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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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Mostrando postagens com marcador Friedrich Hayek. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Friedrich Hayek. Mostrar todas as postagens

segunda-feira, 30 de junho de 2014

Hayek na UniCamp: impossivel? Coisas impossiveis sempre acontecem...

O mais surpreendente nesta matéria não é que seu autor seja um defensor da livre iniciativa, da liberdade dos mercados, dos preços livres. É que ele seja formado na UniCamp, tradicional reduto de desenvolvimentistas keynesianos de botequim. Tem aquela famosa frase de flores nascendo no esterco? Pois é, é o caso...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

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O dia em que Hayek enfrentou a máfia dos táxis em defesa de um aplicativo de celular

Boa parte da filosofia política e da pesquisa econômica de Hayek teve como base sua visão sobre a natureza do conhecimento na sociedade.
Hayek compreendia que o conhecimento na sociedade se encontra disperso entre seus diversos membros, além do mesmo possuir características tácitas (difíceis de serem transmitidas) e subjetivas.
Hayek compreendia que em qualquer sistema de organização social existe um grande problema a ser solucionado: como coordenar as ações e expectativas individuais independentes para produzir bens e serviços demandados utilizando recursos escassos.
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Em sua visão, o sistema de preços é a ferramenta necessária para “condensar” esse conhecimento disperso na sociedade e auxiliar os produtores a produzir os produtos mais demandados da forma mais barata.
Isso vem a complementar os ensinamentos de Mises - sem mercados (possíveis apenas com propriedade privada dos meios de produção), não há preços em termos de moeda. Sem preços em termos de moeda, não há como calcular a lucratividade de um processo produtivo. Ou seja, não se produz o que mais se demanda. Produz-se errado e com desperdícios.
Mises e Hayek provaram a impossibilidade teórica do sistema produtivo socialista desde 1920 com estudos nessa linha de pesquisa. A URSS, Cuba, Leste Europeu, China Pré-Reformas, Sudeste da Ásia, África Pós-colonial e agora a Venezuela são apenas aplicações históricas desses teoremas.
O pensamento de Hayek foi fundamental para Jimmy Wales e sua principal invenção: a Wikipedia. Como o próprio Jimmy disse:
“O trabalho de Hayek sobre a teoria de preços é fundamental para o meu próprio pensamento sobre como gerenciar o projeto Wikipedia. Não se pode compreender minhas idéias sobre a Wikipedia sem entender Hayek.”
Mas Hayek não para por aí.

O Aplicativo Uber

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Já ouviu falar em Uber? Uber é um aplicativo digital que conecta potenciais motoristas a potenciais demandantes de transporte. Parte da receita da corrida é revertida para o aplicativo, que demanda o uso de um cartão de crédito cadastrado no sistema.
A empresa Uber não fornece os carros, porém exige que sejam carros habilitados para uso comercial e motoristas em condições de dirigir. Tanto nos EUA como no Brasil já existem aplicativos concorrentes (Lyft e Zaznu), embora o Zaznu siga mais o modelo de “carona remunerada” ao invés do sistema “motorista profissional remunerado”.
Atualmente, o Uber é a startup com maior valoração de mercado: 85x o múltiplo das vendas. A expectativa de crescimento é grande, afinal de contas o modelo de negócio pode capturar parte das receitas que até então eram destinadas para táxi, transporte coletivo público, compra e manutenção de carros privados, estacionamentos, gasolina, dentre outras imagináveis.
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Source: http://www.statista.com/chart/1967/startups-valued-at-one-billion-or-more/
 
A tecnologia do Uber e demais aplicativos são exatamente a aplicação dos ensinamentos de Hayek.
Há pessoas demandando deslocamentos e uma infinidade de formas de se deslocar, todas elas consumindo recursos escassos. Uma dessas formas inclui compartilhar veículos e economizar motoristas, seja com outras pessoas dentro do carro numa única viajem, seja em diversas viagens com um único carro.
Os aplicativos são capazes de fazer algo até então impossível no mundo analógico: fornecer um “matching” detalhado de locais de destino demandados e carros disponíveis se deslocando.
Ao reduzir os custos de transação, os aplicativos permitem também ampliar a oferta e variedade de parceiros de viajem. São capazes até de reduzir o espaço físico necessário para ser utilizado como ponto de taxi, bem como filas desnecessárias em locais congestionados (a tecnologia permite escolher o local de encontro).
Com isso, quem ganha é o consumidor: mais variedade e menores preços, além de viagens mais rápidas.

A Reação Das Guildas

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No final da Idade Média, as guildas eram associações de profissionais que controlavam o comércio de um determinado serviço, recebendo uma autorização governamental para restringir a oferta.
Os táxis atuais nada mais são do que uma guilda. A oferta de taxis é controlada pelo governo, que vende caríssimas “licenças”, e em troca persegue os taxistas “irregulares”. O mesmo vale para as empresas de ônibus – as empresas concorrem a licitações, que nada mais são do que leilões de monopólio. E quando os “clandestinos” aparecem são perseguidos.
O sistema de metrô e trens, por sua vez, tende a ter apenas um operador por trajeto por razões técnicas (embora pudéssemos conceber trens privados concorrentes numa mesma infraestrutura de trilhos privados), porém trata-se de um concorrente a ambos em alguns trechos.
Aplicativos como os citados são simplesmente capazes de driblar o controle estatal sobre esses mercados, controle esse que impede a entrada de novos concorrentes e diferenciação de produtos.
Ao ser uma fonte de concorrência, o aplicativo vem sendo motivo de protesto por parte das guildas – especialmente das guildas de táxi.
Em Barcelona o governo local deu razão para os taxistas e exigiu o fim das atividades da Uber. Só não perguntou aos consumidores se preferem pagar mais caro nos táxis convencionais e aos57% de jovens espanhóis desempregados que poderiam obter renda prestando serviços de motorista. Na socialista França, vândalos atiraram pedras e ovos nos carros do Uber.
No Rio de Janeiro, única cidade atendida pelo Uber no Brasil (até então), um representante da guilda deu a seguinte declaração:
“Não existe a menor possibilidade de os taxistas aderirem ao Uber”, afirmou por telefone André Oliveira, organizador do movimento Taxinforme, depois de participar da manifestação no Rio. “Trata-se de concorrência desleal. Investimos em licença, em seguro, em vistorias. Uma empresa não pode simplesmente chegar e promover a liberação geral do mercado.”
A declaração apenas mostra como o mercado é completamente distorcido pelo governo em conjunto com as guildas de táxi: preços tabelados, não há concorrência (ausência de barreiras legais à entrada no mercado) e o governo extrai parte da renda do trabalho dos taxistas via licenças, regulamentações de seguro (aqui forçosamente distribuídas para seguradoras) e vistorias. A mentalidade é a de que competição é ruim.

