Mostrando postagens com marcador Kaiser Y Kuo. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Kaiser Y Kuo. Mostrar todas as postagens

sábado, 7 de fevereiro de 2026

On Not Intervening in Iran - Kaiser Y Kuo (Sinica)

Uma reflexão sobre a tragédia iraniana, e o intervencionismo americano, por um especialista em China. Sim, Kaiser Y Kuo, entra no âmago da presente tragédia, e vale ler sua reflexão.

Contra o massacre dos manifestantes iranianos e contra a intervenção de Trump, ou dos EUA, nessa tragédia. PRA

On Not Intervening in Iran
KAISER Y KUO
Sinica, Feb 6, 2026

I’m wandering off from the usual China-centered fare in this essay because I’ve been thinking a lot about the right thing to do with Iran. It’s not wholly unconnected to China, as you’ll see as you read it. I don’t pretend to be any kind of an expert on Iran; I trust any errors will be pointed out to me by keen reader, and I sincerely hope some of you will share your thoughts on what we should do in the comments, open to all readers fort his one.

The question before us isn’t new, but the circumstances make it feel urgent in ways we haven’t experienced since the early 2000s. Iranian protesters, killed in a crackdown of staggering brutality, have pleaded for American help. President Trump drew and redrew red lines against mass killings, sent a carrier strike group toward the Persian Gulf, and threatened intervention. Yet as the death toll reportedly climbed into the thousands, no strikes came. Advocates for intervention frame this as a moral imperative — the chance to support a popular uprising without repeating the catastrophic nation-building mistakes of Iraq and Afghanistan. Limited strikes, they argue, could tip the balance toward regime change while demonstrating that America still stands with those fighting for their basic rights.

My instinct is against military intervention in Iran. Not reflexively, not out of pacifism, and not because I’m indifferent to the suffering of Iranians risking everything for dignity and basic rights. I lean against it because I’ve thought carefully about what intervention would likely accomplish versus what it would cost, because history offers devastating lessons about what happens when we conflate military capability with political wisdom, and because the very assumptions underlying liberal interventionism deserve scrutiny — especially now, as American hegemony wanes and the consequences of our actions become harder to predict or control.

For the record: I’d reach this conclusion under any American president. My objections aren’t about Trump specifically — though I think his administration both increases the risks of mismanagement and makes the moral case for intervention impossible to sell. The hypocrisy would be staggering. Our allies wouldn’t buy it, and neither would most of the world. But the fundamental problems with intervention hold regardless of who occupies the White House. I know there are people for whom this question is straightforward — who’ve concluded on principle that American military intervention is categorically unjustified, or who are so committed to ending American hegemony that suffering under regimes like Iran’s becomes an acceptable cost. I’m not one of them. Something in me resists foreclosing intervention as a category — whether that’s residual American exceptionalism I haven’t fully examined or something else, I’m not certain. But that pull toward the possibility of using American power for good doesn’t change where I land on this case.

Before explaining my provisional opposition, I want to engage honestly with the strongest arguments for intervention — arguments that reflect genuine moral concern and strategic calculation, even if I ultimately find them unpersuasive.

The humanitarian case is real. Between late December and mid-January, Iranian security forces killed protesters — estimates range widely, from several thousand to over 30,000, though the true toll remains deeply uncertain. The regime cut internet access, deployed live ammunition against unarmed demonstrators, and began threatening mass executions under the charge of *moharebeh* (enmity against God), a capital offense. These aren’t abstractions. They’re people who share the same aspirations for dignity and human rights that we claim to value universally. When some of them explicitly call for foreign help, what does it say about us if we turn away?

The strategic case has weight too. Iran’s regional influence has been significantly degraded — its “axis of resistance” battered by Israeli strikes, its nuclear program set back by Operation Midnight Hammer last June, its economy in freefall with the rial having lost over 40% of its value. The regime faces compounding crises: economic, political, legitimacy, deterrence. Pro-intervention voices argue this is the moment of maximum leverage, when limited strikes could accelerate internal collapse without the need for occupation or nation-building. They point to the Soleimani assassination and last year’s nuclear strikes as evidence that targeted American force can weaken the regime without triggering the “rally around the flag” effect that intervention skeptics predict.

