O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

quinta-feira, 16 de julho de 2015

Inquerito criminal contra o capo di tutti i capi: at last...

Demorou...

Financial Times

Last updated: July 16, 2015 9:56 pm

Lula da Silva faces criminal inquiry

©AFP

Former Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva


preliminary inquiry into alleged illegal influence peddling by former Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has been turned into a formal criminal investigation, deepening a growing political crisis in Latin America’s biggest economy. 
The move by prosecutors came as the leader of Brazil’s lower house of Congress, Eduardo Cunha, said he was seeking legal advice on whether there were grounds to impeach Dilma Rousseff, Brazil’s president and Mr Lula da Silva’s protégé, over separate allegations of impropriety. 
Mr Lula da Silva has been accused of irregularities in his dealings with Odebrecht, the nation’s largest construction conglomerate, in relation to contracts it won for projects in Africa and the Caribbean. He has denied any wrongdoing. 
“The prosecutor decided to open a [formal] inquiry before the time limit for doing so expired,” a spokesman for the Federal district public prosecutor’s office said. 
The Brazilian real weakened on the news 0.46 per cent against the dollar to R$3.15. 
The probe into the left-leaning former president, who ended his two four-year terms in power in 2010 with record approval ratings, is the most serious threat yet to Brazil’s ruling Workers’ party, or PT, which he helped to found. 
Época, a weekly magazine, alleged in May that Mr Lula da Silva had improperly used his influence to obtain loans from Brazil’s state development bank BNDES for Odebrecht’s dealings in Cuba and the Dominican Republic, often travelling to meet the countries’ leaders at the company’s expense. 
The magazine also accused Mr Lula da Silva of similar influence peddling in Ghana and Angola. 
A spokesman at Mr Lula da Silva’s thinktank, Instituto Lula, said on Thursday that it received news of the formal inquiry “with surprise”. 
“But we also received the news with tranquillity out of certainty of the honesty and legality of the activities of the Institute and of the ex-president,” the institute said. 
Separately, Mr Cunha, a congressman with the PMDB, the PT’s main coalition partner, said Brazil was suffering a “grave” crisis in governability. 
Ms Rousseff’s hold over Congress has diminished since elections last year in which the PT performed poorly while her own approval ratings have plummeted. 
Her lack of popularity has been fuelled by the Petrobras scandal, in which ruling coalition politicians are alleged to have collaborated with former directors and contractors to extract bribes from the company. She was chairman of the company when much of the alleged activity took place but has denied wrongdoing.
Mr Cunha, who has also been named for investigation in the Petrobras case, said he was considering a request for Ms Rousseff’s impeachment, submitted by civil activist group the Free Brazil Movement, and was consulting legal experts and Congress’s own counsel. “In the next 30 days, I will have a position on that,” he said. 
The PMDB would prepare its own candidate for the next presidential elections with the partnership with the PT “practically finished”, he said. 

We . . . received the news with tranquillity out of certainty of the honesty and legality of the activities of the Institute and of the ex-president

- Instituto Lula
“It’s that story of a marriage in which the couple have already been sleeping in separate houses for some time. But that’s not to say the PMDB does not support governability,” he said. 
The ratcheting up of the rhetoric by Mr Cunha comes as markets are closely watching Ms Rousseff’s government to see if it can deliver a fiscal adjustment to restore balance to public finances and prevent Brazil losing its coveted investment grade credit rating. 
Economists have been increasing their forecasts for the deepening of a recession in Brazil this year, with Santander on Thursday revising its estimate for a contraction in gross domestic product of 1.9 per cent from 1.5 per cent. 
“The fiscal and monetary policy tightening, Brazilian real depreciation, current crisis in the oil sector, political uncertainty, and business confidence at the lowest level of its historical series sustain our expectation of a strong contraction in investments this year,” Santander said.
 

