A caminho do lançamento em Brasília...
...”De certa feita, o então governador Orestes Quércia teria dito: “quebrei o Banespa, mas elegi meu sucessor”. Dilma Rousseff poderia parafraseá-lo: quebrei o país, mas me reelegi presidente...”
Finanças Públicas: da contabilidade criativa ao resgate da credibilidade
Felipe Salto e Mansueto Almeida, orgs.
PREFÁCIO
Edmar Bacha*
(em: Felipe Salto e Mansueto Almeida, orgs., Finanças Públicas: da contabilidade criativa ao resgate da credibilidade)
Se um marciano pousar em Brasília, ficará pasmo ao saber que o Brasil paga taxas de juros altíssimas no mercado internacional, apesar de dispor de US$370 bilhões em reservas internacionais (US$20 bilhões a mais que o total da dívida externa do país) e de seu balanço de pagamentos em conta corrente estar a caminho do equilíbrio.
A surpresa do marciano será maior ao verificar que, descontada a inflação, a taxa de juros interna do país é uma das mais altas do mundo, apesar de o déficit primário do setor público ser relativamente pequeno, podendo ser facilmente coberto com o caixa de quase um trilhão de reais do Tesouro Nacional no Banco Central – como aliás ocorreu com o pagamento das “pedaladas fiscais” de 2014 no final de 2015.
Um analista local ponderará ao marciano que esse caixa do Tesouro tem como contrapartida um valor ainda maior de dívidas do próprio Tesouro com o Banco Central, não devendo por isso mesmo ser usado para pagar “pedaladas”. Arguirá, ainda, que a prova de que as contas públicas estão mesmo em maus lençóis é que a dívida bruta do governo central alcança elevados 65% do PIB.
Mas o marciano ficará novamente confuso ao ver que apenas pouco mais da metade dessa dívida está associada a déficits acumulados do governo central. A outra quase metade têm como contrapartida a aquisição de ativos pelo governo, como as reservas internacionais e créditos com o setor privado. Deduzidos esses ativos, a dívida líquida do governo alcança 34% do PIB, um valor que não assusta para os padrões internacionais atuais.
O analista não se dará por vencido, e observará que o déficit público total, incluindo o pagamento de juros, atinge assustadores 9% do PIB. Mas o marciano achará essa constatação algo tautológica, pois o déficit total é elevado apenas porque os juros são tão altos. Se os juros fossem baixos como em quase todo mundo, o déficit também deixaria de ser assustador.
O analista insistirá que os juros não podem baixar de suas alturas, pois a inflação anual supera os 10% anuais, quando a meta que o Banco Central persegue é de 4,5%. O marciano ficará pasmo ao saber que a inflação se mantém alta apesar de o país enfrentar uma das piores recessões de sua história, com o desemprego beirando os 9% e o PIB caindo quase 4% no ano.
Concluirá o marciano – parafraseando Tom Jobim sem o saber – que decididamente o Brasil não é para extraterrestres. Não basta pousar o disco voador em Brasília e dar uma olhada superficial nos números. Além de uma boa formação em economia, é preciso conhecer a história do país. Essas são qualidades que sobram nos autores reunidos por Felipe Salto e Mansueto Almeida neste livro, o que é uma boa razão para lê-lo com atenção.
O Brasil é conhecido por ser um “caloteiro serial”, na expressão cunhada por Reinhart e Rogoff[1]. Calotes na dívida foram dados de forma direta, por Delfim Neto em 1981, Sarney em 1986 e Collor em 1990. Ou mais comumente por via de uma aceleração da inflação. Nisso o Brasil foi um recordista, até o Plano Real. Entre dezembro de 1979 e julho de 1994, a inflação acumulada foi superior a treze trilhões por cento, uma das maiores da história mundial.
Apesar desse histórico, ao contrário de outros serial defaulters o Brasil não dolarizou. O governo conseguiu que os brasileiros continuassem a usar a moeda nacional ao invés do dólar em suas transações financeiras. Para isso, entretanto, teve que pagar uma das mais altas taxas reais de juros de mundo em sua dívida interna. Como o ônus da dívida é pesado, os brasileiros continuam a antecipar que mais dia menos dia o governo optará por provocar um novo surto inflacionário para tentar desvencilhar-se de sua custosa dívida interna, como o fez tantas vezes antes do Plano Real. Estabeleceu-se assim no país um equilíbrio precário, em que tanto a taxa de juros real como a expectativa de um calote futuro se mantêm elevadas, mesmo quando a dívida pública líquida e o déficit primário não assustam para os padrões internacionais atuais.
Informado dessa triste história, o marciano possivelmente entenderá a razão dos números que tanto o confundiram[2]. E também porque somente através de uma continuada responsabilidade fiscal – conforme preconizada neste volume — poderá o Brasil com o tempo superar os traumas financeiros do passado e conviver com taxas de juros civilizadas.
Como argui com conhecimento de causa Mailson da Nobrega neste livro, as tentativas de regular as contas públicas antecedem o Plano Real. Antes dele, vieram a extinção do chamado orçamento monetário e das atividades de fomento do Banco Central a ele correlatas; o fim da “conta movimento” (que era uma espécie de cheque especial sem limites que o Banco do Brasil tinha no Banco Central); e a criação da Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional, por exemplo.
