Keynes e o art. 231 do tratado de Versailles - Edward W. Fuller (Mises)

Keynes and the Versailles Treaty's Infamous "Article 231"

Edward W. Fuller

Mises Institute, April 5, 2019

April 7, 2019, marks the hundredth anniversary of Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles — the infamous war-guilt clause. Although the treaty was not signed until June 28, the Supreme Council approved the notorious article on April 7, 1919. Thus, April 7 is the proper day to mourn the centenary of the calamitous war-guilt clause of the Treaty of Versailles.

After giving some background, this article presents documents that prove John Maynard Keynes, along with John Foster Dulles, was the author of Article 231. Next, it is argued that the war-guilt clause was unjust because Germany was not solely responsible for the war. Finally, the article draws some lessons to be learned from the war and the peace treaty. The most important is that the free market economy is the only way to lasting world peace.

The Prehistory of Article 231

Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles required Germany to admit responsibility for starting the First World War. The clause reads:

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

The history of the article starts with President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Points seven and eight stipulate, “Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored,” and “All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored.” The term “restored” is significant, for it meant France and Belgium could seek compensation from Germany for the invasion.

In October 1918, President Woodrow Wilson urged Britain, France, and Italy to offer peace terms to Germany based on the Fourteen Points. In late October, Colonel Edward House, Wilson’s advisor, met with Allied leaders in Paris to discuss the Fourteen Points. The British had one major objection to Wilson’s proposal: the Fourteen Points did not allow Britain to make claims against Germany for compensation.

The war on the western front was fought entirely on French and Belgian soil. And the Fourteen Points only called for the restoration of territory Germany had invaded. This was unacceptable to the British. David Lloyd George, the British prime minister, told his private secretary Philip Kerr:

She [Germany] must pay ample compensation for damage and that compensation must be equitably distributed among the Allies and not given entirely to France and Belgium. Devastated areas is only one item in war loss. Great Britain has probably spent more money on the war and incurred greater indirect losses in, for instance, shipping and trade, than France. She must have her fair share of compensation.1

On October 30, Lloyd George suggested the following addition to Wilson’s proposal: “Compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies, and their property (by the forces of Germany?), by land, by sea, and from the air.”2 On November 1, the European leaders changed “by the forces of Germany” to “by the invasion by Germany of Allied territory.”3 The European leaders approved this language on November 3. But the British were afraid the term “invasion” might rule out their own claims for compensation. On November 4, the British insisted that the revised phrase be changed to “by the aggression of Germany.”4

Thus the famous Lansing note of November 5, 1918, emerged: “Compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, sea and from the air.”5

This passage was included in the Armistice of November 11, which ended the First World War. The term “aggression” in the Armistice is significant because it was later used in Article 231. The term was suggested by Kerr (also known as Lord Lothian).6 Thus, the use of the loaded term “aggression” in Article 231 must be attributed to the British and their drive for compensation from Germany.

With the Armistice, Germany agreed to make compensation to the Allies. However, this agreement did not constitute an admission of guilt. Furthermore, by signing the Armistice, the Germans only agreed to make compensation for property damaged as a result of military action. The Armistice did not include claims for war costs and reparations.

Given the way the Armistice read, the British claims to German compensation were the most precarious. Hence, Britain certainly had the most to gain from language such as that which became Article 231. As noted, Germany had already agreed to compensate France and Belgium for property damage, and the Americans never planned to seek compensation. Since their claims to compensation were the most questionable, the British were the hardliners on the issues of war guilt and reparations at the Paris Peace Conference.7

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 commenced in early January. Initially, the Americans argued that the Allies could not seek reparations for all damage caused by the war. The American John Foster Dulles wrote on February 4, “Reparation would not be due for all damage caused by the war unless the war in its totality were an illegal act.”8 However, the British opposed the American position and argued that Germany must pay reparations. They claimed on February 10, “The war itself was an act of aggression and wrong; it was, therefore, a wrong for which reparation is due.”9

Unfortunately, the Americans acquiesced. On February 21, Dulles drafted a proposal that is widely considered a precursor of Article 231: “The German Government undertakes to make full and complete reparation, as hereinafter provided, for damage as hereinafter defined, done by the aggression of Germany and/or its allies to the territories and populations of the nations with which the German Government has been at war.”10 Although drafted by Dulles, the proposal reflected the British position. Furthermore, the Dulles draft did not require Germany to accept responsibility for the war. Hence, it was less severe than the final article.

John Maynard Keynes

John Maynard Keynes is the most influential economist in modern history. Like many of the most celebrated and reviled personalities of the twentieth century, Keynes emerged out of the pandemonium of the First World War. He began working in the British Treasury in January 1915, and he was the third-highest-ranking official in the Treasury by the end of the war. In January 1919, he was sent to the Paris Peace Conference as the Treasury’s chief representative. He famously resigned from the British delegation in June 1919, and he publishedThe Economic Consequences of the Peace in December.11 This book made Keynes an international celebrity, and it laid the foundation for his enormous influence in the following decades.

