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Mostrando postagens com marcador BIS. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador BIS. Mostrar todas as postagens

segunda-feira, 26 de fevereiro de 2024

Visão otimista da economia mundial pelo presidente do Banco Central da Índia (BIS)

 

Shaktikanta Das: Fundamental shifts in the global economy - new complexities, challenges and policy options

Keynote address by Mr Shaktikanta Das, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, at the 59th South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Governors' Conference, Mumbai, 15 February 2024.

https://www.bis.org/review/r240219c.htm

On behalf of the Reserve Bank of India, the current Chair of the SEACEN (South East Asian Central Banks) forum, I extend a warm welcome to Governors of central banks and other delegates to this 59th SEACEN Governors' Conference. The weather in Mumbai during this time of the year is pleasant and I hope you get some time for sightseeing. As everyone in this hall is aware, SEACEN plays a pivotal role in promoting collaboration, knowledge sharing and policy coordination among the member central banks, and thereby contributes significantly to the stability, resilience and sustainable development of the regional and the global economy.

We are gathered here at a critical juncture when the international economic landscape is undergoing profound transformations. The prospects of a soft landing have improved for the global economy, but there are multiple challenges with uncertainties looming on the horizon. The theme of the Conference "Navigating Economic Headwinds and Advancing Financial Inclusion: Perspectives and Challenges" aptly fits into the current policy dilemma that all central banks of the region face today. In these times, prudent macro-financial policies assume even greater importance for all of us to not only navigate through the current turbulence, but also to chart a course towards a more promising future. It is heartening to note that the economies in the region are making notable progress and are positioning themselves for continued advancement in the years ahead. There is a need for deeper integration in this region to stimulate economic growth and foster inclusiveness. I am sure the insightful discussions at this conference will offer some takeaways for our future policy making.

I have chosen the theme "Fundamental Shifts in the Global Economy: New Complexities, Challenges and Policy Options" for my address today. First, I propose to speak about the resilience of the global economy in recent years in marked contrast to the earlier periods of crisis. Thereafter, I propose to outline the emerging trends and shifts that are currently reshaping the global economy irreversibly and posing significant challenges for policymakers. Finally, my effort would be to provide a macroeconomic overview of our region, followed by highlighting some policy choices for the future.

Resilience of the Global Economy

According to the latest projection of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the global growth is projected at 3.1 percent in 2024 and 3.2 percent in 2025, with forecast for 2024 revised upward by 0.2 percentage point from its October 2023 projection. It is interesting to note that that this time around the global economy has been far more resilient, weathering repeated shocks remarkably well. Even the financial system has broadly withstood the unprecedented monetary tightening across the world. The resilience of emerging market economies (EMEs), in particular, stands out unlike previous episodes of volatility which saw EMEs at the receiving end. EMEs have probably learnt from their past experience and played it well this time. While there is no definitive answer to this so called soft landing as yet, let me outline some possible factors.

First, during the global financial crisis (GFC) and the previous episodes of global turmoil, banking crises were a common feature in which insufficiently capitalised banks were at the core of the crisis. In contrast, this time the EMEs did not face adverse spillover effects from the recent banking sector turmoil in the advanced economies (AEs) in March 2023. This has been possible due to the strengthening of prudential regulation through wider adoption of Basel III norms and improvements in supervisory practices, which has resulted in a much-improved banking and financial system. Second, the improved macroeconomic fundamentals and buffers of the EMEs in recent years provided cushion against global shocks of the last four years. Third, fiscal and monetary stimulus provided during the COVID-19 has not been fully rolled back, especially in AEs. This has so far somewhat restricted the degree of spillovers from policy tightening by the AEs. Fourth, greater diffusion of technology in industry and services has gained traction after the pandemic. This has enhanced productivity in several EMEs and offset the adverse impact on output from factors like monetary tightening. In fact, technology has opened up new vistas of opportunities for EMEs, particularly in the services sector. Fifth, due credit also has to be given to calibrated and clear communication by central banks. Effective communication has now become an even stronger tool than earlier in providing forward guidance and anchoring market expectations.

Changing Landscape of the Global Economy

The pandemic was an unprecedented crisis of epic proportions in terms of loss of life and livelihood. In recent human history, recessions have been caused by swings in agricultural production, sharp jump in oil prices and financial upheavals. The global financial crisis also was a manifestation of the financial excesses growing under the benign neglect of policymakers. In contrast, the pandemic was a health emergency leading to a complete shutdown of economic activity and mobility to save lives against an unknown enemy. Consequently, there was no clear or readymade template for policymakers to follow; instead, they had to innovate and learn on the job in framing appropriate policy responses to minimise the negative impact of the pandemic on the economy and the financial system.