Com o Plano Real, houve a renegociação definitiva das dívidas dos Estados com a União e a extinção ou privatização de praticamente todos bancos estaduais. A partir da introdução do câmbio flutuante em 1999, ganhou forma o chamado tripé da política macroeconômica que incluiu o regime de metas inflacionárias e o compromisso com superávits primários nas contas do governo altos o suficiente para estabilizar a dívida pública em relação ao PIB. Em 2000, foi aprovada a Lei da Responsabilidade Fiscal, “um dos mais importantes marcos na construção de restrições orçamentárias fortes no Brasil”, nas palavras de Mailson da Nóbrega.
Apesar dos vaticínios em contrário, os dois primeiros anos da administração Lula – até o estouro do escândalo do mensalão e a demissão de Antonio Palocci – caracterizaram-se pela manutenção desses sólidos princípios de condução macroeconômica, acompanhada de reformas na previdência pública e no sistema de garantias de crédito.
A orientação da política econômica começou a mudar a partir da saída de Palocci do governo. Essa mudança coincidiu com a emergência da China no cenário econômico mundial, que gerou uma bonança externa de dimensões jamais antes vistas na história do Brasil. Não somente o PIB se viu dinamizado, mas a demanda interna pôde crescer a taxas ainda mais elevadas que o PIB, sem provocar desequilíbrios externos graças ao superciclo das commodities e a entrada abundante de capitais estrangeiros. Embora a custo de desindustrializar o país, a apreciação do câmbio gerada pela bonança externa permitiu manter a inflação sob controle com juros reais declinantes.
A versão brasileira da chamada maldição dos recursos naturais veio à tona com a descoberta das reservas de petróleo do pré-sal. Ao governo Lula, o céu pareceu então ser o limite e as reformas fiscais foram definitivamente abandonadas.
O impacto da crise financeira mundial de 2008-09 sobre o país durou pouco – uma “marolinha” como então a denominou o Presidente Lula. Recuperado o acesso ao crédito internacional e mantendo a China seu ritmo de crescimento, a bonança externa prosseguiu até 2011.
A partir de então, um novo padrão se estabeleceu na economia mundial. A estagnação dos países desenvolvidos ficou patente, mesmo após a recuperação dos Estados Unidos do pior da crise financeira. Europa e Japão pararam de crescer. A China adentrou a renda média, diminuindo de forma significativa sua taxa de crescimento. O superciclo das commodities deu-se por encerrado e a aversão ao risco voltou a prevalecer no mercado de capitais, provocando uma reversão dos fluxos antes direcionados aos países emergentes.
O impulso externo que garantiu o crescimento da renda e da demanda na administração Lula se dissipou. O governo de Dilma Rousseff, entretanto, ignorou essa nova realidade, iludido pelo aparente êxito das políticas anticíclicas em 2009 e 2010. Uma “nova matriz macroeconômica” foi proclamada em substituição ao tripé do governo de Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
A nova matriz se caracterizou por uma política monetária frouxa que deixou de perseguir o centro da meta; por uma expansão de gastos sem cobertura de impostos, disfarçada por manobras contábeis e pedaladas fiscais; por uma deterioração da qualidade da dívida do Tesouro, camuflada pela ampliação das operações compromissadas do Banco Central; por controles arbitrários dos preços de insumos essenciais (como petróleo, eletricidade e serviços públicos); e pela oferta exagerada de swaps cambiais para tentar evitar a desvalorização do real sem o uso das reservas internacionais.
De certa feita, o então governador Orestes Quércia teria dito: “quebrei o Banespa, mas elegi meu sucessor”. Dilma Rousseff poderia parafraseá-lo: quebrei o país, mas me reelegi presidente.
Não obstante, os autores deste volume estão otimistas que dias melhores virão. Quando eles chegarem, os autores têm a oferecer boas alternativas para retomar a construção abandonada há uma década de instituições fiscais sólidas. As receitas que apresentam são sensatas e qualificadas. Dão-nos a esperança de que na próxima vez que o marciano aterrissar em Brasília poderá encontrar um país com as contas públicas em ordem, pronto para voltar a crescer com estabilidade e equidade.
Desejando aos leitores uma proveitosa leitura, faço votos para que as propostas de resgate da credibilidade fiscal contidas neste volume sejam postas em prática o mais cedo possível.
___________________________
*Edmar Bacha é sócio fundador e diretor do Instituto de Estudos em Política Econômica da Casa das Garças, no Rio de Janeiro. Foi consultor sênior do Banco Itaú BBA. Foi membro da equipe econômica do governo responsável pelo Plano Real. Foi também presidente do BNDES, do IBGE e da ANBID. Foi professor titular na EPGE/FGV, UnB, PUC-Rio e UFRJ, e professor visitante em Columbia, Yale, Berkeley e Stanford. Foi pesquisador no IPEA, MIT e Harvard. Autor de “Belíndia 2.0: fábulas e ensaios sobre o país de contrastes”, prêmio Jabuti de melhor livro de economia em 2013. Bacharel em economia pela UFMG e Ph.D. em economia pela Universidade de Yale.