According to the traditional wisdom, Keynes was a great opponent of German reparations. For example, the Keynesian economist Don Patinkin stresses Keynes’s “passionate disagreement with what he considered to be harsh clauses of the Versailles Peace Treaty.”12 Robert Skidelsky claims in his authoritative biography: “Keynes had no personal reason to feel guilty about the ‘harsh’ peace at Versailles, since he had opposed it.”13

In reality, Keynes was a chief draftsman of Article 231 and other financial sections of the Treaty of Versailles.14

From inside the British Treasury, Keynes was already planning for reparations by late 1915. On January 2, 1916, he submitted an official Treasury memorandum with William J. Ashley entitled “Memorandum on the Effect of an Indemnity.”15This memo shows that the idea to impose long-term reparations on Germany originated with Keynes and Ashley. Lloyd George confirmed that “Professor Ashley and Mr. Keynes are thus the joint authors of the long-term indemnity which was incorporated in the Treaty.”16

It was Keynes’s tragic idea to not fix the amount of reparations in the treaty. The key document is his memorandum of March 11, 1919, entitled “Reparation and Indemnity.” This vital document is reproduced in the appendix. In this memorandum, Keynes argues Germany must be forced to pay reparations. However, he claims it is impossible to determine how much Germany can pay each year. Therefore, he recommends the Allies leave the amount of reparations unfixed in the treaty. Rather than fixing the liability, the Allies should establish a commission to decide each year how much Germany should be forced to pay. He writes, “A Commission shall be set up including representatives of European neutral nations to fix year by year the sum payable annually by Germany for a period of thirty years.”

Unfortunately, the Allies took this advice. Keynes’s policy meant the Germans were forced to sign a blank check, and they felt condemned to indefinite slave labor. This tragic idea poisoned European politics in the interwar years. Shockingly, Keynes hypocritically attacked his own idea in The Economic Consequences of the Peace.17

Given its similarities to the Dulles draft of February 21, Keynes’s memo must be considered a precursor to Article 231. Furthermore, the extremely harsh terms in his proposal show that Keynes’s passionate opposition to reparations is pure mythology:

Germany is liable up to the full extent of the injury she has caused to the Allied and Associated Nations…. The Allied and Associated Governments demand accordingly that Germany render payment for the injury which she has caused up to the full limit of her capacity…. Germany shall hand over immediately (a) the whole of her mercantile marine, (b) the whole of her gold and silver coin and bullion in the Reichsbank and all other banks; (c) the whole of the foreign property of her nationals situated outside Germany, including all foreign securities, foreign properties and business and concessions.

The war-guilt clause began to take form in late March, and Keynes was Britain’s chief draftsman. By April 2, the draft committee had nearly arrived at Article 231: “The Allied and Associated Governments affirm the responsibility of the enemy states for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of the Enemy States.”18 Keynes’s copy of the April 2 draft shows his suggested revisions in his own handwriting.

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The April 2 draft comes extremely close to Article 231. Still, it lacks the severity of the final clause. In the April 2 draft, the Allies “affirm the responsibility of the enemy states.” But this draft does not stipulate that Germany must accept responsibility for starting the war. For this reason, the final clause incorporated in the treaty is harsher than the April 2 draft.

With Keynes’s help, Article 231 was achieved by April 7.19 His copy of the draft is reproduced below. As shown in his own hand, Keynes inserted the war-guilt language “and the Enemy States accept” responsibility. This addition is crucial. The Supreme Council approved the article on April 7.20

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The draft committee made one minor change to the article after its acceptance on April 7. On April 21, the language “Enemy States” was changed to “Germany and her allies.” With this change, the final article was achieved. Keynes and Dulles were responsible for the change.21 As all this shows, Keynes and Dulles were the chief draftsmen of Article 231. Keynes bears much responsibility for the most disastrous diplomatic article in modern history.

Keynes’s problematic role in the history of Article 231 has been almost totally neglected by historians. Roy Harrod’s official biography suppresses his involvement, as does Skidelsky’s hagiographical biography. In fact, Skidelsky distances his hero from the problematic article by incorrectly attributing the war-guilt clause to Philip Kerr.22 Donald Moggridge is the only Keynes biographer to admit his involvement: “The significant draftsmen of the clause were Keynes and John Foster Dulles.”23

After the conference, Keynes maintained that Germany was responsible for the war. He writes on the first page of The Economic Consequences of Peace: “Moved by insane delusion and reckless self-regard, the German people overturned the foundations on which we all lived and built.” He repeats in 1920:

Persons in power in Germany deliberately provoked the war and intended that it should commence when it did. If this be so, the accepted standards of international justice entitled us to impose, at Germany’s expense, any terms which might be calculated to make good some part of the destruction done, to heal Europe’s wounds, to preserve and perpetuate peace, and to terrify future malefactors.24

Keynes utterly failed to predict the disastrous consequences of his war-guilt clause. He argued the article was harmless, and he even had the audacity to give his draftsmanship a compliment in The Economic Consequences of the Peace: “So far, however, all this is only a matter of words, of virtuosity in draftsmanship, which does no one any harm, and which probably seemed much more important at the time than it ever will again between now and judgment day.”25

Was Germany Guilty?

Article 231 played a momentous role in European politics between the world wars. The war-guilt clause was loathed in Germany, and it became the focus of German opposition to the treaty. Adolf Hitler made Article 231 the great symbol of the injustice of the Versailles Treaty, or Diktat, and it was a major cause of his rise to power. We must ask on the centenary of this tragic article: Did Germany actually start the war? And was Article 231 unjust?