When the shadows of the pandemic were receding, geopolitical tensions and supply chain disruptions fuelled new challenges and inflation came back strongly. The resultant regime shift in monetary policy rattled financial market sentiments leading to a period of 'great volatility'. Existing models that were built to explain historical patterns in the data were found wanting in explaining the new realities. These models are now being increasingly challenged by ongoing shocks, geo-economic tensions and supply chain reconfigurations. For instance, models focusing on aggregate analysis fell short to explain what we observed in the aftermath of the pandemic. There was a rotation in demand initially from services to goods and then from goods to services. There was also a period of pent-up and revenge spending. These sectoral imbalances kept the levels of inflation high. The pandemic has indeed highlighted the need for more granular and sectoral analysis. In a sense, paradigm shifts in economic thinking are on the anvil. Let me reflect on some of these issues further.

First, the world after the pandemic has changed fundamentally in terms of shifting labour market dynamics, work processes and technological deepening. Work from home, online education and shopping have received wide acceptance, altering the way we work, learn and live. Technological innovation and digitalisation are permeating through every sector of the economy. Businesses are adapting to these trends for their survival. Frontier technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) are being used widely to boost productivity. These technologies open new opportunities, but they also present challenges that we need to address.

Second, monetary policy before the pandemic was operating in a low for long regime in its quest for reviving growth while resisting deflationary pressures. This situation changed suddenly and drastically with monetary policy adopting the stance of "higher for longer" rates to fight inflationary pressures, following the war in Ukraine. Such regime shifts in the presence of debt overhang in an environment of high interest rates and low growth raise concerns on macroeconomic stability in many countries. Higher interest rates not only raise the interest servicing burden of heavily indebted countries but also impact the balance sheet of banks and financial institutions, as it was seen during the recent banking sector turmoil in advanced economies. In an extreme sense, high indebtedness of countries may constrain monetary policy due to sharp trade-off between price stability and financial stability.

Third, globalisation had boosted the global economy by enhancing productivity, creating global value chains and free movement of capital and labour across countries. The benefits of globalisation, however, had reached unevenly across countries. Given the recent trends of geo-economic fragmentation, industrial and trade policies worldwide are undergoing a shift. Several economies are now reshoring, nearshoring and friend-shoring 1 their production processes on security and strategic considerations. Consequently, there is growing trade fragmentation, technological decoupling, disrupted capital flows and labour movements. All of these do not portend well for an integrated global market for goods and services.

Fourth, from emerging market economies (EMEs) perspective, disruptions in trade flows in food, energy and critical industrial inputs due to recurring geopolitical flashpoints and disturbances in key trade routes are raising concerns for food security and macroeconomic management. Moreover, in view of the volatility in financial markets and capital flows, these countries remain vulnerable to external shocks. In such an environment, creation of domestic buffers in terms of strategic reserves of critical commodities as well as a strong umbrella of forex reserves become imperative for the EMEs.

Fifth, macroeconomic models used by central banks so far have mainly focused on the demand side of the economy. Enough emphasis was not given on supply side factors. The pandemic, followed by the war, and the resultant supply chain disruptions have brought in a sharp focus on the supply side. Overlapping supply shocks, as we saw recently, led to persistent inflationary pressures even when aggregate demand was not unreasonably high. In this context, the role of governments in managing the supply-side or cost-push pressures on inflation has increasingly gained wider acceptance. Going forward, a better understanding of the supply side of the economy has become very important for conducting monetary policy more effectively.

Against this background, let me now briefly touch upon the macroeconomic settings in our region.

Macroeconomic Overview of the SEACEN Region

The South-East Asian economies have shown remarkable resilience in the face of large global shocks. To a large extent, this can be attributed to improved monetary and macroeconomic policy framework that these countries have adopted in recent years. Growth in this region has remained strong, while inflation has been lower than the OECD average. Economic activity of the region has been supported by resilient services activity across sectors such as retail trade, digital services, e-commerce and tourism. This region remains a model of regional integration with close trade and labour flow linkages. Nevertheless, there is significant untapped potential for further trade integration. I strongly feel that promotion of tourism within the SEACEN countries can further strengthen the economies of the region.

