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sábado, 7 de setembro de 2024

The Pre-Modern Order, by Patricia Crone , review by Arnold Kling

Repostagem

segunda-feira, 5 de fevereiro de 2024

The Pre-Modern Order, by Patricia Crone; Book review by Arnold Kling

https://www.econlib.org/library/columns/y2024/klingpremodernorder.html?mc_cid=594de2b25a&mc_eid=30e5660eff 

The Pre-Modern Order

  • Pre-industrial society was characterized by low degrees of economic, political and cultural integration. By contrast, a high degree of integration in all three respects is the hallmark of modernity…
  • Economically, modernity breeds integration by its systematic division of labour. All members of modern society specialize in a single economic activity, offering their labour, skill or capital on the market and receiving monetary payment in return. All are thus dependent on the market…
  • Culturally, modernity breeds integration by prising loose the masses from their local communities, getting them together in the same factories and the same cities, subjecting them to the same schooling in the same language from early childhood to late adolescence, bombarding them via the same mass media, and putting an end to the isolation of the communities from which they came.
  • In social and political terms modernity breeds integration by attaching all individuals directly to a bureaucratic state which processes them mechanically without regard for their social, ethnic or religious background.
  • —Patricia Crone, Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World (pp. 206-209).1
Patricia Crone was an historian who specialized in early Islamic society. In Pre-Industrial Societies, which first appeared in 2003, she attempted to spell out the difference between the social order that obtained prior to the industrial revolution and that which we experience today.

The book is very broad in terms of its geographic and temporal scope. She draws examples from all of the major continents and over one thousand years of history. But she says that her standard description of pre-modern social orders is “largely based on the Old World civilizations from about 600 BC onwards, and it probably has a medieval bias.” (p. 170)

Crone’s thesis is that the preconditions for modernity included mechanized agriculture, energy-powered transportation, and long-distance communication. Without these, subsistence farming prevails rather than markets, long-distance trade is only in luxury goods, a common culture exists only among elites, and rulers have little contact with or control over the periphery of their domains.

  • The fact that agriculture and manufacture alike produced little meant that all pre-industrial societies were dominated by scarcity… the inadequate nature of the means of transportation and communication meant that most people lived in very local worlds. (p. 21)

Social stratification was relatively simple.

  • In some societies practically everyone was a peasant apart from the ruling elite, typically less than 2 per cent of the population. More commonly, some 10 per cent of the population were able to leave the production of food.
  • … the contrast with industrialized societies is glaring. Only 2.9 per cent of the population is engaged in agriculture in France, and only 2 per cent in Japan; in early twenty-first-century USA the figure is down to 1.5, and the same is true of Germany. (p. 23)

Crone points out that pre-modern peasants produce primarily for themselves, for subsistence. Modern farmers produce primarily for the market, seeking profit.

Within a village, very little trade took place, mostly in salt and iron.

  • … the pre-industrial world was characterized by a low degree of economic integration. Where subsistence economy prevailed, every household was more or less self-sufficient and every village largely or wholly independent of the next. (p. 42)

Only luxury goods that were worth carrying for long distances, or that could walk themselves, were traded, and these were consumed only by powerful elites.

The low level of labor productivity precluded a labor market based on wages and voluntary agreement. Instead, slavery, serfdom, and government conscription (not just for armies) were used to obtain workers.

Rather than differentiate workers by skill,

  • All agrarian civilizations made heavy use of ascribed status, that is to say status attributed to a person on the basis of features over which he has no control, such as sex, colour or ancestry… descent rather than market forces determined who should do what (p.38)

In the pre-modern era, states were fragile, for a number of reasons. Agricultural societies were vulnerable to raiders, especially those on horseback.

  • It was not until firearms were invented that civilization acquired a decisive advantage over its barbarian rivals (p. 47)

The weakness of states,

  • … had its roots partly in scarcity and partly in the absence of modern means of transportation and communication. Scarcity meant that rulers rarely disposed of sufficient resources, or even very stable ones. They were chronically short of personnel and other infrastructure, and frequently unable to pay such personnel as they had.
  • … Being short of personnel, rulers were unable to conduct regular population counts, land-surveys and other forms of inspection required for the regular reassessment of taxes (p. 49)

To use James Scott’s terminology, “seeing like a state” was difficult to afford. This was exacerbated by the primitive means of communication that were available.

  • The vast majority of people continued to live in more or less self-sufficient villages with more or less autonomous cultures of their own, a fact which rendered the political unity of pre-industrial states precarious. (p. 51)

Pre-modern states had to rest on a narrow base of elite rulers.

  • … the larger a group becomes, the more thoroughly the actions of its members have to be co-ordinated if it is not to disintegrate; and under pre-industrial conditions, large-scale co-ordination was impossible unless power was concentrated in the hands of a few. (p. 53)

The ruler’s control was tenuous.

  • The government might issue decrees, but the implementation of these decrees rested with landed magnates, religious authorities, village councils, urban notables, guilds, tribal leaders, or kin groups of various kinds, or in other words with self-governing institutions and groups which might be in close or in loose alliance with the state or which might defy it altogether. (p. 57)

Because there was very little state capacity, many functions that we now associate with the state were performed by autonomous groups. Law and order were poorly maintained.

  • Every town had its pickpockets, thieves, burglars, swindlers, murderers, assassins and protection racketeers, just as every road had its highwaymen and every sea its pirates. Private war and local feuds, riots and rebellion, marauding soldiers and brigandage, all these and other forms of disorder were commonplace in most societies most of the time. (p. 66)

Moreover,

  • Few pre-industrial states had fixed borders, as opposed to vague frontier areas under the sway of local magnates, tribal groups, bandits or other unruly elements. (p. 77)

One can compare this to the model of North, Weingast, and Wallis. Their state is a “limited-access order,” in which the rights to form political and economic organizations are closely held by the members of a ruling coalition. This “natural state” is not in principle one of low state capacity, which sets it apart from Crone’s pre-modern state. Where NWW describe limited-access orders as stable, for Crone,

  • … states were brittle structures which easily collapsed under internal stress or external pressure. The low degree of integration on the one hand and the minimal services performed by the state on the other meant that there was little to hold them together. (p. 70)

David Goodhart’s distinction between Somewheres (closely tied to local areas) and Anywheres (cosmopolitan elites) seems to hark back to the pre-modern era, as Crone describes it.

  • The ruling elite had to be everything that the masses were not: where the masses were divided into a myriad of diverse communities, the elite had to be homogeneous and cohesive; and where the masses had a diversity of political interests which mostly had to be suppressed, the various branches of the elite had to have a common interest in serving, representing and perpetuating the state. The masses could not be integrated; the means simply did not exist to turn them into members of the same social, political, economic or cultural world. (p. 79-80)

The high cost of transportation meant that frequent travel was a luxury.