Latin American development trends and Brazil’s role in the region - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Mais recente artigo publicado:


1181. “Latin American development trends and Brazil’s role in the region”, revista Paiaguás: revista de estudos sobre a Amazônia e Pacífico (UFMS; vol. I, n. 1, 2015; link para a revista: http://seer.ufms.br/index.php/revpaiaguas; link para o artigo: http://seer.ufms.br/index.php/revpaiaguas/article/view/997; em pdf: http://seer.ufms.br/index.php/revpaiaguas/article/view/997/606). Relação de Originais n. 2830.

Latin American development trends and Brazil’s role in the region

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Resumo

Analytical essay dealing with Latin American integration process, its peculiarities and  the recent development trends in the region. Instead of deepening its integration process, Latin America is experiencing a clear fragmentation path, with many divergences among leading countries in the domains of economic policies and the integration processes, notwithstanding the fact that new instances were created for that objective (Unasur, Celac). The essay also examines Brazil’s economic and political role in the region, and concludes by an assessment of current trends (comparing the region with Asia Pacific) and advance prospects for divergent trends in Latin America.

Uma estada breve (mas suficiente), na Bizarrolandia, uma experiencia inesquecivel - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Não é exatamente Une Saison En Enfer, de Rimbaud (ou Mademoiselle Verlaine), inclusive porque o povo é simpático e acolhedor, mas é uma experiência edificante, tanto em termos econômicos, quanto políticos. Tudo é meio bizarro, surrealista, diáfano e vagamento enganador, a ponto de não se poder determinar ao certo se as novelas é que estão certas, ou se a vida real é assim mesmo maluca...
Em todo caso, foi o que me veio à mente, viajando de ônibus de Anápolis a Brasília, e me preparando para sair do Brasil...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida


