Desde las 10 de la mañana se inició un enfrentamiento entre un grupo de motorizados armados y los vecinos de la calle A de Los Ruices, cuando los integrantes de un colectivo llegaron a la zona a tratar de levantar una barricada. En el hecho resultaron heridos un funcionario de la GNB, que ingresó a la Emergencia de la Policlínica Metropolitana, donde falleció.
sexta-feira, 7 de março de 2014
Venezuela: cenas explicitas de uma ditadura assassina
Retratos ordinários de uma ditadura ordinária (com agradecimentos ao colega blogueiro e amigo da resistência intelectual contra os novos fascismos, Orlando Tambosi).
Las víctimas fueron identificadas como José Gregorio Amaris Castillo, de 25 años, quien trabajaba como mototaxista y que fue trasladado hasta el hospital Pérez de León; y el sargento de la GNB Acner Isaac López Lyon, de 21 años, trasladado hasta la Policlínica Metropolitana, ambos con disparos.
En Los Ruices la confrontación arrancó cuando un grupo de motorizados se presentó a la calle A para quitar las barricadas colocadas por los vecinos. Esto originó un cacerolazo y según los habitantes de la zona, los motorizados comenzaron a lanzar botellas y piedras contra los edificios.
Los vecinos comenzaron a cacerolear cuando llegaron los grupos armados y los motorizados dispararon contra los apartamentos, lo que originó que los habitantes de la zona lanzaran botellas. La situación se mantuvo tensa durante más de dos horas hasta que los integrantes de los colectivos intentaron ingresar a algunas de las torres residenciales de la Calle A, por lo que los vecinos comenzaron a lanzar botellas.
Los grupos armados lanzaron una bomba molotov que cayó encima de un vehículo que se incendió. Cuando llegaron los bomberos a apagar el vehículo fueron agredidos por los grupos armados, quienes comenzaron a lanzarles botellas y disparos.
Casi al mediodía llegó a la zona la Guardia Nacional, quienes lanzaron bombas lacrimógenas contra algunos vecinos que habían bajado a manifestar por la llegada de los colectivos. Después de la arremetida de los militares los colectivos se retiraron de la zona.
Se mantiene cerrado el paso en la avenida Francisco de Miranda entre Los Ruices y Los Cortijos por esta situación. El alcalde de Sucre, Carlos Ocariz, a través de su cuenta en Twitter, informó: "Hace minutos, herido de bala un motorizado en Los Ruices. Polisucre está en el sitio".
A la 1:49pm, Carlos Ocariz informó que la Policía Nacional se llevó varios detenidos. "En este momento hay 25 tanquetas de la Guardia Nacional en Los Ruices".
Venezuela: a revolucao nao sera' supervisionada (nem televisionada) - Francisco Tpro
The Revolution Will Not Be Supervised
The Dangers of Venezuela's Leaderless Protests
Students take part in a protest against Nicolas Maduro's government in Caracas on February 16, 2014. (Courtesy Reuters)
To understand the spasm of violence gripping Venezuela, you need to go back to April 17, 2013. It was three days after the late President Hugo Chávez’s chosen successor, Nicolás Maduro, had won presidential re-election by a paper-thin margin amid accusations of ballot stuffing, coerced voting, and other irregularities. The government-controlled National Elections Council had just dismissed calls for a complete review of the allegations, and the government and the opposition seemed to be on a collision course; Venezuelans steeled themselves for mass protests that were understood to have every chance of ending in violence.
But that evening, Henrique Capriles, the opposition candidate, called the whole thing off. Citing the near-certainty of violence, he urged opposition protesters to stay home and allow him to challenge the results through the judicial system. "Whomever goes out on the streets tomorrow is on the side of violence, and that's the government's game," Capriles said. In the end, Venezuelans stayed home, but, to no one’s surprise, the courts refused to hear Capriles’ legal challenge. Not only that; they fined Capriles for offending the majesty of the state by even suggesting that ballot stuffing could have taken place, and they urged the prosecutor's office to consider bringing charges against him.