Article 231 was unjust because Germany was not solely responsible for starting the war. It is illegitimate to blame any single nation for starting the First World War. All the major European powers were at fault. To blame Germany, or any one combatant, for the war is to fundamentally misconstrue the basic causes of modern wars and the First World War in particular.

To understand why Germany does not bear sole responsibility for the war, it must be realized that all modern wars are commercial, or economic, in origin. President Woodrow Wilson declared in 1917:

Why, my fellow-citizens, is there any man here, or any woman — let me say, is there any child here, who does not know that the seed of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry? … This war, in its inception, was a commercial and industrial war. It was not a political war.26

The First World War was the result of Europe’s imperialistic intervention in foreign trade. Britain and France had gained imperial control over significant markets in Asia and Africa long before the German unification of 1871. Unfortunately, the British and French did not allow free trade in the foreign markets they controlled. Powers like Germany were shut out of foreign markets. Thus, Germany felt imperial expansion was the only way to open new markets for German goods. Like the British and French, the Germans failed to allow other imperial powers to trade freely in German-controlled territories. The fundamental cause of the First World War was Europe’s adoption of the principle of imperialism over the principle of free trade. All of the major powers were guilty of this charge, meaning they were all responsible for the war.

Keynes was a zealous imperialist, and the following statement by him is an excellent example of the common European attitude toward imperialism before the war:

It is only during the present reign that we have begun to realize the responsibilities of the Empire and to see our duties to subject races. We have begun to see that Great Britain may have a high destiny and a great future before her. We have before taken up “the white man’s burden” and we must endeavor to wield the power of Empire with more lasting effect and to greater good than the mighty empires that have risen and fallen through the course of history.27

The European powers believed they had the right, and even the duty, to exercise imperialistic control over less developed peoples. But the imperialistic mindset inevitably creates antagonism between nations. The following passage from Keynes reflects the bellicosity bred by the ideology of imperialism:

We, who are imperialist … think that British rule brings with it an increase of justice, liberty, and prosperity; and we administer our Empire not with a view to our pecuniary aggrandizement…. Germany’s aims are not such.… [S]he looks rather to definite material gains.… [W]e distrust her diplomacy, we distrust her international honesty, we resent her calumnious attitude towards us. She envies our possessions; she would observe no scruple if there was any prospect of depriving us of them. She considers us her natural antagonist. She fears the preponderance of the Anglo Saxon race.28

Imperialistic sentiment prevented the Allies from establishing a just and durable peace at the Paris Peace Conference. The great problem with the treaty was that it enshrined British and French imperialism. The Allies carved up the world and created new but unsustainable nation-states with government coercion. Imperialists like Keynes maintained, “The setting up of a great many of these states was, in my opinion, justified.”29 The imperialistic inclinations of Keynes and other Allied delegates prevented the Allies from establishing a just peace based on genuine national self-determination. The Second World War was the inevitable result.

Lessons for the Future

On the centenary of the infamous war-guilt clause, it is appropriate to contemplate the lessons to be learned from the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference. The first lesson is this: everyone loses in modern wars. Even the winners are worse off after a great war. Although victorious, the war cost Britain its superpower status. Britain’s economic might and financial dominance were the foundation of its massive empire. By destroying the economic basis of the empire, the First World War was the beginning of the end of British world hegemony. Britain was one of the greatest losers of the war.

If anyone benefited from the Great War, it was the United States. The war passed hegemony from Britain to the United States. Still, the war and its aftermath have haunted the United States ever since. First, the war set the stage for the Great Depression of the 1930s. All of the current financial problems facing the United States have their origins in the Depression. Thus, the financial effects of the war and the resulting Depression are still with us today.

Moreover, all of the United States’ greatest foreign-policy struggles over the last hundred years must be traced to the First World War. The war and the Allies’ peacemaking produced Nazism in Germany, militarism in Japan, extremism in the Middle East, and communism in Russia, China, Korea, and Vietnam. Thus, the Second World War, the Cold War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the ongoing wars in the Middle East all resulted from the First World War. These conflicts have squandered vast resources that could have been used to improve living standards in the United States.

The second lesson is this: victors of modern wars must not write war-guilt clauses. Such clauses only breed contempt between peoples. All peacemaking efforts must be aimed at establishing a durable peace, but the antagonism engendered by war-guilt clauses undermines peace. A just war must result in a just and lasting peace. A war-guilt clause undercuts the peace and thereby calls into question whether the war itself was really just.

But here is the most important lesson: the free market economy is the only economic system compatible with durable peace between nations. All modern wars have one fundamental cause — namely, government intervention in the free market economy. Government intervention in the domestic economy renders domestic producers incapable of competing with foreign producers. Domestic producers then inevitably call on government for protection from foreign producers. In other words, they demand government level the playing field by penalizing foreign producers with protectionist measures. And protectionism leads to international conflict and war. Government intervention in the economy is the ultimate cause of all modern wars.

Those who wish for lasting peace among nations must advocate free trade abroad. But foreign and domestic economic policy must form an integrated whole. Free trade abroad is impossible if the domestic economy is burdened by government intervention. Free trade abroad starts with free markets at home. The free market economy at home and abroad is the only way to lasting world peace.

