O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

Meu Twitter: https://twitter.com/PauloAlmeida53

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/paulobooks

terça-feira, 8 de maio de 2018

Academia.edu: minha pequena ONU

Acho que o “país” mais frequente nos acessos a meus trabalhos é mesmo um tal de “unknown”, que aparece diversas vezes. Preciso descobrir o “endereço” para agradecer devidamente o interesse...

Country30-Day ViewsAll-Time Views
Unknown7393,967
Brazil1,75754,934
United States1545,227
Portugal311,313
France51966
Unknown0799
Mozambique21727
United Kingdom12509
Argentina18480
Angola8415
Germany5330
Spain8325
Belgium0321
Canada10280
Italy5250
Unknown0246
Russian Federation8224
Mexico11210
Uruguay2193
Colombia12179
Netherlands3167
Ecuador10150
Switzerland1147
Japan0145
Peru0138
India7127
Paraguay6111
Australia099
Romania197
Chile894
Turkey484
Venezuela183
China272
Indonesia069
Korea, Republic of065
Ukraine259
Poland055
South Africa354
Sweden649
Egypt149
Denmark044
Cape Verde043
Belarus040
Morocco140
Greece039
Senegal038
Côte D'Ivoire037
Nigeria632
Israel030
Pakistan130
Unknown029
Czech Republic229
Guatemala028
Ireland128
Lebanon128
Viet Nam027
Norway025
Austria025
Philippines023
Hungary023
Malaysia022
Dominican Republic222
Hong Kong122
Bolivia222
Slovakia021
Cuba221
Guinea-Bissau020
Sao Tome and Principe120
Kenya018
Nicaragua118
Thailand017
New Zealand017
Algeria017
Timor-Leste016
Zambia015
Serbia015
Sri Lanka015
Ethiopia015
Taiwan014
Namibia014
Moldova, Republic of014
Haiti014
Bulgaria014
Bosnia and Herzegovina014
Puerto Rico012
El Salvador112
Togo211
Tunisia010
Madagascar010
Luxembourg010
Honduras010
Iran, Islamic Republic Of110
Singapore09
Oman09
Croatia09
Finland09
Costa Rica49
Zimbabwe08
Slovenia08
Kuwait07
French Guiana07
Congo, The Democratic Republic Of The07
United Arab Emirates07
Macao06
Iraq06
Gabon06
Cameroon06
Panama26
Trinidad and Tobago05
Saudi Arabia05
Macedonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic Of05
Kazakhstan05
Jamaica05
Guadeloupe05
Guinea05
Ghana05
Bangladesh05
Tanzania04
Nepal04
Malta04
Mali04
Benin04
Burundi04
Sudan03
Rwanda03
Réunion03
Mauritius03
Martinique03
Mongolia03
Lithuania03
Liberia03
Kyrgyzstan03
Belize03
Armenia03
Montenegro23
Yemen02
Somalia02
Qatar02
Papua New Guinea02
Malawi02
Cambodia02
Jordan02
Iceland02
Estonia02
Bahrain02
Azerbaijan02
Albania02
Latvia12
Saint Vincent And The Grenedines01
Uzbekistan01
Swaziland01
Suriname01
Palestinian Territory, Occupied01
Mauritania01
Myanmar01
Guyana01
Equatorial Guinea01
Georgia01
Fiji01
Cyprus01
Congo01
Burkina Faso01
Aruba01
Unknown01
Afghanistan01
Andorra01

US trade policy, by Douglas A. Irwin - book review by Alfred E. Eckes

Eh.net Book Review: Clashing over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy
Reply-To: newsletter@eh.net

Published by EH.Net (May 2018)
Douglas A. Irwin, Clashing over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017. x + 860 pp. $35 (hardcover), ISBN: 978-0-226-39896-9.
Reviewed for EH.Net by Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., Department of History, Ohio University.