Notas:
[1] Cf. Carmen M. Reinhart e Kenneth S. Rogoff, “Serial default and the “paradox” of rich-to-poor capital flows”. American Economic Review/Papers and Proceedings, 94(2), págs. 53-58, maio 2004.
[2] Para explorar mais a fundo as explicações oferecidas nos dois parágrafos anteriores, o marciano levou em sua viagem de volta o artigo de Persio Arida, Edmar Bacha e André Lara Resende, “Crédito, juros e incerteza jurisdicional: conjeturas sobre o caso do Brasil”. Reproduzido em: Edmar Bacha, Belíndia 2.0: fábulas e ensaios sobre o país dos contrastes (Civilização Brasileira, 2012), págs. 213-249.
Mostrando postagens com marcador finanças públicas. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador finanças públicas. Mostrar todas as postagens
terça-feira, 16 de agosto de 2016
segunda-feira, 13 de junho de 2016
A trindade impossivel: interacao entre a estabilidade fiscal, monetaria e financeira - Jens Weidemann (Deutsche Bundesbank)
Interessante, para países já estabilizados, ou de macroeconômica relativamente estável. Era o caso do Brasil, tentativamente, entre 1994-99 e 2004-2005, depois a coisa degringolou, como todos sabemos...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Welcome remarks by Dr Jens Weidmann,
President of the Deutsche Bundesbank and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Bundesbank
Spring Conference "Monetary, financial and fiscal stability", Eltville,
10 June 2016.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
An impossible trinity? The interplay of monetary, financial and fiscal stability
Jens Weidmann
BIS e-mail alert, 13 June 2016
Welcome remarks by Dr Jens Weidmann,
President of the Deutsche Bundesbank and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Bundesbank
Spring Conference "Monetary, financial and fiscal stability", Eltville,
10 June 2016.
1. Introduction
Ladies and gentlemen
I would like to welcome all of you to the Bundesbank Spring Conference. It is a great pleasure to have you here.
An old joke about economics is that it's "the only field in which two people can win a Nobel Prize for saying exactly the opposite thing". But sometimes, it is also a field in which people say exactly the same thing - and even Nobel-prize-worthy things - without having ever talked to one another beforehand.
That was the case with Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming - at least if anecdote is to be believed. They conducted research on the same topic - stabilisation policies for open economies; they worked at the same institution - the IMF; and they came to basically the same conclusions. But they did not join forces to produce the insights that form the basis of our understanding of open-economy macroeconomics to this day.
One of the insights offered by what is known as the Mundell-Fleming model is that you cannot have it all - a fixed exchange rate, free movement of capital and an independent monetary policy - at the same time. This insight came to be known as the impossible trinity. Our conference today will not be dealing with the ramifications of this trinity, although it remains the subject of academic debate, as the research work by Hélène Rey, for example, shows.
Instead, it's another trinity, the trinity of monetary, financial and fiscal stability, that is the focus of today's conference. And while this trinity should not be an impossible one, the recent financial and sovereign debt crises suggest that it might be a more improbable one than everyone perhaps thought ten years ago.
Even if Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming are counter-examples, I think that economic research benefits from an exchange of views. More often than not, it's discussion with others that produces a new idea or uncovers a flaw in reasoning, whereas a breakthrough is seldom achieved working alone.
What is true of economic research in general seems to be particularly true of research on the interplay of monetary, financial and fiscal policies, which is currently on the research agenda of so many different institutions. As a case in point, the Deutsche Bundesbank initiated the Trinity research network along with the Sveriges Riksbank, the Bank of Canada and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York under the auspices of Markus Brunnermeier (of Princeton University) and Eric Leeper (of Indiana University).
The aim of the network is to foster high-quality research on this topic and to boost interactions among the organising institutions as well as external researchers. Consequently, this year's Spring Conference is dedicated to the Trinity research network, and I am absolutely confident that it will make an important contribution towards achieving the aim of the network.
2. Monetary and financial policy
Ladies and gentlemen
In the years before the financial crisis, we had almost forgotten that generations of economists had grappled with one central question: how to achieve macroeconomic stability.
For many people, the success of the so-called "Great Moderation" provided the answer to this question. Inflation had apparently been conquered, and large swings in economic output seemed a thing of the past as well. By keeping prices stable, central banks also appeared to be able to moderate the business cycle, thereby providing for overall macroeconomic stability.
In hindsight, it looks as if, for a while, confidence had turned into complacency. But the financial crisis has reconnected everybody with the reality that the success of monetary policy depends on conditions it cannot create on its own. In particular, it is dependent on a stable financial system. And as the sovereign debt crisis has reminded us, sound fiscal policies remain as important as ever for monetary policy to be able to deliver price stability.
In recent years, however, academic progress has been made on all counts: with regard to the effects of unconventional monetary policy instruments, the principles of a stable financial system and of sound fiscal policies. And one additional insight is that, while the instruments for these three policy areas are different, the areas are nonetheless interdependent.
