EUA reconhecem a URSS em 1933 - This Day in History (NYT)

ON THIS DAY

On Nov. 16, 1933, the United States and the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations. President Roosevelt sent a telegram to Soviet leader Maxim Litvinov, expressing hope that United States-Soviet relations would "forever remain normal and friendly.'' 

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[Permito-me citar aqui a biografia de George Kennan por John Lewis Gaddis, pois ele foi um dos arquitetos desse reconhecimento de relações diplomáticas.]

 

UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES SOVIET, EXACTING PLEDGE ON PROPAGANDA; BULLITT NAMED FIRST AMBASSADOR

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PRESIDENT REVEALS PACT

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Reads to Press Letters in Which He and Litvinoff Bind Nations.

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FREE WORSHIP CONCEDED

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Russia Also Agrees to Allow Americans Own Counsel if Brought to Trial

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WORLD PEACE IS STRESSED

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Russo-American Claims Will Be Adjusted Through Regular Diplomatic Channels.

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By WALTER DURANTY

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES

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Washington, Nov. 17--Official relations between the United States and the Soviet were established at ten minutes before midnight yesterday. Or, to express it more simply, the United States recognized the U. S. S. R. at that hour after sixteen years and nine days of the Soviet Government's existence. The fact of the establishment of relations was announced this afternoon by President Roosevelt, but historically speaking the date was 11:50 P.M., Nov. 16.
The undertakings of the two governments were set forth in eleven letters and a memorandum exchanged between the President and Maxim Litvinoff, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, covering agreements and concessions completed in ten days of negotiation.
Subject to the approval of the Soviet Government, William C. Bullitt of Philadelphia, special assistant to the Secretary of State, was designated to be the first American Ambassador to the U. S. S. R.
The pact read to the press by Mr. Roosevelt at his press conference this afternoon, covers propaganda, freedom of worship, protection of nationals and debts and claims.
Anti-Propaganda Pledge
The United States receives the most complete pledge against Bolshevist propaganda that has ever been made by the Soviet Government, and includes "organizations in receipt of any financial assistance from it" as well as persons or organizations under the jurisdiction or control of the government. Complete freedom of worship is assured Americans, as well as assurance against discrimination because of "ecclesiastical status."
To Americans is accorded "the right to be represented by counsel of their choice" if brought to trial in the U. S. S. R., which represented perhaps the most definite concession that M. Litvinoff made. The President made reciprocal pledges except regarding religion, which the Soviet did not desire.
Debts and claims were left to be thrashed out later for "a final settlement of the claims and counterclaims" between the governments "and the claims of their nationals." Claims arising out of the military occupation of Siberia by American forces, or assistance to military forces in Siberia after 1917, were waived, but the Murmansk occupation was not mentioned.
One may surmise that the article relating to propaganda was drawn up after the most careful consideration by the Americans of the propaganda treaties or clauses between the Soviet and Latvia and the Soviet and Afghanistan, or both, but it goes further than either of these two, and might almost be termed a diplomatic victory of high order.
The question of religious freedom has great political importance and is treated with corresponding detail. Americans are allowed everything they can want in this respect, but it is worth noting that M. Litvinoff takes the opportunity of "slipping something over" in a quiet way by quoting the laws of the Soviet Union to show that many of the reports upon the restriction of religious liberty in that country have been exaggerated.
The American side, however, scores a tactical success in M. Litvinoff's admission that "no persons having ecclesiastical status" shall be refused visas to enter the U.S.S.R. on that account.