Appendix: Reparation and Indemnity

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Image published with permission of Proquest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission.

Image published with permission of Proquest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission.

Image published with permission of Proquest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission.

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• 1. Quoted in The Cost of the War, 1914–1919, R.E. Bunselmeyer (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1975), p. 82.
• 2. Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference from the Standpoint of the American Delegation , P.M. Burnett (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), vol. 1, p. 393
• 3. Ibid., pp. 397, 402.
• 4. Ibid., pp. 407–08.
• 5. Ibid., p. 411.
• 6. See Lord Lothian, Philip Kerr, 1882–1940, J.R.M. Butler (New York: St. Martin’s Press., 1960), p. 73. Also see The Cost of the War, 1914–1919, R.E. Bunselmeyer (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1975), p. 82.
• 7. Keynes deceptively portrayed the French as the hardliners on reparations in The Economic Consequences of the Peace. According to Margaret MacMillan, “The picture painted so vividly by Keynes and others of a vindictive France, intent on grinding Germany down, begins to dissolve.” See Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World, M. MacMillan (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 192.
• 8. John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Freedom, R. Skidelsky (New York: Viking, 2000 [2001]), p. 27.
• 9. Quoted in My Diary at the Conference of Paris, D.H. Miller (New York, 1928), vol. 19, p. 268.
• 10. Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference from the Standpoint of the American Delegation , P.M. Burnett (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), vol. 1, p. 600.
• 11. Skidelsky describes Keynes’s work as “one of the most influential books of the twentieth century.” See John Maynard Keynes: Hopes Betrayed, R. Skidelsky (New York: Viking, 1983 [1986]), p. 384.
• 12. Anticipations of the General Theory and Other Essays on Keynes, D. Patinkin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1982), p. xx.
• 13. John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Freedom , R. Skidelsky (New York: Viking, 2000 [2001]), p. 27.
• 14. For a detailed critique of Keynes’s actions during and after the war, see “Keynes and the First World War,” E.W. Fuller and R.C. Whitten, Libertarian Papers (vol. 9, no. 1, 2017), available at: http://libertarianpapers.org/fuller-whitten-keynes-first-world-war/.
• 15. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (London: Macmillan and Cambridge University Press for the Royal Economic Society, 1923 [1971]), vol. 16, pp. 311–34.
• 16. The Truth about the Peace Treaties, D. Lloyd George (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938), p. 446.
• 17. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (London: Macmillan and Cambridge University Press for the Royal Economic Society, 1919 [1971]), vol. 2, pp. 85, 99. Marc Trachtenberg agrees: “It was British policy, especially British intransigence on figures, that was ultimately responsible for the failure of the Treaty to include a fixed sum.” See “Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference” in The Journal of Modern History (vol. 51, no. 1, 1979), p. 39.
• 18. John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Freedom , R. Skidelsky (New York: Viking, 2000 [2001]), p. 27.
• 19. Ibid, p. 847.
• 20. Ibid, p. 857. Also see p. 847.
• 21. Ibid, p. 964.
• 22. John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Freedom , R. Skidelsky (New York: Viking, 2000 [2001]), p. 27.
• 23. Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography , D. Moggridge (London: Routledge, 1992) pp. 308, 331.
• 24. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (London: Macmillan and Cambridge University Press for the Royal Economic Society, 1920 [1977]), vol. 17, p. 52.
• 25. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (London: Macmillan and Cambridge University Press for the Royal Economic Society, 1919 [1971]), vol. 2, p. 96.
• 26. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), vol. 63, pp. 45–46.
• 27. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (London: Macmillan and Cambridge University Press for the Royal Economic Society, 1919 [1971]), vol. 2, pp. 85, 99. Marc Trachtenberg agrees: “It was British policy, especially British intransigence on figures, that was ultimately responsible for the failure of the Treaty to include a fixed sum.” See “Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference” in The Journal of Modern History (vol. 51, no. 1, 1979), p. 39.
• 28. Keynes was a passionate British imperialist, but Skidelsky, in an effort to protect Keynes, vigorously maintains that Keynes was not an imperialist: “Keynes was neither a jingoistic imperialist, nor an economic imperialist.” See Keynes in Canada, 2001, available at: http://www.skidelskyr.com/site/article/keynes-and-canada/
• 29. The John Maynard Keynes Papers (Cambridge, UK: King’s College), PS/2/51. Skidelsky admits, Keynes “did not object to the territorial or military clauses.” See John Maynard Keynes: Hopes Betrayed, R. Skidelsky (New York: Viking, 1983 [1986]), p. 371.