Turning to the Indian economy, India has successfully navigated through multiple challenges and emerged as the fastest growing large economy. Prudent monetary and fiscal policies have paved the path for India's success in sailing through these rough waters. The Reserve Bank projects the Indian economy to grow by 7.0 per cent during 2024-25, marking the fourth successive year of growth at or above 7 per cent. Inflation has moderated from the highs of the summer of 2022. Recurring food price shocks and renewed flash points on the geo-political front, however, pose challenges to the ongoing disinflation process. We remain vigilant to navigate through the last mile of disinflation as it is often the most difficult part of the journey. We firmly recognise that stable and low inflation will provide the necessary bedrock for sustainable economic growth.

India's coordinated policy response in the face of a series of adverse shocks can be a good template for the future. While monetary policy worked on anchoring inflation expectations and quelling demand-pull pressures, supply side interventions by the government alleviated supply-side pressures and moderated cost-push inflation. Effective fiscal-monetary coordination was at the core of India's success.

I would now like to turn to some possible policy choices for the future course of the global economy, as new realities take shape in the years to come.

Policy Choices Going Ahead

First, we need to chalk out an effective strategy for global cooperation and coordination to deal with multiple challenges afflicting the global economy. Multilateralism must be re-energised. In this regard, agreements on a "critical minerals corridor" and a "food corridor" for safeguarding food security are necessary. Such arrangements have to be fair and equitable.

Second, there is a need to develop cooperation in areas of common interest and urgent needs such as climate change where no country can devise strategies on its own. Smooth and orderly green transition is necessary to avoid disruptions to economic activity and loss of growth potential. While the investment needs for smooth green transition are large, the actual financial flows to green projects are highly skewed and are, by and large, concentrated in advanced economies. As a result, there is a need to enhance green capital flows to EMEs. At the same time, we have to be mindful of potential financial stability implications of green transition.

Third, improving infrastructure remains key to long-term growth. While investment in hard infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, electricity, water) is important, there has to be equal emphasis on creating soft infrastructure (education, health, legal, financial, institutional). Skill enhancement and increasing female labour force participation are key to enhancing effective labour supply and potential growth of the region.

Fourth, India's experience has shown how Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) can be utilised for advancing financial inclusion and productivity gains through cost reductions. Our sustained engagement in the India Stack and the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), especially during the pandemic and thereafter, has given us the confidence that digital public infrastructure can become a critical part of global public good when scaled up beyond national boundaries. The linkage of Indian UPI and the fast payment systems of a few other countries drives home the potential of the UPI to become an international model for cross-border payments.

Fifth, new technological developments like artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) can bring about significant improvements in efficiency and productivity of businesses. Necessary safeguards, however, need to be put in place to prevent the misuse of technology. In particular, global financial market regulators need to be vigilant about the possible misuse of AI and ML in perpetrating financial fraudulence.

Conclusion

The global economy stands at crossroads. Challenges remain in plenty, but new opportunities are also knocking at the door. Together, the course we take from here will decide our destiny in times to come. We need policies that are attuned to the new realities of the global economy. In an uncertain world, central banks need to be proactive to better serve the objectives of price and financial stability.

In this environment, collaboration is not an option but a necessity. We need greater resolve and coordination to make significant progress in dealing with global challenges. SEACEN, as a platform for central banks of the region, serves as a valuable forum for sharing insights and fostering cooperation in several areas for enhanced progress and prosperity. The cooperation among countries should give due consideration to the principles of comparative advantage and resource endowments so that each one of us benefits. Let us take our deliberations to the next level to achieve well-being of our people and our economies.

Thank You, Namaskar.


1 The term "reshoring" refers to a country's transfer of (part of the) global supply chain back home (or geographically closer to home the case of "nearshoring"). "Friend-shoring" limits supply-chain networks and the sourcing of inputs to countries allied with the home country and trusted partners with aligned strategic and political preferences.


segunda-feira, 5 de junho de 2023

BIS; dezenas de discursos de banqueiros centrais, neste boletim semanal do Banco de Basileia

 