With regard to the protection of American nationals, President Roosevelt has succeeded in obtaining one sentence which will have a considerable reverberation and cause no small heartburning in Downing Street, London, namely:
"Americans shall have the right" (if brought to trial in the U. S. S. R.) to "be represented by counsel of their choice." That sounds like something rather different from the circumstances of the Metro-Vickers trial, not to mention the earlier Shakta trial in which three Germans were involved.
In the matter of debts and claims, the honors are more evenly divided than appears at first sight. The important phrase here is "preparatory to a final settlement of the claims and counter-claims between the two governments" in the first paragraph of M. Litvinoff's letter, which to a certain extent detracts from the apparent importance of the waiving of immediate claims by the Soviet.
M. Litvinoff stated that there would be no mixed claims commission to adjust various Russo-American claims. They will all be handled through regular diplomatic channels.
It is also within the bounds of possibility that some more far-reaching agreements, at least with regard to the private debts, may be arrived at shortly, although they do not form part of the documents published today.
It is not surprising that the Russians agreed to waive a claim against the effects of the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, because both in fact and intent it was far from damaging to Soviet interests. But here, too, what looks like any American victory is somewhat modified by the point that there is no reference to the American Expeditionary Force in Murmansk, which undoubtedly will provide the basis for a Soviet claim, according to the Alabama precedent.
Speaking by and large, it is probable that claims and counter-claims, so far as the two governments are concerned, and not impossibly the pre-revolution debts as well, will more or less cancel each other, whereas the American claims for money or property of American nationals seized by the Soviet will fall in another category.
President Reads Treaty
There must have been 200 newspaper men in the circular study of the Chief Executive when he made his historic announcement, and the way he did it gave an interesting illustration of the character of Franklin D. Roosevelt, his sense of drama--I hope the word "showmanship" is not "lese-majeste"--and his profound knowledge of psychology. Every one present was on tiptoe waiting for news about the result of the negotiations with M. Litvinoff.
Mr. Roosevelt smiled pleasantly at the crowd, cast an affectionate eye round the walls at his splendid collection of colored prints of old New England scenes and stated in a conventional tone that he had gratifying news from the iron and steel industry about the working of their NRA code. This he thought was important news, and it seemed, too, that there were encouraging reports along the same line from the textile industry.
It was a genuine "coup de theatre," and there was something like a gasp of suspense from his hearers.
Reporters are supposed to be toughened by their profession against surprises but, speaking personally at least, there was one of them who was startled. And the President knew it and got th full flavor of that moment of thrill.
Then quietly and calmly he proceeded to read the preamble to what is tantamount to an American-Soviet treaty.
The preamble consists of a letter from the President to the Commissar stating:
"I am very happy to inform you that as a result of our conversations, the Government of the United States has decided to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to exchange Ambassadors.
"I trust that the relations now established between our peoples may forever remain normal and friendly, and that our nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world."
Formal recognition was followed immediately by the designation of Mr. Bullitt as Ambassador to Russia. Hard on the heels of this announcement came publication by the State Department of the correspondence terminating the tenuous hold of representatives of the old Kerensky regime on the Russian diplomatic and consular service in this country.
No Russian Ambassador to the United States has been designated, but it is taken for granted that an announcement will be made in the very near future.