  • Each village could thus remain a world unto itself while the elite developed a common culture over and above them. (p. 108)

There was no national culture. The masses were sub-national. The elites were super-national.

Crone says that a pre-modern ruler had to forge and maintain an alliance that included church leaders, educational institutions, and the wealthy. In particular,

  • Mercantile wealth was accumulated outside the ranks of the ruling elite, from sources other than land, by means other than political service or mastery of the high culture (p. 85)

Thus, merchants were generally regarded as a threat. I would note that according to Deirdre McCloskey, overcoming the hostility toward merchants was a necessary step in creating the modern economy.

Religion could be a unifying force, because it was one of the few common cultural elements within a polity. But Crone also points out that by the same token many revolts took on a religious character.

Education was limited to the elite. But rulers needed to pay attention to educational institutions, because the elite were often the source of revolts.

There was no sense of exploration regarding knowledge.

  • The belief that the truth was incarnate in the past also encouraged the view that knowledge was finite: everything had been said; everything could be mastered given sufficient time. (p. 103)

Crone says that people conceived of society in hierarchical and holistic terms. For the whole to function, each individual had to remain in his or her proper place.

  • Society was holistic rather than individualistic (as sociologists put it): the individual existed for the benefit of the overall group, not the other way round. (p. 128)

Pre-modern societies had very different marriage patterns than what we are used to.

  • If girls were not married off as children, they were usually provided with husbands as soon as they reached physical maturity. (p. 132)

Pre-modern societies also had a more central role for religion. Crone suggests as a possible explanation for this:

  • Religions have been more popular in history than their atheist or non-theist counterparts, presumably because supernatural beings endowed with human feelings are easier to understand, love and obey than abstract concepts such as cosmic order, karma or proletarian struggle, which operate like machines without regard for their effect on human beings and which are hard to visualize. (p. 146)

Crone also points out that religion was important because of its influence on behavior. She writes,

  • … hominids are forced to supplement their deficient genetic programming with culture; differently put, their genetic programming has stopped giving them specific instructions and started to give them general instructions to be inventive instead. What we invent, or in other words culture, is not an unexpected bonus of high intelligence, but on the contrary what our intelligence is for…
  • Religion is part of culture; indeed, in primitive societies it is more or less synonymous with culture. Humans could be said to have religions precisely because they are dependent on culture for their survival. (p. 147)

Years after Crone wrote, Joseph Henrich, Michael Muthukrishna and others called this way of thinking about genes and culture “dual inheritance theory.” Crone further writes,

  • … many cultural rules actually go against genetic instructions: there is no human society without extensive practice of self-control. (p. 151)

Religion helps to promote this self-control. Furthermore, it helps to glue a society together.

  • … societies depend for their viability on the existence of value systems which command sufficient consent for a sufficient number of people to live together in accordance with their rules even when coercive attention is withdrawn. (p. 161)
“Why did Western Europe enter modernity before India, China, or the Islamic world? Crone says that this transition took place because unlike in those other regions, pre-modern institutions in Western Europe failed.”

Why did Western Europe enter modernity before India, China, or the Islamic world? Crone says that this transition took place because unlike in those other regions, pre-modern institutions in Western Europe failed. The stability that was preserved elsewhere was not maintained in Western Europe.

Western Europe’s pre-modern institution, feudalism, differed in some respects from the arrangements in other regions.

  • … protection, access to land, social status and political power had all become negotiable assets acquired through agreement with whoever could dispense them rather than by birth into a particular family, lineage or tribe. (p. 178)

Also,

  • … north-west Europe was or eventually became unique by its practice of delayed marriage for men and women: both sexes would postpone marriage until their twenties or even thirties…
  • … it enabled Europe to escape the so-called Malthusian cycle.
  • … Where marriage was delayed, men and women of peasant origin would typically accumulate their funds by working as servants (or so at least from the later Middle Ages onwards). Pre-industrial Europe is unique in that service came to be part of the life-cycle, and the prominence of hired servants in the household is the domestic counterpart to the prominence of feudal retainers in the political sphere: in both cases, recruitment was by contract rather than by kinship. (p. 178-179)

The relative independence of Western European peasants gave them more leverage. And their feudal lords had more leverage vis-a-vis their rulers.

  • Feudalism amounted to an extreme dispersal of power along vertical lines. No agency had a monopoly on any governmental activity, let alone on the right to use force; taxes had entirely disappeared, the agricultural surplus being siphoned off purely in the form of rent to landlords
  • … society was in an extremely strong position vis-à-vis the state even though it was no longer tribal. It shared with tribal societies the features of being ‘corporate’, that is composed of groups through which the individual acquired well-defined rights and duties; of being passionately defensive of liberty or ‘liberties’, both individual and collective; of being strongly imbued with a sense of reciprocity; and of possessing a leadership of its own as opposed to one imposed by the state. But it owed all of these features to contracts and charters as opposed to kinship on the one hand and to participation in the state as opposed to rejection of it on the other. (p. 182)

This was not a viable order.

  • … the feudal solution was too primitive to endure… But kings had to recover their power from very local and very humble levels; they had to work for their money because they could not tax; and they had to bargain because their subjects were endowed with well-entrenched rights… [It was] the weakness of feudal kings which led to the development in Europe of representative institutions. (p. 183-184)

European rulers could not as easily tax land and agricultural products. So they had to tolerate the merchant class as another source of tax revenue. They could not arbitrarily exile merchants or confiscate their goods.

  • European rulers were too dependent on subjects too well endowed with contractual rights to indulge in arbitrary fleecing, (p. 186)

Crone notes that Europeans had a penchant for technology. She speculates that,

  • It was the failure of the European elite thoroughly to distance itself from the masses which made technology respectable… a state without money generated an aristocracy without manners and bearers of high culture without a proper disdain for flywheels and cranks, let alone for the uneducated men who put such things together. (p.197)

We think of the industrial revolution primarily in terms of its economic effects. But Patricia Crone’s book reminds us that the pre-modern world had a totally different cultural basis, including strict hierarchies and strong religious influence. It was an order based on social stability rather than prosperity. It was the collapse of this pre-modern order in Western Europe that ushered in modernity.


Footnotes

[1] Patricia Crone, Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World. Oneworld Publications, 2015.


*Arnold Kling has a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of several books, including Crisis of Abundance: Rethinking How We Pay for Health CareInvisible Wealth: The Hidden Story of How Markets WorkUnchecked and Unbalanced: How the Discrepancy Between Knowledge and Power Caused the Financial Crisis and Threatens Democracy; and Specialization and Trade: A Re-introduction to Economics. He contributed to EconLog from January 2003 through August 2012.

Read more of what Arnold Kling’s been reading. For more book reviews and articles by Arnold Kling, see the Archive.


As an Amazon Associate, Econlib earns from qualifying purchases.