There’s also the question of American credibility. Trump drew a public red line — “help is on the way” to the protesters — and then assembled military assets in the region. If he backs down, does it signal that American threats are hollow? Does it abandon the principles of liberal internationalism at precisely the moment when they’re being tested?

These arguments deserve more than perfunctory acknowledgment. Not all of them come from cartoon warmongers; many are thoughtful analysts grappling with impossible trade-offs. I simply think they’re likely wrong about what intervention would accomplish and what it would unleash.

Start with the most basic claim: that strikes would help the protesters. The historical record suggests otherwise. When external powers bomb a country during internal upheaval, the regime’s narrative of foreign conspiracy often gains instant credibility. Iran’s leaders have spent decades depicting dissent as American and Israeli manipulation. Military strikes would risk vindicating that propaganda in the eyes of many Iranians who might otherwise sympathize with the protests but aren’t willing to be seen as tools of Washington and Tel Aviv.

The 1953 CIA-backed coup against Mohammad Mossadegh remains Iran’s original sin in relations with the United States, precisely because it validated suspicions that America prioritizes control over genuine Iranian rights. Every intervention since — from support for the Shah to sanctions to the Soleimani killing — gets interpreted through that lens. New strikes would more likely reinforce this history than overcome it.

Nor would strikes necessarily “punish” the regime’s decision-makers in ways that change their calculations. The people who ordered the crackdown — Ayatollah Khamenei, the IRGC leadership, the security apparatus — have demonstrated repeatedly that they’ll tolerate enormous costs to maintain power. They survived eight years of devastating war with Iraq, decades of sanctions, international isolation, and multiple rounds of domestic unrest. The notion that targeted strikes would instill fear and deter future repression may fundamentally misread the regime’s decision-making logic. Their actions suggest they may fear losing control over Iran’s political future more than they fear American bombs.

Intervention might give hardliners much of what they want: an external enemy to rally around, justification for emergency measures, and grounds to frame protesters as traitors rather than patriots. The protests would likely wane as people fear becoming collateral damage in an American campaign, and opposition figures would face impossible choices between supporting foreign intervention or being labeled regime defenders.

Here’s where a comparison might be useful. Imagine mass protests erupting across Chinese cities — driven by economic collapse, political repression, and demands for fundamental change. Imagine the government cracking down with lethal force, killing thousands, and cutting internet access. Imagine protesters asking America for help. Imagine Trump threatening military strikes. Would we support intervention then?

I strongly suspect most Americans would recoil from the idea. The risks would be immediately obvious: nuclear escalation, global economic catastrophe, superpower war. We’d recognize that bombing China would likely strengthen the Party’s grip, that the protesters themselves would be divided on whether foreign intervention helps, and that America doesn’t have the competence or legitimacy to reshape Chinese politics through force. Many Americans were troubled by reports from Xinjiang, yet no one seriously proposed military intervention.

So why is Iran different? The standard answer is that China is a peer competitor with nuclear weapons while Iran is a middle power with degraded defenses — which is my point. The Iran intervention debate isn’t really about principles of liberal internationalism or humanitarian responsibility. It seems to me to come down to perceived feasibility. We’re willing to contemplate intervention in Iran because we think we can get away with it, not because the moral case is fundamentally different from scenarios we’d reject elsewhere. If our commitment to supporting protesters is calibrated entirely by military vulnerability rather than by whether intervention would actually help, then we’re not operating from principle — we’re opportunistic. And that opportunism corrodes the very international norms and moral authority we claim to be defending.

There’s another dimension to this debate that most discussions avoid but that’s essential to understanding the strategic calculations at play: America’s waning global hegemony. For policymakers in the Trump administration and the broader strategic class, Iran represents a test case for whether American power can still shape outcomes in a region where our influence has been declining. There’s an unspoken fear that inaction would be another nail in the coffin of American primacy — that if America can’t or won’t intervene when protesters are being massacred in a middle power whose regional influence has already been degraded, what does that say about our ability to shape global events going forward?