This Day in History: Tratado de Versalhes, em 1919, o que provocou uma nova guerra

On June 28, 1919, the Treaty of Versailles was signed in France, ending World War I.
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Peace Signed, Ends the Great War; Germans Depart Still Protesting; Prohibition Till Troops Disband Enemy Envoys in Truculent Spirit Say Afterward They Would Not Have Signed Had They Known They Were to Leave First by Different Way China Refuses to Sign, Smuts Makes Protest These Events Somewhat Cloud the Great Occasion at Versailles--Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George Receive a Tremendous Ovation RELATED HEADLINESWilson Promises to Act: Must Wait Until Complete Demobilization, His Word from Paris: This Will Take 7 Weeks: President Calls Attention of Congress to His Request for Repeal: Liquor Men Unprepared: Had Hoped Until Announcement That Executive Would Intervene at the Eleventh Hour President Sends A Prohibition Message; Says He Will Act When Demobilization Ends League Opponents Uniting: Republican Senators Now Seem Agreed on Policy of Reservations: McCumber Is Won Over: But North Dakota Senator Opposes Any Action Nullifying the Covenant: Shantung Action Assailed: Borah Calls It Indefensible--Norris Demands a Reservation Regarding It Wilson Says Treaty Will Furnish the Charter for a New Order of Affairs in the World Violence Grows in Berlin Ferment: Bomb Hurled at Building in Which Officials Were Conferring on Strike: Shots Fired at Ministers: Railway Strikers Ignore Orders from Noske and Union Chiefs to Resume Work Dutch Unwilling To Give Up Kaiser: Majority of the People Firmly Opposed to Yielding to Allies' Demand: Hopeful at Amerongen: Troelstra Says Chamber Would Surrender Ex-Ruler to Germany Only Deport Thirty 'Red' Agitators: Fifteen Have Been Shipped Away in a Week--18 More Waiting at Ellis Island: Most of Them Anarchists: Number Includes Some Suspected of Having a Hand in Plot Against Officials America Greeted By King George: "Brothers in Arms Will Continue Forever to be Brothers in Peace": Sends Message to Wilson: "We Lay Down Our Arms in Proud Consciousness of Valiant Deeds Nobly Done" Versailles, June 28, (Associated Press.)--Germany and the allied and associated powers signed the peace terms here today in the same imperial hall where the Germans humbled the French so ignominiously forty-eight years ago. This formally ended the world war, which lasted just thirty-seven days less than five years. Today, the day of peace, was the fifth anniversary of the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand by a Serbian student at Serajevo. The peace was signed under circumstances which somewhat dimmed the expectations of those who had worked and fought during long years of war and months of negotiations for its achievement. Absence of the Chinese delegates, who at the last moment were unable to reconcile themselves to the Shantung settlement, struck the first discordant note. A written protest which General Smuts lodged with his signature was another disappointment. But bulking larger than these was the attitude of Germany and the German plenipotentiaries, which left them, as evident from the expression of M. Clemenceau, still outside of formal reconciliation and made the actual restoration to regular relations and intercourse with the allied nations dependent, not upon the signature of the "preliminaries of peace" today, but upon ratification by the National Assembly. To M. Clemenceau's warning in his opening remarks that they would be expected, and held, to observe the treaty provisions loyally and completely the German delegates, through Dr. Haniel von Halmhausen, replied after returning to the hotel that had they known that they would be treated on a different status after signing than the allied representatives, as shown by their separate exit before the general body of the conference, they never would have signed. Under the circumstances the general tone of sentiment in the historic sitting was one rather of relief at the uncontrovertible end of hostilities than of complete satisfaction. The ceremony had been planned deliberately to be austere, befitting the sufferings of almost five years, and the lack of impressiveness and picturesque color, of which many spectators, who had expected a magnificent State pageant, complained, was a matter of design, not merely omission. The actual ceremony was far shorter than had been expected, in view of the number of signatures which were to be appended to the treaty and the two accompanying conventions, ending a bare forty-nine minutes after the hour set for the opening. Premier Clemenceau called the session to order in the Hall of Mirrors at 3:10 P.M. The signing began when Dr. Hermann M & uuml;ller and Johannes Bell, the German signatories, affixed their names. Herr M & uuml;ller signed at 3:12 o'clock and Herr Bell 3:13 o'clock. President Wilson, the first of the allied delegates, signed a minute later. At 3:49 o'clock the momentous session was over. The most dramatic moment connected with the signing came unexpectedly and spontaneously at the conclusion of the ceremony, when Premier Clemenceau, President Wilson and Premier Lloyd George descended from the Hall of Mirrors to the terrace at the rear of the palace, where thousands of spectators were massed. Great Demonstration for Allied Leaders With the appearance of the three who had dominated the councils of the Allies there began a most remarkable demonstration. With cries of "Vive Clemenceau!" "Vive Wilson!" "Vive Lloyd George!" dense crowds swept forward from all parts of the spacious terrace. In an instant the three were surrounded by struggling, cheering masses of people, fighting among themselves for a chance to get near the statesmen. It had been planned that all the allied delegates would walk across the terrace after signing, to see the great fountains play, but none of the other plenipotentiaries got further than the door. President Wilson, M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George were caught in the living stream which flowed across the great space and became part of the crowd themselves. Soldiers and bodyguards struggled vainly to clear the way. The people jostled and struggled for a chance to touch the hands of the leaders of the Allies, all the while cheering madly. Probably the least concerned for their personal safety were the three themselves. They went forward smilingly, as the crowd willed, bowing in response to the ovation, and here and there reaching out to shake an insistent hand as they passed on their way through the ch & acirc;teau grounds to watch the playing of the