O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

segunda-feira, 4 de abril de 2022

Francis Fukuyama em defesa de um nacionalismo liberal (Foreign Affairs)

  De fato, não deveria haver contradição ou oposição entre uma sociedade perfeitamente liberal e o sentimento nacionalista, uma vez que as sociedades atuais estão organicamente e institucionalmente organizadas emEstados nacionais distintos e separados (à exceção da aventura comunitária da UE), em número de aproximadamente 200 nações atualmente (contra pouco mais de 50 no nascimento da ONU, em 1945). Mas, líderes populistas costumam estimular, e excitar, os sentimentos nacionalistas exclusivos do seu próprio povo (que por vezes não é homogêneo ou dotado da mesma língua e religião), para fins de ganhos eleitorais, explorando reações de rejeição em sociedades estressadas por problemas econômicos (recessão, desemprego, inflação, pressões fiscais, previdência, etc.) ou levas imigratórias vindas de regiões miseráveis ou em guerra.

A deterioração da democracia liberal e o crescimento dos regimes iliberais no mundo são fenômenos deveras preocupantesmeste início de um século que enfrenta a possibilidade de novas fricções imperiais, o outro grande desafio à tolerância democrático no mundo e no plano doméstico dos Estados nacionais. A democracia está sob pressão em diversas partes do mundo, inclusive no Brasil. A boa informação e a educação são as respostas adequadas, mas tem muita gente interessada no autoritarismo.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Foreign Affairs, Nova York - Maio-Junho 2022

A Country of Their Own

Liberalism Needs the Nation

Francis Fukuyama

 

Liberalism is in peril. The fundamentals of liberal societies are tolerance of difference, respect for individual rights, and the rule of law, and all are under threat as the world suffers what can be called a democratic recession or even a depression. According to Freedom House, political rights and civil liberties around the world have fallen each year for the last 16 years. Liberalism’s decline is evident in the growing strength of autocracies such as China and Russia, the erosion of liberal—or nominally liberal—institutions in countries such as Hungary and Turkey, and the backsliding of liberal democracies such as India and the United States.

In each of these cases, nationalism has powered the rise of illiberalism. Illiberal leaders, their parties, and their allies have harnessed nationalist rhetoric in seeking greater control of their societies. They denounce their opponents as out-of-touch elites, effete cosmopolitans, and globalists.They claim to be the authentic representatives of their country and its true guardians. Sometimes, illiberal politicians merely caricature their liberal counterparts as ineffectual and removed from the lives of the people they presume to represent. Often, however, they describe their liberal rivals not simply as political adversaries but as something more sinister: enemies of the people.

The very nature of liberalism makes it susceptible to this line of attack. The most fundamental principle enshrined in liberalism is one of tolerance: the state does not prescribe beliefs, identities, or any other kind of dogma. Ever since its tentative emergence in the seventeenth century as an organizing principle for politics, liberalism deliberately lowered the sights of politics to aim not at “the good life” as defined by a particular religion, moral doctrine, or cultural tradition but at the preservation of life itself under conditions in which populations cannot agree on what the good life is. This agnostic nature creates a spiritual vacuum, as individuals go their own ways and experience only a thin sense of community. Liberal political orders do require shared values, such as tolerance, compromise, and deliberation, but these do not foster the strong emotional bonds found in tightly knit religious and ethnonationalist communities. Indeed, liberal societies have often encouraged the aimless pursuit of material self-gratification.

Liberalism’s most important selling point remains the pragmatic one that has existed for centuries: its ability to manage diversity in pluralistic societies. Yet there is a limit to the kinds of diversity that liberal societies can handle. If enough people reject liberal principles themselves and seek to restrict the fundamental rights of others, or if citizens resort to violence to get their way, then liberalism alone cannot maintain political order. And if diverse societies move away from liberal principles and try to base their national identities on race, ethnicity, religion, or some other, different substantive vision of the good life, they invite a return to potentially bloody conflict. A world full of such countries will invariably be more fractious, more tumultuous, and more violent.

That is why it is all the more important for liberals not to give up on the idea of the nation. They should recognize that in truth, nothing makes the universalism of liberalism incompatible with a world of nation-states. National identity is malleable, and it can be shaped to reflect liberal aspirations and to instill a sense of community and purpose among a broad public.

For proof of the abiding importance of national identity, look no further than the trouble Russia has run into in attacking Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Ukraine did not have an identity separate from that of Russia and that the country would collapse immediately once his invasion began. Instead, Ukraine has resisted Russia tenaciously precisely because its citizens are loyal to the idea of an independent, liberal democratic Ukraine and do not want to live in a corrupt dictatorship imposed from without. With their bravery, they have made clear that citizens are willing to die for liberal ideals, but only when those ideals are embedded in a country they can call their own.