At the National Press Club this evening, while President Roosevelt was speeding toward Warm Springs, Ga., for a Thanksgiving holiday, M. Litvinoff in a brief speech and in reply to questions reviewed the negotiations for the benefit of Washington newspaper correspondents.
It is worth noting that the final phrase in the President's letter is "for the preservation of the peace of the world."
That is no formal insertion. Indeed there is hardly a word or line in the whole exchange of letters which does not merit the most careful scrutiny and attention.
M. Litvinoff replied in almost the same phrasing, and he, too, stressed the preservation of world peace which, as I cabled from Moscow, was the keynote of the first official Soviet reaction to the news of the President's message to Kalinin.
The letters cover four points of vital moment and are listed, one may presume, in the order of their importance. I venture that presumption because if ever there has been a conference in world history, and historically this conference may be found to rank among the most decisive, which really did "proceed according to plan," at least according to President Roosevelt's plan, it is this one.
You can hardly call it "an open covenant openly arrived at," that is to say, not so far as the last three words are concerned, but as a piece of "State planning," to employ the phrase familiar in Moscow and not unknown in Washington, it stands unique in post-war international events.
Put briefly, the points are propaganda, freedom of worship, protection of nationals and the question of debts and claims.
Right here there is to be noticed a most interesting point. As to propaganda, M. Litvinoff's letter comes first, expressing what the Soviet undertakes in this matter. The President's letter follows, recording, registering, and approving the said undertaking.
In the case of protection of nations, M. Litvinoff announces that certain steps shall be taken and the President assents, after which M. Litvinoff adds a short note of explanation upon the somewhat obscure question of economic espionage, which he clarifies. Once more M. Litvinoff leads in the matter of debts and claims and the President takes note of and records what he says.
To discuss the four points in detail, the propaganda letter of the Commissar contains four articles which admirably illustrate upon what a fair and reciprocal footing these negotiations have been conducted. Because, although all four articles are apparently undertakings by the Soviet, the first two are specifically things in which the United States is interested, whereas the two latter are things in which the Soviet is interested.
President Accepts Terms
The fourth article is reminiscent of a clause in the Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact which referred primarily to "White Russian," or Nationalist Georgian and Ukrainian anti- Bolshevist organization.
The President's reply recapitulates the four articles, but adds significantly "it will be the fixed policy of the Executive of the United States within the limits of the powers conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States to adhere reciprocally to the engagements above expressed."
The agreement was described in informed circles as including every concession the Soviet government has ever made singly to any other country. The significant thing is that in this case the concessions are lumped into one vastly important international document--and were made prior to recognition.
To sum up, it would seem to me, with a certain knowledge of both countries, that this is one of the best and fairest international agreements I have ever read because it has a solid basis of mutual understanding and respect.
If one wants to estimate the "horse trade," I should say M. Litvinoff has got perhaps a shade the worst of it, but on the other hand, to vary the metaphor, M. Litvinoff is taking home a pretty fat turkey for Thanksgiving.
And don't forget that there is no mention of future credits and business in these documents, save rather vague allusions to consular conventions, and so forth. It is absurd to suppose that such subjects have not been discussed and may lead to great mutual benefits.
There are other points of international and political interest which have perhaps been covered. The negotiations have taken ten days, and, without being oversanguine, it may happen that, in view of the gravity of the issues involved in this moment of international confusion, general perplexity and danger, too, some future historian will term them "ten days that steadied the world."
 