BIS Alert - Central bankers' speeches 
01 June 2023
Speech by Mr Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Círculo Financiero La Caixa, Barcelona, 22 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Speech by Mr Felipe M Medalla, Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP, the central bank of the Philippines), at the launch of the legal book "Banking Laws of the Philippines – Annotated", Manila, 25 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Speech by Mr Felipe M Medalla, Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP, the central bank of the Philippines), at the inauguration of the Philippine Stock Exchange's new events hall, Manila, 28 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Speech by Dr Joachim Nagel, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, at the Economic Conference (Wirtschaftstag) of the Economic Council of the Christian Democratic Union, Berlin, 23 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Public lecture by Mr Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at the University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, 10 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Speech by Mr Pan Gongsheng, Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China, at the launch ceremony of Swap Connect, Hong Kong, 15 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Introductory remarks by Mr Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Brussels, 25 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Remarks by Mr Philip N Jefferson, Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at the 22nd Annual International Conference on Policy Challenges for the Financial Sector, Washington DC, 31 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Speech by Mr Klaas Knot, President of the Netherlands Bank, at the International Banking Summit, Brussels, 1 June 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Opening remarks by Ms Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank, at the celebration to mark the 25th anniversary of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 24 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Speech by Ms Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank, at "Deutscher Sparkassentag 2023", Hanover, 1 June 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Speech by Mr Olli Rehn, Governor of the Bank of Finland, at the 2023 Bank of Japan and Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (BOJ-IMES) conference, hosted by the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Tokyo, 1 June 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Opening remarks (virtual) by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore and Chair of the Network for Greening the Financial System, at the Green Swan conference 2023, Basel, 31 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Brief remarks by Ms Michelle W Bowman, Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at the Fed Listens event on transitioning to the post-pandemic economy, Boston, Massachusetts, 31 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Concluding remarks by Mr Ignazio Visco, Governor of the Bank of Italy, at a meeting for the presentation of the Annual Report 2022 - 129th Financial Year, Rome, 31 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Opening remarks by Mr Ueda Kazuo, Governor of the Bank of Japan, at the 2023 Bank of Japan and Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (BOJ-IMES) conference, hosted by the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Tokyo, 31 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France and Chair of the Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority (ACPR), at the ACPR press conference, Paris, 31 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Keynote speech by Prof Claudia Buch, Vice-President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, at the Konstanz Seminar, Constance, 24 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Remarks by Mr Gabriel Makhlouf, Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, at the Dubrovnik Economic Conference, Dubrovnik, 27 May 2023.
 
01 June 2023
Remarks by Dr Kevin Greenidge, Governor of the Central Bank of Barbados, at the 2023 Visual Arts and Craft - Season of Emancipation Exhibition Series, Bridgetown, 26 May 2023.
 
30 May 2023
Opening remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 10th Asian Monetary Policy Forum, Singapore, 26 May 2023.
 
30 May 2023
Speech (via webcast) by Mr Christopher J Waller, Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at the 2023 Santa Barbara County Economic Summit, University of California, Santa Barbara Economic Forecast Project, Santa Barbara, California, 24 May 2023.
 
30 May 2023
Speech by Dr Sabine Mauderer, Member of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank, at the Annual General Meeting of the International Capital Market Association (ICMA), Paris, 26 May 2023.
 
30 May 2023
Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Annual General Meeting of the International Capital Market Association (ICMA), Paris, 25 May 2023.
 

segunda-feira, 27 de junho de 2022

Mais um passo na internacionalização do Renmimbi: Moeda de reserva no BIS

A China continua a avançar na internacionalização de sua moeda. Reparem que até o Banco Central do Chile participa desse arranjo.

25 June 2022
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) announced today a Renminbi Liquidity Arrangement (RMBLA), which has been developed with the People's Bank of China (PBC), to provide liquidity to central banks through a new reserve pooling scheme.
 

BIS announces Renminbi Liquidity Arrangement

Press release  | 
25 June 2022
  • The Renminbi Liquidity Arrangement (RMBLA) will provide liquidity through a reserve pooling scheme to participating central banks from the Asia-Pacific region
  • The RMBLA is a strong addition to existing BIS liquidity facilities

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) announced today a Renminbi Liquidity Arrangement (RMBLA), which has been developed with the People's Bank of China (PBC), to provide liquidity to central banks through a new reserve pooling scheme.

The RMBLA aims to provide liquidity support and can be utilised by participating central banks during future periods of market volatility.

Each participating central bank contributes a minimum of RMB 15 billion or US dollar equivalent, in RMB or USD, placed with the BIS, creating a reserve pool.

The arrangement initially includes a group of central banks in Asia and the Pacific, including Bank Indonesia, Central Bank of Malaysia, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Central Bank of Chile, as well as the PBC.

The reserve pooling provides additional features as participating central banks would not only be able to draw down on their contributions, but would also gain access to additional funding through a collateralised liquidity window operated by the BIS up to an amount equivalent to the central bank's share of the collateralised liquidity window.

The BIS, as a bank for central banks, is well positioned to implement this arrangement, given its existing banking relationships with the central banks and a highly liquid and flexible balance sheet. The BIS has over time worked with major reserve currency-issuing central banks to assist in the implementation of part of the liquidity support packages provided by these central banks to their counterparts to protect against market stresses and to safeguard financial stability.


segunda-feira, 19 de abril de 2021

Spillovers in a “Post-Pandemic, Low-For-Long” World - Joint BIS, BoE, ECB and IMF Conference, April, 26-27, 2021

 Para os que amam política monetária (devem ser poucos), ou gostam de relações econômicas internacionais (devem ser mais numerosos) e todos aqueles que se interessam pelo futuro econômico deste nosso planetinha redondo (no qual o Brasil aparece desgarrado)...