Capriles' decision proved a fateful one for the Venezuelan opposition. It widened a long-standing rift between opposition "moderates," led by Capriles, and a more radical wing convinced that only a direct head-on confrontation would ever get a response from Venezuela’s authoritarian government. The more radical faction despaired of any attempt at dialogue and centered its hopes on a strategy of popular protest culminating in revolution. The most prominent member of this side of the opposition is Leopoldo López, a charismatic, telegenic Harvard-educated economist.
López has loudly supported the ongoing protests in Venezuela. But many observers have falsely concluded on that basis that he is the leader of the protest movement. The true organizing force has been a vanguard of university students. Their first march, which was in response to a campus sexual assault that drew no police response, took place on February 4 in San Cristóbal, a small city high up on the Venezuelan Andes, very far from López's organizing base. It set off the ongoing cycle of protests and crackdowns. Since then, the movement has spread to different campuses and different cities that were coordinating with one another only lightly, if at all. They are united by a shared revulsion at the violence used by security forces and by anger at the economic chaos, corruption, and crime that have marked Venezuela's experiment with socialism since Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999. Their preferred means of protest has been the erection of makeshift barricades from burning tires, garbage, and other debris that serve to isolate their neighborhoods from the outside world. They pursue direct action, in the areas where they live, organized via social media networks, and they feel accountable to no one other than themselves.
What Venezuela has, then, is not two but three main actors on the opposition side: the moderate and radical wings of the traditional opposition, and then an anarchic student movement that, although radical in spirit, has only tangential links to López and his brethren. To complicate matters further, López was charged with inciting this month's violence and jailed. That leaves Henrique Capriles, the head of the moderate faction that the students have never quite trusted, as the only visible head of the opposition -- no other radical has moved to claim the mantle.
Committed to a strategy of nonviolence, Capriles has done what he can to try to quell the anarchy on Venezuela’s streets. In a speech last Saturday, flanked by a few of the more recognizable student leaders, he called for an end to nighttime protesting and barricades. Instead, he suggested, the students should concentrate on building a powerful and cohesive social movement that could attract disaffected chávistas. But the speech did little to curtail the violence. For one, the student radicals still feel little inclination to heed a call for compromise from a man who, they believe, discredited himself after the last election. More important, however, few people outside the rally heard the speech. Under strong government pressure, Venezuela's broadcast media declined to cover the event.
It might seem strange that a government that wants to portray itself as concerned chiefly with peace has been actively censoring the one message with a slight -- but real -- possibility of toning down the violence. But there is a method to its madness. By goading student hotheads, the government can instigate the very acts of violent resistance that it needs to justify an even wider crackdown. There have been plenty of opportunities, over the course of the crisis, to find a point of compromise with the students, but the government has preferred to deploy tear gas and rubber bullets instead.
Why Maduro decided to escalate tensions with the opposition is a subject of some speculation. Part of the answer is surely the scale of Venezuela’s economic crisis. Since Chávez’s election 15 years ago, Venezuela has become one of the most complicated places to do business on earth. Conditions have worsened precipitously over the past year. Price and foreign exchange controls have fed a deliriously profitable arbitrage industry, with regime-connected businessmen able to buy dollars on the official market and sell them for ten times that price on the black market.
As a result of these terrible policies and the rampant corruption they enable, Venezuela is on the verge of running out of foreign currency, and therefore out of the things you need foreign currency to import: everything from milk and wheat flour to toilet paper, airline flights, and antiretrovirals has become difficult to procure. Despite possessing the world's largest proven oil reserves, Venezuela is now a place where fistfights routinely break out at supermarkets upon the arrival of a shipment of chicken.
It may be that the government calculated that, amid such economic chaos, it could only keep control by becoming markedly more repressive; the increasingly radical protests have given it an excuse to do just that. In that sense, the students may be correct when they suggest that the government’s model is Cuba -- a regime capable of keeping a tight grip on power through decades of economic stagnation. And given those grim prospects, the students’ anger should come as no surprise.
LATEST COMMENTARY & NEWS ANALYSIS
Weekly Digest
NewslettersWelcome to Cold War II - Dimitri Trenin
Na verdade, a Russia NUNCA deixou de hostilizar o Ocidente. Mas foi o Ocidente que pensou que ela tinha virado boazinha, apenas porque deixou de ser socialista para se tornar "capitalista" (fake, claro).