Crone; Book review by Arnold Kling

https://www.econlib.org/library/columns/y2024/klingpremodernorder.html?mc_cid=594de2b25a&mc_eid=30e5660eff 

The Pre-Modern Order

  • Pre-industrial society was characterized by low degrees of economic, political and cultural integration. By contrast, a high degree of integration in all three respects is the hallmark of modernity…
  • Economically, modernity breeds integration by its systematic division of labour. All members of modern society specialize in a single economic activity, offering their labour, skill or capital on the market and receiving monetary payment in return. All are thus dependent on the market…
  • Culturally, modernity breeds integration by prising loose the masses from their local communities, getting them together in the same factories and the same cities, subjecting them to the same schooling in the same language from early childhood to late adolescence, bombarding them via the same mass media, and putting an end to the isolation of the communities from which they came.
  • In social and political terms modernity breeds integration by attaching all individuals directly to a bureaucratic state which processes them mechanically without regard for their social, ethnic or religious background.
  • —Patricia Crone, Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World (pp. 206-209).1
Patricia Crone was an historian who specialized in early Islamic society. In Pre-Industrial Societies, which first appeared in 2003, she attempted to spell out the difference between the social order that obtained prior to the industrial revolution and that which we experience today.

The book is very broad in terms of its geographic and temporal scope. She draws examples from all of the major continents and over one thousand years of history. But she says that her standard description of pre-modern social orders is “largely based on the Old World civilizations from about 600 BC onwards, and it probably has a medieval bias.” (p. 170)

Crone’s thesis is that the preconditions for modernity included mechanized agriculture, energy-powered transportation, and long-distance communication. Without these, subsistence farming prevails rather than markets, long-distance trade is only in luxury goods, a common culture exists only among elites, and rulers have little contact with or control over the periphery of their domains.

  • The fact that agriculture and manufacture alike produced little meant that all pre-industrial societies were dominated by scarcity… the inadequate nature of the means of transportation and communication meant that most people lived in very local worlds. (p. 21)

Social stratification was relatively simple.

  • In some societies practically everyone was a peasant apart from the ruling elite, typically less than 2 per cent of the population. More commonly, some 10 per cent of the population were able to leave the production of food.
  • … the contrast with industrialized societies is glaring. Only 2.9 per cent of the population is engaged in agriculture in France, and only 2 per cent in Japan; in early twenty-first-century USA the figure is down to 1.5, and the same is true of Germany. (p. 23)

Crone points out that pre-modern peasants produce primarily for themselves, for subsistence. Modern farmers produce primarily for the market, seeking profit.

Within a village, very little trade took place, mostly in salt and iron.

  • … the pre-industrial world was characterized by a low degree of economic integration. Where subsistence economy prevailed, every household was more or less self-sufficient and every village largely or wholly independent of the next. (p. 42)

Only luxury goods that were worth carrying for long distances, or that could walk themselves, were traded, and these were consumed only by powerful elites.

The low level of labor productivity precluded a labor market based on wages and voluntary agreement. Instead, slavery, serfdom, and government conscription (not just for armies) were used to obtain workers.

Rather than differentiate workers by skill,

  • All agrarian civilizations made heavy use of ascribed status, that is to say status attributed to a person on the basis of features over which he has no control, such as sex, colour or ancestry… descent rather than market forces determined who should do what (p.38)

In the pre-modern era, states were fragile, for a number of reasons. Agricultural societies were vulnerable to raiders, especially those on horseback.

  • It was not until firearms were invented that civilization acquired a decisive advantage over its barbarian rivals (p. 47)

The weakness of states,

  • … had its roots partly in scarcity and partly in the absence of modern means of transportation and communication. Scarcity meant that rulers rarely disposed of sufficient resources, or even very stable ones. They were chronically short of personnel and other infrastructure, and frequently unable to pay such personnel as they had.
  • … Being short of personnel, rulers were unable to conduct regular population counts, land-surveys and other forms of inspection required for the regular reassessment of taxes (p. 49)

To use James Scott’s terminology, “seeing like a state” was difficult to afford. This was exacerbated by the primitive means of communication that were available.

  • The vast majority of people continued to live in more or less self-sufficient villages with more or less autonomous cultures of their own, a fact which rendered the political unity of pre-industrial states precarious. (p. 51)

Pre-modern states had to rest on a narrow base of elite rulers.

  • … the larger a group becomes, the more thoroughly the actions of its members have to be co-ordinated if it is not to disintegrate; and under pre-industrial conditions, large-scale co-ordination was impossible unless power was concentrated in the hands of a few. (p. 53)

The ruler’s control was tenuous.

  • The government might issue decrees, but the implementation of these decrees rested with landed magnates, religious authorities, village councils, urban notables, guilds, tribal leaders, or kin groups of various kinds, or in other words with self-governing institutions and groups which might be in close or in loose alliance with the state or which might defy it altogether. (p. 57)

Because there was very little state capacity, many functions that we now associate with the state were performed by autonomous groups. Law and order were poorly maintained.

  • Every town had its pickpockets, thieves, burglars, swindlers, murderers, assassins and protection racketeers, just as every road had its highwaymen and every sea its pirates. Private war and local feuds, riots and rebellion, marauding soldiers and brigandage, all these and other forms of disorder were commonplace in most societies most of the time. (p. 66)

Moreover,

  • Few pre-industrial states had fixed borders, as opposed to vague frontier areas under the sway of local magnates, tribal groups, bandits or other unruly elements. (p. 77)

One can compare this to the model of North, Weingast, and Wallis. Their state is a “limited-access order,” in which the rights to form political and economic organizations are closely held by the members of a ruling coalition. This “natural state” is not in principle one of low state capacity, which sets it apart from Crone’s pre-modern state. Where NWW describe limited-access orders as stable, for Crone,

  • … states were brittle structures which easily collapsed under internal stress or external pressure. The low degree of integration on the one hand and the minimal services performed by the state on the other meant that there was little to hold them together. (p. 70)

David Goodhart’s distinction between Somewheres (closely tied to local areas) and Anywheres (cosmopolitan elites) seems to hark back to the pre-modern era, as Crone describes it.

  • The ruling elite had to be everything that the masses were not: where the masses were divided into a myriad of diverse communities, the elite had to be homogeneous and cohesive; and where the masses had a diversity of political interests which mostly had to be suppressed, the various branches of the elite had to have a common interest in serving, representing and perpetuating the state. The masses could not be integrated; the means simply did not exist to turn them into members of the same social, political, economic or cultural world. (p. 79-80)

The high cost of transportation meant that frequent travel was a luxury.

  • Each village could thus remain a world unto itself while the elite developed a common culture over and above them. (p. 108)

There was no national culture. The masses were sub-national. The elites were super-national.