Spillovers in a “Post-Pandemic, Low-For-Long” World
Joint BIS, BoE, ECB and IMF Conference
April 26-27, 2021

In recent decades, countries have deepened their economic and financial interdependencies. Over the same period, global interest rates have fallen to historic lows, despite a slight pick-up this year. In this environment, countries have increasingly adopted policy mixes featuring unconventional monetary policy, foreign exchange interventions, macroprudential measures and capital flow management to cope better with the spillovers of a highly interconnected global economy. The COVID-19 pandemic introduced an additional layer of complexity, with consequences for the global economy, public finances, monetary policy and financial fragilities. This conference aims to close gaps in our understanding of the international transmission of local vulnerabilities and shocks in a post-pandemic, high-debt, low interest rate environment.
Monday. April 26, 2021 (ET)
To register for the conference, please email: 

Opening Session: 8:00 am
Welcoming Remarks – Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB
Monetary Autonomy in a Globalised World

SESSION 1: Chair: Livio Stracca, ECB, 8:30 am
What Goes Around Comes Around: How Large Are Spillbacks from US Monetary Policy Really?
Max Breitenlechner (University of Innsbruck), Georgios Georgiadis (ECB), Ben Schumann (Free University of Berlin)
Discussant: Silvia Miranda-Agrippino (Bank of England)

9:15 am:
Supply Spillovers During the Pandemic: Evidence from High-Frequency Shipping Data
Diego Cerdeiro (IMF), Andras Komaromi (IMF)
Discussant: Nitya Pandalai-Nayar (University of Texas at Austin)

10:00 am: Interest Rates and Foreign Spillovers
Roberto de Santis (ECB) and Srecko Zimic (ECB)
Discussant: Chiara Scotti (Federal Reserve Board)

10:40 am: Break

SESSION 2: Capital Flows and Macroprudential Policy
Chair: Angela Maddaloni, ECB, 11:00 am
Surges and Instability: The Maturity Shortening Channel
Xiang Li (Halle Institute for Economic Research), Dan Su (University of Minnesota)
Discussant: Mahvash Qureshi (IMF)

11:45 am: Spillovers at the Extremes: Macroprudential Tools and Vulnerability to the Global Financial Cycle
Kristin Forbes (MIT Sloan), Anusha Chari (University of North Carolina), Karlye Dilts-Stedman (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City)
Discussant: Damiano Sandri (IMF)

12:25 pm:
Session Ends

April 27, 2021 (ET)
SESSION 3: Covid Effects and Monetary Policy Responses
Chair: Katrin Assenmacher, ECB, 8:30 am
An Event Study of COVID-19 Central Bank Quantitative Easing in Advanced and Emerging Economies
Alessandro Rebucci (Johns Hopkins), Jonathan Hartley (Harvard University), Daniel Jimenez (EAFIT University)
Discussant: Kristina Bluwstein (Bank of England)

9:15 am: The Calming of Short-term Market Fears and its Long-term Consequences: The Federal Reserve's Reaction to COVID-19
Lerby Ergun (Bank of Canada), Mattia Bevilacqua (London School of Economics), Lukas Brandl-Cheng (London School of Economics), Jon Danielsson (London School of Economics), Andreas Uthemann (Bank of Canada), Jean-Pierre Zigrand (London School of Economics)
Discussant: Saleem Bahaj (Bank of England)

10:00 am: ECB Euro Liquidity Lines
Silvia Albrizio (Bank of Spain), Ivan Kataryniuk (Bank of Spain), Luis Molina (Bank of Spain)
Discussant: Inaki Aldasoro (BIS)

10:40 am: Session Ends

SESSION 4: Exchange Rates and Currency Exposures
Chair: Luca Dedola, ECB, 11:10 am
The Original Sin Redux: A Model-based Evaluation
Nikhil Patel (BIS), Boris Hofmann (BIS), Steve Pak Yeung Wu (University of British Columbia)
Discussant: Ozge Akinci (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)

11:45 am: The Exchange Rate Insulation Puzzle
Giancarlo Corsetti (Cambridge University), Keith Kuester (University of Bonn), Gernot Mueller (University of Tubingen), Sebastian Schmidt (ECB)
Discussant: Anna Lipinska (Federal Reserve Board)

12:25 pm: Session Ends

sexta-feira, 5 de março de 2021

FUNAG lança livro sobre o Banco de Compensações Internacionais (BIS) - Davi Augusto Oliveira Pinto

 FUNAG lança livro sobre o Banco de Compensações Internacionais (BIS)

 

TeseBIS 1

 

A Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG) publica, em sua biblioteca digital, a obra A diplomacia dos bancos centrais: renovação versus anacronismo no Banco de Compensações Internacionais (BIS), do diplomata Davi Augusto Oliveira Pinto.