Isso nos remete a Raymond Aron, sobre a política de poder sendo mais ou menos independente do sistema econômico, ou das condições materiais.
Na verdade, a política de poder é altamente dependente dos líderes políticos e de sua percepção do que seja o país e seus interesses permanentes, ou seja, um pouco de psicologia política, ou o inconsciente social. Dirigentes russos querem sempre se colocar nas botinas de um Ivan, o Grande, ou nos sapatos de Catarina, a terrível (OK, eu sei que era Ivan o Terrível, e Catarina, a Grande, mas a mudança não faz muita diferença; ambos fora totalitários).
O Ocidente se enganou sobre e com a Rússia. O despertar para a dura realidade sempre é decepcionante...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Welcome to Cold War II
OP-ED MARCH 4, 2014FOREIGN POLICY
Isso nos remete a Raymond Aron, sobre a política de poder sendo mais ou menos independente do sistema econômico, ou das condições materiais.
Na verdade, a política de poder é altamente dependente dos líderes políticos e de sua percepção do que seja o país e seus interesses permanentes, ou seja, um pouco de psicologia política, ou o inconsciente social. Dirigentes russos querem sempre se colocar nas botinas de um Ivan, o Grande, ou nos sapatos de Catarina, a terrível (OK, eu sei que era Ivan o Terrível, e Catarina, a Grande, mas a mudança não faz muita diferença; ambos fora totalitários).
O Ocidente se enganou sobre e com a Rússia. O despertar para a dura realidade sempre é decepcionante...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Welcome to Cold War II
OP-ED MARCH 4, 2014FOREIGN POLICY
The West and Russia have sailed into uncharted waters. Crimea has de facto declared independence from Kiev. Russia has intervened to effectively secure the new entity without, so far, a shot being fired. The Ukrainian police, security, and military forces on the peninsula have been neutralized, many of them pledging allegiance to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. In Kiev, the new government talks about Russia's aggression and orders mobilization -- even as it loses control over some of the key cities in the country's east and south. Meanwhile, the West has responded with suspension of preparations for the G-8 summit in Sochi. The U.S. president has talked about Russia paying a high price for its actions, and the U.S. secretary of state has laid out a menu of possible sanctions and other measures.
Thus, the post-Cold War may now be seen, in retrospect, as the inter-Cold War period. The recent developments have effectively put an end to the interregnum of partnership and cooperation between the West and Russia that generally prevailed in the quarter-century after the Cold War. Geopolitically, this period saw a massive reduction of Russian power and influence in Europe and Eurasia, along with the arrival of new states, many of them carved out of the historical Russian Empire. Instead, the United States became the dominant power in Eurasia, and the European Union, while no great power or even a strategic actor itself, turned into an economic magnet for its eastern neighbors. The Russian Federation, the core of the former empire, was essentially left out of the new system, mired in an increasingly awkward, uneasy relationship with the United States and Europe.
The system had been fraying on its eastern edge for almost as long as it had been in existence, but it took a crisis in Ukraine to lead to its clear breakdown. The successful, Western-supported revolution in Kiev in February fatally undermined the delicate balance in the key state between Russia and the West, leading to domestic turmoil in Ukraine. But perhaps more importantly, it also marks the end of Russia's post-Soviet passivity. Make no mistake: Putin's actions in Crimea and the powers he received over the weekend from the Russian parliament -- allowing him to using military force in Ukraine writ large -- return Moscow as an active player in Europe for the first time since 1989.
In 1991, Russia agreed to the dismantlement of its historical empire and accepted the ex-Soviet administrative lines as international borders, which left some 25 million ethnic Russians in the "near abroad." Even if one adds the painful and bloody Chechen wars, this was the most peaceful dissolution of any empire in the 20th century. Russia's "gas wars" with Ukraine, roundly lost by Moscow in Western public opinion, were no more than heavy-handed attempts to make that country pay more for the natural gas it received from Moscow. Even the 2008 war against Georgia was fought by the Russians in response to the Georgian shelling of South Ossetia, which killed Russian peacekeepers deployed there. But all these events, as well as the ramifications they caused vis-à-vis the West, pale compared with what's coming now.