True to the adage that central bankers are concerned more with what they cannot control than what they can, in my remarks I will touch upon a few selected issues regarding monetary, financial and fiscal policy. These are: the interdependency between the monetary transmission process and financial market conditions, the minimum standards for bail-inable capital, the distortions stemming from the privileged regulatory treatment of sovereign debt, and the possible use of GDP-linked bonds as a tool through which private investors would bear fiscal risks.
The financial crisis has shown in no uncertain terms that the transmission of monetary policy depends heavily on financial market conditions. When the financial markets were disrupted in autumn 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the traditional interest rate pass-through of our conventional monetary policy measures was obviously hampered.
But even today, the effectiveness of our monetary policy depends on financial market conditions. This can be illustrated, for example, by the role asset managers play in how non-standard monetary policy measures impact on longer-term interest rates.
Recent research by Morris and Shin1 suggests that, in trying to avoid ranking last in short-term performance tables, asset managers' portfolio choices could lead to large jumps in risk premiums in anticipation of small future changes in central bank policy rates. Due to their own payment arrangements, asset managers cannot usually afford to be the last to notice a switch in monetary policy, because the financial loss in the funds under management increases if many others try to sell their securities before them.
Consequently, they might become increasingly nervous the longer monetary policymakers try to maintain the low-interest-rate policy. This, in turn, could raise the probability of a sudden hike in risk premiums, the longer forward guidance is in place and the more aggressively quantitative easing is pursued. Monetary policymakers have to take this into account in order to avoid unintended consequences.
But it is not only the behaviour of asset managers that is relevant to monetary policy. The crisis has reminded us that financial exuberance, too, is potentially a harbinger of unstable consumer prices. But this does not mean that monetary policy is the way to go in terms of pre-empting financial instability as well.
Tinbergen's timeless insight continues to apply: to reach each policy goal reliably, at least one separate instrument is needed for each policy area. The crisis has therefore spawned a whole new set of instruments - macroprudential policies - designed to target specific sectors of the financial system. Rather than focusing on individual financial institutions, macroprudential policies that seek to prevent exuberance in entire financial sectors can take systemic interdependencies into account.
What is a treasure trove for researchers - the host of questions surrounding the functioning of the new set of instruments - is tricky terrain for policymakers, and for central bankers in particular. Shedding light on the use and effectiveness of different macroprudential instruments therefore remains an eminent task of economic research, and I am positive this conference will provide a valuable contribution.
Does this mean that monetary policymakers can ignore the financial stability implications of their actions? I don't think so. While I am not in favour of a dual monetary policy mandate, I am convinced that monetary policy cannot stand on the sidelines when financial imbalances build up.
First, we cannot be sure that macroprudential policies will eliminate financial imbalances. The experience with macroprudential instruments is still limited, and the toolkit is still incomplete.
Second, the crisis has vividly demonstrated how financial instability affects inflation developments and the capacity of the central bank to safeguard price stability. Therefore, monetary policy would be wise to take the implications of financial imbalances for price stability into account.
As a first line of defence, however, it is financial regulation that has to bear the brunt of the financial stability burden. With regard to traditional microprudential regulation, the direction for reform seems clear: realigning risk and reward in a way that sets incentives for sustainable action. Privatising gains and socialising losses is not only socially corrosive: it also produces bad economic results, as financial actors are encouraged to take on excessive risks.
A cornerstone of the international efforts to ensure the resolvability of systemic banks is the standard for bail-in debt, the so called Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC). It requires those banks to hold a minimum of debt that can absorb losses in the case of a bank resolution. This shields the taxpayer from footing the bill.
Europe already has a bail-in standard of its own, the so called minimum requirements on eligible liabilities (MREL). For efficiency and financial stability purposes, one could argue that TLAC and MREL should be as similar as justifiable.
Systemically relevant banks pose a special challenge when it comes to resolving them without creating substantial repercussions for the wider financial system. For that reason, the Single Resolution Fund exists. When resolving a systemic bank, the Single Resolution Board, which is the relevant European authority, can draw on the resources of this fund - but only after at least 8 % of the banks' liabilities have been bailed in. It seems therefore sensible that MREL for systemically important banks is guided by this threshold.
When it comes to bailing in creditors, the fear of contagion is probably the most important reason for refraining from doing so. Naturally, contagion risk is high when the creditors who are to be bailed in are banks themselves. Currently, the MREL standards do not discourage banks from holding another institution's bail-in debt. In the interests of financial stability, this has to change.
3. Fiscal and financial policy
The importance of realigning risk and return has come to the fore with regard to yet another issue: the research of Todd Walker and of Sascha Steffen and Joseph Korte2 - both works will be presented at this conference - are examples of a growing body of scientific evidence that the zero-risk weighting of sovereign debt distorts capital allocation and therefore acts as a drag on growth. The absence of exposure limits also encourages loading up on sovereign debt, potentially creating cluster risks that can pose a threat to financial stability as well.
The research is there; what is needed now are political results. The regulation of sovereign exposures is under discussion at both the European and the Basel level. And while progress at both levels is desirable, it is particularly urgent in the euro area.
In contrast to other jurisdictions, the Eurosystem is forbidden to act as a lender of last resort for governments. Such a function would be tantamount to mutualising sovereign risk, which would be incompatible with the decentralised Maastricht framework. The risk profile of euro-area sovereign debt is therefore different.