 

LIBERALISM’S SPIRITUAL VACUUM

 

Liberal societies struggle to present a positive vision of national identity to their citizens. The theory behind liberalism has great difficulties drawing clear boundaries around communities and explaining what is owed to people inside and outside those boundaries. This is because the theory is built on top of a claim of universalism. As asserted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”; further, “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Liberals are theoretically concerned with violations of human rights no matter where in the world they occur. Many liberals dislike the particularistic attachments of nationalists and imagine themselves to be “citizens of the world.”

The claim of universalism can be hard to reconcile with the division of the world into nation-states. There is no clear liberal theory, for instance, on how to draw national boundaries, a deficit that has led to intraliberal conflicts over the separatism of regions such as Catalonia, Quebec, and Scotland and disagreements over the proper treatment of immigrants and refugees. Populists, such as former U.S. President Donald Trump, have channeled that tension between the universalist aspirations of liberalism and the narrower claims of nationalism to powerful effect.

Nationalists complain that liberalism has dissolved the bonds of national community and replaced them with a global cosmopolitanism that cares about people in distant countries as much as it cares for fellow citizens. Nineteenth-century nationalists based national identity on biology and believed that national communities were rooted in common ancestry. This continues to be a theme for certain contemporary nationalists, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has defined Hungarian national identity as being based on Magyar ethnicity. Other nationalists, such as the Israeli scholar Yoram Hazony, have sought to revise twentieth-century ethnonationalism by arguing that nations constitute coherent cultural units that allow their members to share thick traditions of food, holidays, language, and the like. The American conservative thinker Patrick Deneen has asserted that liberalism constitutes a form of anticulture that has dissolved all forms of preliberal culture, using the power of the 

Significantly, Deneen and other conservatives have broken with economic neoliberals and have been vocal in blaming market capitalism for eroding the values of family, community, and tradition. As a result, the twentieth-century categories that defined the political left and right in terms of economic ideology do not fit the present reality neatly, with right-wing groups being willing to countenance the use of state power to regulate both social life and the economy.

There is considerable overlap between nationalists and religious conservatives. Among the traditions that contemporary nationalists want to preserve are religious ones; thus, the Law and Justice party in Poland has been closely aligned with the Polish Catholic Church and has taken on many of the latter’s cultural complaints about liberal Europe’s support for abortion and same-sex marriage. Similarly, religious conservatives often regard themselves as patriots; this is certainly true for the American evangelicals who formed the core of Trump’s “Make America Great Again” movement.

The substantive conservative critique of liberalism—that liberal societies provide no strong common moral core around which community can be built—is true enough. This is indeed a feature of liberalism, not a bug. The question for conservatives is whether there is a realistic way to turn back the clock and reimpose a thicker moral order. Some U.S. conservatives hope to return to an imagined time when virtually everyone in the United States was Christian. But modern societies are far more diverse religiously today than at the time of Europe’s religious wars in the sixteenth century. The idea of restoring a shared moral tradition defined by religious belief is a nonstarter. Leaders who hope to effect this kind of restoration, such as Narendra Modi, India’s Hindu nationalist prime minister, are inviting oppression and communal violence. Modi knows this all too well: he was chief minister of the western state of Gujarat when it was racked by communal riots in 2002 that left thousands dead, mostly Muslims. Since 2014, when Modi became prime minister, he and his allies have sought to tie Indian national identity to the masts of Hinduism and the Hindi language, a sea change from the secular pluralism of India’s liberal founders.

 

THE INESCAPABLE STATE

 

Illiberal forces around the world will continue to use appeals to nationalism as a powerful electoral weapon. Liberals may be tempted to dismiss this rhetoric as jingoistic and crude. But they should not cede the nation to their opponents.

 All societies need to make use of force, both to preserve internal order and to protect themselves from external enemies. A liberal society does this by creating a powerful state but then constraining the state’s power under the rule of law. The state’s power is based on a social contract among autonomous individuals who agree to give up some of their rights to do as they please in return for the state’s protection. It is legitimized by both the common acceptance of the law and, if it is a liberal democracy, popular elections.

Liberal rights are meaningless if they cannot be enforced by a state, which, according to the German sociologist Max Weber’s famous definition, is a legitimate monopoly of force over a defined territory. The territorial jurisdiction of a state necessarily corresponds to the area occupied by the group of individuals who signed on to the social contract. People living outside that jurisdiction must have their rights respected, but not necessarily enforced, by that state.

States with a delimited territorial jurisdiction therefore remain critical political actors, because they are the only ones able to exercise a legitimate use of force. In today’s globalized world, power is employed by a wide variety of bodies, from multinational corporations to nonprofit groups to terrorist organizations to supranational bodies such as the European Union and the United Nations. The need for international cooperation in addressing issues such as global warming and pandemics has never been more evident. But it remains the case that one particular form of power, the ability to enforce rules through the threat or the actual use of force, remains under the control of nation-states. Neither the European Union nor the International Air Transport Association deploys its own police or army to enforce the rules it sets. Such organizations still depend on the coercive capacity of the countries that empowered them. To be sure, there is today a large body of international law that in many domains displaces national-level law; think, for example, of the European Union’s acquis communautaire, which serves as a kind of common law to regulate commerce and settle disputes. But in the end, international law continues to rely on national-level enforcement. When EU member states disagree on important matters of policy, as they did during the euro crisis of 2010 and the migrant crisis of 2015, the outcome is decided not by European law but by the relative power of the member states. Ultimate power, in other words, continues to be the province of nation-states, which means that the control of power at this level remains critical.