Gorbachev: o apaziguador (sobre os mísseis nucleares de Russia e EUA) - The Washington Post

 

 

 

 

 

Opinions

Mikhail Gorbachev: My plea to the presidents of Russia and the United States

President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at a signing ceremony for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in the White House on Dec. 8, 1987. (Barry Thumma/AP)

By Mikhail Gorbachev  

The Washington Post, October 11 at 11:00 AM

 

Mikhail Gorbachev was leader of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1991.
 

This December will mark the 30th anniversary of the signing of the treaty between the Soviet Union and United States on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. This was the start of the process of radically cutting back nuclear arsenals, which was continued with the 1991 and 2010 strategic arms reduction treaties and the agreements reducing tactical nuclear weapons.

The scale of the process launched in 1987 is evidenced by the fact that, as Russia and the United States reported to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2015, 80 percent of the nuclear weapons accumulated during the Cold War have been decommissioned and destroyed. Another important fact is that, despite the recent serious deterioration in bilateral relations, both sides have been complying with the strategic weapons agreements.
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, however, is now in jeopardy. It has proved to be the most vulnerable link in the system of limiting and reducing weapons of mass destruction. There have been calls on both sides for scrapping the agreement.

So what is happening, what is the problem, and what needs to be done?
Both sides have raised issues of compliance, accusing the other of violating or circumventing the treaty’s key provisions. From the sidelines, lacking fuller information, it is difficult to evaluate those accusations. But one thing is clear: The problem has a political as well as a technical aspect. It is up to the political leaders to take action.
Therefore I am making an appeal to the presidents of Russia and the United States.
Relations between the two nations are in a severe crisis. A way out must be sought, and there is one well-tested means available for accomplishing this: a dialogue based on mutual respect.
It will not be easy to cut through the logjam of issues on both sides. But neither was our dialogue easy three decades ago. It had its critics and detractors, who tried to derail it.
In the final analysis, it was the political will of the two nations’ leaders that proved decisive. And that is what’s needed now. This is what our two countries’ citizens and people everywhere expect from the presidents of Russia and the United States.
I call upon Russia and the United States to prepare and hold a full-scale summit on the entire range of issues. It is far from normal that the presidents of major nuclear powers meet merely “on the margins” of international gatherings. I hope that the process of preparing a proper summit is in the works even now.
I believe that the summit meeting should focus on the problems of reducing nuclear weapons and strengthening strategic stability. For should the system of nuclear arms control collapse, as may well happen if the INF Treaty is scrapped, the consequences, both direct and indirect, will be disastrous.
The closer that nuclear weapons are deployed to borders, the more dangerous they are: There is less time for a decision and greater risk of catastrophic error. And what will happen to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty if the nuclear arms race begins anew? I am afraid it will be ruined.
If, however, the INF Treaty is saved, it will send a powerful signal to the world that the two biggest nuclear powers are aware of their responsibility and take their obligations seriously. Everyone will breathe a sigh of relief, and relations between Russia and the United States will finally get off the ground again.
I am confident that preparing a joint presidential statement on the two nations’ commitment to the INF Treaty is a realistic goal. Simultaneously, the technical issues could be resolved; for this purpose, the joint control commission under the INF Treaty could resume its work. I am convinced that, with an impetus from the two presidents, the generals and diplomats would be able to reach agreement.
We are living in a troubled world. It is particularly disturbing that relations between the major nuclear powers, Russia and the United States, have become a serious source of tensions and a hostage to domestic politics. It is time to return to sanity. I am sure that even inveterate opponents of normalizing U.S.-Russian relations will not dare object to the two presidents. These critics have no arguments on their side, for the very fact that the INF Treaty has been in effect for 30 years proves that it serves the security interests of our two countries and of the world.
In any undertaking, it is important to take the first step. In 1987, the first step in the difficult but vitally important process of ridding the world of nuclear weapons was the INF Treaty. Today, we face a dual challenge of preventing the collapse of the system of nuclear agreements and reversing the downward spiral in U.S.-Russian relations. It is time to take the first step.

Renegociando o NAFTA: o mercantilismo americano reaparece - The Economist

Seconds out 

The North American Free-Trade Agreement renegotiation begins

Rewriting North America’s trade rules will not be easy

The Economist, August 17, 2017

Print edition | Finance and economics

Aug 17th 2017

 

THE North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a 23-year-old trade deal between America, Mexico and Canada, is being revamped. On August 16th, after months of threats, taunts and tweets, the first round of talks started in Washington. The negotiators face a daunting challenge, straddling domestic and foreign policy. They must please their political masters while grappling with devilishly detailed policy problems. If they fail, it will not be for lack of experience. The professionals are in the room.

This negotiation will be more tense than most. Participation in trade talks is usually by mutual consent. In this one, President Donald Trump is trying to hold his trade partners hostage, by threatening to withdraw from the original deal if a better one cannot be agreed on. That such an outcome would also hurt America does not make the exercise any easier.
 