Doing away with sovereign debt as a cluster risk would also pave the way for the orderly restructuring of sovereign debt. If necessary, an orderly restructuring would be possible without endangering the stability of the overall financial system - and this would be good not only for euro-area countries but for other countries, too. In this case, financial risks would be borne by those who took them: the private investors. But an orderly restructuring of sovereign debt is not the only way in which financial market participants can be involved in bearing fiscal risks in a structured way.
A recent initiative by the Bank of England is pushing for the introduction of standardised GDP-linked bonds. By tying coupon payments, and potentially the principal as well, to a country's growth rate, investors share both the upside and the downside risk of a country's economic development. That way, a country can potentially retain fiscal space even when faced with adverse economic events. GDP-linked bonds exhibit equity-like features, which of course gives rise to questions as well.
How would a financial system cope with the fact that sovereign debt would cease to exist as a "safe asset"? How many investors would be interested in GDP-linked bonds and, leading on from there, how would a GDP-linked bond be priced? These are the questions that need to be answered before GDP-linked bonds can ever become a widespread vehicle for transferring fiscal risks - upside as well as downside ones - to private investors. But it is an avenue worth exploring.
Limiting fiscal risks, however, should be the first line of defence. An effective mechanism to achieve this aim would be to pursue a sound fiscal policy. This would also help to plug a constant source of uncertainty, at least in the euro area. As Eickmeier, Metiu and Prieto3 show, this might help to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy as well. When uncertainty is reduced, actors behave in a less risk-averse manner, which heightens responsiveness to monetary policy impulses.
The benefits of pursuing sound policies in a particular area are therefore not confined to that area, but extend to other policy areas as well. Triggering a virtuous cycle of sound monetary, fiscal and financial policies therefore seems like the surest and fastest way to resolve the conundrum the euro area faces right now.
The euro area still has a long way to go, especially with regard to fiscal policy. Unfortunately, the spill-over from monetary policy - savings through lower interest expenses - has not been used as much as it could to press ahead with improving public budgets.
4. Conclusion
Ladies and gentlemen
Macroeconomic stability is multidimensional, and this is essentially what this year's Spring Conference seeks to capture. While sound policies have to be pursued in each area to safeguard overall economic stability, the benefits of pursuing a sound policy spill over to other areas as well.
A virtuous circle of sound monetary, financial and fiscal policies is without doubt an enticing prospect, not only for the euro area, and I am confident this conference can enrich our understanding of how to make it happen.
I wish us all an exciting conference.
Ladies and gentlemen
I would like to welcome all of you to the Bundesbank Spring Conference. It is a great pleasure to have you here.
An old joke about economics is that it's "the only field in which two people can win a Nobel Prize for saying exactly the opposite thing". But sometimes, it is also a field in which people say exactly the same thing - and even Nobel-prize-worthy things - without having ever talked to one another beforehand.
That was the case with Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming - at least if anecdote is to be believed. They conducted research on the same topic - stabilisation policies for open economies; they worked at the same institution - the IMF; and they came to basically the same conclusions. But they did not join forces to produce the insights that form the basis of our understanding of open-economy macroeconomics to this day.
One of the insights offered by what is known as the Mundell-Fleming model is that you cannot have it all - a fixed exchange rate, free movement of capital and an independent monetary policy - at the same time. This insight came to be known as the impossible trinity. Our conference today will not be dealing with the ramifications of this trinity, although it remains the subject of academic debate, as the research work by Hélène Rey, for example, shows.
Instead, it's another trinity, the trinity of monetary, financial and fiscal stability, that is the focus of today's conference. And while this trinity should not be an impossible one, the recent financial and sovereign debt crises suggest that it might be a more improbable one than everyone perhaps thought ten years ago.
Even if Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming are counter-examples, I think that economic research benefits from an exchange of views. More often than not, it's discussion with others that produces a new idea or uncovers a flaw in reasoning, whereas a breakthrough is seldom achieved working alone.
What is true of economic research in general seems to be particularly true of research on the interplay of monetary, financial and fiscal policies, which is currently on the research agenda of so many different institutions. As a case in point, the Deutsche Bundesbank initiated the Trinity research network along with the Sveriges Riksbank, the Bank of Canada and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York under the auspices of Markus Brunnermeier (of Princeton University) and Eric Leeper (of Indiana University).
The aim of the network is to foster high-quality research on this topic and to boost interactions among the organising institutions as well as external researchers. Consequently, this year's Spring Conference is dedicated to the Trinity research network, and I am absolutely confident that it will make an important contribution towards achieving the aim of the network.
2. Monetary and financial policy
Ladies and gentlemen
In the years before the financial crisis, we had almost forgotten that generations of economists had grappled with one central question: how to achieve macroeconomic stability.
For many people, the success of the so-called "Great Moderation" provided the answer to this question. Inflation had apparently been conquered, and large swings in economic output seemed a thing of the past as well. By keeping prices stable, central banks also appeared to be able to moderate the business cycle, thereby providing for overall macroeconomic stability.
In hindsight, it looks as if, for a while, confidence had turned into complacency. But the financial crisis has reconnected everybody with the reality that the success of monetary policy depends on conditions it cannot create on its own. In particular, it is dependent on a stable financial system. And as the sovereign debt crisis has reminded us, sound fiscal policies remain as important as ever for monetary policy to be able to deliver price stability.