There is thus no necessary contradiction between liberal universalism and the need for nation-states. Although the normative value of human rights may be universal, enforcement power is not; it is a scarce resource that is necessarily applied in a territorially delimited way. A liberal state is perfectly justified in granting different levels of rights to citizens and noncitizens, because it does not have the resources or the writ to protect rights universally. All people within the state’s territory are due the equal protection of the law, but only citizens are full participants in the social contract, with special rights and duties, in particular the right to vote.

The fact that states remain the locus of coercive power should inspire caution about proposals to create new supranational bodies and to delegate such power to them. Liberal societies have had several hundred years of experience learning how to constrain power at a national level through rule-of-law and legislative institutions and how to balance power so that its use reflects general interests. They have no idea how to create such institutions at a global level, where, for example, a global court or legislature would be able to constrain the arbitrary decisions of a global executive. The European Union is the product of the most serious effort to do this at a regional level; the result is an awkward system characterized by excessive weakness in some domains (fiscal policy, foreign affairs) and excessive power in others (economic regulation). Europe at least has a certain common history and cultural identity that do not exist at the global level. International institutions such as the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court continue to rely on states to enforce their writs.

The German philosopher Immanuel Kant imagined a condition of “perpetual peace” in which a world populated by liberal states would regulate international relations through law rather than by resorting to violence. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated, unfortunately, that the world has not yet reached this post-historical moment and that raw military power remains the ultimate guarantor of peace for liberal countries. The nation-state is therefore unlikely to disappear as the crucial actor in global politics.

 

THE GOOD LIFE

 

The conservative critique of liberalism contains, at its core, a reasonable skepticism of the liberal emphasis on individual autonomy. Liberal societies assume an equality of human dignity, a dignity that is rooted in an individual’s ability to make choices. For that reason, they are dedicated to protecting that autonomy as a matter of basic rights. But although autonomy is a fundamental liberal value, it is not the sole human good that automatically trumps all other visions of the good life.

The realm of what is accepted as autonomy has steadily expanded over time, broadening from the choice to obey rules within an existing moral framework to making up those rules for oneself. But respect for autonomy was meant to manage and moderate the competition of deeply held beliefs, not to displace those beliefs in their entirety. Not every human being thinks that maximizing his or her personal autonomy is the most important goal of life or that disrupting every existing form of authority is necessarily a good thing. Many people are happy to limit their freedom of choice by accepting religious and moral frameworks that connect them with other people or by living within inherited cultural traditions. The U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment was meant to protect the free exercise of religion, not to protect citizens from religion.

Successful liberal societies have their own culture and their own understanding of the good life, even if that vision may be thinner than those offered by societies bound by a single doctrine. They cannot be neutral with regard to the values that are necessary to sustain themselves as liberal societies. They need to prioritize public-spiritedness, tolerance, open-mindedness, and active engagement in public affairs if they are to cohere. They need to prize innovation, entrepreneurship, and risk-taking if they are to prosper economically. A society of inward-looking individuals interested only in maximizing their personal consumption will not be a society at all.

States are important not just because they are the locus of legitimate power and the instruments for controlling violence. They are also a singular source of community. Liberal universalism on one level flies in the face of the nature of human sociability. People feel the strongest bonds of affection for those closest to them, such as friends and family; as the circle of acquaintance widens, their sense of obligation inevitably attenuates. As human societies have grown larger and more complex over the centuries, the boundaries of solidarity have expanded dramatically from families and villages and tribes to entire countries. But few people love humanity as a whole. For most people around the world, the country remains the largest unit of solidarity to which they feel an instinctive loyalty. Indeed, that loyalty becomes a critical underpinning of the state’s legitimacy and thus its ability to govern. In certain societies, a weak national identity can have disastrous consequences, as is evident in some struggling developing countries, such as Myanmar and Nigeria, and in some failed states, such as Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria.

 

THE CASE FOR LIBERAL NATIONALISM

 

This argument may seem similar to ones made by Hazony, the conservative Israeli scholar, in his 2018 book, The Virtue of Nationalism, in which he advocates a global order based on the sovereignty of nation-states. He makes an important point in warning against the tendency of liberal countries, such as the United States, to go too far in seeking to remake the rest of the world in their own image. But he is wrong in assuming that the existing countries are clearly demarcated cultural units and that a peaceful global order can be built by accepting them as they are. Today’s countries are social constructions that are the byproducts of historical struggles that often involved conquest, violence, forced assimilation, and the deliberate manipulation of cultural symbols. There are better and worse forms of national identity, and societies can exercise agency in choosing among them.