Quem Ajuda A Resolver o Problema do Transporte?

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Pessoas de tendência pró-empreendedorismo costumam dizer que o inventor do pendrive fez muito mais pelas florestas do que os abraçadores de árvore do Greenpeace.
Quem mais ajuda a resolver o problema do transporte urbano?
De um lado temos o Movimento Passe Livre/Catraca Livre, hostis ao empreendedorismo, falando que transporte não é mercadoria e desejando um preço igual a zero.
Ou seja, desejam exatamente a situação que Mises e Hayek provaram levar a um caos produtivo e à escassez. De quebra costumam protestar bloqueando as mesmas vias que julgam estar tentando libertar.
Do outro lado temos empreendedores utilizando tecnologias para aumentar a oferta e a variedade do produto demandado – transporte.
O Uber mostra que o caminho correto é o segundo – empreendedorismo e avanços tecnológicos ao invés de batalhas políticas e infantilismo econômico. 
Ao tratar o transporte como um bem escasso e precifica-lo, assim conforme sugerem Mises e Hayek, seu processo empreendedor tende a descongestionar as vias e oferecer preços mais baixos. De quebra, ainda tende a reduzir a poluição gerada pelos carros.
Nós poderíamos citar aqui outros tantos casos. Como a tecnologia do Bitcoin, que permite um sistema monetário livre das perversidades governamentais. Ou a tecnologia de software open source e das impressoras 3D, que permite o barateamento e a produção local de produtos patenteados e recheados de impostos e outras barreiras governamentais à importação. E até mesmo o Skype e o Whats App, que reduzem nossa dependência do sistema de telefonia regulamentado.
Os aplicativos de transporte são apenas mais um dos capítulos. E pode apostar: veremos mais deles nos próximos tempos.
  
 

sábado, 10 de maio de 2014

Instituto Liberal do Centro-Oeste: criacao e seminario sobre a vinda de Hayek ao Brasil, 12 e 13 de maio de 2014

Transcrevo da página do Instituto Mises Brasil, esta notícia, e convido a ouvir o podcast com o primeiro presidente do Instituto Liberal do Centro-Oeste, com o qual colaborarei na medida de minhas possibilidades, uma vez que acredito nas suas causas, muito diferentes das que estão sendo patrocinadas atualmente no Brasil.
O evento programado será filmado e depois disseminado pela internet, o que registrarei aqui.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

INSTITUTO LIBERAL DO CENTRO-OESTE
PODCAST 123 – FÁBIO GOMES FILHO


Na segunda e terça-feira da próxima semana (dias 12 e 13 de maio), o Grupo de Estudos Lobos da Capital vai realizar um simpósio para celebrar os 33 anos da visita e palestra de F. A. Hayek na Universidade de Brasília (UnB), em maio de 1981. Estão programadas palestras do embaixador Carlos Henrique Cardim, um dos idealizadores da ida do economista Austríaco, de Helio Beltrão (presidente do Instituto Mises Brasil), e de Rodrigo Saraiva Marinho (presidente do Instituto Liberal do Nordeste).

E o evento também será marcante por outra razão: será anunciada a fundação e início dos trabalhos do Instituto Liberal do Centro-Oeste (IL-CO). Para falar sobre o seminário e sobre a nova instituição, o Podcast do IMB entrevistou Fábio Gomes Filho, membro do Grupo Lobos da Capital e que será o primeiro presidente do IL-CO. Engenheiro elétrico de formação, Fábio falou sobre o seminário, acerca das atividades do Lobos da Capital e sobre o trabalho que será desenvolvido pelo IL-CO junto com os outros grupos liberais/libertários da região.





A propósito do simpósio sobre a vinda de Hayek ao Brasil, transcrevo um texto de Roberto Ellery no Liberzone: 


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5 Razões para um Economista Neoclássico apreciar Hayek


Fui surpreendido com o convite da página para escrever a respeito de Hayek por ocasião de seu aniversário. Conhecendo o Liberzone e apreciador do trabalho deles não tive como recusar, porém aceitar não foi uma decisão simples. Existem excelentes economistas brasileiros que seguem a Escola Austríaca e poderiam falar de Hayek com bem mais propriedade do que eu, afinal sou um economista neoclássico. Desconfiado, é verdade, mas definitivamente neoclássico. Sou desconfiado por duas razões: desconfio dos modelos que uso e desconfio das intenções de quem diz que vai aplicar os modelos para trazer mais bem-estar à sociedade. Talvez por ser desconfiado eu tenha recebido a confiança do Liberzone.
Como sempre ocorre de ser, o convite ainda era mais complicado do que parecia. Não bastava escrever sobre Hayek, o pedido incluía listar razões que fizeram de Hayek um símbolo do liberalismo. É complicado, vejo o liberalismo como uma doutrina essencialmente individualista, no sentido que é uma doutrina que supõe cada indivíduo como muito complexo para ser enquadrado em um grupo específico. Como então listar razões para alguém ser símbolo do liberalismo se eu tenho dificuldades para definir quem são os liberais. Ao escrever esse texto me propus a superar o desafio de homenagear Hayek sem ser um seguidor da Escola Austríaca, o desafio de escrever a respeito de um grupo que não sei definir eu não vou tentar superar. Desta forma em vez de escrever as razões para Hayek ser um símbolo do liberalismo escreverei as razões que me levaram a apreciar Hayek. Fazendo isto facilito minha tarefa e de saída me mantenho fiel a uma das razões que me levaram a apreciar Hayek.
Seguem as razões:

1. Não existe liberdade política sem liberdade econômica

EconEdLink-593-Keynes-Hayek-Chicago-Economics
Hayek sabia que a liberdade é indivisível. Não existe liberdade política sem liberdade econômica e vice-versa. Essa é uma lição fundamental para economistas que vivem na América Latina e que são constantemente confrontados com a necessidade de avaliar políticas econômicas de ditadores que periodicamente assombram o continente. Isto quando não são convidados a participar de governos autoritários. Se um dia receberem tal convite lembrem a lição de Hayek e saibam que não vão criar um livre mercado a partir de um governo autoritário. Antes que perguntem, eu aviso que recomendação é válida mesmo se Pinochet o convidar para um certo “Centro de Estudios Públicos”.