What follows will be "interesting" in the Chinese sense -- i.e., fraught with dangers. The geopolitics of the new Eastern Europe will be fundamentally altered. It will be some time before Ukraine is reconstituted in some new shape -- almost certainly without Crimea -- and with a new structure, probably taking account of its ethnic and cultural complexity, apparent between its western and southeastern regions. The entire former Soviet Black Sea region, from Moldova/Transnistria to Abkhazia/Georgia will look markedly different from how it looks today. Georgia, once deemed too much of a pressure point in the Kremlin's backside, will be back on the fast track for NATO's Membership Action Plan, while Moldova might succumb to instability as the governing pro-EU coalition faces a challenge from pro-Russian opposition. As to Transnistria, it will gravitate to Russian-speaking southeastern Ukraine. Farther north, one can safely forecast pressure building for permanent, if symbolic, U.S. troop deployments in Poland and the Baltic states, as well as for Finland's and Sweden's membership in NATO.
Meanwhile, relations between Russia and NATO will assume a more familiar, adversarial nature. A military standoff in Europe will not be as massive as that during the Cold War, but there will be more certainty than in recent years as to just who is the potential adversary. There would be no need, for example, to talk about Iran when upgrading NATO's missile defenses from bases in Romania and Poland or those at sea. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could actually be brought back from the closet where it has languished since the end of the Cold War and become a prime venue for Russian-Western security dialogue. Indeed, the recent agreement between Russian President Vladimir Putin and German Chancellor Angela Merkel to use the OSCE to form a contact group with regard to Crimea already points in that direction.
When it comes to Washington, Russia's relations with the United States will eschew any warmth that may still remain. There will be no return to the eyeball-to-eyeball Cold War confrontation, though; on the contrary, the relationship is likely to grow even more distant. Elements of U.S.-Russia cooperation might survive where the two countries' interests clearly meet, but doing anything together in Syria or Iran would become much more difficult. Trade and investment will be restricted as a result of U.S. government sanctions, and the Russian equity market, owned largely by foreigners, will collapse. By contrast, however, EU-Russia trade, worth almost $500 billion a year, will continue by and large, due to economic interdependence between the two.
As Russia's relations with the West deteriorate, its ties with China will need to grow stronger. With more problems in store for Gazprom in the European market, the Russian gas company may have to agree to sell gas to China. Significantly lower prices offered to Beijing would be compensated by the emergence of an alternative market. With Russia likely to be excluded from the G-8, Moscow will have to make more use of the world's remaining global platforms, such as bilateral summits with China or forums with fellow BRICS countries or with Shanghai Cooperation Organization countries. In all these forums, however, Beijing, rather than Moscow, will be the senior power. As a result, Moscow will lose its unique position of being present in all major multilateral organizations, both Western and non-Western.
It's not a pretty picture. Thankfully, some of the worst things of the first Cold War will never likely be resurrected. Officially sanctioned Russian patriotism, even with an anti-American bent, will not be tantamount to a new ideology. The state-dominated capitalism that controls the economy will be more like its more distant czarist -- rather than its immediate communist -- predecessor. Political liberties will continue to be curtailed by an authoritarian government, but personal liberties will remain. Russia will stay mostly open to the outside world, and Russians with some means will continue traveling around the world. The superrich, however, might have to park their assets in Russia -- or stay with those assets, away from Russia. In terms of historical analogies, in other words, the internal situation in Russia would resemble the early 1850s under Emperor Nicholas I rather than the 1950s under Joseph Stalin.
U.S.-Russia geopolitical competition will not be confined to Ukraine, but a string of proxy wars is also not in the offing. However, U.S.-Russia collaboration on Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan will suffer. The United States might use economic sanctions against Russia in an effort, Iran-style, to split the Russian elite and provoke the resentment of ordinary Russian people against their government. Although the static military confrontation is unlikely to be resurrected, nuclear deterrence will be reaffirmed, and competition in the military sphere will spread to other areas, from cyberspace to conventional prompt global strike.