In particular, if national identity is based on fixed characteristics such as race, ethnicity, or religious heritage, then it becomes a potentially exclusionary category that violates the liberal principle of equal dignity. Although there is no necessary contradiction between the need for national identity and liberal universalism, there is nonetheless a powerful potential point of tension between the two principles. When based on fixed characteristics, national identity can turn into aggressive and exclusive nationalism, as it did in Europe during the first part of the twentieth century.

For this reason, liberal societies should not formally recognize groups based on fixed identities such as race, ethnicity, or religious heritage. There are times, of course, when this becomes inevitable, and liberal principles fail to apply. In many parts of the world, ethnic or religious groups have occupied the same territory for generations and have their own thick cultural and linguistic traditions. In the Balkans, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, ethnic or religious identity is de facto an essential characteristic for most people, and assimilating them into a broader national culture is highly unrealistic. It is possible to organize a form of liberal politics around several cultural units; India, for example, recognizes multiple national languages and has in the past permitted its states to set their own policies with regard to education and legal systems. Federalism and the concomitant devolution of powers to subnational units are often necessary in such diverse countries. Power can be formally allocated to different groups defined by their cultural identity in a structure that political scientists call “consociationalism.” Although this has worked reasonably well in the Netherlands, the practice has been disastrous in places such as Bosnia, Iraq, and Lebanon, where identity groups see themselves locked in a zero-sum struggle. In societies in which cultural groups have not yet hardened into self-regarding units, it is therefore much better to deal with citizens as individuals rather than as members of identity groups.

On the other hand, there are other aspects of national identity that can be adopted voluntarily and therefore shared more broadly, such as literary traditions, historical narratives, and language, food, and sports. Catalonia, Quebec, and Scotland are all regions with distinct historical and cultural traditions, and they all include nationalist partisans seeking complete separation from the country to which they are linked. There is little doubt that these regions would continue to be liberal societies respecting individual rights were they to separate, just as the Czech Republic and Slovakia did after they became separate countries in 1993.

National identity represents obvious dangers but also an opportunity. It is a social construct, and it can be shaped to support, rather than undermine, liberal values. Many countries have historically been molded out of diverse populations that feel a strong sense of community based on political principles or ideals rather than deterministic group categories. Australia, Canada, France, India, and the United States are all countries that in recent decades have sought to construct national identities based on political principles rather than race, ethnicity, or religion. The United States has gone through a long and painful process of redefining what it means to be an American, progressively removing barriers to citizenship based on class, race, and gender—although this process is still incomplete and has experienced many setbacks. In France, the construction of a national identity began with the French Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which established an ideal of citizenship based on a common language and culture. In the mid-twentieth century, Australia and Canada were countries with dominant white-majority populations and restrictive laws regarding immigration and citizenship, such as the notorious “White Australia” policy, which kept out immigrants from Asia. Both, however, reconstructed their national identities on nonracial lines after the 1960s and opened themselves up to massive immigration. Today, both countries have larger foreign-born populations than does the United States, with little of the United States’ polarization and white backlash.

Nonetheless, the difficulty of forging a common identity in sharply divided democracies should not be underestimated. Most contemporary liberal societies were built on top of historical nations whose understandings of national identity had been forged through illiberal methods. France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea were all nations before they became liberal democracies; the United States, as many have noted, was a state before it became a nation. The process of defining the American nation in liberal political terms has been long, arduous, and periodically violent, and even today that process is being challenged by people on both the left and the right with sharply competing narratives about the country’s origins.

Liberalism would be in trouble if people saw it as nothing more than a mechanism for peacefully managing diversity, without a broader sense of national purpose. People who have experienced violence, war, and dictatorship generally long to live in a liberal society, as Europeans did in the period after 1945. But as people get used to a peaceful life under a liberal regime, they tend to take that peace and order for granted and start longing for a politics that will direct them to higher ends. In 1914, Europe had been largely free of devastating conflict for nearly a century, and masses of people were happy to march off to war despite the enormous material progress that had occurred in the interim.

The world has perhaps arrived at a similar point in human history: it has been free from large-scale interstate war for three-quarters of a century and has, in the meantime, seen a massive increase in global prosperity that has produced equally massive social change. The European Union was created as an antidote to the nationalism that had led to the world wars and in that respect has been successful beyond all hopes. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine augurs more disarray and violence ahead.

At this juncture, two very different futures present themselves. If Putin is successful in undermining Ukrainian independence and democracy, the world will return to an era of aggressive and intolerant nationalism reminiscent of the early twentieth century. The United States will not be immune from this trend, as populists such as Trump aspire to replicate Putin’s authoritarian ways. On the other hand, if Putin leads Russia into a debacle of military and economic failure, the chance remains to relearn the liberal lesson that power unconstrained by law leads to national disaster and to revive the ideals of a free and democratic world

 

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA is Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and the author of the forthcoming book Liberalism and Its Discontents (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2022), from which this essay is adapted.