O BIS, “o banco central dos bancos centrais”, criado em 1930, é a mais antiga e uma das mais importantes instituições financeiras internacionais, porém ainda é pouco conhecido fora desse nicho. A partir de perspectiva diplomática, o autor examina desde a criação e a evolução do BIS até o seu relacionamento com o Brasil, passando por considerações sobre o seu funcionamento, seu alcance geográfico, suas estruturas de governança e seu papel no estabelecimento de padrões globais de regulamentação financeira, relatando os esforços do organismo em para permanecer relevante face a constantes mudanças desde a sua criação.

A obra, originalmente apresentada no Curso de Altos Estudos do Instituto Rio Branco, está disponível para download gratuito.

Confira o vídeo da entrevista com o Conselheiro Davi Augusto Oliveira Pinto sobre o seu livro no canal da FUNAG no YouTube.

Ouça também a entrevista nas principais plataformas de podcast:

Anchor | Apple Podcasts | Deezer | Google Podcasts | Spotify

segunda-feira, 13 de junho de 2016

A trindade impossivel: interacao entre a estabilidade fiscal, monetaria e financeira - Jens Weidemann (Deutsche Bundesbank)

Interessante, para países já estabilizados, ou de macroeconômica relativamente estável. Era o caso do Brasil, tentativamente, entre 1994-99 e 2004-2005, depois a coisa degringolou, como todos sabemos...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

An impossible trinity? The interplay of monetary, financial and fiscal stability

Jens Weidmann

BIS e-mail alert, 13 June 2016

Welcome remarks by Dr Jens Weidmann, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Bundesbank Spring Conference "Monetary, financial and fiscal stability", Eltville, 10 June 2016.

