O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

Mostrando postagens com marcador global history. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador global history. Mostrar todas as postagens

domingo, 3 de maio de 2020

Uma história global do Leste Europeu na transição do socialismo ao capitalismo - Book review


Klimo on Mark and Iacob and Rupprecht and Spaskovska, '1989: A Global History of Eastern Europe' [review]

by H-Net Reviews
James Mark, Bogdan C. Iacob, Tobias Rupprecht, Ljubica Spaskovska. 
1989: A Global History of Eastern Europe. 
New Approaches to European History Series. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 380 pp. 
$84.99 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-108-42700-5; $26.99 (paper), ISBN 978-1-108-44714-0.
Reviewed by Árpád von Klimo (Catholic University of America) Published on H-Diplo (May, 2020) Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)


People usually struggle to make sense of the historical period they live in. This is also true today, especially in what has been called “the West,” which includes wealthy democratic societies of Europe and the United States, countries (or their elites) that have been identifying themselves in contrast to the communist “Second World” and the poor, underdeveloped “rest,” called the “Third World” by those who believe they represent the “First World” (a designation mostly avoided because it sounds a bit pretentious). With the collapse of the political system of the “Second World” around 1989 and the early 1990s, the “First World” seemed to be the “winner” of the Cold War, although, if we look closely at what was written in the West at the time, many were rather concerned about what would follow, and the wars that accompanied the breaking apart of Yugoslavia seemed to prove that the situation was indeed dangerous. Later, for a moment, “Europeanization” of Eastern Europe seemed to bring the liberal dream of an “end of history” into reality when most countries in Europe had embraced capitalism and democracy, epitomized by the European Union. After the 2008 economic crisis, however, this “myth of 1989” came under increasing attack, not only in Hungary and Poland but also in the Western “core” of the EU.
The new 1989: A Global History of Eastern Europe focuses on the “myth of 1989” and attempts to counter a simplified, Eurocentric narrative of the Eastern part of the continent since 1989 in a number of ways (p. 1). Using a global approach, this extraordinary book, which was written by four authors, who all teach history at the University of Exeter as specialists of different regions (James Mark/Central Europe, Bogdan C. Iacob/Eastern Europe, Tobias Rupprecht/Latin America, and Ljubica Spaskovska/former Yugoslavia), critiques and revises a number of popular aspects of this Eurocentric myth of 1989. They bring back agency to elites and peoples of Eastern Europe, who were not all “waiting” longingly to become a part of the “West” (although, as the authors admit, many were!). The authors, instead, highlight that many experts, often communist “reformers,” were actively engaged in changing the state-socialist economic system by opening it to the world market, thus bringing a new dynamic into the process of globalization that had slowed down during the 1950s because of heightened East-West confrontation. Later, communist reformers sometimes played a crucial role in international debates about capitalism, sometimes asking for more radical, or “neo-liberal,” forms of capitalism in contrast to their Western counterparts who were more oriented toward a social democratic model (page 64 cites the Hungarian economist János Kornai as an example). But this happened long before 1989. Eastern Europe was not an isolated gray zone of people desperate for Western consumer goods and freedom. The images of the opening of the Berlin Wall and East Germans standing in line to get bananas have covered up these long-term developments and the manifold relations between East Germany and the Southern Hemisphere.
Decolonization since the 1960s, which had brought political independence to a number of African states, had opened new perspectives for politicians and experts in both communist and capitalist Europe and initiated an increasing spectrum of “developing” strategies and attempts to integrate or reintegrate Africa and Asia into world trade. The book shows that we have to think about the relationship of two processes: the (self-)integration of Eastern Europe into the world market and the decolonization since the 1960s with a perspective on the involvement of Eastern European communist functionaries. In the early 1980s, however, Western ideas of “Eurafrica” and Eastern European attempts to create a socialist world market in contrast to global capitalism slowly lost their popularity (p. 164). The challenges of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and, most of all, new trends in global mobility brought forth a revival of older ideas of “Christian Europe” or “fortress Europe,” accompanied by racists ideas and acts of violence (pp. 164, 165). Again, this shift could be observed in both the East and West, which demonstrates the insightfulness of the global perspective on Eastern Europe.