Livros de literatura: grandes títulos

 Narrativas longas em prosa estrangeiras favoritas (a lista ficará fixada, a título de sugestão de leituras, com acréscimos ocasionais):

Oferta do José Francisco Botelho

* A Metamorfose (Kafka)

* A História Maravilhosa de Peter Schlemihl (Chamisso)

* O Diabo Enamorado (Jacques Cazotte)

* A Guerra do Fim do Mundo (Vargas Llosa)

* Cem Anos de Solidão (García Márquez)

* O Nome da Rosa (Eco)

* Todas as Manhãs do Mundo (Pascal Quignard)

* Jonathan Strange & Mr. Norrell (Susanna Clarke)

* A Ilustre Casa de Ramires (Eça)

* Em Busca do Tempo Perdido (Proust)

* Salambô (Flaubert)

* Os Idos de Março (Thornton Wilder)

* Pais e Filhos (Turgueniev)

* Guerra e Paz (Tolstoy)

* O Visconde Partido ao Meio (Calvino)

* Fogo Pálido (Nabokov)

* As Benevolentes (Jonathan Littell)

* Meridiano de Sangue (Cormack McCarthy)

* A Costa Mais Longínqua (Ursula Le Guin)

* Os Moedeiros Falsos (Gide)

* Nostromo (Conrad)

* Moby Dick (Melville)

* O Silmarillion (Tolkien)

* Cai o Pano (Agatha Christie)

* Mais que Humano (Theodore Sturgeon)

* Bomarzo (Mujica Lainez)

* Memórias de Adriano (Marguerite Yourcenar)

* Frankenstein (Mary Shelley)

* O Senhor das Moscas (William Golding)

* Dom Quixote (Cervantes)

* O Satyricon (Petronio)

* História Verídica (Luciano de Samosata)

* Genji Monogatari (Murasaki)

* Noites das Mil e Uma Noites (Nagib Mahfouz)


P.S.

* Almas Mortas (Gogol)

* A Ilha do Tesouro (Stevenson)

*Bel Ami (Maupassant)

*O Pão Nu (Mohammed Choukry)

*A Estepe (Tchekhov)

*Um Deus Andava na Brisa da Tarde (Mário de Carvalho)

*O Estrangeiro (Camus)

*O Morro dos Ventos Uivantes

*O Egípcio (Mika Waltari)

*Wolf Hall (Hilary Mantel) 

*O Retrato de Dorian Gray (Oscar Wilde)

*Às Avessas (Huysmans)

*Tabloide Americano (James Ellroy)

*A Invenção de Morel (Bioy Casares)

*Pedro Paramo (Juan Rulfo)

*O Lugar (Mario Levrero)

*O Relato de Arthur Gordon Pym (Poe)

*O Homem do Castelo Alto (Philip k. Dick)

*Homem Invisível (Ralph Ellison)

*A Máquina do Tempo (Wells)

*Micrômegas (Voltaire)

*A Casa das Sete Torres (Hawthorne)

*Ivanhoe (Walter Scott)

*A Literatura Nazista nas Américas (Bolano)

*Os Sete Loucos (Arlt)

*Dom Segundo Sombra (Guiraldes)

*Inimigos do Estado (Brian Aldiss)

*Matadouro 5 (Kurt Vonnegut)

*The Vhorr (Brian Catling)

*The Arabian Nightmare (Robert Irwin)

*Os Demônios (Dostoievsky)

*Complexo de Portnoy (Philip Roth)

*Neve de Primavera (Mishima)

*Fundação e Império (Isaac Asimov)

*O  Caso de Charles Dexter Ward (Lovecraft)

domingo, 3 de abril de 2022

O futuro do dólar está em jogo? Não exatamente, acredita Adam Tooze

 

Chartbook #107: The future of the dollar - Fin-Fi (finance fiction) and Putin's war 

What is the future of the dollar-based financial order in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? Are we entering a new financial and economic regime? Will it be a regime of inflation? How safe are US Treasuries as a vehicle for investment? 

A lot of folks are struggling with these questions right now. It has spawned a genre of future-orientated Finance-Fiction all of its own. 

When I googled finance fiction, I discovered that since 2008, finance fictionand the finance novel has emerged as respectable genres of literature. 

What I mean to refer to in using the terms is the less literary, more speculative variety of writing - by analysts and other authors of non-fiction - about possible future scenarios for the world economy and its financial system. To distinguish this less literary genre let me call it Fin-Fi for short, as in Sci-Fi or Cli(mate)-Fiction.

At the current moment, two lines of questions dominate these narratives.

One is the question of supply chains, which poses profound questions about the relationship between the monetary and the real economy. 

The other is geopolitics and the power of the dollar. 

With regard to both I am skeptical. My bet is that the current system has huge inertia and is tied down by gigantic network economies. 

I discussed Eichengreen et al’s findings about diversification of reserve holdings away from the dollar in Chartbook 106

I don’t find it convincing to claim that a greater use of Australian dollars or South Korean won in foreign exchange reserves amounts to a watering down of dollar hegemony. All these “alternatives” to the dollar are, in fact, underpinned by dollar swap lines. 