2. O Uso do Conhecimento na Sociedade

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Hayek sabia que é impossível substituir o mercado por um planejador central. Não por acaso “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, artigo publicado por Hayek em 1945 na American Economic Review, foi listado em 2011 entre os vinte melhores artigos publicados quando das comemorações dos cem anos da revista. No artigo, Hayek argumenta que um planejamento centralizado nunca poderá substituir o mercado porque cada indivíduo detém apenas uma pequena fração do conhecimento existente na sociedade.

3.  A ordem econômica não é resultado de um desenho consciente

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Hayek sabia que o sistema de preços, melhor dizendo, a ordem econômica não é resultado de um desenho consciente. Pelo contrário, é uma ordem espontânea resultante da ação humana, mas não de planos humanos. Willian Eaterly, no excelente livro “The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor” recupera o tema da ordem espontânea e questiona as razões e as consequências de especialistas em desenvolvimento econômico dentro e fora da academia terem abraçado a tese oposta que suponha a ordem econômica como decorrente de um desenho consciente e, portanto, passível de substituição por outro desenho consciente, talvez melhor desenhado.

4. Hayek sabia da necessidade de uma teoria do capital

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Hayek sabia da necessidade de uma teoria do capital. Até hoje capital é um tema difícil de inserir na análise econômica, basta dizer que a maioria das estimativas do estoque de capital toma o custo do investimento como a medida de capital. Hayek sabia mais do que isto, sabia que o valor do capital é o valor presente esperado do fluxo de bens ou serviços produzidos pelo capital. Não é pouca coisa. Hayek tentou construir uma teoria do capital integrada à análise macroeconômica, queria uma teoria do capital que fosse útil para analisar economias monetárias. Tenho minhas dúvidas a respeito da relação entre capital, investimento e moeda, mas a despeito destas dúvidas aprecio a teoria do capital de Hayek.

5. Hayek sabia que o governo tem papéis importantes a cumprir

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Hayek sabia que o governo tem papéis importantes a cumprir. Que me desculpem os que sonham viver em um mundo sem governo, mas eu aprecio Hayek por saber e dizer que o governo tem funções na economia. O autor de “The Road to Serfdom”, livro que apontou os perigos da intervenção, apontou a importância de existir regulações que restrinjam métodos de produção, desde que não desenhadas para favorecer alguns grupos, a prevenção de fraudes e, fundamental para o Brasil de hoje, a existência de uma rede de seguridade social não é incompatível com o sistema de competição. O perigo não está no governo ajudar os pobres, o perigo está no governo decidir quem serão os ricos.
Os seguidores da Escola Austríaca devem ter notado pelo menos duas ausências em minha lista: a teoria dos ciclos econômicos e a teoria do investimento. A primeira talvez seja a que mais incomode. Entendo a relevância da teoria austríaca dos ciclos, mas como disse sou um economista neoclássico, mais precisamente: estou entre os que acreditam no ciclo econômico como advindo de respostas ótimas de famílias e empresas a choques reais na economia. Não nego que a moeda e crédito tenham algum papel na explicação do ciclo econômico, mas não os coloco como principal razão da existência do ciclo econômico. Desta forma não sigo a teoria de Hayek que o ciclo é devido a expansões da moeda e o crédito decorrentes de ações do Banco Central.
O investimento entrou na lista de ausências para marcar posição. Quando falei da teoria do capital fiz a ressalva da relação entre capital, investimento e política monetária. Marquei o investimento como ausência para ressaltar esta ressalva. Não discordo que diferentes bens de investimento mereçam tratamentos diferentes e reconheço que a teoria neoclássica é pobre neste quesito, porém a relação entre política monetária e investimento proposta por Hayek me parece superestimar o papel da política monetária. A ideia de que juros baixos e crédito fácil levam a um excesso de investimento de longo prazo e isto é a razão dos ciclos de expansão e recessão me parece difícil de conciliar com um investidor racional que maximiza lucro esperado mesmo com informação imperfeita. Sei que para Escola Austríaca isto não é um problema, mas para mim é um problema. No fundo as duas ausências são uma só.
O leitor atento deve ter reparado que antes de fazer a lista fiz referência a uma razão para apreciar Hayek e não toquei mais no assunto, não foi esquecimento, pelo contrário, queria encerrar o texto com este tema. Hayek sabia dos perigos de dar muita autoridade a um economista, disse isto quando recebeu o prêmio Nobel e alertou a respeito de um economista com tanto reconhecimento. Só isto seria motivo para colocar Hayek na minha galeria de heróis, só isto já é suficiente para justificar minha hesitação em listar razões para colocar Hayek como símbolo do liberalismo e optar por listar apenas minhas razões para aprecia-lo.

sexta-feira, 3 de janeiro de 2014

Um pouco da historia do neoliberalismo, Hayek, Friedman, and the others - Book review

Published by EH.Net (December 2013)

Angus Burgin:
The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012. v + 303 pp. $30 (hardcover), ISBN: 978-0-674-05813-2.
Reviewed for EH.Net by Ross B. Emmett. James Madison College, Michigan State University.