I understand this anxiety, but acting from it seems like a mistake. The fundamental problem with the liberal interventionist project isn’t that we haven’t applied it rigorously enough; it’s that the assumptions underlying it were always questionable and have become less tenable as American power has become more contested. The belief that American force can reliably produce liberal or even favorable outcomes, that we understand other societies well enough to predict second- and third-order effects of our interventions, that military strikes can substitute for political legitimacy — these were never as solid as their proponents claimed, and they’ve been systematically undermined by two decades of failure in the broader Middle East.

Intervening in Iran to demonstrate that American primacy remains viable might accomplish the opposite. If the campaign strengthens hardliners, fragments the opposition, or sparks wider conflict, it would confirm rather than refute doubts about American power. The smarter approach is to recognize these limits and work within them, rather than risk another costly failure trying to prove we’re still the hegemon we once were.

This is also a pivotal moment for liberal interventionism as a doctrine. Whether the U.S. strikes or chooses restraint, the decision will shape how seriously the international community takes humanitarian intervention arguments for years to come. If strikes fail to achieve their aims — or worse, backfire spectacularly — it may mark the final discrediting of a foreign policy tradition already battered by Iraq and Afghanistan. If restraint prevails but is seen as abandonment, it could equally undermine future claims that American power serves moral purposes. Either way, Iran may prove to be the case that forces a long-overdue reckoning with what military force can and cannot accomplish in service of liberal ideals.

This doesn’t mean I advocate abandoning Iranian protesters or accepting a purely realist foreign policy that ignores human rights altogether. It means understanding that genuine support requires listening to what Iranians themselves want — and they appear to be divided on intervention — and that the most effective support often comes through non-military means: communications infrastructure, targeted sanctions on regime officials (not broad sanctions that punish civilians), asylum for dissidents, intelligence operations that expose corruption, diplomatic isolation of the regime while maintaining channels to civil society. I don’t know what toolkit is available to us, but surely something short of brute force is possible.

I mentioned earlier that I’m not a pacifist, and I want to be clear about what I mean. There are circumstances where military force might be justified — where it’s genuinely the least-bad option among terrible choices. But those circumstances are narrower than liberal interventionists often suggest.

I don’t have a rigid set of criteria that would apply universally. When we confront real decisions about intervention, we’re forced to reckon with a huge range of factors including intensely personal and emotional ones, at least in my case. The Rwandan genocide haunts some of us precisely because non-intervention allowed an atrocity that might have been stopped. The Iraq War haunts us because intervention based on nonexistent weapons created catastrophe in pursuit of goals that also turned out to be illusory.

What I can say is that the burden of proof for intervention should be extraordinarily high. It requires not just that something terrible is happening, but that military force would make it better rather than worse, that we understand the society in question well enough to predict the consequences, that we’re willing to commit the resources necessary to see it through, and that we’re not acting primarily from other motives (strategic advantage, hegemonic maintenance, domestic political concerns) while dressing them up in humanitarian language.

The Iran case seems to fail most of these tests. We don’t have strong evidence that strikes would help protesters rather than undermine them. Our track record in predicting Middle Eastern political dynamics is abysmal. The motives are transparently mixed — genuine concern about human rights intertwined with nuclear containment, regional competition, and questions about American credibility. And crucially, the Iranian protesters themselves are divided, with many activists inside Iran explicitly opposing foreign military intervention even as some diaspora voices call for it.

What ultimately tips me toward provisional opposition isn’t just the pragmatic case against intervention, though that’s compelling by itself. It’s the recognition that genuine support for people fighting for dignity and rights means respecting their agency rather than imposing our preferred solutions.

The patronizing assumption runs through much of the pro-intervention literature: that we in the West know better than Iranians themselves what they need, that our military power can accomplish what their political organizing cannot, that the region’s future is primarily a question for American decision-makers rather than for the people who actually live there. This reflects a presumption of centrality — the idea that every global crisis requires an American “response” — that I find both morally and practically unsupportable.