In the last issue of Chartbook, I went back and forth with Robert Armstrong and Ethan Wu of the FT’s Unhedged over Larry Fink’s comments about the Ukraine war and the end of globalization. I ended up unconvinced that Larry Fink was himself not in earnest. There is such a compulsion to cater to the demand for Fin-Fi right now that in his annual letter Fink could hardly avoid saying something. So he ended up saying something anodyne and incoherent. 

Zoltan Pozsar’s writing on the theme, however, is in a different league. If Fin-Fi in the current moment has an H.G. Wells or a Jules Verne, it is Pozsar of Credit Suisse. 

If Eichengreen and his co-authors demand attention because of the empirical depth of their work, what entices about Pozsar is his conceptual depth and idiosyncratic style. What sets Pozsar’s musings over the last two months apart is that he starts from a fundamental analysis of how money works. 

In his latest must-read note, Pozsar starts with the framework for thinking about money offered by his intellectual mentor, the great Perry Mehrling

For Mehrling, money can be thought of as being situated in four different relationships, each calibrated by a price. 

Par price refers to the price that you pay to exchange different types of money into each other - regular bank deposits for reserve deposits at the central bank, for instance. Claims that in good times are “as good as money”, will, in a crisis be exchangeable into central bank money only at a signifiant discount to par. 

The interest rate is the price you pay to exchange money today for money at some other point in the future.

Foreign exchange is the price you pay to swap one currency into another. 

The price level is the rate at which money exchanges for actual commodities. 

Crises that play out in monetary domains (1), (2) and (3) are obviously within the reach of central banks. The central bank can ensure that assets trade with each other on stable and equal terms. It can manipulate interest rates and, to a degree, exchange rates. It can certainly ensure that markets continue to function for both credit and foreign exchange. 

As Pozsar emphasizes, his perspective is that of a bond market analyst, so what concerns him is less whether the central bank can actually fix a particular exchange rate, but whether it has the tools, in a general sense, to intervene in that market and what implications that might have for government bonds. It is up to the market to haggle over particular exchange rates, or interest rate levels. If there are divergent perspectives on the proper price that can be hedged with derivatives of various kinds. 

For someone coming from the monetary sphere, the bamboozling thing about the last few years is that central banks clearly do not have all the tools necessary to deal with shocks that originate on the supply side of the sphere of commodities and impact on the price level. 

For decades the open secret has been that for all their talk about price stability, the one thing that central banks have not had to worry about is prices. Inflation was tamed. That no longer seems the case. 

The problem first reared its ugly head during the COVID crisis and the ensuing supply chain problems. The war now adds the further dimension of national security to supply chain issues. Both factors push in an inflationary direction and they push from the “real side”, from the “supply side”, over which the central bank has precious little influence. 

The importance of Pozsar’s latest note is that he expands Merhling’s money framework to explicitly address both the “real side” of the economy and its political frame. 

What Pozsar then sets out to do is to map the seismic shocks the world economy is currently experiencing onto this list and to derive from that analysis a story about its likely future development. 

To understand the drivers of his narrative we need to dig into his analytical framework a little more deeply. 

The items on Pozsar’s seven-point list are conceptually and practically linked. 

The real counterpart to the prices that we aggregate as “the price level”, are the commodities to which those prices are attached. Those commodities have an order that is more multi-dimensional than that of prices. Perhaps we ought to call it the “matrix of commodities”. 

That matrix is geographically, nationally demarcated. So, the counterpart to foreign exchange is trade in foreign commodities. 

The counterpart to the trade-off between money now and money later that defines the rate of interest in Pozsar’s scheme, is the fact that moving commodities from one place to another takes time. So, in our supply-chain-obsessed world, shipping is the counterpart to interest. One of the pleasures of reading Pozsar is to follow him as he loses himself in detail, whether it be bond markets, the plumbing flow of shadow banking, or oil tankers. 

Finally, if the exchange of one type of money for another (the question of the par price) as conceptualized by Mehrling, is essentially a question of where one is located in the hierarchy of money types, then it makes sense to think of the “real” counterpart to par as the question of protection i.e. your relationship to power. In extremis, will your transaction be protected by a “gunboat” or, more likely, a drone, or not? 

The really interesting links in this analysis to my mind are the pairing of 

(1) par and (7) protection 

and (2) interest and (6) shipping. 

Pairing par and protection allows us to bring politics and geopolitics seamlessly into the conversation about money. That is where the conversation about lender of last resort took off back in 2008. Holding American dollars or claims on the US tax payer in the form of Treasuries entitles you to a different degree of protection. So too does holding claims on the US banking system. 

When the hierarchy of the dollar-based financial system is combined with foreign exchange (3) you end up back at the question of which countries have access to swap lines, the question that has preoccupied so many of us since 2008. Which fx claims get backed by an offer from the US Federal Reserve to swap them into dollars on demand? 