Neo-liberalism has had several histories written recently. Daniel Stedman Jones (2012) linked the stories of F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman to the rise of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, crossing intellectual history with political history. Phil Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (2009; see also Mirowski, 2013) provided us with the account of a unitary social movement – a “thought collective” as they called it. Stedman Jones’ account fell short because he lacked a clear understanding of how ideas are translated into institutions and rules via political entrepreneurship (see Leighton and López, 2012 for one model of how political entrepreneurship works). His account both underestimated the subtleties of the ideas of theorists in their academic setting, and overestimated the role of political leaders in translating ideas into the political realities. Mirowski and Plehwe brought the social movement emerging from Mont Pelerin to life. But all too often in the essays inc!uded in their volume the ideas and actions of the individuals within the movement were evaluated solely in terms of the outcomes of the movement as a whole – outcomes that were perceived to be threats to all good things; like democracy, human welfare, freedom and the like.
Angus Burgin also sets a lofty objective; but he gives us a much more subtle and nuanced history than either of two accounts mentioned above. “The history of the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) can, and to some extent should, be read as an extended plea for the relevance of the history of ideas to the history of politics” (p. 224), he tells us in his conclusion. Agreed. Yet, unlike the one-dimensional, and uni-directional, studies cited above, the historical “relationship between theory and praxis” among members of MPS that he narrates for us reveals the nuanced subtleties of “the dynamic nature of a historical transformation” (p. 224); a transformation in the way we configured the relationship between the state and markets during the latter half of the twentieth century. In Burgin’s account, living, breathing human beings communicate, argue, negotiate, pontificate, and yes, even conspire in their efforts to encourage and preserve “capitalist modes of social organization” (p. 225).
What “capitalism” meant was itself a question. Frank Knight, one of the contributors to the discussion who rightly figures in Burgin’s narrative as a key participant in the early years, never used the word “capitalism” in his little textbook The Economic Organization (2013). Yet Knight’s book did much to revitalize acceptance among the future members of MPS of the benefits of social organization via the price mechanism in an “exchange system” (Knight, 2013, p. 23-24). One of the reasons Knight (in contrast, say, to Ludwig von Mises) figures so prominently in Burgin’s account is that he could never settle on a simple account of the complex relationship among the political, social, economic, and even moral aspects of a society which decided (consciously? or simply as a result of accepting other things like the rule of law, family control of property, certain social customs, etc.) to allow markets to play a central role in social organization (see ! p. 112-122). Knight’s concerns were shared, to a greater or lesser extent, by other MPS members: Bernard de Jouvenel, Wilhelm Röpke, and Albert Hunold (who served as secretary for the Society in its early years, but eventually left it) for example. And even Hayek, whose intellectual leadership is central to Burgin’s account, reconfigured his understanding of the relation between markets, the state, and various forms of social organization several times.
If anyone is the “hero” in Burgin’s narrative, it is Milton Friedman, who took over leadership of the MPS at the moment when conflict over the relation between capitalism defined narrowly in market terms, and capitalism defined in terms of individual liberty, came to a head. It was to Friedman that Jouvenel wrote his famous letter of resignation from the Society, and it was Friedman that wrote the polemic Capitalism and Freedom (2002) that replaced Hayek’s Road to Serfdom (1994) as the call-to-arms for the next generation of MPS members. Interestingly, Capitalism and Freedom was originally published in the same year that Hayek left Friedman’s lair in Chicago for retirement back on the continent, at the University of Freiburg. Capitalism and Freedom articulated a liberal social philosophy that was “less conflicted than those of the leading figures in the early Mont Pèlerin Society” (p. 177). Unlike his predecessors, who wrote general accounts of the benefits of a liberal society, “Friedman’s consistent preference for unconstrained markets combined with his methodological orientation toward empiricism to inspire him to propose an astonishing range of specific alterations to governmental practice” (p. 178). Among conservative policy-makers in America and Europe, the MPS had been held at arms-length, admired at a distance, and kept away from the practice of policy making. Friedman changed all that. His academic reputation and willingness to engage the public in their own terms “made him a formidable figure in the conservative intellectual world.” But he also possessed a toolbox equipped with novel, explicit ideas “that were clearly derived from and representative of a singular worldview” (p. 184). The combination of these qualities provided him with the means to change the public debate over markets in America, and eventually around the world.
As important as Friedman’s ideas became, and as narrowly focused on the efficiency gains from adopting market-based solutions to social problems the MPS became, there were always those who asked the Society to recall the broader dimensions of social and moral inquiry that had so animated its early members. Burgin spends the penultimate chapter of the book on this debate over the moral capital of the Society, concluding that the Friedman shift – dare I call it a version of the Samuelson’s “F-Twist” (1963)? – may have captured the spirit of an age, but it left a Society that had abandoned the very “questions of value that Hayek had established [it] to address” (p. 213).
Earlier I said that, in Burgin’s account, we see human beings communicating and acting to encourage society’s re-engagement with capitalism. And yet, as I walk away from the book, it is his account of those human beings’ thinking that most captivates me. Thinking in the midst of praxis, I’m tempted to say, because it is not thought leading to action; nor action leading to thoughts. It is both together, and more. Burgin ends by urging modern MPSers to return to the critical openness of the early MPS to engagement with a broader understanding of capitalism in all its dimensions. Can modern proponents of capitalism engage the discontent with liberalism that troubled Knight and Jouvenel, Michael Oakeshott and Röpke? “We have accepted the virtues of markets but failed to determine how to integrate them into life as we wish it to be” (p. 226).
References:
Friedman, M. (2002). Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F. A. (1994). The Road to Serfdom: Fiftieth Anniversary Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Knight, F. H. (2013). The Economic Organization. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Leighton, W. and López, E. (2012). Madmen, Intellectuals and Academic Scribblers: The Economic Engine of Political Change.  Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Mirowski, P. (2013). Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown. London: Verso.
Mirowski, P. and Plehwe, D. (Editors) (2009). The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Samuelson, P. A. (1963). “Problems of Methodology – Discussion,” American Economic Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Papers and Proceedings): 231-36.
Stedman Jones, D. (2012). Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ross B. Emmett’s publications include Frank Knight and the Chicago School in American Economics, Routledge (2009).
Copyright (c) 2013 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.NetAdministrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (December 2013). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://www.eh.net/BookReview
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Apresentação de dois dos livros citados na bibliografia no site Abebooks.com:
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Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics (Hardback)