Pressure is added by a desperately tight, if unacknowledged, deadline, set by the presidential-election timetable in Mexico. If no deal is agreed by early 2018, talks must pause to restart a year later. By then, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, a fiercely anti-American Mexican candidate, may be in power. Ildefonso Guajardo (pictured, right), Mexico’s economy minister, reckons there is a 60% chance that the deal will be renegotiated this year. The original NAFTA talks took three years.The first round of negotiations is when each side sets out its priorities. At the opening press conference the Mexicans and the Canadians both emphasised the importance of keeping the benefits of the existing deal. Less promisingly, Robert Lighthizer (pictured, left), the United States Trade Representative, said he wanted assurances that America’s huge trade deficits would not continue. Making the deal hinge on this would cross the others’ red lines.
Mr Lighthizer also spoke of making a pact that respects sovereignty, a swipe at Chapter 19 of the original deal. This sets out a process for resolving disputes over defensive tariffs, arbitrated by a panel of judges picked by the three partners. Mexico and Canada are open to making this process faster. But ditching it is unacceptable to the Canadians, who do not want to be vulnerable to American anti-dumping measures.
The talks will be split into groups covering specific negotiating areas. Labour standards and dispute settlement were on the agenda for the first day. Each side usually brings along some proposed text, often lifted from another agreement. On labour standards, American trade veterans may recognise some text negotiated for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration’s attempt—jettisoned by Mr Trump—to update NAFTA, and bring in nine other Pacific Rim countries. The Mexicans say they will find it difficult to agree to anything stronger.
The Canadians have the advantage of ready-made text from a recent deal with the EU. Its dispute-settlement rules watered down investors’ rights in favour of governments’ freedom to regulate. The Americans may reject that in the face of fierce resistance from corporate lobbyists.
Given the time pressure, tricky topics will be broached early. Procurement was on the agenda for day two. Chrystia Freeland (centre), Canada’s foreign minister, held up pictures of firefighters from the other NAFTA partners tackling Canadian forest fires as a symbol of co-operation. In other comments she was less friendly, declaring that “local-content provisions for major government contracts are political junk-food: superficially appetising, but unhealthy in the long run.” Yet to ease Canadian contractors’ access to American government business would irk Mr Trump, a staunch advocate of “Buy American”.

The bracket bulge

After the first round of meetings, the proposals will be merged into a single document. Uncontroversial items—a prohibition on customs duties for digital products, say—can be slotted in. Disagreements will be in brackets, indicating which side holds which position. The objective then is to remove as many brackets as possible.
Such talks make grubby mercantilist horse-traders of even high-minded negotiators. Perhaps the Canadians could parlay opening their dairy market for better access to American government contracts. Trickier decisions will require “political direction”, said Canada’s chief negotiator, Steve Verheul, who has set up a system to get speedy sign-offs from his superiors.
Rules relating to the car industry will be particularly contentious. Without that trade, America would have no deficit in goods with Mexico. At issue are the rules that set the amount of regional content a product must have for it to count within the deal. Without such rules other countries could exploit the pact to export tariff-free through a NAFTA member. Enticingly for the Trump administration, tight rules (and those in NAFTA are fairly tight) reduce imports from non-NAFTA countries.
Mr Lighthizer says that the rules of origin should require higher NAFTA content and “substantial” American content. The Mexicans will balk at any asymmetry in favour of America, arguing that it violates the spirit of a regional deal. Companies will resist too, and where non-NAFTA tariffs are low, they have the option of simply operating outside the parameters of the agreement. Tariffs on cars entering America are a mere 2.5%. For products where non-NAFTA tariffs are even lower, more than a quarter flowing into America from Mexico bypass the deal entirely.
The need for speed will probably oblige negotiators to sacrifice some of their ambitions. Complicated areas such as services or intellectual property may be jettisoned, or shallow agreements reached. Resolutions for historically difficult disputes, such as between America and Mexico on sugar, or between America and Canada on softwood lumber, may have to wait.
Ms Freeland predicted “some dramatic moments ahead”. Trade negotiators are inured to screaming, yelling, walkouts and all-nighters. Wendy Cutler, a negotiator under the Obama administration, says the tension is sometimes staged for the benefit of a domestic audience: “It’s not always what it looks like to the public.”