This will be the dawn of a new period, reminiscent in some ways of the Cold War from the 1940s to 1980s. Like with the two world wars, the failure to resolve the issues arising out of the imperfect peace settlement and the failure to fully integrate one of the former antagonists into the new system are leading to a new conflict -- even if a large-scale war will again be safely avoided. This new conflict is unlikely to be as intense as the first Cold War; it may not last nearly as long; and -- crucially -- it will not be the defining conflict of our times.
Yet, it will be for real. Competition between two unequal parties carries additional risks of underestimating the other side or overreacting. Keeping the world safe in the uncertain times ahead will be a bigger challenge than many thought only two weeks ago.
Seria preciso contar aos paraguaios todo esse respeito pela nao ingerencia...
Se não fosse desonesto, calhorda e completamente mentiroso, seria até gozado.
E seria o caso de contar aos paraguaios que o Mercosul errou, dois anos atrás, e que se pretende agora refazer todo o processo e acolhe-los sorridentes em Mendoza, com tapinhas nas costas, dizendo: "Belo trabalho, muchachos, vocês fizeram bem em colocar para fora aquele bispo prolífico, fazedor de filhos nas crentes da paróquia."?
A vida é bela...e os companheiros são hipócritas...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
E seria o caso de contar aos paraguaios que o Mercosul errou, dois anos atrás, e que se pretende agora refazer todo o processo e acolhe-los sorridentes em Mendoza, com tapinhas nas costas, dizendo: "Belo trabalho, muchachos, vocês fizeram bem em colocar para fora aquele bispo prolífico, fazedor de filhos nas crentes da paróquia."?
A vida é bela...e os companheiros são hipócritas...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasil descarta atuação direta em crise, diz Rosário
Jamil Chade
O Estado de S.Paulo, 6/03/2014
Em Genebra, na sede da ONU, a ministra da Secretaria de Direitos Humanos, Maria do Rosário, afirmou que o Brasil não pensa em ter uma atuação direta na crise da Venezuela. “Existe um sentimento de grande respeito entre os países sul-americanos”, disse ao ‘Estado’. Segundo ela, um dos pontos que rege a relação com os vizinhos é o “princípio da não ingerência”. Para a ministra, o Brasil subscreve de forma integral o comunicado emitido pela Unasul sobre a situação venezuelana. Na sua avaliação, a solução da crise virá “dos próprios venezuelanos”. Maria do Rosário fez um discurso no Conselho de Direitos Humanos da ONU, no qual delineou as bases da política externa brasileira.
quinta-feira, 6 de março de 2014
Economia brasileira: pode-se NAO ser pessimista (tudo politica de governo)
Projeções pessimistas
06 de março de 2014 | 2h 05
Editorial O Estado de S.Paulo
O Brasil continuará com inflação alta, crescimento econômico abaixo de medíocre e contas externas em mau estado, neste e no próximo ano, segundo as projeções coletadas pelo Banco Central (BC) na pesquisa Focus, realizada semanalmente com cerca de uma centena de instituições financeiras e consultorias. A última pesquisa, divulgada nesta quarta-feira, foi conduzida na sexta passada. Na véspera, dia 27, havia sido divulgada a primeira estimativa do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) de 2013. Na antevéspera o BC havia anunciado a alta dos juros básicos de 10,5% para 10,75%. A principal novidade, neste caso, havia sido um aumento menor que os seis anteriores, todos de 0,5 ponto porcentual. As duas notícias, juntas, foram insuficientes para mudar o humor do mercado e afetar seriamente as estimativas formuladas nas semanas anteriores. Os analistas continuam à espera de informações muito mais positivas para abandonar ou pelo menos atenuar o pessimismo. Isso dependerá basicamente do governo.