fountains--a part of the program which had been planned as a dignified State processional of all the plenipotentiaries. Every available point of vantage in the palace and about the grounds was filled with thousands of people, who, less hardy than their comrades, had not been able to join the procession. No more picturesque setting could have been selected for this drama. The return of President Wilson, M. Clemenceau, and Lloyd George toward the palace was a repetition of their outward journey of triumph. As they reached the ch & acirc;teau, however, they turned to the left instead of entering. The crowd was in doubt as to what was intended, but followed, cheering tumultuously. Nearby a closed car was waiting and the three entered this and they drove from the grounds together amid a profusion of flowers which had been thrust through the open window. All the diplomats and members of their parties who attended the ceremony of treaty signing wore conventional civilian clothes. Outside of this also there was a marked lack of gold lace and pageantry, with few of the fanciful uniforms of the Middle Ages, whose traditions and practices are so sternly condemned in the great, seal-covered document signed today. One spot of color was made against the sombre background by the French Guards. A few selected members of the Guard were there, resplendent in red-plumed silver helmets and red, white and blue uniforms. A group of allied Generals, including General Pershing, wore the scarlet sash of the Legion of Honor. As a contrast with the Franco-German peace session of 1871, held in the same hall, there were present today grizzled French veterans of the Franco-Prussian war. They took the place of the Prussian guardsmen of the previous ceremony, and the Frenchmen today watched the ceremony with grim satisfaction. The conditions of 1871 were exactly reversed. Today the disciples of Bismarck sat in the seats of the lowly, while the white marble statue of Minerva, Goddess of War, looked on. Overhead, on the frescoed ceiling, were scenes from France's ancient wars. German Protest at the Last Minute Three incidents were emphasized by the smoothness with which the ceremony was conducted. The first of these was the failure of the Chinese delegation to sign. The second was the protest submitted by General Jan Christian Smuts, who declared the peace unsatisfactory. The third, which was unknown to the general public, came from the Germans. When the program for the ceremony was shown to the German delegation, Herr von Haimhausen of the German delegation went to Colonel Henri, French liaison officer, and protested. He said: "We cannot admit that the German delegates should enter the hall by a different door than the Entente delegates; nor that military honors should be withheld. Had we known there would be such arrangements before, the delegates would not have come." After a conference with the French Foreign Ministry it was decided, as a compromise, to render military honors as the Germans left. Otherwise the program as originally arranged was not changed. Secretary Lansing was the first of the American delegation to arrive at the palace, entering the building at 1:45 o'clock. The Peace Treaty was deposited on the table at 2:10 o'clock by William Martin of the French Foreign Office. It was inclosed in a stamped leather case. Premier Clemenceau entered the palace at 2:20 o'clock. Detachments of fifteen soldiers each from the American, British and French forces entered just before 3 o'clock and took their places in embrasures of the windows, overlooking the ch & acirc;teau park, a few feet from Marshal Foch, seated with the French delegation at the peace table. The American soldiers who saw the signing of the treaty were all attached to President Wilson's residence. They were: George W. Bender, Baltimore; Stanley Cohek, Chicopee, Mass.; George Bridgewater, Palestine, Texas; Harlan Hayes, Green City, Wis.; J.S. Horton, Lexington, Miss.; William R. Knox, Temple, Okla.; Albert E. Landreth, Portsmouth, Va.; Sergeant Sam Lane, Prosper, Texas; George Laudance, Philadelphia; M.D. Mary, Havre, Mon.; Fred Quantz, Cleveland; Hubert Ridgeway, Mo.; Raymond Riley, Baltimore, and Frank Wilgus, Allentown, Penn. With the thirty poilus and Tommies they were present as the real "artisans of peace" and stood within the enclosure reserved for plenipotentiaries and high officials of the conference as a visible sign of their role in bringing into being a new Europe. Premier Clemenceau promptly stepped up to the French detachment and shook the hand of each man. The men had been selected from those who bore honorable wounds, and the Premier expressed his pleasure at seeing them there and his regret for the sufferings they had endured for their country. Delegates of the minor powers made their way with difficulty through the crowd to their places at the table. Officers and civilians lined the walls and filled the aisles. President Wilson entered the Hall of Mirrors at 2:50 o'clock. All the allied delegates were then seated except the Chinese, who did not attend. The difficulty of seeing well from many parts of the hall militated against demonstrations on the arrival of the chief personages. Only a few persons saw President Wilson when he came in, and there was but a faint sound of applause for him. An hour before the signing of the treaty those assembled in the hall had been urged to take their seats, but their eagerness to see the historic ceremony was so keen that they refused to remain seated, and crowded toward the centre of the hall, which is so long that a good view was impossible from a distance. Even with opera glasses, correspondents and others were unable to observe satisfactorily, as the seats were not elevated; consequently there was a general scramble for standing room. German correspondents were ushered into the hall just before 3 o'clock and took standing room in a window at the rear of the correspondents' section. When Premier Lloyd George arrived many delegates sought autographs from the members of the Council of Four, and they busied themselves for the next few minutes signing copies of the official program. At 3 o'clock a hush fell over the hall, and the crowds shouted for the officials, who were standing, to sit down, so as not to block the view. The delegates showed some surprise at the disorder, which did not cease until all the spectators had seated themselves or found places against the walls. Muller and Bell Show Great Composure At seven minutes past 3 Dr. M & uuml;ller, German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Dr. Bell, Colonial Secretary, were shown into the hall, and quietly took