Crone says that a pre-modern ruler had to forge and maintain an alliance that included church leaders, educational institutions, and the wealthy. In particular,

  • Mercantile wealth was accumulated outside the ranks of the ruling elite, from sources other than land, by means other than political service or mastery of the high culture (p. 85)

Thus, merchants were generally regarded as a threat. I would note that according to Deirdre McCloskey, overcoming the hostility toward merchants was a necessary step in creating the modern economy.

Religion could be a unifying force, because it was one of the few common cultural elements within a polity. But Crone also points out that by the same token many revolts took on a religious character.

Education was limited to the elite. But rulers needed to pay attention to educational institutions, because the elite were often the source of revolts.

There was no sense of exploration regarding knowledge.

  • The belief that the truth was incarnate in the past also encouraged the view that knowledge was finite: everything had been said; everything could be mastered given sufficient time. (p. 103)

Crone says that people conceived of society in hierarchical and holistic terms. For the whole to function, each individual had to remain in his or her proper place.

  • Society was holistic rather than individualistic (as sociologists put it): the individual existed for the benefit of the overall group, not the other way round. (p. 128)

Pre-modern societies had very different marriage patterns than what we are used to.

  • If girls were not married off as children, they were usually provided with husbands as soon as they reached physical maturity. (p. 132)

Pre-modern societies also had a more central role for religion. Crone suggests as a possible explanation for this:

  • Religions have been more popular in history than their atheist or non-theist counterparts, presumably because supernatural beings endowed with human feelings are easier to understand, love and obey than abstract concepts such as cosmic order, karma or proletarian struggle, which operate like machines without regard for their effect on human beings and which are hard to visualize. (p. 146)

Crone also points out that religion was important because of its influence on behavior. She writes,

  • … hominids are forced to supplement their deficient genetic programming with culture; differently put, their genetic programming has stopped giving them specific instructions and started to give them general instructions to be inventive instead. What we invent, or in other words culture, is not an unexpected bonus of high intelligence, but on the contrary what our intelligence is for…
  • Religion is part of culture; indeed, in primitive societies it is more or less synonymous with culture. Humans could be said to have religions precisely because they are dependent on culture for their survival. (p. 147)

Years after Crone wrote, Joseph Henrich, Michael Muthukrishna and others called this way of thinking about genes and culture “dual inheritance theory.” Crone further writes,

  • … many cultural rules actually go against genetic instructions: there is no human society without extensive practice of self-control. (p. 151)

Religion helps to promote this self-control. Furthermore, it helps to glue a society together.

  • … societies depend for their viability on the existence of value systems which command sufficient consent for a sufficient number of people to live together in accordance with their rules even when coercive attention is withdrawn. (p. 161)
“Why did Western Europe enter modernity before India, China, or the Islamic world? Crone says that this transition took place because unlike in those other regions, pre-modern institutions in Western Europe failed.”

Why did Western Europe enter modernity before India, China, or the Islamic world? Crone says that this transition took place because unlike in those other regions, pre-modern institutions in Western Europe failed. The stability that was preserved elsewhere was not maintained in Western Europe.

Western Europe’s pre-modern institution, feudalism, differed in some respects from the arrangements in other regions.

  • … protection, access to land, social status and political power had all become negotiable assets acquired through agreement with whoever could dispense them rather than by birth into a particular family, lineage or tribe. (p. 178)

Also,

  • … north-west Europe was or eventually became unique by its practice of delayed marriage for men and women: both sexes would postpone marriage until their twenties or even thirties…
  • … it enabled Europe to escape the so-called Malthusian cycle.
  • … Where marriage was delayed, men and women of peasant origin would typically accumulate their funds by working as servants (or so at least from the later Middle Ages onwards). Pre-industrial Europe is unique in that service came to be part of the life-cycle, and the prominence of hired servants in the household is the domestic counterpart to the prominence of feudal retainers in the political sphere: in both cases, recruitment was by contract rather than by kinship. (p. 178-179)

The relative independence of Western European peasants gave them more leverage. And their feudal lords had more leverage vis-a-vis their rulers.

  • Feudalism amounted to an extreme dispersal of power along vertical lines. No agency had a monopoly on any governmental activity, let alone on the right to use force; taxes had entirely disappeared, the agricultural surplus being siphoned off purely in the form of rent to landlords
  • … society was in an extremely strong position vis-à-vis the state even though it was no longer tribal. It shared with tribal societies the features of being ‘corporate’, that is composed of groups through which the individual acquired well-defined rights and duties; of being passionately defensive of liberty or ‘liberties’, both individual and collective; of being strongly imbued with a sense of reciprocity; and of possessing a leadership of its own as opposed to one imposed by the state. But it owed all of these features to contracts and charters as opposed to kinship on the one hand and to participation in the state as opposed to rejection of it on the other. (p. 182)

This was not a viable order.

  • … the feudal solution was too primitive to endure… But kings had to recover their power from very local and very humble levels; they had to work for their money because they could not tax; and they had to bargain because their subjects were endowed with well-entrenched rights… [It was] the weakness of feudal kings which led to the development in Europe of representative institutions. (p. 183-184)

European rulers could not as easily tax land and agricultural products. So they had to tolerate the merchant class as another source of tax revenue. They could not arbitrarily exile merchants or confiscate their goods.

  • European rulers were too dependent on subjects too well endowed with contractual rights to indulge in arbitrary fleecing, (p. 186)

Crone notes that Europeans had a penchant for technology. She speculates that,

  • It was the failure of the European elite thoroughly to distance itself from the masses which made technology respectable… a state without money generated an aristocracy without manners and bearers of high culture without a proper disdain for flywheels and cranks, let alone for the uneducated men who put such things together. (p.197)

We think of the industrial revolution primarily in terms of its economic effects. But Patricia Crone’s book reminds us that the pre-modern world had a totally different cultural basis, including strict hierarchies and strong religious influence. It was an order based on social stability rather than prosperity. It was the collapse of this pre-modern order in Western Europe that ushered in modernity.


Footnotes

[1] Patricia Crone, Pre-Industrial Societies: Anatomy of the Pre-Modern World. Oneworld Publications, 2015.


*Arnold Kling has a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of several books, including Crisis of Abundance: Rethinking How We Pay for Health CareInvisible Wealth: The Hidden Story of How Markets WorkUnchecked and Unbalanced: How the Discrepancy Between Knowledge and Power Caused the Financial Crisis and Threatens Democracy; and Specialization and Trade: A Re-introduction to Economics. He contributed to EconLog from January 2003 through August 2012.

Read more of what Arnold Kling’s been reading. For more book reviews and articles by Arnold Kling, see the Archive.


As an Amazon Associate, Econlib earns from qualifying purchases.