Another popular but partly erroneous narrative the book addresses is the idea that all Eastern Europeans wanted a liberal democratic system to replace the communist dictatorship, which was seen as a quasi essential complementary to the market economy. Many economists and communist reformers were, especially before 1989, convinced that an authoritarian-capitalist model, like the examples of South Korea under Park Chung-Hee or Chile under Augusto Pinochet, were superior to a combination of capitalism and democracy. In Russia, because of the chaotic situation in the early 1990s, the belief in “Formula Pinochet” had many adherents also after 1989. Emphasizing that the question regarding which political model to follow was fierce and not determined in 1989 in many parts of Eastern Europe is not only important for the historical record but also in relation to the authoritarian and illiberal tendencies in the region that have been observed in the last decade.
In Africa, the myth of 1989 had strong influence on the political elites who quickly abandoned Marxism and their connections to the Soviet Union and often engaged in “democracy talk” without actually giving up their grip on power (p. 221). However, the myth also brought back ideas of a “superior” Western model that Africans had to follow, introducing stronger “conditionality” in agreements or loans from the European Community or the International Monetary Fund while African elites feared that investments would now mostly flow into Eastern Europe (p. 226). A similar push to support democracy and human rights could be observed in other parts of the world, especially in the Middle East or the Balkans, where the narrative of 1989 was used to justify Western interventionism, although, as the authors underline, “third-wave democratisation and marketisation, catalyzed by Eastern Europe’s 1989, was not simply a story of instrumentalisation of the West and then export to the rest” (p. 264). Instead, traditions created by the socialist or the nonaligned world, which were not perceived as part of the West, still resonated in these parts of the world after 1989. At least since 2010, when the “Arab Spring” turned into brutal civil wars, and populist right-wing politicians started to rise in many parts of the world, the myth of 1989 as the triumph of Western capitalism and democracy has become increasingly contested and probably even “marginalized” in Eastern Europe itself (p. 308). “For many Eastern European conservatives, 1939 superseded 1989 because it symbolised both national martyrdom and the non-Western, non-liberal roots of their national and Christian European identity” (p. 310). Even the oppositional groups active today against populist governments in Hungary, the Czech Republic, or Poland are not fully behind the older Western liberal narrative but are more concerned with anti-corruption causes or government responsibility. But who knows, maybe the myth of 1989 will, eventually, return?
1989: A Global History of Eastern Europe is, in any case, an important contribution to our understanding of today’s world. The book offers a coherent narrative, and this sometimes results in repetitions, but the reflexivity of the authors who counter their own theses with counter-theses inspires further discussions. One does not have to agree with the authors’ critical, postcolonial critiques of the “neoliberal” West to see the value of the new insights their global perspectives bring to the field of Eastern European history.
Arpad von Klimo teaches modern European history at The Catholic University of America in Washington, DC. He is currently working on a project on global anticommunism, détente, and decolonization, focusing on the followers of Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty in the early 1970s.
Citation: Árpád von Klimo. Review of Mark, James; Iacob, Bogdan C.; Rupprecht, Tobias; Spaskovska, Ljubica, 1989: A Global History of Eastern Europe. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. May, 2020. URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=54866
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