Iranian protesters deserve support. They deserve diplomatic backing, asylum when they need it, assistance to those who manage to get out, and as bright a spotlight as we can provide on the regime’s violence. What they probably don’t need is American bombs turning their uprising into a proxy conflict, strengthening the very hardliners they’re trying to remove, and validating decades of regime propaganda about foreign manipulation.

This isn’t comfortable moral territory. There’s something genuinely troubling about having the power to act and choosing restraint while people die. But the alternative — acting from a combination of moral urgency and hegemonic anxiety without clear understanding of the likely consequences — has produced enough catastrophe already. Sometimes the hardest wisdom is recognizing the limits of what outside powers can accomplish, however much we wish it were otherwise.

That’s where I land: with opposition to intervention, deep discomfort about the moral trade-offs involved, and recognition that this conclusion flows from my broader worldview about American power, Western assumptions about universal governance models, and respect for the agency of people fighting their own battles. It’s not knee-jerk anti-interventionism, and it’s not indifference to suffering. It’s a position arrived at through wrestling with history, power dynamics, and the question of what genuine support actually requires. I’m open to arguments that might shift my thinking, but this is where the evidence has brought me.

segunda-feira, 28 de julho de 2025

Answering the Needham Question with Neuroscience - Kaiser Y Kuo (Podcasts and Essays on China)

PRA: Uma das questões mais intrigantes da história econômica mundial: por que a China, tendo liderado várias revoluções científicas e econômicas séculos atrás, não conseguiu, a partir do século XVII (momento da revolução científica na Europa), avançar decisivamente para uma economia avançada, como a Europa o fez a partir do século XVIII e depois todo o Ocidente?

Mas, ela parece já ter recuperado o atraso e disparou rapidamente na frente do Ocidente. Leiam esta postagem muito interessante:

"Podcasts and Essays on China
Answering the Needham Question with Neuroscience
Does Iain McGlichrists's work on the brain's hemispheres explain why the Scientific Revolution didn't happen first in China? A guest post by Heidi Berg
KAISER Y KUO
JUL 17, 2025

Interest in Chinese innovation and technology has returned to levels comparable to those of the pre-COVID era. New EVs, batteries, perovskite solar panels, and the “DeepSeek moment” have fueled the demand for “China Tech Tours” among Western executives. They come to experience the shiny and fancy, and to gain some understanding of how Chinese technology development differs from “The West”. They are indeed not the first to seek such insights. The Jesuit missionaries arriving in the 16th century brought new knowledge to China, but they also spent much of their time understanding local technologies. However, the one person who stands out related to this interest is Dr. Joseph Needham (1900-1995), who in 1969 phrased the question that now bears his name.¹ The so-called Needham Question, in his own words, was this: “the essential problem [is] why modern science had not developed in Chinese civilization but only in Europe.”

Medieval China was undoubtedly technologically advanced, with the Tang and Song dynasties (618-1279) particularly notable for their advancements on multiple fronts. As the organizers of the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony were eager to make clear, critically important inventions such as paper, printing, gunpowder, and the compass were developed in ancient China.

But despite all the advancements, traditional Chinese civilization never developed modern science. The Scientific Revolution took place in Europe, hundreds of years later than the highly innovative periods in China. This is the background for Needham’s central question. His work on Science and Civilization in China, a project to catalogue technologies developed in China, is still ongoing at the Needham Archive at Cambridge University 30 years after his death.

Needham’s main hypothesis for an answer is related to religion: “There was no confidence that the codes of nature could be read because there was no assurance that a divine being had formulated a code capable of being read.” Others have discussed reasons related to the geography of China, or its governance system, or its incentive structures. Albert Einstein pointed to “the lack of formal logical system (in Euclidean geometry) and the practice of scientific experiments.” In a paper form 2023, Lui Lam at San Jose University builds on Einstein in his answer: “The ancient Chinese had picked the complex system of humans to study while breakthroughs in Western modern science happened in the study of simple systems.”