Uma breve estada na Bizarrolândia

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Acabo de passar dez dias num país profundamente anormal. Um país no qual as pessoas acreditam que existam coisas, qualquer coisa, bem ou serviço, que podem ser adquiridas em "dez vezes sem juros". A anormalidade é tão grande que as pessoas, vendedores ou consumidores, nem percebem mais a anomalia econômica. Esse é o preço final e está conversado, nem se discute e nem se contesta: ele está registrado nos cartazes, nos sites, em todos os lugares. E se por acaso você esquecer dessa particularidade, a mocinha do caixa se encarrega de lembrá-lo: "Em quantas vezes o Sr. quer pagar?"
E não precisa ser algum bem de maior valor, de consumo durável, que justifique algum financiamento embutido, aliás nunca explicitado, seja no preço, seja no ato do pagamento. Pode ser qualquer coisa, numa farmácia ou no supermercado: "Quer dividir? Em quantas vezes?" E você, meio surpreso, esboça uma resposta: "Dá para fazer em 55 vezes?" Não, em 55 vezes não dá, mas ela pode parcelar em até cinco vezes, está bem assim?
Eu sinceramente me pergunto quando começou o "dez vezes sem juros", mas sobretudo eu gostaria de saber se as pessoas realmente acreditam que elas estão adquirindo algum bem ou serviço em "dez vezes sem juros". Será possível isso? Essas coisas são normais?
Eu começo a desconfiar da capacidade de raciocínio de pessoas educadas, gente de classe média, com dinheiro, já fazendo pós-graduação: "Fessor, a gente tá viajando pra Flórida nas férias!" "Ah, tá bom, mas a alta do dólar não vai atrapalhar um pouco?" "Não, a gente tá fazendo tudo em 10 vezes sem juros." "Ah, tá bom então."
O que é que eu vou dizer? Vou chamar o cidadão de idiota, ali na frente dos outros? Mas aí eu percebo que o único anormal ali sou eu mesmo, que ainda me dou ao trabalho de questionar essas coisas e de ver anormalidades numa situação que é considerada a mais normal do mundo. Dez vezes sem juros, quem é que não gosta, quem é que não quer? Como é que eu ouso contestar essa santa paz dos negócios, essa absoluta normalidade do "Quer parcelar?"? E eu me pergunto se economistas sensatos, ou normais, não alertam para o tremendo engodo incorporado a essa mania -- ou seria já um hábito normal? -- do "dez vezes sem juros", e não começam a avisar os incautos que eles estão pagando o dobro do valor real, que eles estão pagando dois televisores e só levando um para casa, que eles estão na verdade adquirindo um financiamento a 100%, não comprando um bem ou serviço.
Mas essa não foi a única anormalidade que eu encontrei em minha recente estada na Bizarrolândia. Confesso que fiquei igualmente surpreso com o comportamento de uma tribo especial de cidadãos, os políticos, ou representantes do povo, como são chamados por aqui. Eles parecem se situar numa outra galáxia, não nesta onde estão os que os elegeram. Eles são capazes de tudo, menos de mirar a situação economicamente caótica que vive Bizarrolândia atualmente. Eles continuam a aprovar aumento de gastos -- geralmente para eles mesmos ou em benefício dos que lhes são caros -- na total indiferença em relação à inflação, ao desemprego, ao descalabro das contas públicas. E se acusam mutuamente de trapaças, de traições, até de roubalheira e de corrupção, vejam só.
Prepostos dos políticos confessam candidamente que desviaram tantos e tantos milhões de uma estatal qualquer, e que mandaram esses milhões para algum paraíso fiscal e já ninguém mais se espanta! Pior: não acontece nada, nadinha. As coisas continuam como se tudo fosse absolutamente normal. O cidadão, ou a cidadã, foi eleito com base em dinheiro desviado, extorquido de empresas privadas e tudo segue adiante na mais perfeita normalidade.
Mais estranho ainda, o que eu fiquei sabendo nessa breve estada em Bizarrolândia, foi que os guardiões do Tesouro, dos recursos duramente amealhados dos contribuintes, fraudaram completamente as contas, despeitaram o orçamento, violaram as leis e a própria Constituição de Bizarrolândia, e nada se passa: as coisas continuam fluindo na mais perfeita (a)normalidade.
E não só os guardiões, mas inacreditavelmente foi o principal responsável pelo respeito à lei e à Constituição quem incorreu nesses crimes contra a moralidade ou ao simples dever constitucional. Como é que pode?
Confesso que não sei. Não sei como é que o povo de Bizarrolândia consegue conviver com essas coisas, assim numa boa, como se tudo isso fosse absolutamente normal. Será que sou eu o anormal?
Não sei. Só sei que estou deixando Bizarrolândia por algum tempo, mas vou ficar observando de longe. Confesso que gostaria de voltar. Encontrei um povo simpático e até brincalhão, no meio do caos econômico e das esquisitices políticas. Mas gostaria de encontrar algo mudado quando eu voltar.
  
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Em viagem, Anápolis-Brasília, 16/07/2015

quarta-feira, 15 de julho de 2015

Paraguai: Lugo apela 'a CIDH sobre seu julgamento politico de 2012

Parece que o bispo prolífico deseja voltar a reproduzir a partir da presidência da República. Bem, se ele não perdeu os direitos políticos -- tanto é que exerce atualmente a função de Senador -- poderá, sem problemas voltar a concorrer à presidência da República.
Quanto a esta apelação à CIDH, será muito barulho por nada, apenas agitação estéril, pois ele foi objeto de um julgamento constitucional, e não será a CIDH que vai ensinar ao Senado paraguaio quais são os trâmites para a destituição de um presidente.
Ele foi destituído por ser incompetente, uma acusação que figura na Constituição paraguaia, e ajudaria muito o Brasil se esse dispositivo também figurasse em nossa Carta. Seria possível mandar para casa presidentes ineptos segundo um ritual simplificado.
Hoje, por exemplo, no Brasil, é preciso configurar algum crime político, mas não é crime ser totalmente incompetente, o que é verdadeiramente uma pena.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

PARAGUAY
Corte Interamericana da trámite a demanda de Lugo

 Hoy.com.py, 15/07/2015

La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDHH) hizo lugar a la demanda promovida por el exmandatario de Paraguay y actual senador, Fernando Lugo, respecto al juicio político del año 2012. El canciller nacional recibió la comunicación y corrió traslado al Congreso Nacional. Eladio Loizaga aseguró que el Ejecutivo no tiene injerencia en el asunto.

