The death of liberal world order - Richard Haas

Project Syndicate, Praga – 21.3.2018

Liberal World Order, R.I.P.

America’s decision to abandon the global system it helped build, and then preserve for more than seven decades, marks a turning point, because others lack either the interest or the means to sustain it. The result will be a world that is less free, less prosperous, and less peaceful, for Americans and others alike.

Richard N. Haas

New Delhi - After a run of nearly one thousand years, quipped the French philosopher and writer Voltaire, the fading Holy Roman Empire was neither holy nor Roman nor an empire. Today, some two and a half centuries later, the problem, to paraphrase Voltaire, is that the fading liberal world order is neither liberal nor worldwide nor orderly.

The United States, working closely with the United Kingdom and others, established the liberal world order in the wake of World War II. The goal was to ensure that the conditions that had led to two world wars in 30 years would never again arise.

To that end, the democratic countries set out to create an international system that was liberal in the sense that it was to be based on the rule of law and respect for countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Human rights were to be protected. All this was to be applied to the entire planet; at the same time, participation was open to all and voluntary. Institutions were built to promote peace (the United Nations), economic development (the World Bank) and trade and investment (the International Monetary Fund and what years later became the World Trade Organization).

All this and more was backed by the economic and military might of the US, a network of alliances across Europe and Asia, and nuclear weapons, which served to deter aggression. The liberal world order was thus based not just on ideals embraced by democracies, but also on hard power. None of this was lost on the decidedly illiberal Soviet Union, which had a fundamentally different notion of what constituted order in Europe and around the world.

The liberal world order appeared to be more robust than ever with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. But today, a quarter-century later, its future is in doubt. Indeed, its three components – liberalism, universality, and the preservation of order itself – are being challenged as never before in its 70-year history.

Liberalism is in retreat. Democracies are feeling the effects of growing populism. Parties of the political extremes have gained ground in Europe. The vote in the United Kingdom in favor of leaving the EU attested to the loss of elite influence. Even the US is experiencing unprecedented attacks from its own president on the country’s media, courts, and law-enforcement institutions. Authoritarian systems, including China, Russia, and Turkey, have become even more top-heavy. Countries such as Hungary and Poland seem uninterested in the fate of their young democracies.

It is increasingly difficult to speak of the world as if it were whole. We are seeing the emergence of regional orders – or, most pronounced in the Middle East, disorders – each with its own characteristics. Attempts to build global frameworks are failing. Protectionism is on the rise; the latest round of global trade talks never came to fruition. There are few rules governing the use of cyberspace.

At the same time, great power rivalry is returning. Russia violated the most basic norm of international relations when it used armed force to change borders in Europe, and it violated US sovereignty through its efforts to influence the 2016 election. North Korea has flouted the strong international consensus against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The world has stood by as humanitarian nightmares play out in Syria and Yemen, doing little at the UN or elsewhere in response to the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons. Venezuela is a failing state. One in every hundred people in the world today is either a refugee or internally displaced.

There are several reasons why all this is happening, and why now. The rise of populism is in part a response to stagnating incomes and job loss, owing mostly to new technologies but widely attributed to imports and immigrants. Nationalism is a tool increasingly used by leaders to bolster their authority, especially amid difficult economic and political conditions. And global institutions have failed to adapt to new power balances and technologies.

But the weakening of the liberal world order is due, more than anything else, to the changed attitude of the US. Under President Donald Trump, the US decided against joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership and to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement. It has threatened to leave the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Iran nuclear deal. It has unilaterally introduced steel and aluminum tariffs, relying on a justification (national security) that others could use, in the process placing the world at risk of a trade war. It has raised questions about its commitment to NATO and other alliance relationships. And it rarely speaks about democracy or human rights. “America First” and the liberal world order seem incompatible.

My point is not to single out the US for criticism. Today’s other major powers, including the EU, Russia, China, India, and Japan, could be criticized for what they are doing, not doing, or both. But the US is not just another country. It was the principal architect of the liberal world order and its principal backer. It was also a principal beneficiary.

America’s decision to abandon the role it has played for more than seven decades thus marks a turning point. The liberal world order cannot survive on its own, because others lack either the interest or the means to sustain it. The result will be a world that is less free, less prosperous, and less peaceful, for Americans and others alike.

Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department (2001-2003), and was President George W. Bush's special envoy to Northern Ireland and Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan. He is the author of A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order.