In recent years, however, academic progress has been made on all counts: with regard to the effects of unconventional monetary policy instruments, the principles of a stable financial system and of sound fiscal policies. And one additional insight is that, while the instruments for these three policy areas are different, the areas are nonetheless interdependent.
True to the adage that central bankers are concerned more with what they cannot control than what they can, in my remarks I will touch upon a few selected issues regarding monetary, financial and fiscal policy. These are: the interdependency between the monetary transmission process and financial market conditions, the minimum standards for bail-inable capital, the distortions stemming from the privileged regulatory treatment of sovereign debt, and the possible use of GDP-linked bonds as a tool through which private investors would bear fiscal risks.
The financial crisis has shown in no uncertain terms that the transmission of monetary policy depends heavily on financial market conditions. When the financial markets were disrupted in autumn 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the traditional interest rate pass-through of our conventional monetary policy measures was obviously hampered.
But even today, the effectiveness of our monetary policy depends on financial market conditions. This can be illustrated, for example, by the role asset managers play in how non-standard monetary policy measures impact on longer-term interest rates.
Recent research by Morris and Shin1 suggests that, in trying to avoid ranking last in short-term performance tables, asset managers' portfolio choices could lead to large jumps in risk premiums in anticipation of small future changes in central bank policy rates. Due to their own payment arrangements, asset managers cannot usually afford to be the last to notice a switch in monetary policy, because the financial loss in the funds under management increases if many others try to sell their securities before them.
Consequently, they might become increasingly nervous the longer monetary policymakers try to maintain the low-interest-rate policy. This, in turn, could raise the probability of a sudden hike in risk premiums, the longer forward guidance is in place and the more aggressively quantitative easing is pursued. Monetary policymakers have to take this into account in order to avoid unintended consequences.
But it is not only the behaviour of asset managers that is relevant to monetary policy. The crisis has reminded us that financial exuberance, too, is potentially a harbinger of unstable consumer prices. But this does not mean that monetary policy is the way to go in terms of pre-empting financial instability as well.
Tinbergen's timeless insight continues to apply: to reach each policy goal reliably, at least one separate instrument is needed for each policy area. The crisis has therefore spawned a whole new set of instruments - macroprudential policies - designed to target specific sectors of the financial system. Rather than focusing on individual financial institutions, macroprudential policies that seek to prevent exuberance in entire financial sectors can take systemic interdependencies into account.
What is a treasure trove for researchers - the host of questions surrounding the functioning of the new set of instruments - is tricky terrain for policymakers, and for central bankers in particular. Shedding light on the use and effectiveness of different macroprudential instruments therefore remains an eminent task of economic research, and I am positive this conference will provide a valuable contribution.
Does this mean that monetary policymakers can ignore the financial stability implications of their actions? I don't think so. While I am not in favour of a dual monetary policy mandate, I am convinced that monetary policy cannot stand on the sidelines when financial imbalances build up.
First, we cannot be sure that macroprudential policies will eliminate financial imbalances. The experience with macroprudential instruments is still limited, and the toolkit is still incomplete.
Second, the crisis has vividly demonstrated how financial instability affects inflation developments and the capacity of the central bank to safeguard price stability. Therefore, monetary policy would be wise to take the implications of financial imbalances for price stability into account.
As a first line of defence, however, it is financial regulation that has to bear the brunt of the financial stability burden. With regard to traditional microprudential regulation, the direction for reform seems clear: realigning risk and reward in a way that sets incentives for sustainable action. Privatising gains and socialising losses is not only socially corrosive: it also produces bad economic results, as financial actors are encouraged to take on excessive risks.
A cornerstone of the international efforts to ensure the resolvability of systemic banks is the standard for bail-in debt, the so called Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC). It requires those banks to hold a minimum of debt that can absorb losses in the case of a bank resolution. This shields the taxpayer from footing the bill.
Europe already has a bail-in standard of its own, the so called minimum requirements on eligible liabilities (MREL). For efficiency and financial stability purposes, one could argue that TLAC and MREL should be as similar as justifiable.
Systemically relevant banks pose a special challenge when it comes to resolving them without creating substantial repercussions for the wider financial system. For that reason, the Single Resolution Fund exists. When resolving a systemic bank, the Single Resolution Board, which is the relevant European authority, can draw on the resources of this fund - but only after at least 8 % of the banks' liabilities have been bailed in. It seems therefore sensible that MREL for systemically important banks is guided by this threshold.
When it comes to bailing in creditors, the fear of contagion is probably the most important reason for refraining from doing so. Naturally, contagion risk is high when the creditors who are to be bailed in are banks themselves. Currently, the MREL standards do not discourage banks from holding another institution's bail-in debt. In the interests of financial stability, this has to change.
3. Fiscal and financial policy
The importance of realigning risk and return has come to the fore with regard to yet another issue: the research of Todd Walker and of Sascha Steffen and Joseph Korte2 - both works will be presented at this conference - are examples of a growing body of scientific evidence that the zero-risk weighting of sovereign debt distorts capital allocation and therefore acts as a drag on growth. The absence of exposure limits also encourages loading up on sovereign debt, potentially creating cluster risks that can pose a threat to financial stability as well.