Daniel Stedman Jones
(Gloucester, ., United Kingdom)
Quantity Available: 1

Book Description: Princeton University Press, United States, 2012. Hardback.
How did American and British policymakers become so enamored with free markets, deregulation, and limited government? This book - the first comprehensive transatlantic history of the rise of neoliberal politics - presents a surprising answer. Based on archival research and interviews with leading participants in the movement, "Masters of the Universe" traces the ascendancy of neoliberalism from the academy of interwar Europe to supremacy under Reagan and Thatcher and in the decades since. Daniel Stedman Jones argues that there was nothing inevitable about the victory of free-market politics. Far from being the story of the simple triumph of right-wing ideas, the neoliberal breakthrough was contingent on the economic crises of the 1970s and the acceptance of the need for new policies by the political left. "Masters of the Universe" describes neoliberalism's road to power, beginning in interwar Europe but shifting its center of gravity after 1945 to the United States, especially to Chicago and Virginia, where it acquired a simple clarity that was developed into an uncompromising political message.Neoliberalism was communicated through a transatlantic network of think tanks, businessmen, politicians, and journalists that was held together by Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. After the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971, and the "stagflation" that followed, their ideas finally began to take hold as Keynesianism appeared to self-destruct. Later, after the elections of Reagan and Thatcher, a guileless faith in free markets came to dominate politics. Fascinating, important, and timely, this is a book for anyone who wants to understand the history behind the Anglo-American love affair with the free market, as well as the origins of the current economic crisis.
Mirowski, P. and Plehwe, D. (Editors) (2009). The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Book Description: HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, United States, 2009. Hardback. 
What exactly is neoliberalism, and where did it come from? This volume attempts to answer these questions by exploring neoliberalism's origins and growth as a political and economic movement. Although modern neoliberalism was born at the 'Colloque Walter Lippmann' in 1938, it only came into its own with the founding of the Mont Pelerin Society, a partisan 'thought collective', in Vevey, Switzerland, in 1947. Its original membership was made up of transnational economists and intellectuals, including Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Karl Popper, Michael Polanyi, and Luigi Einaudi. From this small beginning, their ideas spread throughout the world, fostering, among other things, the political platforms of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan and the Washington Consensus. "The Road from Mont Pelerin" presents the key debates and conflicts that occurred among neoliberal scholars and their political and corporate allies regarding trade unions, development economics, antitrust policies, and the influence of philanthropy.The book captures the depth and complexity of the neoliberal 'thought collective' while examining the numerous ways that neoliberal discourse has come to shape the global economy.

quinta-feira, 20 de dezembro de 2012

F. Hayek: O Uso do Conhecimento na Sociedade (1945)

Uma transcrição longa, mas altamente relevante:

Hayek, Friedrich A. (1899-1992)
"The Use of Knowledge in Society"
American Economic Review. XXXV, No. 4, September 1945, pp. 519-30. American Economic Association
Available at: Library of Economics and Liberty, link: http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw1.html