their seats, the other delegates not rising. They showed composure, and manifested none of the uneasiness which Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, head of the German peace delegation, displayed when handed the treaty at Versailles. Dr. M & uuml;ller and Dr. Bell had driven early to Versailles by automobile from St. Cyr instead of taking the belt line railroad, as did the German delegates who came to receive the terms of peace on May 7. Their credentials had been approved in the morning. In the allotment of seats in the ceremonial chamber places for the German delegates were on the side of the horseshoe table, where they touched elbows with Japanese plenipotentiaries on their right and the Brazilians on their left. Delegates from Ecuador, Peru, and Liberia faced the Germans across the narrow table. M. Clemenceau, as President of the Conference, made this address: "The session is open. The allied and associated powers on one side and the German reich on the other side have come to an agreement on the conditions of peace. The text has been completed, drafted, and the President of the Conference has stated in writing that the text that is about to be signed now is identical with the 200 copies that have been delivered to the German delegation. "The signatures will be given now and they amount to a solemn undertaking faithfully and loyally to execute the conditions embodied by this treaty of peace. I now invite the delegates of the German reich to sign the treaty." There was a tense pause for a moment. Then in response to M. Clemenceau's bidding, the German delegates rose without a word and, escorted by William Martin, master of ceremonies, moved to the signatory table, where they placed upon the treaty the sign manuals which German Government leaders declared until recently would never be appended to this treaty. They also signed a protocol covering changes in the document and the Polish undertaking. It was too distant to see, even with glasses, the expression on the faces on the German plenipotentiaries during the ceremony, but observers among the officials say that the Germans fulfilled their roles without apparent indications of emotions such as marked Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau's dramatic declarations at the first meeting. President First Leader to Sign When they regained their seats after signing, President Wilson immediately arose and, followed by the other American plenipotentiaries, moved around the sides of the horseshoe to the signature tables. President Wilson, and not M. Clemenceau, thus had the honor of signing as first of the leaders of the world alliance, but the honor was due to the alphabet, not other considerations as the signatures occur in the same French alphabetical order as the enumeration of the allied and associated powers in the prologue of the treaty--the same order which determined the seating of the delegations at the plenary sessions of the interallied conference. Premier Lloyd George came next, after the American envoys, with the English delegation. The British dominions followed. The representatives of the dominions signed in the following order: For Canada--Charles J. Doherty, Minister of Justice; Sir George Foster, Minister of Trade and Commerce, and Arthur L. Sifton, Minister of Customs. For Australia--Premier William M. Hughes and Sir Gilbert Cook, Minister for the Navy. For New Zealand--W.F. Massey, Prime Minister and Minister of Labor. For the Union of South Africa--Premier Louis Botha and Jan Christian Smuts, Minister of Defense. For India--Edwin S. Montagu, Secretary for India, and the Maharaja of Bikanir. Surprise Over Smuts's Protest A murmur of surprise passed around the hall when it became known that General Smuts, representing South Africa, signed under protest and filed a document declaring that the peace was unsatisfactory. He held that the indemnities stipulated could not be accepted without grave injury to the industrial revival of Europe. He declared that it would be to the interests of the allied powers to render the stipulations more tolerable and moderate. General Smuts asserted that there were territorial settlements which he believed would need revision, and that guarantees were provided which he hoped would soon be found out of harmony with the new peaceful temper and unarmed state of the Central Powers. Punishments were also foreshadowed, he said, over which a calmer mood might yet prefer to pass the sponge of oblivion. M. Clemenceau with the French delegates, were the next in line for the signing, then came Baron Salonji and the other Japanese delegates. The Italians came after the Japanese, and they, in turn, were followed by the representatives of the smaller powers. During the attaching of the signatures of the great powers and the Germans a battery of moving picture machines and cameras clicked away so audibly that they could be heard above the general disorder. At 3:45 the booming of cannon in celebration of the peace broke the monotony in the Hall of Mirrors, where the crowd had already tired of watching the signing. China's failure to send her delegates to the ceremony created much comment. The vacant seats of the Chinese were noted early in the proceedings, but it was expected that the delegates would arrive later. Then the report was circulated officially that the Chinese would not sign without reservation on Shantung, and would issue a statement this evening on their position. Some Confusion About Arrangements While formal proceedings moved with system and complete adherence to program, the same cannot be said for other arrangements, which detracted markedly from the impressiveness of the event. So many spectators had, in one manner or another, gained access to the hall that the struggle for points of vantage at times approached the stage of a brawl, and the few officials intrusted with keeping order had the greatest difficulty in obtaining a semblance of it. Cries of "Down in front!" which were probably never before heard at a gathering of similar importance, were addressed quite as often to officials of the Conference as to unofficial spectators. The stage for the ceremony was as crowded as the spectators' inclosures, giving a picture of crush and confusion. The plenipotentiaries and attach & eacute;s, instead of arriving in delegations, formally introduced by ushers, as had been planned, drifted in individually as at the earlier sessions. Among the American witnesses of the signing were Mrs. Wilson, accompanied by Miss Wilson and Mrs. Lansing, Mrs. House, Mrs. Wallace, Mrs. Scott, and several other wives of delegates and officials; Herbert Hoover, Bernard