quarta-feira, 9 de dezembro de 2015

Global History: Harvard Fellowships, candidates have until December 15 to apply

Receboio, de H-Net, este aviso:

Weatherhead Initiative on Global History Fellowship

The Weatherhead Initiative on Global History (WIGH) at Harvard University identifies and supports outstanding scholars whose work responds to the growing interest in the encompassing study of global history. We seek to organize a community of scholars interested in the systematic scrutiny of developments that have unfolded across national, regional, and continental boundaries and who propose to analyze the interconnections—cultural, economic, ecological, political and demographic—among world societies. We encourage applicants from all over the world, and especially from outside Europe and North America, hoping to create a global conversation on global history.

WIGH Fellows are appointed for one year and are provided time, guidance, office space, and access to Harvard University facilities. They should be prepared to devote their entire time to productive scholarship and may undertake sustained projects of research or other original work. They will join a vibrant community of global history scholars at Harvard.

This fellowship is funded by a grant from the Volkswagen Foundation.

Terms
The competition for these awards is open only to scholars with a PhD (or comparable professional school degree). If still pursuing the PhD, WIGH Fellows must receive their degree no later than May 2016. There is no limit on time since submission of the candidate’s degree; we are open to candidates at various stages of their careers. We expect that candidates will be able to submit samples of independent work (articles, papers, dissertation chapters) in support of their candidacies on request. The WIGH Fellowship is residential and Fellows are expected to live in the Cambridge/Boston area for the duration of their appointments unless traveling for pre-approved research purposes, and they are expected to participate in WIGH activities, including a bi-weekly seminar.

Fellows will receive an annual stipend of up to $50,000, according to fellows’ needs. Because we cannot always offer the amount requested, we urge applicants to apply for funding from other sources as well. Applications are welcome from qualified persons without regard to nationality, gender, or race.

How to Apply
Applications are due December 15, 2015. Letters of reference are due by January 8th, 2016.
Please visit our website (http://wigh.wcfia.harvard.edu/content/wigh-fellowships-2016-2017) to apply.

Contact:
Jessica Barnard, Program Coordinator
jbarnard@wcfia.harvard.edu
Phone: +011 (617) 495-8923

domingo, 23 de novembro de 2014

Book review: a global history of developing world

Não confio muito num livro que acha que o principal evento ocorrido na histórica da América Latina no século 20 foi a revolução cubana. Ele transforma um episódio menor, que só teve maior importância por causa da Guerra Fria, num evento relevante. Se ele mudou a história da América Latina foi para pior...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Utietiang on White, 'A Global History of the Developing World'
by Seth Offenbach
Utietiang on White, 'A Global History of the Developing World'

Author:
Christopher M. White
Reviewer:
Bekeh Utietiang
Christopher M. White. A Global History of the Developing World. New York: Routledge, 2013. 320 pp. $130.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-415-69210-6; $44.95 (paper), ISBN 978-0-415-69211-3.

Reviewed by Bekeh Utietiang Published on H-Diplo (November, 2014) Commissioned by Seth Offenbach

In A Global History of the Developing World, Christopher M. White explores the struggles that have led to the independence of nations in the Global South. White focuses his narrative on this struggle with the goal of understanding the present geopolitical and socioeconomic status of these nation-states.

The book is an introductory textbook for world history courses. It is divided into four sections that correspond to four key themes: imperialism, nationalism, globalization, and development. In the first three sections, White focuses on Latin America, Asia, and Africa. In his discussion of imperialism, the author does not begin with the second European colonial project, which was mainly focused on Africa and Asia, but starts with the European colonial conquest of Latin America and the Caribbean. He weaves within his analysis the Catholic Church’s role in Latin America’s colonization as they sought to evangelize and convert the people. For White, “the Church and State were essentially the same institution” (p. 24). In the second European colonial project, Spain and Portugal played less significant roles; Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany were the main actors. White makes an intervention in the historiography on the Berlin conference of 1884-85 that partitioned Africa. He argues that some scholars overstate the importance of this conference as it was “not the event that officially decided the boundaries of the European colonies in Africa” (p. 67). What he does here is get his readers to think about these historical events as being more complex than most readers typically would.

In his exploration of nationalism, White argues that “the Cuban Revolution is the most important event to take place in Latin America during the twentieth century” (p. 82). The revolution defeated Fulgencio Batista, an ally of the United States, and had the potential to curb America’s sphere of influence in the region. Unlike Cuba, Asia’s independence was not a military revolution, but a social revolution. In India, for example, the author says, the nationalist movement began with Mohandas Gandhi in 1916 “during the peak of European imperialism” (p. 107). Independence was achieved in 1947 when colonial India was partitioned into India and Pakistan. Independence of African states came in the late 1950s and early 1960s. White posits that “European colonialism, slavery, drought and disease all played a role in Africa’s development foundations prior to independence” (p. 131). Despite independence, he argues, most African countries “were not much better off at the end of the century than they were upon independence two generations before” (p. 130). While this is an important observation of the problems that continue to plague independent Africa, some of White’s readers will find this point debatable. It would be hard to find many Africans who would argue that they would be better off under colonial rule. The nature of colonial rule limited the advancement of Africans because at its structure racial biases existed. While economic growth has been slow in postcolonial Africa, colonialism is partly to be blamed as it created what historian Frederick Cooper calls “Gatekeeper States.”