A pesquisa Focus apresenta projeções sobre preços, juros, dívida pública, crescimento econômico, câmbio e contas externas. As cifras publicadas são as medianas das estimativas. Os economistas do mercado, tudo indica, estão menos otimistas que os dirigentes do BC em relação à alta de preços. Para a inflação oficial, medida pelo Índice de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo (IPCA), foi mantida a projeção de 6%, a mesma coletada nas quatro semanas anteriores. Mas pioraram as estimativas do IGP-DI, do IGP-M e do IPC-Fipe. Só diminuíram as projeções da Selic. A taxa final prevista para o ano foi baixada de 11,25% para 11,13%. A taxa média de 2014 foi diminuída de 10,97% para 10,91%. De toda forma, foi mantida a aposta em novos aumentos de juros, porque a inflação deverá permanecer elevada e resistente.
A decisão do BC pode ter sido baseada em algum otimismo quanto à evolução dos preços. Pode ter sido motivada pela preocupação com o crescimento econômico. Pode ter resultado de uma combinação desses dois fatores. Seja como for, o pessoal das consultorias e das instituições financeiras pouco mudou suas avaliações e manteve as previsões de inflação muito longe da meta de 4,5% e de expansão econômica inferior à do ano passado. No caso do PIB, a melhora da projeção foi muito pequena, de 1,67%, na semana anterior, para 1,70%.
Mas a estimativa da produção industrial piorou, caindo de 1,87% para 1,80%. A expansão econômica mais uma vez dependerá, portanto, dos serviços e da agropecuária - e isso ainda será determinado pelos estragos da estiagem.
O pessimismo ainda se estende ao próximo ano. Para 2015, a inflação projetada continua em 5,70%, a mesma taxa estimada quatro semanas antes. O crescimento econômico deve chegar a 2%, uma taxa extraordinariamente baixa para uma economia emergente. A produção industrial poderá expandir-se 3% - resultado abaixo de pífio, depois de três anos muito ruins.
Os analistas do setor privado continuam, portanto, duvidando amplamente de qualquer melhora significativa das condições de funcionamento da economia nacional. Segundo essa avaliação, o País continuará operando com baixa produtividade e, portanto, com reduzido potencial de crescimento.
Essas dúvidas são perfeitamente compatíveis com as projeções para as contas externas. A projeção para o superávit comercial foi rebaixada de US$ 8,25 bilhões, há quatro semanas, para US$ 7,80 bilhões e, em seguida, para US$ 7 bilhões. Em quatro semanas, a previsão do saldo no próximo ano diminuiu de US$ 13 bilhões para US$ 10 bilhões. O déficit em transações correntes para este ano foi mantido em US$ 75 bilhões na pesquisa Focus da sexta-feira passada - menor que o do ano passado (US$ 81,4 bilhões), mas ainda um forte sintoma de desarranjos internos.
Um surto de investimentos produtivos poderia justificar um déficit em conta corrente dessa magnitude, mas o caso brasileiro é outro. O Brasil continua investindo menos que 20% do PIB tanto em infraestrutura quanto em meios de produção para empresas. Milagre econômico seria crescer mais com investimento tão baixo.
Venezuela: o homem mais perigoso do pais (para os totalitarios e seus companheiros)
Gracias a Orlando Tambosi
Álvaro Vargas Llosa, do Instituto Independiente, escreve sobre o homem que, hoje preso, é tido tido pela ditadura chavista como seu principal inimigo. Virtudes demais, sob um brutal regime nacional-socialista conduzido a ferro e fogo pelo apedeuta Nicolás Maduro:
Tras varios días en la clandestinidad, Leopoldo López, uno de los líderes del movimiento de resistencia de Venezuela, se entregó durante una masiva manifestación de protesta y proclamó: “Si mi encarcelamiento sirve para que el país despierte, ha valido la pena”.
La dictadura chavista encabezada por Nicolás Maduro lo ha acusado de actos de violencia relacionados con las recientes protestas. En realidad, como múltiples testimonios y una gran cantidad de pruebas gráficas lo demuestran, la violencia ha sido perpetrada por los grupos paramilitares, conocidos como “colectivos”, que el gobierno ha armado y ensalzado como protectores de la revolución bolivariana.