The Pre-Modern Order, by Patricia Crone; Book review by Arnold Kling - Comentário anônimo

Um longo comentário de um leitor anônimo de meu blog Diplomatizzando, a uma postagem que fiz de resenha de im livro de Patrícia Crone sobre o mundo pré-moderno, que estou repostando na sequência.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, 7/09/2024

Esse é um livro nota 10, um dos meus favoritos e dos que eu mais gosto de recomendar. 
A autora ter um viés medieval não é acidente e o papel central da antiguidade clássica e especialmente da república romana seguida pelo começo do imperio (o "principado") no ensino de história é parte do motivo desse livro ser elucidador pra muita gente. Essas sociedades eram muito atípicas: a guerra naval conduzida por remadores vindos das camadas mais pobres que se possivel iriam preferir lutar como infantaria (mas pra isso teria que poder bancar seu equipamento) é provavelmente a razão detras do surgimento desses varios microestados mais ou menos democraticos. Atenas e Rodes ambas polis gregas democraticas no seu periodo de auge naval mas Roma e Cartago não eram tão diferentes em sua organização política exceto por controlarem impérios muito maiores do que a velha liga de Delos. A primeira guerra Punica entre elas com 7 batalhas navais envolvendo centenas de navios e dezenas, por vezes centenas de milhares de homens permanece insuperada como maior guerra naval em termos de marinheiros envolvidos, e a próxima batalha naval em escala semelhante ocorreria de novo somente em Lepanto 1500 anos depois, logo antes da transição plena para canhoes o que desfavoreceu as velhas galés impulsionadas ppr remadores. Exércitos gregos frequentemente elegiam e destituiam seus lideres se assim quisessem mesmo numa expedição heterogênea como na famosa marcha dos 10 mil relatada por Xenofonte. Outra pratica pitoresca era a de exércitos cartagineses em campanha julgarem e crucificarem generais julgados como incompetentes. Bem mais tarde a Crise do Seculo Tres em boa parte foi causada pelos varios exercitos regionais "votando" em imperador apesar da comitia centuriata ter sido extinta por mais de 200 anos antes. Roma
durante a república realizava censos completos a cada 5 anos cobrindo boa parte, eventualmente toda a Itália, censos provinciais mais tarde embora raramente preservados tambem ocorreram, a exemplo do citado no Novo Testamento. A elevada idade no primeiro casamento tem origem nesse periodo, devido a prática de conscrição geral cidadãos romanos adiavam o casamento para depois de finalizarem seu serviço militar. Apesar do fim da conscrição na transição para o principado, a pratica persiste desde então e é exportada para regioes onde nunca tinha ocorrido. Nesse período também que a pirataria é eliminada nos litorais sob seu controle e durante a famosa paz romana quando o volume de comércio atinge niveis somente ultrapassados muito mais tarde, com a integração econômica entre as regiões do litoral mediterrâneo com vários exemplos arqueológicos de regiões inteiras se especializando em cultivos segundo vantagens competitivas de solo e clima: mais notavelmente a Itália substituindo cultivo de grâos por uvas e azeite apesar de já estar importando grão da África (atual Tunísia) desde pelo menos as guerras civis da república. Mesmo as redes de comercio de bens de luxo se expandiram com as vastas quantidades de moedas romanas na India e romanos chegando por mar na China no famoso caso do que provavelmente eram mercadores confundidos pelo historiador chinês com emissarios trazendo tributo. 
A proximidade do litoral era um fator chave devido ao menor custo de transporte: o interior europeu onde o urbanismo era novidade foi mais afetado pela introdução do urbanismo e várias tradiçoes religiosas e filosoficas ao ponto que o cristianismo em questão de 100 anos entre a adoção por Constantino e o colapso do lado ocidental sob Honório era predominante e já estava se espalhando para regiões como a Irlanda e a Alemanha. 400 anos depois no tempo de Carlos Magno a fronteira do cristianismo era a mesma, terminando na Saxônia e tendo até recuado na europa oriental.

George Gurdjieff e seus 83 conselhos para uma vida melhor - Andre Quintao

Reproduzindo uma postagem de sete anos atrás... 

quarta-feira, 15 de fevereiro de 2017

George Gurdjieff e seus 83 conselhos para uma vida melhor - Andre Quintao


George Gurdjieff viajou o mundo e deixou 83 conselhos para uma vida mais leve

George Gurdjieff foi um professor, escritor e compositor armênio de grande conhecimento sobre inúmeras questões da vida. Conhecimento esse que ele adquiriu em diversas viagens pela Rússia, Afeganistão, França e outros países. Ensinava filosofia e autoconhecimento profundo. Estes ensinamentos auxilia nossa visão de como se relacionar com o mundo, com as pessoas e internamente com seus próprios desejos. Uma visão clara e sábia sobre viver livremente, mas com responsabilidade sobre si e os outros.
Esses ensinamentos foram reunidos em 83 conselhos dados por Gurdjieff em um livro feito pelo escritor Alejandro Jodorowsky, “O Mestre e os Magos”.
Confira abaixo todos os conselhos do professor Gurdjieff e veja tudo de bom que eles podem trazer e acrescentar à sua vida.
  1. Fixe a atenção em si mesmo, seja consciente em cada instante do que pensa, sente, deseja e faz.
  2. Termine sempre o que começar.
  3. Faça o que estiver fazendo da melhor maneira possível.
  4. Não se prenda a nada que com o tempo venha a te destruir.
  5. Desenvolva sua generosidade sem testemunhas.
  6. Trate cada pessoa como um parente próximo.
  7. Arrume o que desarrumou.
  8. Aprenda a receber, agradeça cada dom.
  9. Pare de se autodefinir.
  10. Não minta, nem roube, pois estarás mentindo e roubando a si mesmo.
  11. Ajuda seu próximo sem deixá-lo dependente.
  12. Não deseje que te imitem.
  13. Faça planos de trabalho e cumpra-os.
  14. Não ocupe muito espaço.
  15. Não faças ruídos nem gestos desnecessários.
  16. Se não têm fé, finja ter.
  17. Não se deixe impressionar por personalidades fortes.
  18. Não te apropries de nada nem de ninguém.
  19. Divida de maneira justa.
  20. Não seduza.
  21. Coma e durma estritamente o necessário.
  22. Não fale de seus problemas pessoais.
  23. Não emita juízos nem críticas quando desconhece a maior parte dos fatos.
  24. Não estabeleça amizades inúteis.
  25. Não siga modas.
  26. Não se venda.
  27. Respeite os contratos que firmaste.
  28. Seja pontual.
  29. Não inveje os bens ou o sucesso do próximo.
  30. Fale só o necessário.
  31. Não pense nos benefícios que virão da tua obra.
  32. Nunca faça ameaças.
  33. Realize suas promessas.
  34. Coloque-se no lugar do outro em uma discussão.
  35. Admita que alguém te supera.
  36. Não elimine, mas transforme.
  37. Vença seus medos, cada um deles é um desejo camuflado.
  38. Ajude o outro a ajudar-se a si mesmo.
  39. Vença suas antipatias e aproxime-se das pessoas que você deseja rejeitar.
  40. Não reaja ao que digam de bom ou mau sobre você.
  41. Transforme seu orgulho em dignidade.
  42. Transforme sua cólera em criatividade.
  43. Transforme sua avareza em respeito pela beleza.
  44. Transforme sua inveja em admiração pelos valores do outro.
  45. Transforme seu ódio em caridade.
  46. Não se vanglorie nem se insulte.
  47. Trate o que não te pertence como se te pertencesse.
  48. Não se queixe.
  49. Desenvolva a sua imaginação.
  50. Não dê ordens só pelo prazer de ser obedecido.
  51. Pague pelos serviços que te prestam.
  52. Não faça propaganda de suas obras ou ideias.
  53. Não tente despertar, nos outros em relação a você, emoções como piedade, admiração, simpatia, cumplicidade.
  54. Não tente chamar a atenção pela sua aparência.
  55. Nunca contradiga, apenas cale-se.
  56. Não contraia dívidas. Compre e pague em seguida.
  57. Se ofender alguém, peça desculpas.
  58. Se ofender alguém publicamente, peça perdão publicamente também.
  59. Se perceber que falou algo errado, não insista no erro por orgulho e desista imediatamente dos seus propósitos.
  60.  Não defenda suas ideias antigas só pelo fato de ter sido você quem as enunciou.
  61. Não conserve objetos inúteis.
  62. Não se enfeite com as ideias alheias.
  63. Não tire fotos com personagens famosos.
  64. Não preste contas a ninguém, seja o seu próprio juiz.
  65. Nunca se defina pelo o que possui.
  66. Nunca fale de você sem conceder-se a possibilidade de mudança.
  67. Aceita que nada é teu.
  68. Quando pedirem a sua opinião sobre alguém, fale somente de suas qualidades.
  69. Quando você ficar doente, em lugar de odiar esse mal, considere-o como seu mestre.
  70. Não olhe dissimuladamente, olhe fixamente.
  71. Não esqueça seus mortos, mas dê a eles um lugar limitado que lhes impeça de invadir a sua vida.
  72. Em sua casa, reserve sempre um espaço ao sagrado.
  73. Quando você realizar um serviço, não ressalte seus esforços.
  74. Se decidir trabalhar para alguém, trate de fazer com prazer.
  75. Se você tem dúvida entre fazer ou não fazer, arrisque-se e faça.
  76. Não queira ser tudo para teu cônjuge; admita que busque em outros o que você não pode dar.
  77. Quando alguém tenha seu público, não tente contradizê-lo e roubar-lhe a audiência.
  78. Viva dos seus próprios ganhos.
  79. Não se vanglorie por aventuras amorosas.
  80. Não exalte as suas fraquezas.
  81. Nunca visite alguém só para preencher o seu tempo.
  82. Obtenha para repartir.
  83. Se você está meditando e um diabo se aproxima, coloque-o para meditar também.
Conheça mais George Gurdjieff no Wikipédia