In the section on globalization, White does an excellent job showing the interconnections between the economies of the world and their impact on local people. He looks at the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994 and argues that it was responsible for the Mayan revolt. The Mayans wanted self-determination because they found that they could no longer compete with American and Canadian agribusiness. In another example of how international economics affect locals, he argues that NAFTA drove many immigrants to the United States, most of whom are undocumented (p. 164). This argument is ironic given that many American factory workers believe that NAFTA took away jobs to Mexico and one of NAFTA’s purposes was to limit migrations to the United States. It is true that some of the farmers were displaced as a result of NAFTA but another important outcome of NAFTA is that many automobile shops set up assembly plants in Mexico and created many skilled manufacturing jobs. As a result, American factory workers lost jobs.

White also looks at the conflicts that have become symptomatic of the Global South. The book’s treatment of the conflicts in Rwanda and the Congo is a superb summation of the ugly history in that region of Africa that has left many millions dead. He properly situates the conflicts as regional conflicts rather than national conflicts. The author shows how race and ethnicity has played a role in some of these conflicts.

The last section focuses on the theoretical debates scholars and practitioners have on the causes of development and underdevelopment. Here, White makes a distinction between scholars who hold “a bottom-up perspective of development” and those who hold a top-down perspective (p. 229). For those who hold the former, he begins with Karl Marx, who, he says, has had “more effect on the world than any other author of the social sciences” (p. 233). He is critical of Marxist theory and uses the failure of the communist experiments around the world to discredit it. But the author makes a good distinction between “Marxist analysis and Marxist politics/economics/social planning” (p. 234). He also argues that the dependency theory advanced by economist Raul Prebisch inspires import substitution industrialization which encourages production for internal consumption. In the 1970s, this economic policy encouraged massive spending and corruption in the developing world. With fallen oil prices in the 1980s, governments of the developing world had to privatize these companies.

In his analysis of the scholars who hold the views from above, he describes them as subscribing to the theory of “cultural determinism.” He begins this discussion with Adam Smith’s Wealth of the Nation (1776), August Comte’s positivist views, and Max Weber’s protestant ethic. White writes that “capitalism, in its purest theoretical form, as advocated by Adam Smith, Comte, and Max Weber, or in the form carried out by governments in practice, with all its flaws, is what is most needed to create a better world” (p. 245). He also summarizes the views of economist Milton Friedman and the Chicago school of economics, which advances a neoliberal economic policy: lower taxes, deregulation, privatization, and spending cuts.

The task White undertakes in writing this book is a daunting one; he covers a very large geographical area in a time frame of over five hundred years. For this reason, the book suffers from a lack of in-depth analysis and commits the offense of oversimplification of key events. For example, he discusses Napoleon’s occupation of Egypt leading to French and later British colonization of Egypt in one sentence (p. 44). The next sentence does not tell us how this happened but moves on to mention how the Russians took land from the Ottoman Empire leading to the Crimean War, creating the close ties between Turkey and Europe today. There are too many events conflated here without any unpacking or analysis. In the section on globalization, an engagement with the key theorists in the field and an analysis of opposing viewpoints to show how they are in conversation with one another would have greatly strengthened White’s overall arguments.

Despite these weaknesses, White must be commended for this work. The author’s ability to bring together the historiographies of these diverse regions in a conversation is one of the strengths of the book. The reader will immediately begin to see the commonalities between these regions as they struggle for self-determination from European colonialism and its aftermath. In this conversation, White does not focus his analysis only on the bigger nations, but also pays close attention to the smaller ones, such as Zimbabwe, Burma, and Haiti. Professors and students will find this book helpful as it points them to key events and themes. The questions in each chapter will also help in facilitating class discussions.

I will recommend this book as a textbook for world history survey courses. It is also a good primer for those wanting a concise explanation of key events in the modern history of the Global South.

Printable Version: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=41630

Citation: Bekeh Utietiang. Review of White, Christopher M., A Global History of the Developing World. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. November, 2014. URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=41630

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
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