The research is there; what is needed now are political results. The regulation of sovereign exposures is under discussion at both the European and the Basel level. And while progress at both levels is desirable, it is particularly urgent in the euro area.
In contrast to other jurisdictions, the Eurosystem is forbidden to act as a lender of last resort for governments. Such a function would be tantamount to mutualising sovereign risk, which would be incompatible with the decentralised Maastricht framework. The risk profile of euro-area sovereign debt is therefore different.
Doing away with sovereign debt as a cluster risk would also pave the way for the orderly restructuring of sovereign debt. If necessary, an orderly restructuring would be possible without endangering the stability of the overall financial system - and this would be good not only for euro-area countries but for other countries, too. In this case, financial risks would be borne by those who took them: the private investors. But an orderly restructuring of sovereign debt is not the only way in which financial market participants can be involved in bearing fiscal risks in a structured way.
A recent initiative by the Bank of England is pushing for the introduction of standardised GDP-linked bonds. By tying coupon payments, and potentially the principal as well, to a country's growth rate, investors share both the upside and the downside risk of a country's economic development. That way, a country can potentially retain fiscal space even when faced with adverse economic events. GDP-linked bonds exhibit equity-like features, which of course gives rise to questions as well.
How would a financial system cope with the fact that sovereign debt would cease to exist as a "safe asset"? How many investors would be interested in GDP-linked bonds and, leading on from there, how would a GDP-linked bond be priced? These are the questions that need to be answered before GDP-linked bonds can ever become a widespread vehicle for transferring fiscal risks - upside as well as downside ones - to private investors. But it is an avenue worth exploring.
Limiting fiscal risks, however, should be the first line of defence. An effective mechanism to achieve this aim would be to pursue a sound fiscal policy. This would also help to plug a constant source of uncertainty, at least in the euro area. As Eickmeier, Metiu and Prieto3 show, this might help to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy as well. When uncertainty is reduced, actors behave in a less risk-averse manner, which heightens responsiveness to monetary policy impulses.
The benefits of pursuing sound policies in a particular area are therefore not confined to that area, but extend to other policy areas as well. Triggering a virtuous cycle of sound monetary, fiscal and financial policies therefore seems like the surest and fastest way to resolve the conundrum the euro area faces right now.
The euro area still has a long way to go, especially with regard to fiscal policy. Unfortunately, the spill-over from monetary policy - savings through lower interest expenses - has not been used as much as it could to press ahead with improving public budgets.
4. Conclusion
Ladies and gentlemen
Macroeconomic stability is multidimensional, and this is essentially what this year's Spring Conference seeks to capture. While sound policies have to be pursued in each area to safeguard overall economic stability, the benefits of pursuing a sound policy spill over to other areas as well.
A virtuous circle of sound monetary, financial and fiscal policies is without doubt an enticing prospect, not only for the euro area, and I am confident this conference can enrich our understanding of how to make it happen.
I wish us all an exciting conference.
1 See Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin (2015), Risk
Premium Shifts and Monetary Policy: A Coordination Approach, Princeton
University - William S Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper
No 075_2016, 2015.
2 Korte, J, and S Steffen (2014), "Zero Risk Contagion - Banks' Sovereign Exposure and Sovereign Risk Spillovers", Working Paper.
3 Sandra Eickmeier, Norbert Metiu and Esteban Prieto
(2016), "Time-varying volatility, financial intermediation and monetary
policy", IWH Discussion Papers No. 19/2016.
Versão PDF: http://www.bis.org/review/r160610e.pdf
Versão PDF: http://www.bis.org/review/r160610e.pdf
quinta-feira, 17 de junho de 2010
Brasil: inacreditavel desvio das financas publicas
O chamado Fundo Soberano do Brasil -- que não é bem fundo, sequer soberano -- representa uma forma especialmente deformada de contornar controles parlamentares e a boa administração das finanças públicas para capitalizar, sem passar pelo Congresso, uma empresa pública como o Banco do Brasil.
O Fundo Soberano do Brasil não foi constituído, como os outros exemplos do gênero, com superávits fiscais ou saldos excedentários de transações correntes -- duas coisas que o Brasil não tem -- mas com recursos orçamentários, num terrível desvio de uma administração correta das contas públicas, já que esse dinheiro transferido para o FSB passa a ser administrado exclusivamente pelo Executivo sem qualquer controle parlamentar.
Teoricamente destinado a operar no plano internacional, o FSB está sendo utilizado para prover de capital uma empresa pública, que poderia estar se abastecendo no mercado de capitais, ou se submeter aos controles parlamentares para o provimento de recursos.
Mais um exemplo de deterioração na qualidade das contas públicas no país.
Mas esse tipo de desvio de funções da boa administração das contas públicas e uso indevido de recursos da sociedade brasileira não existe apenas na configuração do Fundo Soberano -- uma piada de mau gosto -- mas sobretudo nas capitalizações que o Tesouro vem fazendo indevidamente e não contabilizando como dívida pública o que de fato é dívida pública.