At a time when concerns about trade wars unsettle financial markets and engage media pundits, those seeking a deeper understanding of trade issues may choose to consult Douglas Irwin’s hefty volume. Prospective readers should be aware of the book’s strengths and limitations.
The author, a Dartmouth College economist, is interested more in the “formation of trade policy rather than the consequences of any particular policy outcome” (p. 4). He seeks to update economist Frank Taussig’s classic Tariff History of the United States, whose eighth edition was published in 1931. His approach involves explaining how changing regional economic interests and domestic political forces have impacted average tariff levels over more than two centuries. These changes transformed the tariff system during the 1930s and produced a consensus in Congress for lower tariffs.
The book has three distinct sections. The first focuses on the U.S. government’s reliance on tariffs from 1789 to the Civil War to generate revenue. Irwin argues that Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton was primarily concerned about securing adequate revenue for the new national government, not in establishing a program of high tariffs to protect infant industry. To promote industry Hamilton preferred subsidies to tariffs. Irwin also says that Adam Smith’s writings were known to the Founding Fathers and influenced early policy debates. While Irwin stresses Smith’s influence, he gives little attention to Friedrich List, the German economic journalist and railroad builder, who helped mobilize U.S. support for protection in the 1820s. List’s thinking later influenced the twentieth century mercantilist trade policies of Japan, China, and other developing countries.
A second section examines the rise of protective tariffs during the Civil War. This phase of restrictive tariffs continued with only brief interruptions until the Great Depression, as Northern industry sought to limit import competition. Irwin emphasizes that lobbyists representing affected industries, mobilized in Washington and bombarded Congress with requests for tariff protection. Here the author’s account seems one sided since he overlooks the countervailing influence of Cobden Clubs, funded and supported by British interests, eager to persuade U.S. officials to adopt freer trade policies. The historian Marc William Palen (2016, pp. 59-69) has shown that the membership of Cobden organizations, extended from President James Garfield to leading public figures, business leaders, and academics, including the renown international economist Frank Taussig, who became President Woodrow Wilson’s first chairman of the U.S. Tariff Commission.
Regarding the Hawley-Smoot Tariff (or Smoot-Hawley as many prefer) Irwin agrees that the act had little impact on the Great Depression. However, he believes that passage of the 1930 tariff spurred significant retaliation from trading partners. On this point we disagree. In May 1931 the State Department asked consular officials at 96 posts to report on foreign discrimination against U.S. exports, and little was reported. Irwin has apparently not taken into account diplomatic records in the National Archives that contradict his conclusion (see Eckes 1995, p. 125-29).
In a third section, Irwin emphasizes that the transition to a reciprocity-based trade policy, begun with Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s reciprocal trade program in 1934 and continued after World War II as the U.S. sponsored the GATT/WTO multilateral system, which flourished until recent years. Cordell Hull, a tariff-cutting enthusiast from rural Tennessee, was a single-minded proponent of reciprocal trade, and although Irwin notes that he had little influence on foreign policy during the 1930s he left a huge imprint on twentieth-century trade policy. His reciprocal trade program and the successor multilateral trade initiative under the auspices of GATT and the WTO can be credited to Hull’s vision and determination.
It is said that economist Paul Samuelson wore a green-eye shade to White House discussions on tax policy during the Kennedy administration. Irwin seems to have introduced the green-eye shade approach to tariff policy. His massive 860-page volume rests on detailed research on congressional debates and legislative proposals. His narrative is filled with information about obscure provisions of long-forgotten tariff bills. His bibliography lists a variety of relevant published materials, including memoirs of participants, and scholarly articles. He appears to have made excellent use of the data and secondary research of other economists. But, his 123-pages of bibliography and end notes expose some significant, and surprising, omissions.
Irwin has made little use of unpublished records in government archives and presidential libraries. Documents in these facilities offer an unexpurgated look at trade negotiations and policy implementation issues at the working level. They enable research historians to peer behind the spin in memoirs and to unearth discoveries that alter conventional wisdom. Another major omission involves contemporary newspaper accounts and periodicals. On-line databases such as Newspapers.com and ProQuest’s American Periodicals now enable researchers to access easily a variety of primary sources, not examined extensively by scholars, on topics such as customs fraud and smuggling that may skew Irwin’s average tariff calculations.
In the nineteenth century, high tariffs invited extensive smuggling and customs corruption, subjects not examined in this book. In 1865, for example, Commissioner of Customs Nathan Sargent reported an extensive system of smuggling along the Canadian border from New Hampshire to Lake Superior. He said that hundreds of men of “pretended respectability” were secretly engaged in smuggling liquors, teas, silks, spices, laces and other light goods to evade payment of U.S. tariffs (see, for example, Buffalo Commercial, 1865). Researchers can find many other accounts of smuggling and customs fraud by using newspapers, periodicals, court, and Treasury records from the period. These detail a wide range of enforcement issues from piracy to customs fraud. Apparently, at the New York Customhouse, which processed two-thirds of U.S. imports after the Civil War, fraud was rampant and continued over an extended period. It involved undervaluation, kickbacks and bribery (see Cohen 2010 and 2015). As a result, many of the trade data seem suspect, and generalizations about tariff levels and the effectiveness of protection do not take into account the significance of pervasive corruption and circumvention.
Despite the claim on the book jacket describing it as the “most authoritative and comprehensive history of U.S. trade policy to date,” this book offers an incomplete account of U.S. trade history. The author gives relatively little attention to non-tariff issues, such as customs corruption, smuggling, and theft of intellectual property, which were present even in the founding years of the American republic. In the last hundred years — particularly, since the Great Depression — other non-tariff issues such as export controls and strategic trade, technology transfer, dispute settlement, and forms of managed trade that distort the global market place have gained in importance. It is worth emphasizing that Irwin’s focus on tariff levels largely overlooks some of the difficult issues of policy implementation, including the free rider problem growing out of Hull’s enthusiasm for the unconditional most-favored nation policy.
Examples of free-riding involve the integration of Japan and China into the GATT/WTO multilateral trading system. In the post-World War II period, a series of U.S. administrations used tariff liberalization as a tool to integrate former adversaries into the world trading system. In GATT accession negotiations with Japan the Eisenhower administration failed to open the Japanese market significantly for American manufactures and agricultural exports. Japan, however, upon entering GATT qualified for the lowest tariff levels in the American market. This facilitated the rapid growth of Japanese manufactured exports, while continuing to restrict U.S. exports to Japan. A similar asymmetry resulted from the Clinton administration’s negotiations for Chinese accession to the WTO.
Irwin’s book represents an impressive effort by an economist to survey U.S. tariff history, but it breaks little new ground. Many important areas of trade policy and implementation continue to invite the efforts of scholars with the discipline to undertake archival research and the training to employ the research methods of economics, history, and law.
References:
Andrew Wender Cohen, “Smuggling, Globalization, and America\’s Outward State, 1870-1909,” Journal of American History, 92:2 (September, 2010), 371-398.
Andrew Wender Cohen, Contraband: Smuggling and the Birth of the American Century (New York: Norton, 2015), 122-35.
Alfred Eckes, Opening America’s Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy since 1776 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
“Extensive Smuggling along Canadian Frontier,” Buffalo Commercial (July 13, 1865), 2.
Marc-William Palen, The ‘Conspiracy’ of Free Trade: The Anglo-American Struggle over Empire and Economic Globalization, 1846-1896 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., is an emeritus professor in the Department of History at Ohio University, a former Chairman and Commissioner of the U.S. International Trade Commission and author of several books on U.S. trade policy.