sexta-feira, 6 de setembro de 2024

O prazer intelectual como objetivo de vida (2016) - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 

sábado, 8 de outubro de 2016

Mini-reflexão sobre o significado da satisfação intelectual como objetivo de vida

O prazer intelectual como objetivo de vida

Paulo Roberto de Almeida
 [Mini-reflexão sobre minhas preferências em matéria de hobby e conduta.] 

Eu venho de uma família bem mais pobre do que a condição social de grande parte dos brasileiros da atualidade: meus pais não tinham sequer primário completo, sem qualquer profissão definida, pois meu pai era motorista e minha mãe lavava roupa para fora para o sustento da família. Eu também passei a trabalhar desde muito cedo na vida. A grande diferença em minha vida e formação foi a de que eu residia próximo a uma biblioteca infantil, que comecei a frequentar ainda antes de aprender a ler. Foi o que me permitiu ascender na vida por meus próprios esforços, estudando em escola pública e trabalhando desde criança, e por isso mesmo estudando de noite, lendo no ônibus ou em qualquer lugar. Eu me fiz por minhas leituras e por meu trabalho, mas nunca pensei em ganhar dinheiro ou ficar rico, e sim em ter prazer intelectual pela leitura, e através do estudo, que resumem todos os meus objetivos de vida.
O que se puder fazer para estimular o gosto, e mesmo a necessidade da leitura, constante, regular, intensa, dos bons livros, nos jovens, nos nossos filhos e netos, é um empreendimento meritório em si, e digno de ser levado adiante, em quaisquer circunstâncias, em qualquer tempo e lugar. Não tenho nenhuma outra recomendação a fazer senão esta, muito simples na verdade: o estímulo ao estudo, à leitura, a reflexão própria, a produção intelectual, a promoção do saber, pelo saber em si, não necessariamente por qualquer outro objetivo. 
Ajudou-me, nessa trajetória individual de ascensão social, que pode ser considerada exitosa -- uma vez que hoje faço parte de um grupo considerado de elite dentro do funcionalismo público, o dos diplomatas -- justamente o fato de ter podido, por mérito e esforço próprios, ingressar por concurso, ou por seleção pelo talento, a profissões, na academia e na diplomacia, que me são amplamente gratificantes, no plano puramente intelectual, do ponto de vista do que mais prezo na vida, e que nunca foi o dinheiro, a riqueza ou o conforto material, e sim o prazer intelectual, a satisfação espiritual, a realização pessoal, que é a de viver num mundo de livros, de saber, de conhecimento, para mim, se possível ajudando outros a ter o mesmo tipo de perspectiva na vida.
Contribuiu também enormemente para isso o fato de ter encontrado alguém, Carmen Lícia, minha mulher, que também mantém, e exerce intensamente, o mesmo gosto pela leitura, pelas viagens, pelas descobertas intelectuais, pelo prazer de ter conhecimento das coisas. Fui gratificado por essa circunstância, que se não é excepcional, no sentido de ser exclusiva, constitui pelo menos uma condição essencial para uma vida de satisfação intelectual.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
Brasília, 8 de outubro de 2016

PS.: Se, um dia, eu resolver escrever minhas memórias (eu não tenho muito o que contar no plano das atividades públicas), elas serão basicamente intelectuais, ou seja, falando de livros, de ideias, de teorias, de conhecimento, e das ideologias, das falsas ideias e dos equívocos conceituais que muito fizeram por afundar o Brasil (e boa parte da América Latina), nestas décadas e décadas de frustração com a roubalheira, a incompetência, o atraso, a desigualdade, a miséria intelectual de nosso continente.

"Reagan Didn’t Win the Cold War - How a Myth About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Leads Republicans Astray on China" - Max Boot (Foreign Affairs)

 "Reagan Didn’t Win the Cold War - How a Myth About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Leads Republicans Astray on China"

Max Boot

Foreign Affairs, september 2924

 

...To be sure, there is a superficial allure to the thesis that Reagan brought down the Soviet Union and won the Cold War, because Reagan sometimes spoke of doing just that.