El ministro de Relaciones Exteriores acudió este lunes al Parlamento, para entregar los antecedentes del caso a ambas cámaras (Diputados y Senado).

El titular de la Cancillería no quiso ahondar en muchos detalles y solo atinó a decir que hay plazos que cumplir, por eso al entrar en contacto con la comunicación de CIDHH corrió traslado al Congreso.

"Las cámaras tendrán que definir el tema, nosotros solo somos un canal (…) El Ejecutivo no tiene participación?, declaró a radio UNO.

En diciembre de 2012, el expresidente de la República Fernando Lugo acudió a la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDHH) para denunciar el juicio político que lo destituyó en junio de ese mismo año.

El demanda se presentó bajo el patrocinio de los abogados Emilio Camacho y Adolfo Ferreiro. Se aduce que el Congreso violó supuestamente los derechos de Lugo a un justo proceso y a la defensa, provocando un quiebre institucional en el país.

Varoufakis: o acordo de rendicao da Grecia a seus horriveis credores (anotado pelo proprio)

O patético, bizarro, folclórico ex-ministro das (não)finanças da infeliz Hélade anotou o acordo recém concluído entre o seu primeiro-ministro traidor e os perversos e crueis credores europeus.
Ele vai criar o PSOL do Syriza, ou o Syriza do B (no caso da G), e liderar uma oposição de extrema-esquerda ao novo status colonizado de seu país.
Ele na verdade, pretendia que os europeus continuassem pagando as não-reformas do Syriza, um pouco como os companheiros no Brasil pretendem que a "burguesia" (leia-se, classe média) pague pelos buracos enormes que eles deixaram no orçamento, inclusive fazendo as mesmas maquiagens contábeis e os mesmos truques rastaqueras que os gregos usaram durante durante anos.
Os europeus deram uma banana para eles, ou talvez um limão amargo...
Melhor assim. Sempre é necessário críticos de esquerda para ver quantas bobagens eles são capazes de fazer, e quantos protestos idiotas são capazes de liderar.
Sempre é didático do ponto de vista da educação do povo.
Os alemães, que não me deixam mentir, precisaram passar por uma hiper-inflação e depois por uma ditadura assassina monstruosa para se converterem no povo mais bonzinho da Europa, capazes de ajudar gregos e troianos, com alguma cenouras e um grande porrete para contentar os bonzinhos e corrigir os recalcitrantes.
Demora mais se aprende.
Vamos ver o Brasil agora...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Comentário inicial do meu amigo Maurício David, quem me enviou esse brilhante documento anotado:
Recebi do ex-ministro grego da Fazenda Yanis Varoufakis - e até há pouco o principal negociador pela Grécia com os credores representados pela Troica - o seguinte relato (e suas anotações pessoais) sobre as difíceis negociações. Por ser um documento muito importante para relatar a visão de um dos lados da negociação, transcrevo-o na íntegra. Para sentir o seu espírito, basta dizer que o Varoufakis classifica o documento final do acordo como "Os Termos da Rendição da Grécia"...
Surge agora um nova oposição de esquerda ao governo Tsipras e ao Syrisa, na voz do "herói" da resistência grega às medidas de austeridades (ao meu ver necessárias, no entanto,  para a recuperação da estrangulada economia grega...), o ex-ministro Yanis Varoufakis... Não vai ser fácil o Tsipras dar uma de Dilma Rousseff e tentar implementar agora tudo o que nas negociações e também na campanha do plebiscito chamou de "extorsões imperialistas que visavam massacrar a economia grega")...
Quanto mais o mundo gira...
Mauricio David, 15/07/2015

