Russia has three possible options to respond to Ukraine’s strategically successful mid- and long-range strikes into its territory.
Since the beginning of 2026, Ukraine has rapidly expanded a long-range strike campaign, with droneshitting targets ever deeper within Russia’s hinterland and with more impact on the Russian industry as well as the military. Kyiv’s new strategy is changing the character of the Ukraine War: Rather than seeking stabilization or breakthrough at the front, Kyiv aims to degrade the economic, logistical, and social systems that sustain the Russian troops deployed against Ukraine.
Ukrainian deep strikes with drones and cruise missiles into Russia’s rear are disrupting, damaging, or destroying more and more military-industrial, transportation, and energy infrastructure. According to Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, the number of strikes inflicted on Russia’s operational and strategic depth has grown by 1,150 percent since the beginning of 2026. Ukraine’s front strikes now reach up to 150 kilometers (93 miles), middle strikes approximately to 300 kilometers (186 miles), and deep strikes up to 2,000 kilometers (1243 miles).
This is driving Russia into a broader socio-economic crisis. Moscow has had to restrict access to gasoline and diesel in 60 of 83 Russian regions amid rising fuel prices. Especially in annexed Crimea, the supply of fuel, water, electricity, and food has become a major problem, and economic life has largely halted. In several Russian regions, the state-backed messenger “Maks” is blocking public chats where drivers exchange information about the gasoline supply and queues at gas stations.
Ukraine’s Mid-Strike Attacks on Russia’s Frontline Troops
Yet, the increasing deep strikes into Russia’s far-away hinterland are not Moscow’s only problem. More and more so-called “mid-strikes” on areas behind frontline troops complicate the Russian army’s supply even when sufficient fuel and other supplies are available. Ukraine is attempting to disrupt the functioning of Russia’s logistics networks by connecting still-operational fuel plants and storage facilities to Russian fighting troops with its growing mid-range UAV fleet. To do that, Ukraine has developed and is now deploying a new generation of FPV drones optimized for near- and mid-range logistics strikes.
In June 2026, Russia’s Ministry of Defense proudly reported that it had intercepted 8,849 Ukrainian drones in May 2026. That would seem to indicate a large success when compared to 3,676 interceptions in January 2026 and 2,504 in May of the previous year. There are reasons to doubt the accuracy of the Russian government’s data, which may overstate interception rates. Whether that is the case or not, the growing Russian figures also indicate that the pace of Ukrainian attacks has been rising. The drones deployed by Ukraine are more and more saturating the Russian air defense and obviously grow faster than the capabilities of Russia’s air defense.
Russia’s Insufficient Drone Interception
That is even more so the case as an entirely new type of weapon, anti-drone drones, at the front are highlighting the continued fundamental Russian equipment inadequacies. For instance, the most widely used Russian anti-aircraft system, the Pantsir-S1, is designed to engage large, radar-reflective targets such as cruise missiles. Yet, it largely fails against low-signature drones made of plastic and plywood.
Unlike Ukraine, Russian industry has only recently begun developing the capability to mass-produce interceptor drones. Its new Yolka and Lys-2 anti-drone UAVs exist only as prototypes so far. Russia lacks the integrated radar-and-software ecosystem that lets Ukrainian interceptor operators act on real-time targeting data across an assigned sector.
Defending thousands of kilometers of critical infrastructure requires vastly more resources than attacking selected high-value targets. Every improvement in Ukrainian strike capability therefore expands Russia’s defensive burden disproportionately. As a result, Russia reaching Ukraine’s current level of air-defense effectiveness is assessed by military-industrial experts as currently unachievable. Contrary to Russian propaganda narratives, the interception rates against Ukrainian deep- and mid-strike drones will remain low—at least, for the foreseeable future.
None of these pressures mechanically determines Russian behavior. Authoritarian regimes can, in general, absorb economic losses that would be politically unacceptable in democracies. The question is less about whether pressure exists than about how the Kremlin chooses to respond. Three obvious strategic pathways can be distinguished, yet they do not exclude one another; rather, they appear in combination.
Scenario One: Russia Adapts to Ukrainian Attacks
Either implicitly or explicitly, many commentators on Russia’s currently growing economic, social and logistical problems assume that they are temporary, moderate and/or secondary. From such a viewpoint, even if these issues may, at the moment, look grave, the Russian state will be able to adapt and preserve its political stability, integrity and course. The Kremlin will successfully neutralize social discontent through repression, compensation, or—most likely—a combination of both.
Temporary rationing of fuel, electricity, food, and water—as is already partly happening on Russia’s occupied Ukrainian territories—can be introduced temporarily and framed as patriotic sacrifice. Moscow will, according to this scenario, eventually find ways to largely restore the supply, transportation, and distribution lines via importing, for instance, gasoline from Central Asia.
In such a scenario, the Russian state would view the current crisis as partial and transitory or bearable from the standpoint of Russian society. The reduction in quality of life will be insufficient to prompt major protests, constraints on foreign adventurism, or political change. Even if ordinary Russians’ standard of living sinks, a new equilibrium can be reached and sustained.
Scenario Two: Russia Moderates Its Objectives in Ukraine
The moderation scenario assumes that Moscow’s current social challenges, resulting from ongoing deep Ukrainian strikes on Russian infrastructure and parallel economic challenges such as low oil prices, are steep and will continue to worsen. A cascade of effects from further air-defense fragmentation, refinery damage, supply deficits, logistical bottlenecks, and related disruptions leads to a fundamental structural shift in Russia’s societal mood and political outlook. Recognizing this, the Russian leadership—either with or without President Vladimir Putin—temporarily moderates its maximalist war aims and negotiating position.