The Use of Knowledge in Society
AER, 1945
I
H.1
What is the problem we wish to solve when we try to construct a rational economic order? On certain familiar assumptions the answer is simple enough. If we possess all the relevant information, if we can start out from a given system of preferences, and if we command complete knowledge of available means, the problem which remains is purely one of logic. That is, the answer to the question of what is the best use of the available means is implicit in our assumptions. The conditions which the solution of this optimum problem must satisfy have been fully worked out and can be stated best in mathematical form: put at their briefest, they are that the marginal rates of substitution between any two commodities or factors must be the same in all their different uses.
H.2
This, however, is emphatically not the economic problem which society faces. And the economic calculus which we have developed to solve this logical problem, though an important step toward the solution of the economic problem of society, does not yet provide an answer to it. The reason for this is that the "data" from which the economic calculus starts are never for the whole society "given" to a single mind which could work out the implications and can never be so given.
H.3
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate "given" resources—if "given" is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these "data." It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality.
H.4
This character of the fundamental problem has, I am afraid, been obscured rather than illuminated by many of the recent refinements of economic theory, particularly by many of the uses made of mathematics. Though the problem with which I want primarily to deal in this paper is the problem of a rational economic organization, I shall in its course be led again and again to point to its close connections with certain methodological questions. Many of the points I wish to make are indeed conclusions toward which diverse paths of reasoning have unexpectedly converged. But, as I now see these problems, this is no accident. It seems to me that many of the current disputes with regard to both economic theory and economic policy have their common origin in a misconception about the nature of the economic problem of society. This misconception in turn is due to an erroneous transfer to social phenomena of the habits of thought we have developed in dealing with the phenomena of nature.
II
H.5
In ordinary language we describe by the word "planning" the complex of interrelated decisions about the allocation of our available resources. All economic activity is in this sense planning; and in any society in which many people collaborate, this planning, whoever does it, will in some measure have to be based on knowledge which, in the first instance, is not given to the planner but to somebody else, which somehow will have to be conveyed to the planner. The various ways in which the knowledge on which people base their plans is communicated to them is the crucial problem for any theory explaining the economic process, and the problem of what is the best way of utilizing knowledge initially dispersed among all the people is at least one of the main problems of economic policy—or of designing an efficient economic system.
H.6
The answer to this question is closely connected with that other question which arises here, that of who is to do the planning. It is about this question that all the dispute about "economic planning" centers. This is not a dispute about whether planning is to be done or not. It is a dispute as to whether planning is to be done centrally, by one authority for the whole economic system, or is to be divided among many individuals. Planning in the specific sense in which the term is used in contemporary controversy necessarily means central planning—direction of the whole economic system according to one unified plan. Competition, on the other hand, means decentralized planning by many separate persons. The halfway house between the two, about which many people talk but which few like when they see it, is the delegation of planning to organized industries, or, in other words, monopoly.
H.7
Which of these systems is likely to be more efficient depends mainly on the question under which of them we can expect that fuller use will be made of the existing knowledge. And this, in turn, depends on whether we are more likely to succeed in putting at the disposal of a single central authority all the knowledge which ought to be used but which is initially dispersed among many different individuals, or in conveying to the individuals such additional knowledge as they need in order to enable them to fit their plans with those of others.
III
H.8
It will at once be evident that on this point the position will be different with respect to different kinds of knowledge; and the answer to our question will therefore largely turn on the relative importance of the different kinds of knowledge; those more likely to be at the disposal of particular individuals and those which we should with greater confidence expect to find in the possession of an authority made up of suitably chosen experts. If it is today so widely assumed that the latter will be in a better position, this is because one kind of knowledge, namely, scientific knowledge, occupies now so prominent a place in public imagination that we tend to forget that it is not the only kind that is relevant. It may be admitted that, as far as scientific knowledge is concerned, a body of suitably chosen experts may be in the best position to command all the best knowledge available—though this is of course merely shifting the difficulty to the problem of selecting the experts. What I wish to point out is that, even assuming that this problem can be readily solved, it is only a small part of the wider problem.
H.9
Today it is almost heresy to suggest that scientific knowledge is not the sum of all knowledge. But a little reflection will show that there is beyond question a body of very important but unorganized knowledge which cannot possibly be called scientific in the sense of knowledge of general rules: the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place. It is with respect to this that practically every individual has some advantage over all others because he possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him or are made with his active coöperation. We need to remember only how much we have to learn in any occupation after we have completed our theoretical training, how big a part of our working life we spend learning particular jobs, and how valuable an asset in all walks of life is knowledge of people, of local conditions, and of special circumstances. To know of and put to use a machine not fully employed, or somebody's skill which could be better utilized, or to be aware of a surplus stock which can be drawn upon during an interruption of supplies, is socially quite as useful as the knowledge of better alternative techniques. And the shipper who earns his living from using otherwise empty or half-filled journeys of tramp-steamers, or the estate agent whose whole knowledge is almost exclusively one of temporary opportunities, or the arbitrageur who gains from local differences of commodity prices, are all performing eminently useful functions based on special knowledge of circumstances of the fleeting moment not known to others.
H.10
It is a curious fact that this sort of knowledge should today be generally regarded with a kind of contempt and that anyone who by such knowledge gains an advantage over somebody better equipped with theoretical or technical knowledge is thought to have acted almost disreputably. To gain an advantage from better knowledge of facilities of communication or transport is sometimes regarded as almost dishonest, although it is quite as important that society make use of the best opportunities in this respect as in using the latest scientific discoveries. This prejudice has in a considerable measure affected the attitude toward commerce in general compared with that toward production. Even economists who regard themselves as definitely immune to the crude materialist fallacies of the past constantly commit the same mistake where activities directed toward the acquisition of such practical knowledge are concerned—apparently because in their scheme of things all such knowledge is supposed to be "given." The common idea now seems to be that all such knowledge should as a matter of course be readily at the command of everybody, and the reproach of irrationality leveled against the existing economic order is frequently based on the fact that it is not so available. This view disregards the fact that the method by which such knowledge can be made as widely available as possible is precisely the problem to which we have to find an answer.
IV
H.11
If it is fashionable today to minimize the importance of the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place, this is closely connected with the smaller importance which is now attached to change as such. Indeed, there are few points on which the assumptions made (usually only implicitly) by the "planners" differ from those of their opponents as much as with regard to the significance and frequency of changes which will make substantial alterations of production plans necessary. Of course, if detailed economic plans could be laid down for fairly long periods in advance and then closely adhered to, so that no further economic decisions of importance would be required, the task of drawing up a comprehensive plan governing all economic activity would be much less formidable.
H.12
It is, perhaps, worth stressing that economic problems arise always and only in consequence of change. So long as things continue as before, or at least as they were expected to, there arise no new problems requiring a decision, no need to form a new plan. The belief that changes, or at least day-to-day adjustments, have become less important in modern times implies the contention that economic problems also have become less important. This belief in the decreasing importance of change is, for that reason, usually held by the same people who argue that the importance of economic considerations has been driven into the background by the growing importance of technological knowledge.
H.13
Is it true that, with the elaborate apparatus of modern production, economic decisions are required only at long intervals, as when a new factory is to be erected or a new process to be introduced? Is it true that, once a plant has been built, the rest is all more or less mechanical, determined by the character of the plant, and leaving little to be changed in adapting to the ever-changing circumstances of the moment?
H.14
The fairly widespread belief in the affirmative is not, as far as I can ascertain, borne out by the practical experience of the businessman. In a competitive industry at any rate—and such an industry alone can serve as a test—the task of keeping cost from rising requires constant struggle, absorbing a great part of the energy of the manager. How easy it is for an inefficient manager to dissipate the differentials on which profitability rests, and that it is possible, with the same technical facilities, to produce with a great variety of costs, are among the commonplaces of business experience which do not seem to be equally familiar in the study of the economist. The very strength of the desire, constantly voiced by producers and engineers, to be allowed to proceed untrammeled by considerations of money costs, is eloquent testimony to the extent to which these factors enter into their daily work.
H.15
One reason why economists are increasingly apt to forget about the constant small changes which make up the whole economic picture is probably their growing preoccupation with statistical aggregates, which show a very much greater stability than the movements of the detail. The comparative stability of the aggregates cannot, however, be accounted for—as the statisticians occasionally seem to be inclined to do—by the "law of large numbers" or the mutual compensation of random changes. The number of elements with which we have to deal is not large enough for such accidental forces to produce stability. The continuous flow of goods and services is maintained by constant deliberate adjustments, by new dispositions made every day in the light of circumstances not known the day before, by B stepping in at once when A fails to deliver. Even the large and highly mechanized plant keeps going largely because of an environment upon which it can draw for all sorts of unexpected needs; tiles for its roof, stationery for its forms, and all the thousand and one kinds of equipment in which it cannot be self-contained and which the plans for the operation of the plant require to be readily available in the market.
H.16
This is, perhaps, also the point where I should briefly mention the fact that the sort of knowledge with which I have been concerned is knowledge of the kind which by its nature cannot enter into statistics and therefore cannot be conveyed to any central authority in statistical form. The statistics which such a central authority would have to use would have to be arrived at precisely by abstracting from minor differences between the things, by lumping together, as resources of one kind, items which differ as regards location, quality, and other particulars, in a way which may be very significant for the specific decision. It follows from this that central planning based on statistical information by its nature cannot take direct account of these circumstances of time and place and that the central planner will have to find some way or other in which the decisions depending on them can be left to the "man on the spot."
V
H.17
If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them. We cannot expect that this problem will be solved by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board which, after integrating all knowledge, issues its orders. We must solve it by some form of decentralization. But this answers only part of our problem. We need decentralization because only thus can we insure that the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used. But the "man on the spot" cannot decide solely on the basis of his limited but intimate knowledge of the facts of his immediate surroundings. There still remains the problem of communicating to him such further information as he needs to fit his decisions into the whole pattern of changes of the larger economic system.
H.18
How much knowledge does he need to do so successfully? Which of the events which happen beyond the horizon of his immediate knowledge are of relevance to his immediate decision, and how much of them need he know?
H.19