Yanis Varoufakis
The Euro-Summit ‘Agreement’ on Greece – annotated by Yanis Varoufakis
 July 15, 2015

The Euro Summit statement (or Terms of Greece’s Surrender – as it will go down in history) follows, annotated by yours truly. The original text is untouched with my notes confined to square brackets (and in red). Read and weep…

Euro Summit Statement Brussels, 12 July 2015

The Euro Summit stresses the crucial need to rebuild trust with the Greek authorities [i.e. the Greek government must introduce new stringent austerity directed at the weakest Greeks that have already suffered grossly] as a pre- requisite for a possible future agreement on a new ESM programme [i.e. for a new extend-and-pretend loan].

In this context, the ownership by the Greek authorities is key [i.e. the Syriza government must sign a declaration of having defected to the troika’s ‘logic’], and successful implementation should follow policy commitments.

A euro area Member State requesting financial assistance from the ESM is expected to address, wherever possible, a similar request to the IMF This is a precondition for the Eurogroup to agree on a new ESM programme. Therefore Greece will request continued IMF support (monitoring and financing) from March 2016 [i.e. Berlin continues to believe that the Commission cannot be trusted to ‘police’ Europe’s own ‘bailout’ programs].

Given the need to rebuild trust with Greece, the Euro Summit welcomes the commitments of the Greek authorities to legislate without delay a first set of measures [i.e. Greece must subject itself to fiscal waterboarding, even before any financing is offered]. These measures, taken in full prior agreement with the Institutions, will include:

By 15 July
- the streamlining of the VAT system [i.e. making it more regressive, through rate rises that encourage more VAT evasion] and the broadening of the tax base to increase revenue [i.e. dealing a major blow at the only Greek growth industry – tourism].
- upfront measures to improve long-term sustainability of the pension system as part of a comprehensive pension reform programme [i.e. reducing the lowest of the low of pensions, while ignoring that the depletion of pension funds’ capital due to the 2012 troika-designed PSI and the ill effects of low employment & undeclared paid labour].
- the safeguarding of the full legal independence of ELSTAT [i.e. the troika demands complete control of the way Greece’s budget balance is computed, with a view to controlling fully the magnitude of austerity it imposes on the government.]
- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, in particular by making the Fiscal Council operational before finalizing the MoU and introducing quasi-automatic spending cuts in case of deviations from ambitious primary surplus targets after seeking advice from the Fiscal Council and subject to prior approval of the Institutions [i.e. the Greek government, which knows that the imposed fiscal targets will never be achieved under the imposed austerity, must commit to further, automated austerity as a result of the troika’s newest failures.]

By 22 July
- the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is a major overhaul of procedures and arrangements for the civil justice system and can significantly accelerate the judicial process and reduce costs [i.e. foreclosures, evictions and liquidation of thousands of homes and businesses who are not in a position to keep up with their mortgages/loans.]
- the transposition of the BRRD with support from the European Commission.

 Immediately, and only subsequent to legal implementation of the first four above-mentioned measures as well as endorsement of all the commitments included in this document by the Greek Parliament, verified by the Institutions and the Eurogroup, may a decision to mandate the Institutions to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) be taken [i.e. The Syriza government must be humiliated to the extent that it is asked to impose harsh austerity upon itself as a first step towards requesting another toxic bailout loan, of the sort that Syriza became internationally famous for opposing.]

This decision would be taken subject to national procedures having been completed and if the preconditions of Article 13 of the ESM Treaty are met on the basis of the assessment referred to in Article 13.1. In order to form the basis for a successful conclusion of the MoU, the Greek offer of reform measures needs to be seriously strengthened to take into account the strongly deteriorated economic and fiscal position of the country during the last year [i.e. the Syriza government must accept the lie that it, and not the asphyxiation tactics of the creditors, caused the sharp economic deterioration of the past six months – the victim is being asked to take the blame by the on behalf of the villain.]