1. Introduction
Ladies and gentlemen
I would like to welcome all of you to the Bundesbank Spring Conference. It is a great pleasure to have you here.
An old joke about economics is that it's "the only field in which two people can win a Nobel Prize for saying exactly the opposite thing". But sometimes, it is also a field in which people say exactly the same thing - and even Nobel-prize-worthy things - without having ever talked to one another beforehand.
That was the case with Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming - at least if anecdote is to be believed. They conducted research on the same topic - stabilisation policies for open economies; they worked at the same institution - the IMF; and they came to basically the same conclusions. But they did not join forces to produce the insights that form the basis of our understanding of open-economy macroeconomics to this day.
One of the insights offered by what is known as the Mundell-Fleming model is that you cannot have it all - a fixed exchange rate, free movement of capital and an independent monetary policy - at the same time. This insight came to be known as the impossible trinity. Our conference today will not be dealing with the ramifications of this trinity, although it remains the subject of academic debate, as the research work by Hélène Rey, for example, shows.
Instead, it's another trinity, the trinity of monetary, financial and fiscal stability, that is the focus of today's conference. And while this trinity should not be an impossible one, the recent financial and sovereign debt crises suggest that it might be a more improbable one than everyone perhaps thought ten years ago.
Even if Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming are counter-examples, I think that economic research benefits from an exchange of views. More often than not, it's discussion with others that produces a new idea or uncovers a flaw in reasoning, whereas a breakthrough is seldom achieved working alone.
What is true of economic research in general seems to be particularly true of research on the interplay of monetary, financial and fiscal policies, which is currently on the research agenda of so many different institutions. As a case in point, the Deutsche Bundesbank initiated the Trinity research network along with the Sveriges Riksbank, the Bank of Canada and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York under the auspices of Markus Brunnermeier (of Princeton University) and Eric Leeper (of Indiana University).
The aim of the network is to foster high-quality research on this topic and to boost interactions among the organising institutions as well as external researchers. Consequently, this year's Spring Conference is dedicated to the Trinity research network, and I am absolutely confident that it will make an important contribution towards achieving the aim of the network.
2. Monetary and financial policy
Ladies and gentlemen
In the years before the financial crisis, we had almost forgotten that generations of economists had grappled with one central question: how to achieve macroeconomic stability.
For many people, the success of the so-called "Great Moderation" provided the answer to this question. Inflation had apparently been conquered, and large swings in economic output seemed a thing of the past as well. By keeping prices stable, central banks also appeared to be able to moderate the business cycle, thereby providing for overall macroeconomic stability.
In hindsight, it looks as if, for a while, confidence had turned into complacency. But the financial crisis has reconnected everybody with the reality that the success of monetary policy depends on conditions it cannot create on its own. In particular, it is dependent on a stable financial system. And as the sovereign debt crisis has reminded us, sound fiscal policies remain as important as ever for monetary policy to be able to deliver price stability.
In recent years, however, academic progress has been made on all counts: with regard to the effects of unconventional monetary policy instruments, the principles of a stable financial system and of sound fiscal policies. And one additional insight is that, while the instruments for these three policy areas are different, the areas are nonetheless interdependent.
True to the adage that central bankers are concerned more with what they cannot control than what they can, in my remarks I will touch upon a few selected issues regarding monetary, financial and fiscal policy. These are: the interdependency between the monetary transmission process and financial market conditions, the minimum standards for bail-inable capital, the distortions stemming from the privileged regulatory treatment of sovereign debt, and the possible use of GDP-linked bonds as a tool through which private investors would bear fiscal risks.
The financial crisis has shown in no uncertain terms that the transmission of monetary policy depends heavily on financial market conditions. When the financial markets were disrupted in autumn 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the traditional interest rate pass-through of our conventional monetary policy measures was obviously hampered.
But even today, the effectiveness of our monetary policy depends on financial market conditions. This can be illustrated, for example, by the role asset managers play in how non-standard monetary policy measures impact on longer-term interest rates.
Recent research by Morris and Shin1 suggests that, in trying to avoid ranking last in short-term performance tables, asset managers' portfolio choices could lead to large jumps in risk premiums in anticipation of small future changes in central bank policy rates. Due to their own payment arrangements, asset managers cannot usually afford to be the last to notice a switch in monetary policy, because the financial loss in the funds under management increases if many others try to sell their securities before them.
Consequently, they might become increasingly nervous the longer monetary policymakers try to maintain the low-interest-rate policy. This, in turn, could raise the probability of a sudden hike in risk premiums, the longer forward guidance is in place and the more aggressively quantitative easing is pursued. Monetary policymakers have to take this into account in order to avoid unintended consequences.
But it is not only the behaviour of asset managers that is relevant to monetary policy. The crisis has reminded us that financial exuberance, too, is potentially a harbinger of unstable consumer prices. But this does not mean that monetary policy is the way to go in terms of pre-empting financial instability as well.
Tinbergen's timeless insight continues to apply: to reach each policy goal reliably, at least one separate instrument is needed for each policy area. The crisis has therefore spawned a whole new set of instruments - macroprudential policies - designed to target specific sectors of the financial system. Rather than focusing on individual financial institutions, macroprudential policies that seek to prevent exuberance in entire financial sectors can take systemic interdependencies into account.
What is a treasure trove for researchers - the host of questions surrounding the functioning of the new set of instruments - is tricky terrain for policymakers, and for central bankers in particular. Shedding light on the use and effectiveness of different macroprudential instruments therefore remains an eminent task of economic research, and I am positive this conference will provide a valuable contribution.