Salvaguardas de Trump: o falso argumento da segurança nacional - Jon Murphy

Does National Security Justify Tariffs?

Jon Murphy*
 
Economists nearly unanimously support open and free trade among nations.1The arguments for free trade are not new, dating back at least to Adam Smith'sfamous book An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations in 1776 and David Hume's series of essays, On Commerce and On the Balance of Trade in 1752. Free trade increases wealth in a nation by promoting the division of labor, thereby increasing the quantity of goods and services in the economy. This increased division of labor benefits people in two main ways. First, it expands the range of goods and services available to people. For example, many spices that are not native to the United States would be unavailable without international trade. Second, it allows people in a nation to buy goods of a given quality that are made more cheaply—that is, produced with fewer or cheaper resources. In short, free trade allows people to minimize their own use of scarce resources to achieve their desired ends.
But even Adam Smith recognized a possible exception to free trade: using tariffs to support domestic industries that are vital to national defense. In the 21st century, are such tariffs for defense-relevant goods justified? My answer is: not likely. First, though, let's consider what's wrong with tariffs.
The Problem with Tariffs
Tariffs, by restricting trade, reduce the wealth of a nation's people. By artificially limiting foreign sources of resources, which are imported only because they are cheaper or better than what can be produced at home, tariffs encourage the wasteful use of resources and reduce the wealth of a nation. 
For example: to buy a jacket made outside the United States, an average American worker need work for only 3 hours.2 That would mean he could use his income from working the other 37 hours of his 40-hour week for other goods and services. Now, imagine that a tariff is implemented that is high enough to make the imported jacket at least as expensive as a domestically produced jacket of the same quality. The worker now has to work 4 hours for the same-quality jacket from a domestic producer; his real income has been reduced. Maybe he forgoes an extra restaurant meal or a few cups of Starbucks' coffee. He might even forgo the new jacket altogether. In short, although he is by no means poor, the tariff makes him poorer.
The National Security Exception
There is one major exception to the case for free trade: national security can trump free trade concerns. Adam Smith carves out this exception in multiple places in The Wealth of Nations. For example, he writes:
If any particular manufacture was necessary, indeed, for the defence of the society, it might not always be prudent to depend upon our neighbours for the supply; and if such manufacture could not otherwise be supported at home, it might not be unreasonable that all the other branches of industry should be taxed in order to support it. The bounties upon the exportation of British-made sail-cloth and British-made gun-powder may, perhaps, both be vindicated upon this principle.3
The fear is, as Smith puts it, that certain items are necessary for national defense, and free trade may reduce the nation's capacity to produce those items, making them too scarce should a national emergency arise. Interestingly, this scarcity can arise due to the threat of price controls, something that economists from Adam Smith on have been quite firmly against. If the price system can work, when the government increases demand for national defense goods, the prices of such goods will rise. The higher prices, in turn, give manufacturers an incentive to produce more of the necessary goods and even to stockpile such goods if they anticipate a foreign policy crisis. However, governments tend to establish price controls in the face of political pressure and sentiments against "war profiteering." Firms are unlikely to invest as much in building wartime inventories or capacity as they would with tariffs since such potential for profits is reduced. Tariffs can encourage increased production capacity in the protected industry by limiting foreign competition and generating higher profits. These tariffs would potentially ensure a domestic industry able to meet ramped-up government demand even if price controls are implemented, as long as the price controls allow for some increase in price.4
 