This article appeared in the Finance and economics section of the print edition under the headline "Seconds out"

Guerra nuclear EUA-RPDC? Possivel mas improvavel - Belfer Center, Harvard

O pessoal responsável, ou seja, todo mundo menos dois malucos nas antípodas, anda preocupado com a guerra verbal entre o gigante estratégico e o rato que ruge.
Vamos ler o que eles têm a nos dizer:

North Korea and Nuclear War
Belfer Center of Science and International Affairs, Harvard University

Lightning strikes behind a B-52 bomber at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota. Bombers like this are one of a variety of delivery methods for nuclear weapons. (J.T. Armstrong/U.S. Air Force) Here’s What Happens When the President Orders a Nuclear Strike Op-ed by James A. Winnefeld, Jr. Fortune Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have risen quickly this week on the heels of another long-range missile test, combined with public revelations that the Kim Jong-un regime may have miniaturized a nuclear weapon that can be mated to such a missile....We knew this was coming. Yet now that the rhetoric is running high, many are concerned that we are on the brink of nuclear war. Even though the possibility of such a war is remote, it has evoked understandable curiosity among the public regarding how the U.S. chain of command would function for ordering a nuclear strike, and whether or not sufficient checks and balances exist to prevent a costly mistake. Read more › North Korea: Nuclear Threats and Consequences TV interview with Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook NECN The Take with Sue O'Connell North Korea Stakes Include Massive Loss of Civilian Life Op-ed by Nicholas Burns USA Today Other media coverage from Nicholas Burns: TV interview on Bloomberg › Trump's Language 'Increases the Capacity for Mistakes' TV interview with Juliette Kayyem CNN Erin Burnett OutFront Other media coverage from Juliette Kayyem: Radio interview on Boston Public Radio › Harvard's Park Troubled by Trump's N. Korea Statements TV interview with John Park Bloomberg John Park also quoted in: The Economist › The Wall Street Journal › Watch John Park on HKS Facebook Live (requires Facebook login): Thursday, August 17, 2017 at 2:00PM EDT › The Real Nuclear Option Featured research from International Security by Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino Slate Is the Use of Nuclear Weapons Becoming More Thinkable? TV interview with Gary Samore BBC Newsnight Gary Samore also featured in: Q & A with Russia Matters › U.S. News and World Report › Reuters (also quotes Jon Wolfsthal) › Obama-era Nuclear Expert Says Trump Has Not Modernized U.S. Nuclear Arsenal TV interview with Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall MSNBC Andrea Mitchell Reports North Korea Threat Radio interview with William Tobey Michigan's Big Show Where Will Trump and Kim's Nuclear Brinkmanship Lead? TV interview with James A. Winnefeld, Jr. CBS Sunday Morning What's Next For The U.S. And North Korea (at 19:43) Radio interview with Jon Wolfsthal NPR On Point

Pais Fundadores Financeiros: o primeiro banco nacional americano - book excerpt

A batalha entre Alexander Hamilton, uma espécie de desenvolvimentista avant la lettre, e os agraristas republicanos reunidos em torno de Jefferson, não se limitou à lei autorizando a criação de um banco nacional, mas se estendia à questão das tarifas alfandegárias e todos os demais mecanismos favorecendo o protecionismo e o apoio à indústria nacional, uma questão que permanece viva, presente e problemático até hoje (basta verificar as posições de Trump a esse respeito).
A questão do banco também se manteve viva, até hoje, ainda que mais uma batalha tenha sido travada em torno da criação do Federal Reserve, um empreendimento que tem pouco mais de cem anos (1913).
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Today's encore selection -- from Financial Founding Fathers: The Men Who Made America Rich by Robert E. Wright and David J. Cowen. When America's Founding Fathers signed the Constitution in 1787, many believed that the new government was only authorized to do the functions specifically enumerated in that document. After all, those enumerated powers were already a bold leap forward from the Articles of Confederation. However, other signers felt that the government should be entitled to do things far beyond the enumerated powers, things "necessary and proper" to carry out its enumerated responsibilities. The difference between those two views formed an immediate rift between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson that echoes to this day -- and first exploded in the battle over a bill to create the first Bank of the United States, an institution nowhere mentioned in the Constitution:

"Banks were then highly controversial, but Alexander Hamilton was at the apex of his brilliance, guiding his Bank bill through Congress, ably aided by Congressman Fisher Ames of Massachusetts, a nationalist of the most fervent type. Although the Bank bill passed the Senate on January 20, 1791, congressman and Federalist Papers co-author James Madison tried to defeat it in the House. On February 8, the diminutive Madison and his allies lost a roll call that counted 39 in favor of the Bank and only 20 opposed. The political fighting had been particularly nasty, causing one senator to state in his diary that 'some gentlemen would have been ashamed to have their speeches of this day reflected in the newspapers of tomorrow.' The attack by the mostly southern opponents to the Bank was a landmark in American history, marking as it did the birth of the agrarian or Jeffersonian wing of the Republican Party. While this stand was the agrarian Re­publicans' first, it was certainly not their last; they would not rest in their attempt to destroy the creative work of Hamilton and his funding system.

 
First Bank of the United States 1792

"Although it had passed both houses of Congress, the Bank bill was anything but a done deal. To become law, President George Washington would have to sign it, and do so before February 26, the time limit imposed by the Constitu­tion. While Hamilton's ties to the president were many and deep, forged as they were during the crises and dangers of the Revolutionary War, Virginia's agrar­ian Republicans, led by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, Attorney General Edmund Randolph, and Madison, also had strong ties with Washington. All four gentlemen shared Virginian roots and bore the stain of slaveholding, though some more thoroughly than others. ... Most importantly, their opposition was not so much political as ideological; they vehe­mently opposed the Bank as unconstitutional and potentially dangerous to republican government. Jefferson and Randolph pressed the president to veto the Bank bill, and Madison's vain attempt to galvanize opposition to the Bank in Congress made it obvious where he stood.

"Washington had a decision to make. Dare he veto a bill of such importance passed by both houses of Congress and eagerly submitted by his closest eco­nomic advisor? Dare he sign the measure and face the accusation that he had passed a law that was, according to many prominent Virginians, impolitic, poor policy, and, perhaps most damning, clearly unconstitutional? Washington showed Hamilton the arguments against the Bank set forth by Randolph and Jefferson and gave him a week to respond. In essence, he placed in Hamilton's hands the power to save his creation.


Alexander Hamilton by William J. Weaver

"It was the sixth day, February 22, and Washington's deadline loomed. ... Hamilton [worked furiously through that night to prepare a rebuttal].

"Many observers, however, demurred or remained unconvinced of the neces­sity of a national bank. Hamilton believed that the long-term viability of his new funding system depended on passage of the law. The pressure to produce a flaw­less retort weighed heavily on him, and he rose to the challenge. In the first clear articulation of the broad or loose interpretation of the Constitution, Hamilton argued that the Bank, though not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, was clearly constitutional because 'every power vested in a Government is in its na­ture sovereign, and includes by force of the term, a right to employ all means req­uisite and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power.'

"Hamilton had turned the tables on his opposition. Where Jefferson, Madi­son, and Randolph argued that the federal government had no power to incor­porate a bank because it was not explicitly allowed to do so in the Constitution, Hamilton retorted that the government enjoyed all powers necessary to its func­tioning that were not explicitly forbidden. Hamilton's logic was unanswerable. From that day forth the doctrine of 'implied powers' increasingly dominated legal interpretation of the Constitution. Hamilton had gained not one but two victories, the establishment of the Bank and the widespread acceptance of the doctrine of implied powers.

"Washington signed the bill on February 25. The centerpiece of Hamilton's creation was in place. The creator had once again triumphed. However, the 'tri­umvirate' of Madison, Randolph, and Jefferson was horrified that their fellow Virginian had signed the bill. As one pamphleteer noted, 'the great Washington burst from the trammels which had been prepared for him, shook off the bias on which the triumvirate had placed their main dependence, and to the great mor­tification of their party, fixed his signature on the bill.' The agrarian trio would not soon forget."

Financial Founding Fathers: The Men Who Made America Rich
Author: Robert E. Wright and David J. Cowen
Publisher: University Of Chicago Press
Copyright 2006 by Robert E. Wright and David J. Cowen
Pages 11-13

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