Estas milicias son similares a las que el gobierno cubano emplea rutinariamente contra sus críticos. No debería ser una sorpresa. Cuba participa activamente con el régimen venezolano y ha jugado un papel preponderante en el diseño y operación del aparato de seguridad. Los lazos de Maduro con La Habana se remontan a la década de 1980, cuando fue entrenado en la tristemente célebre Escuela Superior del Partido Comunista, también conocida como “Ñico López”. Desertores de los servicios de inteligencia han indicado que él ha tenido estrechas relaciones con el Departamento América de Castro, encargado de propagar la revolución por toda América Latina.
¿Por qué es tan peligroso Leopoldo López? Por varias razones.
1. Él no tiene miedo. El mundo lo ha descubierto recientemente, pero los venezolanos lo han sabido desde hace bastante tiempo.
2. Aunque su linaje se remonta a la lucha independentista de Bolívar, no tiene conexión con las cuatro décadas que antecedieron a la llegada al poder de Chávez—conocidas como “puntofijismo” después del Pacto de Punto Fijo suscripto en 1958 por los principales partidos políticos y asociado en la mente de los partidarios del gobierno con la corrupción y un profundo abismo social. El régimen de Chávez ha construido su legitimidad revolucionaria sobre la demonización del período democrático, el “antiguo régimen” que se suponía que Venezuela dejaría atrás. Pero López, que tiene sólo 42 años, saltó a la fama junto con otros líderes jóvenes, incluido Henrique Capriles—el hombre que encabezó la oposición en las fraudulentas elecciones del año pasado—como miembro de Primero Justicia, una nueva organización política en la época en la cual el difunto Chávez llegó al poder.
3. Durante varios años, López fue más popular que Chávez a pesar de que era el alcalde de un pequeño municipio de Caracas. Temiéndolo como un potencial contendiente, el gobierno le prohibió ocupar cargos políticos. El vacío en la oposición fue llenado por Capriles. Pero López fue Capriles antes de Capriles.
4. López es un sobreviviente, una condición poco común en un hombre de sus raíces sociales si usted ve el mundo a través del lente de la lucha de clases. Aunque la maquinaria chavista fue capaz de hacer a un lado al oponente entrenado en Harvard despojándolo de sus derechos, ante el asombro de Maduro López sigue en marcha, convertido ahora en un icono del movimiento de resistencia desde suprisión militar de Ramo Verde.
5. Él ha demostrado un sentido de la épica, una cualidad política más usualmente asociada a la izquierda en América Latina. No hay movimiento de resistencia exitoso sin una narrativa épica. López la está escribiendo.
6. Él también posee un sentido de la estética política. Walter Benjamin habló de la estetización de la política en un contexto diferente. La secuencia que se inició con las protestas del 14 de febrero y terminó con las emotivas imágenes de López entregándose será legendaria. Vestido de blanco, sosteniendo una bandera y algunas flores, el héroe, padre de dos niños pequeños, se despidió con un beso de su esposa en medio de un mar de simpatizantes y posteriormente se entregó a los matones de la Guardia Nacional, quienes lo empujaron brutalmente dentro de un vehículo blindado.
Para los venezolanos amantes de la libertad, esas imágenes serán el equivalente al día, en 1992, cuando un desconocido teniente coronel, Hugo Chávez, apareció en la televisión después de su fallido golpe de Estado contra el presidente Carlos Andrés Pérez y anunció que sus objetivos no habían sido alcanzados “por el momento”.
7. López ha entendido que la presión en las calles, la resistencia civil pacífica, es indispensable en la lucha contra la tiranía. Razón por la cual, junto con la diputada María Corina Machado y el alcalde de Caracas, Antonio Ledezma, se ha embarcado en lo que él llama “la salida” con el fin de forzar una transición al Estado de Derecho. Para Maduro y sus patrocinadores cubanos este es un problema importante. Amenaza su estrategia, diseñada para perpetuar el régimen quitándole toda esperanza de cambio a los millones de víctimas tras quince largos años de populismo autoritario. Ellos desean que los críticos venezolanos se conviertan en lo que los disidentes cubanos son actualmente—un grupo de individuos inmensamente heroico pero políticamente impotente al cual el gobierno no tiene problema alguno en abrumar cuando se vuelve demasiado ruidoso.
Maduro y los cubanos tienen razón: López es un tipo peligroso.
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