For background on the long history of imposing tariffs on the sugar and steel industries, see Some Aspects of the Tariff Question, by Frank Taussig.
The national defense argument has been used to justify tariffs in many industries. Two examples are sugar5 and steel.6 The argument is simple: if we import some of our national defense goods from other nations and do not foster domestic production, then we become beholden to them. In the event of a war or embargo, we would have less ability to defend ourselves. Furthermore, the foreign nation could simply jack up the prices once they commanded a market monopoly, thus making us slightly poorer and somewhat reducing our ability to wage war. But how likely are these fears to be justified? Are they strong enough to justify tariffs in peacetime? The Trump Administration argues that they are, in particular for steel and aluminum. 
U.S. Steel Production and National Defense
Steel and aluminum are important commodities for U.S. national defense. Ships, tanks, aircraft, and buildings all require steel or aluminum. But does that mean that the U.S. primary metals industries are incapable of handling production for national defense industry? It turns out that only about 3% of U.S. steel shipments go to servicing U.S. defense.7 This means that the current capacity is quite capable of handling national security demands and would still be able to even if the metal industries were to contract considerably. 
 
"Most U.S. imports of steel come from solid allies."
The concern about relying on foreign sources of war materials is that they could be unreliable or disrupted. In a world of shifting alliances, geographical concerns, and logistical issues, as in the 18th century Britain of Adam Smith, this fear might be justified. However, in 21st century America, it is less plausible. Most U.S. imports of steel come from solid allies such as Canada (17% of imports, which is 5.9% of total domestic consumption), Brazil (14% of imports, or 4.7% of consumption), South Korea (10% of imports, or 3.4% of consumption) and Mexico (9% of imports, or 3.2% of consumption).8Russia and China, potentially antagonistic countries, account for only 9% and 2% of U.S. imports respectively (3% and 0.7% of consumption, respectively). Moreover, these are primarily "long steel products," which are used in construction. Disruptions of steel imports from these nations would not adversely affect U.S. national defense needs. Furthermore, the United States' main steel trading partners are located primarily along land trade routes; even if the United States were blockaded, the government would still be able to get steel.
One last point on the national defense argument. If China, a national security threat and military threat for influence in the region according to President Trump's economic advisor Peter Navarro9 were dumping steel in the U.S. market to gain some military advantage, the logical thing for the U.S. government to do would be not to encourage U.S. exports but, rather, to encourage Chinese imports. Since steel is a scarce resource, sending it abroad (i.e., encouraging exports) necessarily reduces the stock of steel in the United States, whereas imports increase it. If China is dumping, then it means that the product is being sent to the United States rather than being used in Chinese markets; for every unit of steel sent to the United States, that is one less unit that could be used for a Chinese war machine and one more for a U.S. war machine. The logical action for the U.S. government would be to purchase a lot of low-cost steel from China and simply stockpile it, thus depriving China of war materials while maximizing U.S. steel stockpiles. In the event of war, the United States would have a large stockpile from which to draw, while China's would be reduced.
Predatory Pricing and Trade
Predatory pricing is a strategy by a well-financed entity to enter a market, sell below cost to drive out other competitors, and use the newfound market power to subsequently raise prices to monopolistic levels once competition is reduced. 
If a foreign firm were to engage in predatory pricing with a defense-oriented good like steel, then the worry would be that a country's national defense could be put at risk.
The predatory pricing argument is neither new nor unique to international trade. The argument has been used in the United States since at least the 1800s as a reason for going after "robber barons." Currently, Chinese steel production accounts for approximately 50% of global steel output, whereas the United States', Japan's, and Europe's shares of production have fallen. This has caused consternation among governments and steel producers in the West. A major fear is that China will use a predatory pricing strategy to seize market share and use its newly found monopoly power to charge higher prices.10 If this strategy is used for items that are important for national security, it could put that security at risk.
There are several important problems with the logic of predatory pricing. For a monopoly to persist, there must be high barriers to entry: something that prevents firms from entering the marketplace. The mere fact the potential monopolist initially faces competition indicates that the barriers to entry are already low enough to allow for competition. Therefore, if the monopolist raises prices, new entrants would be attracted by the extra-normal profits, causing the monopolist to reduce his price. 