There is hardly anything that happens anywhere in the world that might not have an effect on the decision he ought to make. But he need not know of these events as such, nor of all their effects. It does not matter for him why at the particular moment more screws of one size than of another are wanted, why paper bags are more readily available than canvas bags, or why skilled labor, or particular machine tools, have for the moment become more difficult to obtain. All that is significant for him is how much more or less difficult to procure they have become compared with other things with which he is also concerned, or how much more or less urgently wanted are the alternative things he produces or uses. It is always a question of the relative importance of the particular things with which he is concerned, and the causes which alter their relative importance are of no interest to him beyond the effect on those concrete things of his own environment.
H.20
It is in this connection that what I have called the "economic calculus" proper helps us, at least by analogy, to see how this problem can be solved, and in fact is being solved, by the price system. Even the single controlling mind, in possession of all the data for some small, self-contained economic system, would not—every time some small adjustment in the allocation of resources had to be made—go explicitly through all the relations between ends and means which might possibly be affected. It is indeed the great contribution of the pure logic of choice that it has demonstrated conclusively that even such a single mind could solve this kind of problem only by constructing and constantly using rates of equivalence (or "values," or "marginal rates of substitution"), i.e., by attaching to each kind of scarce resource a numerical index which cannot be derived from any property possessed by that particular thing, but which reflects, or in which is condensed, its significance in view of the whole means-end structure. In any small change he will have to consider only these quantitative indices (or "values") in which all the relevant information is concentrated; and, by adjusting the quantities one by one, he can appropriately rearrange his dispositions without having to solve the whole puzzle ab initio or without needing at any stage to survey it at once in all its ramifications.
H.21
Fundamentally, in a system in which the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among many people, prices can act to coördinate the separate actions of different people in the same way as subjective values help the individual to coördinate the parts of his plan. It is worth contemplating for a moment a very simple and commonplace instance of the action of the price system to see what precisely it accomplishes. Assume that somewhere in the world a new opportunity for the use of some raw material, say, tin, has arisen, or that one of the sources of supply of tin has been eliminated. It does not matter for our purpose—and it is very significant that it does not matter—which of these two causes has made tin more scarce. All that the users of tin need to know is that some of the tin they used to consume is now more profitably employed elsewhere and that, in consequence, they must economize tin. There is no need for the great majority of them even to know where the more urgent need has arisen, or in favor of what other needs they ought to husband the supply. If only some of them know directly of the new demand, and switch resources over to it, and if the people who are aware of the new gap thus created in turn fill it from still other sources, the effect will rapidly spread throughout the whole economic system and influence not only all the uses of tin but also those of its substitutes and the substitutes of these substitutes, the supply of all the things made of tin, and their substitutes, and so on; and all this without the great majority of those instrumental in bringing about these substitutions knowing anything at all about the original cause of these changes. The whole acts as one market, not because any of its members survey the whole field, but because their limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that through many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all. The mere fact that there is one price for any commodity—or rather that local prices are connected in a manner determined by the cost of transport, etc.—brings about the solution which (it is just conceptually possible) might have been arrived at by one single mind possessing all the information which is in fact dispersed among all the people involved in the process.
VI
H.22
We must look at the price system as such a mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand its real function—a function which, of course, it fulfils less perfectly as prices grow more rigid. (Even when quoted prices have become quite rigid, however, the forces which would operate through changes in price still operate to a considerable extent through changes in the other terms of the contract.) The most significant fact about this system is the economy of knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to know in order to be able to take the right action. In abbreviated form, by a kind of symbol, only the most essential information is passed on and passed on only to those concerned. It is more than a metaphor to describe the price system as a kind of machinery for registering change, or a system of telecommunications which enables individual producers to watch merely the movement of a few pointers, as an engineer might watch the hands of a few dials, in order to adjust their activities to changes of which they may never know more than is reflected in the price movement.
H.23
Of course, these adjustments are probably never "perfect" in the sense in which the economist conceives of them in his equilibrium analysis. But I fear that our theoretical habits of approaching the problem with the assumption of more or less perfect knowledge on the part of almost everyone has made us somewhat blind to the true function of the price mechanism and led us to apply rather misleading standards in judging its efficiency. The marvel is that in a case like that of a scarcity of one raw material, without an order being issued, without more than perhaps a handful of people knowing the cause, tens of thousands of people whose identity could not be ascertained by months of investigation, are made to use the material or its products more sparingly; i.e., they move in the right direction. This is enough of a marvel even if, in a constantly changing world, not all will hit it off so perfectly that their profit rates will always be maintained at the same constant or "normal" level.
H.24
I have deliberately used the word "marvel" to shock the reader out of the complacency with which we often take the working of this mechanism for granted. I am convinced that if it were the result of deliberate human design, and if the people guided by the price changes understood that their decisions have significance far beyond their immediate aim, this mechanism would have been acclaimed as one of the greatest triumphs of the human mind. Its misfortune is the double one that it is not the product of human design and that the people guided by it usually do not know why they are made to do what they do. But those who clamor for "conscious direction"—and who cannot believe that anything which has evolved without design (and even without our understanding it) should solve problems which we should not be able to solve consciously—should remember this: The problem is precisely how to extend the span of our utilization of resources beyond the span of the control of any one mind; and therefore, how to dispense with the need of conscious control, and how to provide inducements which will make the individuals do the desirable things without anyone having to tell them what to do.
H.25
The problem which we meet here is by no means peculiar to economics but arises in connection with nearly all truly social phenomena, with language and with most of our cultural inheritance, and constitutes really the central theoretical problem of all social science. As Alfred Whitehead has said in another connection, "It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and by eminent people when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them." This is of profound significance in the social field. We make constant use of formulas, symbols, and rules whose meaning we do not understand and through the use of which we avail ourselves of the assistance of knowledge which individually we do not possess. We have developed these practices and institutions by building upon habits and institutions which have proved successful in their own sphere and which have in turn become the foundation of the civilization we have built up.
H.26
The price system is just one of those formations which man has learned to use (though he is still very far from having learned to make the best use of it) after he had stumbled upon it without understanding it. Through it not only a division of labor but also a coördinated utilization of resources based on an equally divided knowledge has become possible. The people who like to deride any suggestion that this may be so usually distort the argument by insinuating that it asserts that by some miracle just that sort of system has spontaneously grown up which is best suited to modern civilization. It is the other way round: man has been able to develop that division of labor on which our civilization is based because he happened to stumble upon a method which made it possible. Had he not done so, he might still have developed some other, altogether different, type of civilization, something like the "state" of the termite ants, or some other altogether unimaginable type. All that we can say is that nobody has yet succeeded in designing an alternative system in which certain features of the existing one can be preserved which are dear even to those who most violently assail it—such as particularly the extent to which the individual can choose his pursuits and consequently freely use his own knowledge and skill.
VII
H.27
It is in many ways fortunate that the dispute about the indispensability of the price system for any rational calculation in a complex society is now no longer conducted entirely between camps holding different political views. The thesis that without the price system we could not preserve a society based on such extensive division of labor as ours was greeted with a howl of derision when it was first advanced by von Mises twenty-five years ago. Today the difficulties which some still find in accepting it are no longer mainly political, and this makes for an atmosphere much more conducive to reasonable discussion. When we find Leon Trotsky arguing that "economic accounting is unthinkable without market relations"; when Professor Oscar Lange promises Professor von Mises a statue in the marble halls of the future Central Planning Board; and when Professor Abba P. Lerner rediscovers Adam Smith and emphasizes that the essential utility of the price system consists in inducing the individual, while seeking his own interest, to do what is in the general interest, the differences can indeed no longer be ascribed to political prejudice. The remaining dissent seems clearly to be due to purely intellectual, and more particularly methodological, differences.
H.28
A recent statement by Professor Joseph Schumpeter in his Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy provides a clear illustration of one of the methodological differences which I have in mind. Its author is pre-eminent among those economists who approach economic phenomena in the light of a certain branch of positivism. To him these phenomena accordingly appear as objectively given quantities of commodities impinging directly upon each other, almost, it would seem, without any intervention of human minds. Only against this background can I account for the following (to me startling) pronouncement. Professor Schumpeter argues that the possibility of a rational calculation in the absence of markets for the factors of production follows for the theorist "from the elementary proposition that consumers in evaluating ('demanding') consumers' goods ipso facto also evaluate the means of production which enter into the production of these goods."*1
H.29
Taken literally, this statement is simply untrue. The consumers do nothing of the kind. What Professor Schumpeter's "ipso facto" presumably means is that the valuation of the factors of production is implied in, or follows necessarily from, the valuation of consumers' goods. But this, too, is not correct. Implication is a logical relationship which can be meaningfully asserted only of propositions simultaneously present to one and the same mind. It is evident, however, that the values of the factors of production do not depend solely on the valuation of the consumers' goods but also on the conditions of supply of the various factors of production. Only to a mind to which all these facts were simultaneously known would the answer necessarily follow from the facts given to it. The practical problem, however, arises precisely because these facts are never so given to a single mind, and because, in consequence, it is necessary that in the solution of the problem knowledge should be used that is dispersed among many people.
H.30
The problem is thus in no way solved if we can show that all the facts, if they were known to a single mind (as we hypothetically assume them to be given to the observing economist), would uniquely determine the solution; instead we must show how a solution is produced by the interactions of people each of whom possesses only partial knowledge. To assume all the knowledge to be given to a single mind in the same manner in which we assume it to be given to us as the explaining economists is to assume the problem away and to disregard everything that is important and significant in the real world.
H.31
That an economist of Professor Schumpeter's standing should thus have fallen into a trap which the ambiguity of the term "datum" sets to the unwary can hardly be explained as a simple error. It suggests rather that there is something fundamentally wrong with an approach which habitually disregards an essential part of the phenomena with which we have to deal: the unavoidable imperfection of man's knowledge and the consequent need for a process by which knowledge is constantly communicated and acquired. Any approach, such as that of much of mathematical economics with its simultaneous equations, which in effect starts from the assumption that people's knowledge corresponds with the objective facts of the situation, systematically leaves out what is our main task to explain. I am far from denying that in our system equilibrium analysis has a useful function to perform. But when it comes to the point where it misleads some of our leading thinkers into believing that the situation which it describes has direct relevance to the solution of practical problems, it is high time that we remember that it does not deal with the social process at all and that it is no more than a useful preliminary to the study of the main problem.