O mesmo desvio ocorre, por exemplo, na recente lei que redefiniu o regime de exploração do petróleo do pré-sal, com um esquema malandro de capitalização da Petrobras (de fato, um financiamento antecipado pelo governo, e uma entrega futura, e aleatória, de petróleo ainda não extraído). O que de fato existe é que a sociedade brasileira está financiando a Petrobras, quando ela poderia, na verdade, usar o dinheiro do Tesouro para investimentos e ou despesas tipicamente estatais (saúde e educação, por ex.), quando a Petrobras ou empresas privadas que poderiam estar tranquilamente fazendo os investimentos necessários no regime anterior - teriam a faculdade de se abastecer no mercado de crédito privado (onde a Petrobras, aliás, já teve melhor rating do que o Brasil).
Esse tipo de absuso com o dinheiro público, para fins puramente demagógicos, é uma marca desse governo.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brazil Sovereign Wealth Fund To Buy Banco Do Brasil Shares
Dow Jones, 17.06.2010
SAO PAULO - The Brazilian sovereign wealth fund will buy 66.5 million shares to be offered by state-run Banco do Brasil SA (BDORY, BBAS3.BR), Latin America's biggest bank by assets, through bank's primary and secondary offering of shares on the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange, BMFBovespa.
Banco do Brasil said, in a statement late Wednesday, that Brazil's sovereign wealth fund, Fundo Soberano do Brasil, will acquire its shares via a special fund known as FFIE.
Earlier this month, Banco do Brasil said it will offer a total of 356.85 million shares, with 286 million shares through a primary offering and 70.8 million shares via a
secondary offer.
The operation could raise about 9.77 billion reais ($5.46 billion) based on Banco do Brasil's closing price of BRL27.39 on Wednesday.
Investors can reserve shares from June 21 through June 29. Trading is expected to begin July 2.
With the acquisition of shares to be made by the sovereign wealth fund, the federal government will keep its control on Banco do Brasil.
Brazil created the sovereign wealth fund in late 2007 with the aim of reinforcing public sector savings and funding projects of strategic interest abroad.
O Fundo Soberano do Brasil não foi constituído, como os outros exemplos do gênero, com superávits fiscais ou saldos excedentários de transações correntes -- duas coisas que o Brasil não tem -- mas com recursos orçamentários, num terrível desvio de uma administração correta das contas públicas, já que esse dinheiro transferido para o FSB passa a ser administrado exclusivamente pelo Executivo sem qualquer controle parlamentar.
Teoricamente destinado a operar no plano internacional, o FSB está sendo utilizado para prover de capital uma empresa pública, que poderia estar se abastecendo no mercado de capitais, ou se submeter aos controles parlamentares para o provimento de recursos.
Mais um exemplo de deterioração na qualidade das contas públicas no país.
Mas esse tipo de desvio de funções da boa administração das contas públicas e uso indevido de recursos da sociedade brasileira não existe apenas na configuração do Fundo Soberano -- uma piada de mau gosto -- mas sobretudo nas capitalizações que o Tesouro vem fazendo indevidamente e não contabilizando como dívida pública o que de fato é dívida pública.
O mesmo desvio ocorre, por exemplo, na recente lei que redefiniu o regime de exploração do petróleo do pré-sal, com um esquema malandro de capitalização da Petrobras (de fato, um financiamento antecipado pelo governo, e uma entrega futura, e aleatória, de petróleo ainda não extraído). O que de fato existe é que a sociedade brasileira está financiando a Petrobras, quando ela poderia, na verdade, usar o dinheiro do Tesouro para investimentos e ou despesas tipicamente estatais (saúde e educação, por ex.), quando a Petrobras ou empresas privadas que poderiam estar tranquilamente fazendo os investimentos necessários no regime anterior - teriam a faculdade de se abastecer no mercado de crédito privado (onde a Petrobras, aliás, já teve melhor rating do que o Brasil).
Esse tipo de absuso com o dinheiro público, para fins puramente demagógicos, é uma marca desse governo.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brazil Sovereign Wealth Fund To Buy Banco Do Brasil Shares
Dow Jones, 17.06.2010
SAO PAULO - The Brazilian sovereign wealth fund will buy 66.5 million shares to be offered by state-run Banco do Brasil SA (BDORY, BBAS3.BR), Latin America's biggest bank by assets, through bank's primary and secondary offering of shares on the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange, BMFBovespa.
Banco do Brasil said, in a statement late Wednesday, that Brazil's sovereign wealth fund, Fundo Soberano do Brasil, will acquire its shares via a special fund known as FFIE.
Earlier this month, Banco do Brasil said it will offer a total of 356.85 million shares, with 286 million shares through a primary offering and 70.8 million shares via a
secondary offer.
The operation could raise about 9.77 billion reais ($5.46 billion) based on Banco do Brasil's closing price of BRL27.39 on Wednesday.
Investors can reserve shares from June 21 through June 29. Trading is expected to begin July 2.
With the acquisition of shares to be made by the sovereign wealth fund, the federal government will keep its control on Banco do Brasil.
Brazil created the sovereign wealth fund in late 2007 with the aim of reinforcing public sector savings and funding projects of strategic interest abroad.
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