But what if the monopolist can maintain its power with the mere threat of lower prices? Even this does not suggest permanently high prices or that the putative monopolist will be able to take advantage of consumers. Here, the Second Law of Demand becomes relevant:
[T]he longer the time allowed to adjust amount demand in response to a price change, the greater is the change in amount demanded, that is, the greater the elasticity.... For example, if the price of water were doubled, consumption would immediately decrease some—but would decrease by a great deal more within a few months, after people had more economically made adjustment to their water-using equipment[.]11
In other words, people initially make little adjustments to a rise in prices, but the longer prices stay high, the bigger their adjustments become. Take the water example in the above quote: if the price of water spikes quickly, people may water their lawn less or wash their car less. If the price of water stays high, people may rip out their lawns and go for rock gardens, may move to disposable plates rather than washable dishware, etc. As people adjust their usage, the extra-normal profits of the monopolist start to disappear.
 
For more on these topics, see the Econlib articles "Why Predatory Pricing is Highly Unlikely," by David R. Henderson, May 1, 2017; "Taken to the Cleaners,", by Lauren F. Landsburg, March 5, 2018; and "Boeing vs. Bombardier,", by Pierre Lemiex, September 4, 2017.
There are also economic and legal problems with predatory pricing. A predatory pricing firm needs to have a large market share to have pricing power in the market (in other words, the firm is a price maker). This indicates that, when the predatory firm attempts to cut prices in the market below cost to drive out other firms, the firm takes considerable losses. To earn those losses back, the predatory firm will need to raise its prices not just above cost, but also above the prices it was charging before it engaged in predation. But, as mentioned above, new entrants would be attracted by the profits and enter the market. They may even enter the market at a lower cost level by buying the original firms' resources at fire sale prices, reducing the price in the market and preventing the predatory firm from ever making back its losses.
Legally, determining what constitutes predatory pricing versus healthy price competition is extremely difficult. Firms can sell below cost for any number of reasons (overstock, cancelled special orders, planning mistakes, etc). None of these constitutes predatory pricing, although they may appear to be a predatory pricing strategy. Furthermore, firms can engage in "loss-leader" strategies to encourage sales (for example, video game consoles are often sold at or below cost, while the games themselves are sold above cost). If legal action is taken against firms engaging in healthy price competition, then the resulting lawsuit can reduce economic well-being rather than enhance it.
To bring this back to China, if Chinese producers were to gain monopoly power and raise prices, even if they were to maintain their monopoly power with the mere threat of lower prices, it is unlikely that they would succeed in securing long-term monopoly prices. If the price of steel remains high, people will seek or develop alternatives, or other firms will enter the market. Perhaps someone will develop a super-lightweight but super-strong material that renders steel obsolete (like Kevlar for ships). Maybe steel consumers will shift to other options, such as iron or another alloy. While it's impossible to know what exactly what actions people will take, we do know that the Law of Demand says that people will adjust. Thus, it is highly improbable that anyone who gains monopoly power through predatory pricing will be able to maintain monopoly profits for a considerable period. 
A counterpoint to the above argument is that predatory pricing would not work in the long run, but wars are fought in the short run. While wars are fought in the short run, this fact is not necessarily a strong enough basis for tariffs. As mentioned above, the United States' two main national rivals, China and Russia, account for very little steel used in the United States—steel that is used primarily for non-defense purposes. Furthermore, the United States during World War II provides evidence of how quickly a nation can retool in the event of a national emergency (In 1939, the United States produced approximately 3,000 aircraft per year. By the end of the war, production was around 300,000, or about 822 aircraft per day!12). To disrupt the U.S. war machine through economic means would be a monumental task.
Conclusion
National defense is often stated as a justified exception to a policy of free trade, and it may well be the most reasonable exception. Indeed, national defense is vital to economic prosperity. However, it is a plausible exception, not necessarily a probable one. Many of the tariff arguments presented under the "national defense" guise are flimsy. Given the negative impact of tariffs on wealth, when they are proposed, even under the national defense justification, they should be carefully examined to see if there is a true national defense issue or if domestic firms are merely justifying tariffs for protection from competition. 