This is why it matters that all the “minor” reserve currencies - Canadian, Australian, South Korean etc - discovered by Eichengreen and his co-authors are all covered by swap lines. Those commitments on the part of the Fed make those currencies equivalent to dollars in a crisis. This is the financial counterpart to America’s Indo-Pacific security system. 

The really interesting bit from an economic point of view is the link that Pozsar teases out between (2) interest and (6) shipping and the implications that connection has for money and finance in the current moment.

Though Pozsar doesnt acknowledge it, the first person to my knowledge to spell out the connection between the complexity of modern supply-chains (real globalization) and the complexity of global financialization was the brilliant Hyun Song Shin of the BIS back in 2017 in his paper, “Globalisation: real and financial”, which showed how the extension of global value chains was tied to extended networks of finance. 

You can see a video of a presentation by Shin here.

Shin showed how extending supply chains increased the demand for credit by the square of the length of the chain.

If you go back in the history of economic thought, the depth of production chains - so called roundaboutness - is a key element in Austrian theories of interest and capital. 

Anticipating Pozsar, Shin tied his analysis of trade credit directly to the role of the dollar as the currency intermediating these increasingly “roundabout” transactions. This was also the moment when Shin dropped the immortal line that globalization demands that we: 

“to transcend “islands” view of global economy to that of the matrix of balance sheets.”

For me that has been a lode star ever since. I used Shin’s paper to frame the narrative Crashed in this blogpost from back in 2018

(NB: Before Chartbook there was the blog on adamtooze.com

Note to self: I should spend some time bringing at least some of those earlier blogs into the substack-newsletter era)

In any case, back to 2022. 

As Pozsar argues, what we are seeing right now are overlapping disruptions in this twinned system of real and financial flows. 

As Pozsar puts it in his most recent Credit Suisse note

Today, supply chains are jammed up and the price of commodities traded in the chains is fluctuating wildly and the underlying order of power that underpins the world economy is in question. When that happens, traders need more credit to make markets and allow goods to flow, a see Chartbook #100. And it begins to matter which currency transactions are conducted in.

Since the outbreak of the war Pozsar has been talking in very dramatic terms about the possible emergence of an alternative, commodity-based currency system. See this early-in-the-crisis Oddlots episode. The most recent Credit Suisse paper gives his Fin-Fin visions a conceptual basis. 

As Pozsar sees it, we are on the cusp of a transition in global currency system. 

Under the global economic system we have known since the late 1990s - dubbed Bretton Woods II by a team of economist at Deutsche Bank because China, the main source of growth in trade and real economic growth, unilaterally pegged its currency against the dollar and maintained controls on capital flow, as was the case for Europe and Japan after 1945 - Pozsar argues that “banks create eurodollars and OPEC and China buy U.S. Treasuries with eurodollars.”

This is the triangle that made the dollar the key to the global financial system and the Fed into the indispensable lender and dealer of last resort. 

But, what if the sanctions imposed on Russia break that system? What if, instead, Saudi Arabia and Russia start taking payment in Chinese renminbi and we see the emergence of an offshore renminbi market (call it eurorenminbi)? Then, rather than export surplus countries (Saudi, Russia) accumulating dollars, they will accumulate eurorenminbi balances which they will invest in Chinese Treasuries, as China once invested in US Treasuries, or they might choose 

“outside money like gold instead of G7 inside money, and commodity reserves instead of FX reserves. 

This shift from FX to commodity reserves is the kind of shift from the financial to real economy that hangs over the current moment. It leads Pozsar into an increasingly speculative train of thought: 

Commodity reserves will be an essential part of Bretton Woods III, and historically wars are won by those who have more food and energy supplies – food to fuel horses and soldiers back in the day, and food to fuel soldiers and fuel to fuel tanks and planes today. According to estimates by the U.S. DoA (the Department of Agriculture), China holds half of the world’s wheat reserves and 70% of its corn. In contrast, the U.S. controls only 6% and 12% of the global wheat and corn reserves. This has implications for the price level of food and the conversation about Very Large Crude Carriers and the oil trade for the price level of energy.

Those in the know are somewhat skeptical about the likelihood of a truly gigantic disruption to global grain markets. The financial pressures we have seen in the commodity markets have so far not manifested themselves in systemic stress. But, that does not stop Pozsar, who at this point loses himself in what might best be described as a Fin-Fi reverie. I reproduce the structure of the text on the page to capture the incantatory style that Pozsar adopts. 

Bretton Woods II served up a deflationary impulse (globalization, open trade, just-in-time supply chains, and only one supply chain [Foxconn], not many), and Bretton Woods III will serve up an inflationary impulse (de-globalization, autarky, just-in-case hoarding of commodities and duplication of supply chains, and more military spending to be able to protect whatever seaborne trade is left). 

Empires fall and rise. Currencies fall and rise. 

Wars have winners and losers. 

When Wellington beat Napoleon, the trade was to buy gilts. I am no expert on geopolitics, but I am an interest rate strategist and I think the level of inflation and interest rates and the size of the Fed’s balance sheet will depend on the steady state that emerges after this conflict is over. 