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06/02/2012 Italian aide argues case for expanding Atlantic community southward

Text of report by Italian privately-owned centrist newspaper La Stampa website, on 6 February

[Commentary by Italian Foreign Under Secretary Marta Dassu: "It Is Crucial To Expand the West"]

Dear Editor,

Is the West fated to inevitably decline? Writing in yesterday's edition of La Stampa, Zbigniew Brzezinski chipped into this now time-honoured debate - aggravated by the financial crisis - by responding in the negative. But he added that there are two conditions which must be fulfilled if we are to prevent that decline. The first is domestic and it entails the United States rediscovering the reasons for its "primacy" (innovation, education, and a dynamic society); while the second belongs to the field of "strategic visions" - and the vision offered by the former national security adviser is both simple and direct: If it is to avoid losing its relevancy and its influence in the Asian century, the West needs to expand. But to expand in which direction? In book recently published in Washington, Brzezinski argues that one might envision the "broader"  West, a couple of decades from now, as comprising a head that is still American (on condition, of course, that the United States also does its homework) and a heart that is European (on condition that the EU becomes a genuine political Union), with arms and legs stretching out towards Russia (on condition that it opts for full democracy), towards Turkey (on condition that it becomes more European than neo-Ottoman), and towards old and new Asian allies bent on balancing China's weight. Is that a strategic vision, or is it a mere theory that will never be implemented in practice?

The truth of the matter is that, at a time when the financial crisis is sorely testing liberal democracies and the combination between capitalism and authoritarianism is starting to be seen as an alternative model, it is crucial that we rethink the West's borders. In Brzezinski's opinion, it is obvious that the United States' comparative strength be rebuilt first and foremost from the inside, just as the comparative strength of the Europeans demands a solider Union. But it is clear also that the old transatlantic relationship is no longer sufficient in the face of a shift in economic, demographic, and financial power towards new countries. From his standpoint, expanding the West towards the Eurasian continent is the strategic priority.

Brzezinski's mental map is still "horizontal": It goes from west to east, and along with the impact of China's rise, it continues to reflect the last century's unresolved problems: Integrating Russia into the Western community is one of hopes that has remained at least partially unfulfilled since 1991. Russia's veto on the resolution faulting Syria in the United Nations confirms the gap that still exists - and with bitter consequences, in this case for the people of Syria who have been exposed to brutal repression for months.

Yet there is also a "vertical" map worth exploring and it involves the possibility of bringing into the fold the Atlantic's southern shores, where potentially strong economic powers such as Brazil are theoretically equipped with Western democratic "software" in the form of the historical and cultural roots that shape their identity. In other words, the broader West could have an important leg stretching not only further east but also further south, and the strategic vision could comprise a 21st century "panatlantic" community capable of benefiting from tangible resources (the additional thrust of an emerging area) and of using its common cultural roots to good effect. Keeping the Atlantic alive is even more important a precondition for the Europeans than it is for the United States if they wish to continue carrying weight in the Pacific century. That is one of several reasons why proposals regarding the establishment of something akin to a transatlantic free-trade area should be assessed not only in economic terms (i.e. in terms of their cost and benefit in different areas of the economy) but also in terms of their strategic importance.

Having said that, the vision which Brzezinski prescribes for the United States quite rightly views the Far East as a region where, with or without the global economy, traditional geopolitics continues to matter. The economic interdependence between Washington and Beijing or the importance of commercial ties between China and Germany have not done away with the 20th century fault lines, with dynamics based on deterrence and military balances. In light of this, the "balancing act" which Brzezinski recommends that the United States perform in Asia is still necessary, and indeed the US defence review is moving in that direction. But that is another reason why the Europeans should adopt an increasing share of the responsibility on their borders, in North Africa and in the Balkans. Thus if the West is to continue to wield influence at the global level, it must not simply expand, it must also specialize.

Of course, none of this is going to work unless the first condition that Brzezinski sets the United States - a condition, incidentally , which applies to Western democracies in general, i.e. that they impart a fresh boost both to themselves and to their economies - withstands the test of concrete implementation.

As Niall Ferguson argues in Aspenia, one of the causes behind the West's relative decline is its tendency to shy away from using its winning weapons - competition, scientific research, the work ethic - and even to start questioning its own political systems. The revolution of "growing" expectations that guaranteed the Western model's success over the past two decades, has turned into its opposite, and the economic, political, and social repercussions of that transformation have yet to be gauged.

Source: La Stampa website, Turin, in Italian 6 Feb 12 p 33