... As the journalist Fareed Zakaria has noted, the Soviet economy accounted for roughly 7.5 percent of global GDP at its peak; China today makes up about 20 percent of global GDP. There are no policies that the United States can plausibly implement that will “defeat” China—it is hard to know what “defeating China” even means. It is easy, however, to imagine that unrelentingly hard-line policies from both the United States and China could raise the risk of a nuclear war.

 

 

Reagan Didn’t Win the Cold War

How a Myth About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Leads Republicans Astray on China

By Max Boot

September 6, 2024

 

U.S. President Ronald Reagan addressing a news conference in Washington, D.C., October, 1983

Mal Langsdon / Reuters

 

 

When Republicans strategize about how to deal with China today, many of them point to President Ronald Reagan’s confrontational approach toward the Soviet Union as a model to emulate. H. R. McMaster, who served as national security adviser under President Donald Trump, argued: “Reagan had a clear strategy for victory in the global contest with the Soviet Union. Reagan’s approach—applying intensive economic and military pressure to a superpower adversary—became foundational to American strategic thinking. It hastened the end of Soviet power and promoted a peaceful conclusion to the multi-decade Cold War.” A trio of conservative foreign policy experts—Randy Schriver, Dan Blumenthal, and Josh Young—made the case that the next president “should draw upon the example of former President Ronald Reagan in taking hold of China policy,” citing “the intent to win the Cold War against the Soviet Union” that “permeated” Reagan-era national security documents. And in Foreign Affairs, Trump’s former deputy national security adviser Matt Pottinger and the former Republican representative Mike Gallagher cited Reagan to argue that “the United States shouldn’t manage the competition with China; it should win it.”

I would have been more sympathetic to these prescriptions before I spent a decade researching Reagan’s life and legacy—uncovering a historical record that is sharply at odds with the legends that have come to surround the 40th president. One of the biggest such myths is that Reagan had a plan to bring down the “evil empire” and that it was his pressure that led to U.S. victory in the Cold War. In reality, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union were primarily the work of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev—two consequences of his radically reformist policies (the former intended, the latter unintended). Reagan deserves tremendous credit for understanding that Gorbachev was a different kind of communist leader, someone he could do business with and thereby negotiate a peaceful end to a 40-year conflict. But Reagan did not bring about Gorbachev’s reforms, much less force the collapse of the Soviet Union. To imagine otherwise is to create dangerous and unrealistic expectations for what U.S. policy toward China can achieve today.

WHAT REAGAN REALLY DID

To be sure, there is a superficial allure to the thesis that Reagan brought down the Soviet Union and won the Cold War, because Reagan sometimes spoke of doing just that. Richard Allen, Reagan’s first national security adviser, recounted to me a conversation that he had with the former governor in 1977 as he was preparing for his 1980 presidential campaign. “Do you mind if I tell you my theory of the Cold War?” Reagan said. “My theory is that we win, they lose. What do you think about that?”

Once in office, Reagan raised defense spending—he undertook the largest peacetime military buildup in U.S. history—and launched the Strategic Defense Initiative to create a “space shield” against nuclear missiles. He also provided arms to anticommunist insurgents in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua, along with secret, nonlethal assistance to the Solidarity movement in Poland. Reagan often talked tough about the Soviet Union and forthrightly called out its egregious human rights abuses. In 1982, he prophesied that “the march of freedom and democracy” would “leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history.” In a 1983 speech, he labeled the Soviet Union “the focus of evil in the modern world.”

The most compelling evidence to suggest that Reagan had a strategy to defeat the Soviet Union—cited by advocates of a get-tough approach to China today—is a pair of now declassified national security decision directives issued in 1982 and 1983 by Reagan’s national security adviser, William Clark. NSDD 32 called on the United States to “discourage Soviet adventurism” by “forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries.” NSDD 75 further elaborated on the need “to promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced.”

It is easy to draw a direct connection between the policies enunciated in NSDDs 32 and 75 and the epochal events that followed just a few years later and culminated in the end of the Cold War. Indeed, Clark’s admiring biographers, Paul Kengor and Patricia Clark Doerner, called the policies “the directives that won the Cold War.”

THE CONFLICT WITHIN

Reality, however, is a lot messier than this simplistic story line. “It’s tempting to go back and say, ‘You know, we had this great strategy and we had all these things figured out,’ but I don’t think that’s accurate,” Reagan’s secretary of state George Shultz told me. “What is accurate was that there was a general ‘peace through strength’ attitude.”

Indeed, accounts that focus only on Reagan’s get-tough approach to the Soviet Union during his first term miss a big part of the picture. Reagan’s approach toward the Soviet Union was neither consistently tough nor consistently conciliatory. Instead, his foreign policy was an often baffling combination of hawkish and dovish approaches based on his own conflicting instincts and the clashing advice he received from hard-line aides such as Clark, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and CIA Director William Casey and more pragmatic advisers such as Shultz and national security advisers Robert McFarlane, Frank Carlucci, and Colin Powell.

In dealing with the Soviets, Reagan was constantly torn between two opposing images. On the one hand, there was the human suffering behind the Iron Curtain: after an emotional Oval Office meeting on May 28, 1981, with Yosef Mendelevich, a recently released political prisoner, and Avital Sharansky, the wife of the imprisoned Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky, Reagan wrote in his diary: “D—n those inhuman monsters. [Sharansky] is said to be down to 100 lbs. & very ill. I promised I’d do everything I could to obtain his release & I will.” On the other hand, there was the specter of nuclear destruction if the U.S.-Soviet confrontation spun out of control. This danger was brought home to Reagan by a nuclear war game, code-named Ivy League, on March 1, 1982. While Reagan watched from the White House Situation Room, the entire map of the United States turned red to simulate the impact of Soviet nuclear strikes. “He looked on in stunned disbelief,” the National Security Council staffer Tom Reed noted. “In less than an hour President Reagan had seen the United States of America disappear. . . . It was a sobering experience.” Reagan’s policy toward the Soviet Union was thus far less consistent than most of his admirers would admit. Although his meetings with Soviet dissidents pushed him toward confrontation, his knowledge of what a nuclear war would entail tempered him toward cooperation.

Reagan did not bring about Gorbachev’s reforms, much less force the collapse of the Soviet Union.

While many Reagan fans have suggested that NSDD 32 and 75 amounted to a declaration of economic warfare against the Soviet Union, Reagan repeatedly acted to reduce economic pressure on Moscow. In early 1981, he lifted the grain embargo that President Jimmy Carter had imposed the previous year in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. When a Soviet-backed regime declared martial law in Poland in December 1981, Reagan imposed tough sanctions on the construction of a Siberian gas pipeline to Western Europe before lifting them the following November in response to opposition from European allies. Hawks were frustrated by the president’s willingness to renounce one of the United States’ most powerful economic instruments without getting any concessions in return. Writing in The New York Times in May 1982, the editor of Commentary, Norman Podhoretz, aired these frustrations under the headline “The Neo-Conservative Anguish Over Reagan’s Foreign Policy.” Podhoretz complained that Reagan’s reaction to the imposition of martial law in Poland was even weaker than Carter’s reaction to the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan: “One remembers easily enough that Carter instituted a grain embargo and a boycott of the Moscow Olympics, but one is hard-pressed even to remember what the Reagan sanctions were.”