I believe a new answer to the Needham question can be found through the work of Dr. Iain McGilchrist. McGilchrist is a renowned neuroscientist, now turned philosopher, who practiced psychiatry for 35 years, working at institutions such as the Bethlem Royal Hospital and Johns Hopkins University. In his book The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World, he combines his deep knowledge of neuroscience with a grounding in the humanities and history to discuss the development of European cultures from the ancient Greeks to today.

The book is more than 460 pages long, and the following summary is well documented through scientific studies (there are about 100 pages of notes and academic references in the book). McGilchrist’s starting point is the fact that all animals have two distinct brain hemispheres, with the clear purpose of ensuring two very different capacities: Focusing on the thing we need to grab (e.g., the food) and paying attention to our surroundings (e.g., so that we do not become someone else’s food). The only way to let us do both simultaneously is to have one part of the brain in charge of each. Put simply, the first — narrowly focused on grabbing — is controlled by the left hemisphere, while the second — big picture, watching out for new things on the horizon— is controlled by the right. The differences can be observed in stroke patients: Those with a left hemisphere stroke (for whom only the right hemisphere works properly) often lose the ability to read letters and deal with numbers, both narrow focus tasks, while a right hemisphere stroke can make it impossible to comprehend complex concepts such as empathy and metaphors. Recent technology enables researchers to “turn off” one side of the brain, and these experiments confirm the specialized functions.

The two hemispheres work together in highly complex ways, but individuals are ordinarily “dominated” by one hemisphere’s approach to the world. A simplified example is that people with a dominant left hemisphere are typically attracted to money and structure (owning and controlling), while those with a right-hemisphere worldview are more inclined towards the arts and nature (enjoying the broad picture and being part of something). Which hemisphere is dominant is not genetically determined: both are accessible to all neurological “normal” individuals. (McGilchrist even likens it to two radio channels you can chose between).

There will be a mix of “left and right hemisphere thinkers” in every culture, but often an overweight of one dominant worldview within a group. McGilchrist discusses this by looking at European history: Starting from the ancient Greeks, he argues that there have been several notable shifts in the power-balance between the left and the right hemispheres, impacting culture and societies in Europe. In his view, the right hemisphere was dominant in early ancient Greece (hence the rich arts and culture), while the military strong and vast Roman empire correlated with a left hemisphere dominance. The Renaissance was the next period when a right hemisphere understanding of the world dominated, again leading to an extremely culturally rich period.

What is the connection between the divided brain and the Needham question? Already in the title of the book, The Master and his Emissary: The Making of the Western World, there is a hint at a difference between the “Western World” and other cultures. McGilchrist provides numerous examples of the right hemisphere's strong position in East Asian cultures. He mentions examples such as Taoism and Japanese kintsugi pottery, which he argues can only be understood by the right hemisphere: The first principle of Taoism is “The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao” — a contradiction the left hemisphere cannot understand. Kintsugi pottery is valued for imperfections, while the left hemisphere seeks symmetry and perfection. Further, the right hemisphere is the more pragmatic of the two. This might at first not be intuitive but relates to the “real life” perspective of the right hemisphere compared to the “in theory” approach of the left (here the famous Chinese quotes ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ and ‘it doesn’t matter if the cat is black or white’ come to mind).

McGilchrist takes us directly towards the Needham Question when he discusses the scientific revolution as a child of left hemisphere dominance, precisely for its affinity for theory: A reductionist approach was necessary to establish and work with the scientific and philosophical principles introduced by Newton, Descartes and others. Only the left hemisphere will approach the world as a collection of elements or a machine and try to derive concepts such as “laws of nature.” In his concluding chapter, McGilchrist references Needham’s observations to emphasize the different tendencies in Western and Eastern uses of the brain. Where East Asian cultures tend to use strategies of both hemispheres more evenly, he says, modern Western approaches are steeply skewed towards the left hemisphere. Hence, the work by McGilchrist suggests the following answer to the Needham question: ‘Chinese civilization never developed modern science because there was not a time period in China when the left hemisphere of the brain dominated thinking and society’. This answer implies that the hypotheses of Einstein, Lam, and Needham himself are in fact all valid: The right hemisphere is neither attracted to a cosmology with a one creator and “a code to be read” (Needham’s main point), nor to a structured formal logical system (Einstein’s point). Finally, the right hemisphere cares more about people and complex systems compared to the left (Lam’s hypothesis).