M. Baruch; Vance McCormick, John W. Davis, Ambassador to Great Britain; Hugh C. Wallace, Ambassador to France; Henry Morgenthau, and about seventy of the more important attaches of the Peace Commission. The close of the ceremony came so quickly and quietly that it was scarcely noticed until it was all over. M. Clemenceau arose almost unremarked, and in a voice almost lost amid the confusion and the hum of conversation, which had sprung up while the minor delegates were signing, declared the conference closed and asked the allied and associated delegates to remain in their places for a few minutes--this to permit the German plenipotentiaries to leave the hall and the building before the general exodus. None arose as they filed out, accompanied by their suite of secretaries and interpreters, just as all the plenipotentiaries had kept their seats when Dr. M & uuml;ller and Dr. Bell entered. This was regarded as an answer to the action of Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau in reading his speech seated at the first meeting, but even more as an expression of sentiment at the German attitude toward the acceptance of peace. Germans White-Faced as They Left Beyond the demonstration for the allied leaders the main interest of the people about the palace was centred in the arrival and departure of the Germans. Few people witnessed the arrival of the Germans, but, despite the precautions of the soldiers, great crowds gathered about the rear of the palace when the envoys from Berlin left after signing the treaty. There was no audible demonstration against the Germans, but there was a distinct current of hostility evident among the crowd which jammed close to the cars. The Germans were white-faced and quite apparently suffering strong emotion, but whether it was fear, anger, or chagrin one could only surmise. The scene around the palace had been an animated one from an early hour. All day yesterday workmen and officials were busy in the chateau putting final touches on the arrangements, but the Hall of Mirrors was not yet ready. Much remained to be done at the last moment. The peace table--a huge hollow rectangle with its open side facing the windows in the hall--was, however, in place, its tawny yellow coverings blending with the rich browns, blues, and yellows of the antique hangings of the room and the rugs covering the dais. The mellow tints of the historical paintings in the arched roof of the long hall completed the picture. Last minute changes were made today in the program to expedite the signing of the treaty. Two additional tables were placed beside the large one within the Hall of Mirrors. One of the new tables held the Rhine Convention and the other the protocol, containing changes in and interpretations of the treaty. The arrangement of the tables thus enabled three persons to be engaged simultaneously in affixing their signatures. Most of the seventy-two plenipotentiaries had to write their names only twice, once on the treaty and once on the protocol. The convention covering the left bank of the Rhine and the treaties regarding the protection of minorities in Poland was signed only by delegates of the great powers. Because of the size of the treaty and the fragile seals it bore, the plan to present it for signing to Premier Clemenceau, President Wilson, and Premier Lloyd George was given up. A box of old fashioned goose quills, sharpened by the expert pen pointer of the French Foreign Office, was placed on each of the three tables for the use of plenipotentiaries who desired to observe the traditional formalities. Tables for the secretaries were placed inside the table for the plenipotentiaries. Chairs for the plenipotentiaries were drawn up around three sides of the table, which formed an open rectangle fully eighty feet long on its longer side. A chair for M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference, was placed in the centre of the table facing the windows, with those for President Wilson and Premier Lloyd George on the right and left hand, respectively. The German delegates' seats were at the side of the table nearest the entrance which they could take after all the others had been seated. This arrangement was made to permit the Germans to leave after the signature of the treaty before the allied delegations, not waiting for the procession of allied delegates to the terrace to witness the playing of the fountains. Crowds Gathered Early This morning was cloudy, but just before midday the clouds began to break. People began to gather early in the neighborhood of the palace. As the morning wore on the crowds kept increasing in size, but the vast spaces around the ch & acirc;teau swallowed them up at first. By noon eleven regiments of French cavalry and infantry under command of General Brecard had taken positions along the approaches to the palace, while within the court on either side solid lines of infantry in horizon blue were drawn up at attention. Hours before the time set for the ceremony an endless stream of automobiles began moving out of Paris up the cannon-lined hill of the Champs Elys & eacute;es, past the Arc de Triomphe, and out through the shady Bois de Boulogne, carrying plenipotentiaries, officials, and guests to the ceremony. The thoroughfare was kept clear by pickets, dragoons, and mounted gendarmes. In the meantime thousands of Parisians were packing regular and special trains upon the lines leading to Versailles and contending with residents of the town itself for places in the park where the famous fountains would mark the end of the ceremony. Long before the ceremony began a line of gendarmes was thrown across the approaches. While theoretically only persons bearing passes could get through this line, the crowds gradually filtered into and finally filled the square. Within this square hundreds of fortunate persons had taken up positions at the windows of every wing of the palace. The automobiles, bearing delegates and secretaries, had reserved for their use the Avenue du Paris, the broad boulevard leading direct to the ch & acirc;teau's court of honor, French soldiers being ranged along the highway on both sides. At the end of the court a guard of honor was drawn up to present arms as the leading plenipotentiaries passed, this guard comprising a company of Republican Guards in brilliant uniform. The entrance for the delegates was by the marble stairway to the "Queen's Apartments" and the Hall of Peace, giving access thence to the Hall of Mirrors. This formality was not prescribed for the Germans, who had a separate route of entry; coming through the park and gaining the marble stairway through the ground floor.