The Greek government needs to formally commit to strengthening their proposals [i.e. to make them more regressive and more inhuman] in a number of areas identified by the Institutions, with a satisfactory clear timetable for legislation and implementation, including structural benchmarks, milestones and quantitative benchmarks, to have clarity on the direction of policies over the medium-run. They notably need, in agreement with the Institutions, to:

- carry out ambitious pension reforms [i.e. cuts] and specify policies to fully compensate for the fiscal impact of the Constitutional Court ruling on the 2012 pension reform [i.e. cancel the Court’s decision in favour of pensioners] and to implement the zero deficit clause [i.e. cut by 85% the secondary pensions that the Syriza government fought tooth and nail to preserve over the past five months] or mutually agreeable alternative measures [i.e. find ‘equivalent’ victims] by October 2015;
- adopt more ambitious product market reforms with a clear timetable for implementation of all OECD toolkit I recommendations [i.e. the recommendations that the OECD has now renounced after having re-designed these reforms in collaboration with the Syriza government], including Sunday trade, sales periods, pharmacy ownership, milk and bakeries, except over-the-counter pharmaceutical products, which will be implemented in a next step, as well as for the opening of macro-critical closed professions (e.g. ferry transportation). On the follow-up of the OECD toolkit-II, manufacturing needs to be included in the prior action;
- on energy markets, proceed with the privatisation of the electricity transmission network operator (ADMIE), unless replacement measures can be found that have equivalent effect on competition, as agreed by the Institutions [i.e. ADMIE will be sold off to specific foreign vested interests at the behest of the Institutions.]
- on labour markets, undertake rigorous reviews and modernisation of collective bargaining [i.e. to make sure that no collective bargaining is allowed], industrial action [i.e. that must be banned] and, in line with the relevant EU directive and best practice, collective dismissals [i.e. that should be allowed at the employers’ whim], along the timetable and the approach agreed with the Institutions [i.e. the Troika decides.]

On the basis of these reviews, labour market policies should be aligned with international and European best practices, and should not involve a return to past policy settings which are not compatible with the goals of promoting sustainable and inclusive growth [i.e. there should be no mechanisms that waged labour can use to extract better conditions from employers.]

- adopt the necessary steps to strengthen the financial sector, including decisive action on non-performing loans [i.e. a tsunami of foreclosures is ante portas] and measures to strengthen governance of the HFSF and the banks [i.e. the Greek people who maintain the HFSF and the banks will have precisely zero control over the HFSF and the banks.], in particular by eliminating any possibility for political interference especially in appointment processes. [i.e. except the political interference of the Troika.]