Three is a magic number: 

The four prices of money are managed via Basel III and central banks as Dealer of Last Resort. 

The four pillars of commodity trading are shaped by war, hopefully not WWIII. 

The new world order will bring a new monetary system – Bretton Woods III. 

Paul Volcker had it easy... …he “only” had to break the back of inflation but had a unipolar world order and the rise of Eurodollars to support him. 

… the markets fussed about was (sic) the impossible trinity (you know, the stuff about monetary policy independence, FX rates, and open capital accounts), but that was about “our currency, your problem”. Jay Powell finding his inner Volcker won’t be enough to break inflation today. He’ll need a strong helping hand…

…a strongman to take on the (inflationary) mess caused by other strongmen?

With texts like this latest remarkable note, Pozsar establishes himself as the most brilliant and intellectually fertile exponent of Fin-Fi today. But, as I argued in previous posts this has to be taken with a pinch of salt. And one has to ask, what present interest these fictions serve. 

In Pozsar’s case I was very struck by this passage:

Wheat and oil are connected. Egypt used to be a big importer of Ukranian wheat. If much more oil is about to pass through the Suez Canal, Egypt might consider to introduce its own G-SIB surcharge: raising the fee required to pass through the Suez Canal in order to raise more money for the state’s coffers, such that the Egyptian state can buy more wheat in the wheat market to feed its people. 

Hungary lost to Russia in 1956 because the U.S. protected the Suez Canal…

The connection between the Soviet suppression of Hungary’s breakaway national government and the US reaction to the invasion of Egypt by Israel, the British and French in October-November 1956 was not something I had thought of in this context before. It is explored in this interesting article by historian Peter Boyle. This may link to Pozsar’s aside, but to be honest I am not sure, especially the US connection. But clearly he has wide-ranging geopolitical entanglements and resistance to Russian hegemony on his mind. 

In any case, the challenge is to stand back from these dramatic vistas for the global economy and global finance and ask ourselves how powerful we think these trends actually are. What is the perspective of realism here? 

The conceptual framework is clear. The sanctions imposed within the expanded euro-dollar system (dollar - eurodollar - euro) system clearly do create an incentive to form alternative systems of exchange - based around the ruble and the renminbi, with India and Saudi Arabia as possible partners. But do we really expect these new networks to be anything more than byways? Do we really expect a parallelism to emerge of the type that Pozsar suggests with this diagram? 

It, frankly, seems vastly improbable. Policy Tensor (Anusar Farooqui aka @policytensor) and Tim Sahay (aka @70sBachchan) launched a fantastic substack post last week, which gives us a geopolitical grid for Pozsar’s vision. 

As they point out the power politics of this moment are complex and Modi’s India is emerging as a pivotal player. 

But though I understand the geopolitics, I just don’t see how we get from the map of geopolitical power to the kind of scale of financial transformation that Pozsar’s vision implies. 

The numbers documenting the total global dominance of the dollar-euro system are familiar. But I found this restatement of the case by Zach Meyers of CER particularly compelling. This graph of the use of dollars and euro in trade between Russia and China since 2014 is particularly striking. Almost all of the trade between the two putative rivals to Western power, currently goes through Western currencies.

Admittedly data does show a dramatic shift in the currency used in India-Russia trade under the impact of sanctions.

But if Russia-China is to form anything like and an equivalent to the global dollar system it has a very long way to go.

My summary for now:

(1) Trade and finance are intimately associated and a disruption in one may be mirrored in a shock to the other. We are living through that reality right now. Whether those shocks are truly systemic in scale remains to be seen. They are not large in relation to the overall financial system. But neither were subprime mortgage backed securities. The difference is that so far we have not seen the kind of ramifying and amplifying effects that turned the mortgage securitization debacle into a North Atlantic financial crisis in 2007-8. 

(2) The world is multipolar and so is global trade. Western policy must adjust to that.

(3) There is a huge asymmetry in the world right now between the financial system that remains spectacularly euro-dollar centered and the new multipolarity of power, trade and economic activity.

(4) Given this asymmetry there is a fascination in the cultural and political sphere with the way this glaring asymmetry could be overcome. Not only that, there is a positive desire to see the asymmetry overcome. There is a relish in the discomfiture of the West. The euro-dollar lock feels like the final frontier of Western power, long overdue for overthrow. 

(5) Fin-fi is one of the media in which that sense of impending historical change expresses itself. 

(6) Given the situation from which it emerges we should read the proliferating genre of Fin-fin symptomatically. It expresses a world historic tension. In some cases it delineates trajectories and seeks to map strategies for policy and investors. In other cases these texts are better read are acts of diplomacy (Larry Fink) motivated by complex constellations of interests. 

(7) We should guard against taking Fin-fi literally as a guide to the future rather than as a fascinating expression of the tensions inherent in our current moment. 

(8) Identifying and grasping a tension conceptually, is illuminating and engaging for the reasons stated. But the satisfaction thus derived should not be confused with gauging realistically the likelihood of that tension actually being resolved, certainly not in a “logical” direction.