufficiently elaborate fence, is an illusion that is now being shattered at a terrible human cost.” The United States is also now being pulled back into the Middle East. Secretary of State Antony Blinken will return to Israel on Monday after a whirlwind tour through regional capitals. Though it’s unclear what Iran — Hamas’s chief international sponsor — knew of the specifics surrounding the Oct. 7 attack, tensions with Tehran are rising once more. The prospect of Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, fully entering the fray looks more likely by the day. “If the U.S. gets more directly involved in the fighting, it could reverse what had been seen as the desire by the Trump and Biden administrations to retrench from the region in favor of greater focus on China and, with the Ukraine war, Russia,” wrote Mathew Burrows and Robert Manning of the Stimson Center, in a memo that highlighted the arrival of a “new, ‘new’ Middle East.” In their analysis, the post-Oct. 7 region will not just be defined by the state-to-state competition and conciliation that seemed to be reshaping the Middle East in recent months, but a web of non-state rogue actors that won’t go away — even if “our focus shifted.” More pressingly, the current moment also highlights the vast inequities that carve through the Middle East. Whatever the bottomless wealth of the Saudi or Emirati royals, there’s the destitution of Yemen and the enduring misery of Syria’s refugees. Whatever the confidence and prowess of Israeli’s private sector, there’s the dysfunction of neighboring Lebanon and the despair of millions of Palestinians living under more than half-a-century of occupation. “The new Middle East’s winners embody a transactional mindset that may yet make them richer,” explained the Economist last month. “Its losers are a reminder that in a world with fewer rules and principles, no one is coming to the rescue.” And for Netanyahu — herald of the “new” Middle East — the new, “new” Middle East may be an unforgiving place. Polls of the Israeli public show a majority pins blame on his government for failing to protect Israelis from the bloodiest day in their nation’s history. His political career may be hard to revive once this round of hostilities ceases. “It is almost certain that once the ground operation is over, after some months, Prime Minister Netanyahu will stop serving as prime minister,” Solon Solomon, a former Knesset lawyer and an international law professor at Brunel University London, told my colleagues.