On top of that, the Greek authorities shall take the following actions:
- to develop a significantly scaled up privatisation programme with improved governance; valuable Greek assets will be transferred to an independent fund that will monetize the assets through privatisations and other means [i.e. an East German-like Treuhand is envisaged to sell off all public property but without the equivalent large investments that W. Germany put into E. Germany in compensation for the Treuhand disaster.]
The monetization of the assets will be one source to make the scheduled repayment of the new loan of ESM and generate over the life of the new loan a targeted total of EUR 50bn of which EUR 25bn will be used for the repayment of recapitalization of banks and other assets and 50 % of every remaining euro (i.e. 50% of EUR 25bn) will be used for decreasing the debt to GDP ratio and the remaining 50 % will be used for investments [i.e. public property will be sold off and the pitiful sums will go toward servicing an un-serviceable debt – with precisely nothing left over for public or private investments.] This fund would be established in Greece and be managed by the Greek authorities under the supervision of the relevant European Institutions [i.e. it will be nominally in Greece but, just like the HFSF or the Bank of Greece, it will be controlled fully by the creditors.] In agreement with Institutions and building on best international practices, a legislative framework should be adopted to ensure transparent procedures and adequate asset sale pricing, according to OECD principles and standards on the management of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) [i.e. the Troika will do what it likes.]
- in line with the Greek government ambitions, to modernise and significantly strengthen the Greek administration, and to put in place a programme, under the auspices of the European Commission, for capacity-building and de-politicizing the Greek administration [i.e. Turning Greece into a democracy-free zone modelled on Brussels, a form of supposedly technocratic government, which is politically toxic and macro-economically inept] A first proposal should be provided by 20 July after discussions with the Institutions. The Greek government commits to reduce further the costs of the Greek administration [i.e. to reduce the lowest wages while increasing a little the wages some of the Troika-friendly apparatchiks], in line with a schedule agreed with the Institutions.
- to fully normalize working methods with the Institutions, including the necessary work on the ground in Athens, to improve programme implementation and monitoring [i.e. The Troika strikes back and demands that the Greek government invite it to return to Athens as Conqueror – the Carthaginian Peace in all its glory.] The government needs to consult and agree with the Institutions on all draft legislation in relevant areas with adequate time before submitting it for public consultation or to Parliament [i.e. Greek Parliament must, again, after five months of short-lived independence, become an appendage of the Troika – passing translated legislation mechanistically.] The Euro Summit stresses again that implementation is key, and in that context welcomes the intention of the Greek authorities to request by 20 July support from the Institutions and Member States for technical assistance, and asks the European Commission to coordinate this support from Europe;

With the exception of the humanitarian crisis bill, the Greek government will reexamine with a view to amending legislations that were introduced counter to the February 20 agreement by backtracking on previous programme commitments or identify clear compensatory equivalents for the vested rights that were subsequently created [i.e. In addition to promising that it will no longer legislative autonomously, the Greek government will retrospectively annul all Bills it passed over the past five months.]
The above-listed commitments are minimum requirements to start the negotiations with the Greek authorities. However, the Euro Summit made it clear that the start of negotiations does not preclude any final possible agreement on a new ESM programme, which will have to be based on a decision on the whole package (including financing needs, debt sustainability and possible bridge financing) [i.e. self-flagellate, impose further austerity upon an economy crushed by austerity, and then we shall see whether the Eurogroup will grave you with another toxic, unsustainable loans.]

The Euro Summit takes note of the possible programme financing needs of between EUR 82 and 86bn, as assessed by the Institutions [i.e. the Eurogroup conjured up a huge number, well above what is necessary, in order to signal the debt restructuring is out and that debt bondage ad infinitum is the name of the game.] It invites the Institutions to explore possibilities to reduce the financing envelope, through an alternative fiscal path or higher privatisation proceeds [i.e. And, yes, it may possible that pigs will fly.] Restoring market access, which is an objective of any financial assistance programme, lowers the need to draw on the total financing envelope [i.e. which is something the creditors will do their utmost to avoid, e.g. by ensuring that Greece will only enter the ECB’s quantitative easing program in 2018, once quantitative easing is… over.]

The Euro Summit takes note of the urgent financing needs of Greece which underline the need for very swift progress in reaching a decision on a new MoU: these are estimated to amount to EUR 7bn by 20 July and an additional EUR 5bn by mid August [i.e. Extend and Pretend gets another spin.] The Euro Summit acknowledges the importance of ensuring that the Greek sovereign can clear its arrears to the IMF and to the Bank of Greece and honour its debt obligations in the coming weeks to create conditions which allow for an orderly conclusion of the negotiations. The risks of not concluding swiftly the negotiations remain fully with Greece [i.e. Once more, demanding that the victim takes all the blame in behalf of the villain.] The Euro Summit invites the Eurogroup to discuss these issues as a matter of urgency.