Does this mean that monetary policymakers can ignore the financial stability implications of their actions? I don't think so. While I am not in favour of a dual monetary policy mandate, I am convinced that monetary policy cannot stand on the sidelines when financial imbalances build up.
First, we cannot be sure that macroprudential policies will eliminate financial imbalances. The experience with macroprudential instruments is still limited, and the toolkit is still incomplete.
Second, the crisis has vividly demonstrated how financial instability affects inflation developments and the capacity of the central bank to safeguard price stability. Therefore, monetary policy would be wise to take the implications of financial imbalances for price stability into account.
As a first line of defence, however, it is financial regulation that has to bear the brunt of the financial stability burden. With regard to traditional microprudential regulation, the direction for reform seems clear: realigning risk and reward in a way that sets incentives for sustainable action. Privatising gains and socialising losses is not only socially corrosive: it also produces bad economic results, as financial actors are encouraged to take on excessive risks.
A cornerstone of the international efforts to ensure the resolvability of systemic banks is the standard for bail-in debt, the so called Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC). It requires those banks to hold a minimum of debt that can absorb losses in the case of a bank resolution. This shields the taxpayer from footing the bill.
Europe already has a bail-in standard of its own, the so called minimum requirements on eligible liabilities (MREL). For efficiency and financial stability purposes, one could argue that TLAC and MREL should be as similar as justifiable.
Systemically relevant banks pose a special challenge when it comes to resolving them without creating substantial repercussions for the wider financial system. For that reason, the Single Resolution Fund exists. When resolving a systemic bank, the Single Resolution Board, which is the relevant European authority, can draw on the resources of this fund - but only after at least 8 % of the banks' liabilities have been bailed in. It seems therefore sensible that MREL for systemically important banks is guided by this threshold.
When it comes to bailing in creditors, the fear of contagion is probably the most important reason for refraining from doing so. Naturally, contagion risk is high when the creditors who are to be bailed in are banks themselves. Currently, the MREL standards do not discourage banks from holding another institution's bail-in debt. In the interests of financial stability, this has to change.
3. Fiscal and financial policy
The importance of realigning risk and return has come to the fore with regard to yet another issue: the research of Todd Walker and of Sascha Steffen and Joseph Korte2 - both works will be presented at this conference - are examples of a growing body of scientific evidence that the zero-risk weighting of sovereign debt distorts capital allocation and therefore acts as a drag on growth. The absence of exposure limits also encourages loading up on sovereign debt, potentially creating cluster risks that can pose a threat to financial stability as well.
The research is there; what is needed now are political results. The regulation of sovereign exposures is under discussion at both the European and the Basel level. And while progress at both levels is desirable, it is particularly urgent in the euro area.
In contrast to other jurisdictions, the Eurosystem is forbidden to act as a lender of last resort for governments. Such a function would be tantamount to mutualising sovereign risk, which would be incompatible with the decentralised Maastricht framework. The risk profile of euro-area sovereign debt is therefore different.
Doing away with sovereign debt as a cluster risk would also pave the way for the orderly restructuring of sovereign debt. If necessary, an orderly restructuring would be possible without endangering the stability of the overall financial system - and this would be good not only for euro-area countries but for other countries, too. In this case, financial risks would be borne by those who took them: the private investors. But an orderly restructuring of sovereign debt is not the only way in which financial market participants can be involved in bearing fiscal risks in a structured way.
A recent initiative by the Bank of England is pushing for the introduction of standardised GDP-linked bonds. By tying coupon payments, and potentially the principal as well, to a country's growth rate, investors share both the upside and the downside risk of a country's economic development. That way, a country can potentially retain fiscal space even when faced with adverse economic events. GDP-linked bonds exhibit equity-like features, which of course gives rise to questions as well.
How would a financial system cope with the fact that sovereign debt would cease to exist as a "safe asset"? How many investors would be interested in GDP-linked bonds and, leading on from there, how would a GDP-linked bond be priced? These are the questions that need to be answered before GDP-linked bonds can ever become a widespread vehicle for transferring fiscal risks - upside as well as downside ones - to private investors. But it is an avenue worth exploring.
Limiting fiscal risks, however, should be the first line of defence. An effective mechanism to achieve this aim would be to pursue a sound fiscal policy. This would also help to plug a constant source of uncertainty, at least in the euro area. As Eickmeier, Metiu and Prieto3 show, this might help to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy as well. When uncertainty is reduced, actors behave in a less risk-averse manner, which heightens responsiveness to monetary policy impulses.
The benefits of pursuing sound policies in a particular area are therefore not confined to that area, but extend to other policy areas as well. Triggering a virtuous cycle of sound monetary, fiscal and financial policies therefore seems like the surest and fastest way to resolve the conundrum the euro area faces right now.
The euro area still has a long way to go, especially with regard to fiscal policy. Unfortunately, the spill-over from monetary policy - savings through lower interest expenses - has not been used as much as it could to press ahead with improving public budgets.
4. Conclusion
Ladies and gentlemen
Macroeconomic stability is multidimensional, and this is essentially what this year's Spring Conference seeks to capture. While sound policies have to be pursued in each area to safeguard overall economic stability, the benefits of pursuing a sound policy spill over to other areas as well.
A virtuous circle of sound monetary, financial and fiscal policies is without doubt an enticing prospect, not only for the euro area, and I am confident this conference can enrich our understanding of how to make it happen.
I wish us all an exciting conference.

1 See Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin (2015), Risk Premium Shifts and Monetary Policy: A Coordination Approach, Princeton University - William S Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No 075_2016, 2015.
2 Korte, J, and S Steffen (2014), "Zero Risk Contagion - Banks' Sovereign Exposure and Sovereign Risk Spillovers", Working Paper.
3 Sandra Eickmeier, Norbert Metiu and Esteban Prieto (2016), "Time-varying volatility, financial intermediation and monetary policy", IWH Discussion Papers No. 19/2016.

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