At the very least, the diplomatic theater around peace talks may give way to a more serious process of consultations driven by Moscow’s genuine interest in pausing the fighting. To be sure, social hardship alone will not compel an accommodative course of action, as long as the leadership can absorb political costs and deprioritize civilian welfare.
Yet, under increasing societal pressure, the Kremlin will, in this scenario, seek an at least temporary de-escalation of the conflict and a shift to low-intensity fighting. Moderation would mean, in such a turn of events, not a Russian ideological reorientation but a mere military and economic re-calculation. Serious search for compromise and interest in a ceasefire will occur only when Moscow concludes that the war is, at the moment, unwinnable—a threshold not yet visibly reached.
Scenario Three: Russia Escalates Attacks on Ukraine and the West
As in the second scenario, the third ideal-typical script considered here also assumes that mounting military and economic pressure will prompt the Kremlin to change course radically; Moscow may escalate rather than moderate. Russian escalation can have both political-psychological and military-material purposes, and be designed to scare or/and bomb Ukraine and its Western partners into capitulation or, at least, an acceptance of Russian terms for a ceasefire—a strategic approach sometimes labeled “escalate to deescalate.
Among others, escalation could aim to restore Russia’s initiative on the battlefield, decapitate the leadership of the Ukrainian state, disrupt Ukraine’s long-range drone development and production, or dismantle supply logistics of Ukrainian frontline troops. Arguably, this scenario has already started to materialize with the heavy drone attacks and missile bombardment of Kyiv on the nights of July 1–2 as well as 5–6.
While being the obviously preferred course of action by the Kremlin in response to Ukraine’s successful attacks on Russian infrastructure, Moscow’s options for and benefits from escalation are today more constrained than they were when the full-scale invasion started in 2022. Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself and its support from abroad have significantly increased compared to four years ago. The strategic rationale for escalation is becoming weaker with every additional successful Ukrainian hit of Russia’s infrastructure.
Moscow would benefit from an interruption of the war and a halt of Ukrainian deep strikes. In addition, it would benefit greatly from sanctions relief. A continuing tit for tat will only deepen Russia’s already significant economic dislocations. Intensified strikes on Ukrainian rear areas, including Kyiv, will hardly resolve Russia’s core problems. Moscow cannot easily break the Ukrainian innovation cycle, which continues to outpace the Russian one, which is mostly adaptive and belated.
Still, as long as Moscow is not driven solely by rational motives, it has several escalation options. Internally, this can mean the start of large-scale conscription and broadening of repression against dissent in Russia. Apart from already increasing terror against Ukrainian civilians, the Kremlin may try to force Belarus’ involvement in the war as an active co-belligerent. Even a credible threat from the north may force Ukraine to divert air defenses and ground forces from the front line. Moscow may also try to further expand its hybrid measures, such as cyberattacks, sabotage activity in Europe, and nuclear signaling to the West to deter it from supporting Ukraine.
Russia and the War of Attrition
Instead of focusing on immediate territorial defense and gains, Kyiv is increasingly targeting the material and social structures in Russia’s rear that enable its warfare in Ukraine and hybrid actions elsewhere. This shift has created a strategic environment in which defense rather than offense dominates. To be sure, Russia can still gather troops at the front and mobilize industrial resources.
Yet every additional layer of protection it has to establish in reaction to Ukraine’s rapidly growing deep and mid-strike capabilities requires spreading limited air-defense assets further across its vast territory. Defending critical infrastructure along thousands of kilometers is harder than attacking select weak points of Ukraine. The cost of Russian defense is increasing more rapidly than the cost of offense.
The Ukrainian successes in striking Russia’s energy infrastructure and military-industrial complex will not produce a Russian military collapse. In principle, authoritarian regimes such as Russia can withstand, ignore, or neutralize discontent emerging from civilian hardship while preserving military capacity. The decisive variable is thus not the economic pain inflicted itself. The key question is whether Ukrainian strikes with new long-range weapons can progressively reduce Russia’s ability to sustain and generate combat power faster than Moscow can adapt to the innovation cycle.
For Europe, the challenge is greater than simply helping Ukraine somehow prevail. It is to recognize that the future character of warfare and structure of European security are being written in Ukraine today. Against this background, the European Union has to ensure that the institutions and policies tasked to preserve the sovereignty of its member states and of the European project as a whole evolve as rapidly as the changes on the Ukrainian battlefield demand.
About the Authors: Andreas Umland and Lesia Bidochko
Dr. Andreas Umland is a policy fellow at the European Policy Institute in Kyiv (EPIK), an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies in the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), and an associate professor of Political Science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. He has previously worked at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, Harvard’s Weatherhead Center, St. Antony’s College Oxford, Urals State University in Yekaterinburg, National Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv, Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation (ІЄАС) and Ukrainian Institute for the Future (UIM) in Kyiv, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, and Institute of International Relations (UMV) in Prague.
Dr. Lesia Bidochko is a policy fellow at EPIK, an assistant professor of Political Science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and a non-resident fellow at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder). Her professional experience includes serving as deputy head of the Detector Media Research Center, where she specialized in Russian foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), information campaigns, social media monitoring, and strategic communications to disrupt propaganda networks.
EPIK is co-funded by the European Union and theSwedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).