Given the acute challenges of the Greek financial sector, the total envelope of a possible new ESM programme would have to include the establishment of a buffer of EUR 10 to 25bn for the banking sector in order to address potential bank recapitalisation needs and resolution costs, of which EUR 10bn would be made available immediately in a segregated account at the ESM [i.e. the Troika admits that the 2013-14 recapitalisation of the banks, which would only need a top up of at most 10 billion, was insufficient – but, of course, blames it on… the Syriza government.]

The Euro Summit is aware that a rapid decision on a new programme is a condition to allow banks to reopen, thus avoiding an increase in the total financing envelope [i.e. The Troika closed Greece’s banks to force the Syriza government to capitulate and now cries out for their re-opening.] The ECB/SSM will conduct a comprehensive assessment after the summer. The overall buffer will cater for possible capital shortfalls following the comprehensive assessment after the legal framework is applied.

There are serious concerns regarding the sustainability of Greek debt [N.b. Really? Gosh!] This is due to the easing of policies during the last twelve months, which resulted in the recent deterioration in the domestic macroeconomic and financial environment [i.e. It is not the Extend and Pretend ‘bailout’ loans of 2010 and 2012 that, in conjunction with GDP-sapping austerity, caused the debt to scale immense heights – it was the prospect, and reality, of a government that criticized the the Extend and Pretend ‘bailout’ loans that… caused Debt’s Unustainability!]

The Euro Summit recalls that the euro area Member States have, throughout the last few years, adopted a remarkable set of measures supporting Greece’s debt sustainability, which have smoothed Greece’s debt servicing path and reduced costs significantly [i.e. The 1st & 2nd ‘bailout’ programs failed, the debt skyrocketing as it was always going to since the real purpose of the ‘bailout’ programs was to transfer banking losses to Europe’s taxpayers.] Against this background, in the context of a possible future ESM programme, and in line with the spirit of the Eurogroup statement of November 2012 [i.e. a promise of debt restructure to the previous Greek government was never kept by the creditors], the Eurogroup stands ready to consider, if necessary, possible additional measures (possible longer grace and payment periods) aiming at ensuring that gross financing needs remain at a sustainable level. These measures will be conditional upon full implementation of the measures to be agreed in a possible new programme and will be considered after the first positive completion of a review [i.e. Yet again, the Troika shall let the Greek government labour under un-payable debt and when, as a result, the program fails, poverty rises further and incomes collapse much more, then we may haircut some of the debt – as the Troika did in 2012.]

The Euro Summit stresses that nominal haircuts on the debt cannot be undertaken [N.b. The Syriza government has been suggesting, since January, a moderate debt restructure, with no haircuts, maximizing the expected net present value of Greece’s repayments to creditors’ – which was rejected by the Troika because their aim was, simply, to humiliate Syriza.] Greek authorities reiterate their unequivocal commitment to honour their financial obligations to all their creditors fully and in a timely manner [N.b. Which can only happen after a substantial debt restrucuture.] Provided that all the necessary conditions contained in this document are fulfilled, the Eurogroup and ESM Board of Governors may, in accordance with Article 13.2 of the ESM Treaty, mandate the Institutions to negotiate a new ESM programme, if the preconditions of Article 13 of the ESM Treaty are met on the basis of the assessment referred to in Article 13.1. To help support growth and job creation in Greece (in the next 3-5 years) [N.b. Having already destroyed growth and jobs for the past five years…] the Commission will work closely with the Greek authorities to mobilise up to EUR 35bn (under various EU programmes) to fund investment and economic activity, including in SMEs [i.e. Will use the same order of magnitude of structural funds, plus some fantasy money, as were available in 2010-2014.] As an exceptional measure and given the unique situation of Greece the Commission will propose to increase the level of pre-financing by EUR 1bn to give an immediate boost to investment to be dealt with by the EU co-legislators [i.e. Of the headline 35 billion, consider 1 billion as real money.] The Investment Plan for Europe will also provide funding opportunities for Greece [i.e. the same plan that most Eurozone ministers of finance refer to as a phantom program].