Notes for this chapter
1.
J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York; Harper, 1942), p. 175. Professor Schumpeter is, I believe, also the original author of the myth that Pareto and Barone have "solved" the problem of socialist calculation. What they, and many others, did was merely to state the conditions which a rational allocation of resources would have to satisfy and to point out that these were essentially the same as the conditions of equilibrium of a competitive market. This is something altogether different from knowing how the allocation of resources satisfying these conditions can be found in practice. Pareto himself (from whom Barone has taken practically everything he has to say), far from claiming to have solved the practical problem, in fact explicitly denies that it can be solved without the help of the market. See his Manuel d'économie pure (2d ed., 1927), pp. 233-34. The relevant passage is quoted in an English translation at the beginning of my article on "Socialist Calculation: The Competitive 'Solution,' " in Economica, New Series, Vol. VIII, No. 26 (May, 1940), p. 125.

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MLA Style
Hayek, Friedrich A., "The Use of Knowledge in Society." 1945. Library of Economics and Liberty. 20 December 2012. <http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw.html>.

APA Style
Hayek, Friedrich A. "The Use of Knowledge in Society." 1945. Library of Economics and Liberty. Retrieved December 20, 2012 from the World Wide Web: http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw.html

Turabian Style
Hayek, Friedrich A. "The Use of Knowledge in Society." American Economic Review. XXXV, No. 4. pp. 519-30. American Economic Association. 1945. Library of Economics and Liberty [Online] available from http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw.html; accessed 20 December 2012; Internet.