Conservatives would have been even more horrified if they had known that Reagan was secretly reaching out to the Kremlin at the time. In April 1981, Reagan sent a sentimental handwritten note to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev professing his desire for “meaningful and constructive dialogue which will assist us in fulfilling our joint obligation to find lasting peace,” and in March 1983, two days after calling the Soviet Union an “evil empire,” the president privately told Shultz to maintain lines of dialogue with the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin. Indeed, Reagan hoped to meet with a Soviet leader from the start of his presidency and lamented during his first term that Soviet leaders “keep dying on me.”

Many admirers now give Reagan credit for a calculated strategy that combined pressure and conciliation, but this approach bore little fruit in his first term, instead baffling Soviet leaders: “In his mind such incompatibilities could coexist in perfect harmony, but Moscow regarded such behavior at that time as a sign of deliberate duplicity and hostility,” Dobrynin wrote in his 1995 memoir.

In 1983, a series of escalating crises—including the Soviet shootdown of a Korean civilian airliner, a false Soviet alert of a U.S. missile launch, and a NATO war game (code-named Able Archer) that some Soviet officials saw as a cover for a preemptive U.S. attack—raised the fears of nuclear war to their highest levels since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Realizing that the risk of Armageddon was very real, Reagan consciously dialed back his hawkishness. In January 1984, he delivered a conciliatory speech in which he spoke of how much the typical Soviet citizens “Ivan and Anya” had in common with the typical Americans “Jim and Sally” and promised to work with the Kremlin to “strengthen peace” and “reduce the level of arms.”

The problem was that Reagan had no partner for peace at the time: during his first term, the Soviet Union was successively led by the elderly hard-liners Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko. Only when Chernenko died in March 1985 did Reagan finally find a Soviet leader he could work with in Gorbachev, a true “black swan” who rose to the top of a totalitarian system only to dismantle it.

THE UNEXPECTED COLLAPSE

Those who argue that Reagan brought down the “evil empire” usually focus on Gorbachev’s ascension as the turning point, crediting the U.S. president and his defense buildup with the selection of a reformer as general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. The problem with this theory is that no one in early 1985—not even Gorbachev himself—knew how radical a reformer he would turn out to be. If his colleagues on the Politburo had known, they likely would not have selected him. They had no desire for the Soviet empire, or their own power and privileges, to end.

Gorbachev did not want to reform the Soviet system in order to compete more effectively with the Reagan defense buildup. In fact, it was the opposite. He genuinely worried about the dangers of nuclear war, and he was appalled by how much money the Soviet Union was spending on its military-industrial complex: an estimated 20 percent of GDP and 40 percent of the state budget.

This was not a reflection of a Reagan-induced crisis that threatened the bankruptcy of the Soviet Union but rather a product of Gorbachev’s own humane instincts. As the historian Chris Miller has argued, “When Gorbachev became general secretary in 1985, the Soviet economy was wasteful and poorly managed, but it was not in crisis.” The Soviet regime, having survived Stalinist terror, famine, and industrialization, as well as World War II and de-Stalinization, could have survived the stagnation of the mid-1980s as other, poorer communist regimes such as China, Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam did.

There was nothing inevitable about the Soviet collapse, and it was not the product of Reagan’s efforts to spend more on the military and to curb Soviet expansionism abroad. It was the unanticipated and unintended consequence of the increasingly radical reforms implemented by Gorbachev, namely glasnost and perestroika, over the objections of more conservative comrades who finally tried to overthrow him in 1991. The Soviet Union broke up not because it was economically bankrupt but because Gorbachev recognized that it was morally bankrupt and he refused to hold it together by force. If any other member of the Politburo had taken power in 1985, the Soviet Union might still exist and the Berlin Wall might still stand, just as the demilitarized zone still divides North Korea from South Korea. Although he did not induce Gorbachev’s reforms, Reagan deserves credit for working with the Soviet leader at a time when most conservatives warned that the president was being hoodwinked by a wily communist.

Reagan and Gorbachev hardly saw eye to eye on everything. They clashed over human rights in the Soviet Union and Reagan’s beloved Strategic Defense Initiative. But despite temporary setbacks, the two leaders signed the first arms control accord to abolish an entire class of nuclear weapons, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, in Washington in 1987, and in 1988 the Reagans traveled to Moscow. During the visit, as the two leaders strolled through Red Square, Sam Donaldson of ABC News asked Reagan, “Do you still think you’re in an evil empire, Mr. President?” “No,” Reagan replied. “I was talking about another time and another era.”

PRESSURE DOESN’T MAKE PEACE

There is little evidence that pressure on the Soviet Union in Reagan’s first term made the Soviets more willing to negotiate, but there is a good deal of evidence that his pivot toward cooperation with Gorbachev in his second term allowed the new Soviet leader to transform his country and end the Cold War. Yet many conservatives conflate Reagan’s second-term success with his first-term failures, applying the wrong policy lessons to relations with communist China today.

Ramping up confrontation with Beijing regardless of the consequences risks a repeat of the war scares that brought the world to the brink of catastrophe in 1983, and such a strategy has even less of a chance of success today. Even if it was not on the verge of bankruptcy, the Soviet Union’s economy was weak in the 1980s, thanks to communist central planning and a fall in world oil prices. China, on the other hand, has successfully combined free-market economics and political repression to become the world’s second largest economy. As the journalist Fareed Zakaria has noted, the Soviet economy accounted for roughly 7.5 percent of global GDP at its peak; China today makes up about 20 percent of global GDP. There are no policies that the United States can plausibly implement that will “defeat” China—it is hard to know what “defeating China” even means. It is easy, however, to imagine that unrelentingly hard-line policies from both the United States and China could raise the risk of a nuclear war.

The United States should continue to contain and deter Chinese aggression, limit the export of sensitive technology, and support human rights in China while still engaging in dialogue with Chinese leaders to lessen the risk of war. This was the prudent approach to the Soviet Union that U.S. presidents of both parties adopted during the Cold War. But Washingtonshould not imagine that it can transform China. Only the Chinese people can do that. Today’s confrontation with China can only end if Chinese leader Xi Jinping is succeeded by a true reformer in the Gorbachev mold. Unless that long-shot scenario comes to pass, pursuing a one-sided caricature of Reagan’s policy toward the Soviet Union is likely to make the world a more dangerous place.

 

  • MAX BOOT is Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of Reagan: His Life and Legend.