Is the Needham Question relevant for a Western executive on a “tech tour” to China in 2025? Scholars of history and science in China have moved beyond simplistic views of Chinese civilization and the people, as well as the narrow focus on the European scientific revolution as a point of departure. But the question is in itself a reminder of the long history of interest in the different approaches to problem solving and innovation. McGilchrist’s work offers new perspectives to what we often end up referring to as “cultural differences”. If, in fact, Western “tech tour” participants rely more on the left hemisphere in their understanding of the world, an explanation found in neuroscience should also be appealing to them. Further, the divided brain theory introduces some interesting perspectives related to AI: Simplistically said, artificial intelligence is based on a left-hemisphere worldview as it depends on algorithms (i.e. it can reference all the writings existing about the Tao, but it will never understand the eternal Tao). Maybe a culture where the right hemisphere stands stronger is better positioned to work alongside the left hemisphere-based AI? The Needham question itself does not demand a long lecture during the “tech tour.” But one might well consider adding some neuroscience to the agenda.

Heidi Berg is leading the work at the Danish Confederation of Industries’ China office related to ESG and sustainability services for Danish member companies and local partners. She has worked with projects related to sustainability and ESG over the last fifteen years, both in Europe, Africa, South Asia, and China. Her experience includes investment projects in renewable energy and sustainable agriculture, financial inclusion, the textile industry, and low-emission real estate. She is a recognized keynote speaker, educator, and discussion facilitator. She holds a master’s degree in international management with a specialization in finance.

1 Formulated in J. Needham, The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West, 1969

segunda-feira, 12 de maio de 2025

The Bombing of China's Belgrade Embassy - Kaiser Y Kuo (China History, Sinica)

This Week in China's History: The Bombing of China's Belgrade Embassy

May 7, 1999

LISTEN NOW · 7:56

On the night of May 7-8, 1999, an American B-2 “stealth” bomber, part of NATO operations against Yugoslavia, launched bombs against targets in the Serbian capital, Belgrade. NATO forces were part of an effort to stop the ethnic cleansing being carried out in what was then the Kosovo region of Serbia, which NATO said was being perpetrated by Slobodan Milosevic and Bosnian Serbs. The war was controversial, both in terms of its legitimacy and its effectiveness, and had begun just a month earlier.

According to official U.S. government sources, the bombs were targeting a Yugoslav military target. There is much controversy about what the target was, how it was arrived at, and who made those determinations, but the result was indisputable. Sometime after midnight, local time, five precision-guided bombs landed on and exploded in the compound of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, reducing the building to rubble. The attack killed three journalists and injured more than 20 Chinese nationals, and was immediately the center of an international diplomatic furore.

That the weapons in question were informally known as “smart bombs” was a bitter irony, because the attack could scarcely have been any less intelligent. American officials immediately expressed regret at what had happened, saying it had been a mistake: the bombs did hit their intended target, but U.S. intelligence claimed that an outdated map had been used. American officials had even checked, they asserted, the target against a list of “no strike” locations, including hospitals, churches, and, yes, foreign embassies, but because the Chinese embassy had recently — several years earlier — moved to a different address, it did not come up on the list. Moreover, although the United States was integrated into NATO operations, in some cases it maintained its own parallel command structure rather than submitting its forces to NATO orders. NATO was not authorized, for instance, to operate the B-2 bomber, which carried out the mission, and so the targeting process was done exclusively within American command and control processes. This meant both that the faulty intelligence on which the U.S. attack was based was not checked against European information and that approval for the strike rested solely within American authority..

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