Footnotes
IGM Forum. (2012, March 13). Free Trade: IGM Economics Experts Forum. Retrieved March 10, 2018, from Chicago Booth IGM Forum, http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/free-trade.
Assume that the worker's wage is $18/hr. and that a foreign-made jacket costs $54. He would need to work 3 hours ($54/$18 per hour = 3 hours) to make enough money to buy the jacket.
Smith, Adam (1981). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc. See Paragraph IV.5.36.
For an excellent discussion on this topic, see Benjamin Zycher, "Defense," in David R. Henderson, ed., The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Note, though, that Zycher used this reasoning as an argument in favor of relying on foreigners for defense-related goods, because a government cannot impose price controls on foreigners.
Tamny, John (2015, August 6). Marco Rubio's Big Sugar Embrace Flunks Basic Economics. Retrieved March 10, 2018, from Forbes: https://www.forbes.com/sites/johntamny/2015/08/06/marco-rubios-big-sugar-embrace-flunks-basic-economics.
Office of the President of the United States. (2018, March 8). Presidential Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States. Retrieved March 10, 2018, from White House Official Website: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-adjusting-imports-steel-united-states/.
American Iron and Steel Institute. (n.d.). Market Applications in Steel. Retrieved March 10, 2018, from SteelWorks: http://www.steel.org/about-aisi/statistics/market-applications-in-steel.aspx.
Author calculations derived from International Trade Administration. (2017, December). Steel Imports Report: United States. Retrieved March 10, 2018, from Global Steel Trade Monitor: https://www.trade.gov/steel/countries/pdfs/imports-us.pdf.
Navarro, Peter & Autry, Greg (2011). Death by China. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Ibid., pp. 63-65.
Alchian, Armen A. & William R. Allen, (1983). Exchange and Production: Competition, Coordination, and Control. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Parker, Dana T. (2013). Building Victory: Aircraft Manufacturing in the Los Angeles Area in World War II. Cypress, CA.

*Jon Murphy is a Ph.D. economics student at George Mason University, specializing in Law & Economics and Smithian Political Economy. He previously was an economic consultant in New Hampshire. 

segunda-feira, 7 de maio de 2018

Ricupero: lancamento do livro sobre a diplomacia em Porto Alegre


RUBENS RICUPERO EM PORTO ALEGRE
O autor do livro A diplomacia na construção do Brasil: 1750  2016 estará na capital gaúcha nos dias 8 e 9 de maio.
Ex-embaixador Rubens Ricupero RAFAEL RONCATO
No dia 8, fará o lançamento do livro na Livraria Cultura do Bourbon Shopping Country, a partir de 19h00, com sessão de autógrafos. 
No dia 9, vai proferir Aula Magna na UNISINOS Porto Alegre, a partir de 19h30.
A obra de Rubens Ricupero é a mais completa e atualizada história das relações do Brasil com o mundo – utilíssima para estudiosos das ciências sociais em geral e indis­pensável para os que se dedicam às relações internacionais.
Adquira seu exemplar pelo site versaleditores.com.br (com frete grátis para todo o estado do Rio Grande do Sul).
Promoção válida apenas para compras realizadas no mês de maio.
Edição capa dura
R$89,90
Edição brochura
R$69,90
Garanta já seu exemplar!
Copyright © 2018 Versal Editores. Todos os direitos reservados.