Planejamento diplomático: sua institucionalização

Planejamento Diplomático:

O Itamaraty do século 21

Sistema de planejamento estratégico propiciará mais transparência e eficiência à diplomacia

         

ALOYSIO NUNES FERREIRA*

O Estado de S.Paulo, 20 Abril 2018

No final do ano passado determinei a criação de um grupo no Itamaraty para propor um sistema de planejamento estratégico do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, inspirando-se em outras chancelarias, em exemplos de sucesso de órgãos públicos e do setor privado e na melhor literatura de administração e pensamento estratégico. Essa decisão se baseou em duas constatações principais.

A primeira é que o Itamaraty tem capacidade de planejamento e análise invejável, mas a máquina cresceu muito e os temas são cada vez mais específicos e fragmentados, tornando mais complexa a tarefa de manter uma visão de conjunto e monitorar as atividades. Era necessário, portanto, que o planejamento refletisse essa realidade, garantindo unidade de propósitos, antecipação de tendências e riscos, além de preocupação constante com o resultado, isso tudo num ambiente internacional sempre incerto.

A segunda constatação diz respeito à tendência dos órgãos de controle e da moderna prestação de contas, que exigem não apenas a definição de objetivos e metas, mas também a capacidade de demonstrar resultados concretos com eficiência, de modo a assegurar o melhor uso possível dos recursos aplicados. Os órgãos de controle do próprio governo e os externos e independentes não se contentam mais com a conformidade e legalidade da execução orçamentária e financeira. Exigem também a demonstração do retorno do investimento público. Essa é uma tendência global, e não apenas no Brasil.

Um dos principais desafios de qualquer chancelaria, quando se trata de planejamento estratégico, diz respeito à determinação da eficiência. Não se mede a eficiência da diplomacia como se mensura a eficácia de uma campanha de vacinação, ou seja, pela quantidade de crianças alcançadas. Tampouco é possível medir o êxito com indicadores como a extensão, em quilômetros, de estradas pavimentadas ou rios dragados em um ano.

A eficiência na diplomacia requer, na maioria das vezes, estratégias de longo prazo. A medida dessa eficiência, portanto, exige frequentemente o uso de indicadores qualitativos, especialmente desenhados para as características próprias da política externa. É mais difícil avaliar a eficácia de políticas que exigem paciência, abertura de canais de contato e a construção de boa vontade para alcançar o objetivo almejado.

Por exemplo, levamos dez anos para abrir o mercado norte-americano para a carne bovina in natura brasileira, mas isso não significa que tenhamos sido ineficientes nos primeiros nove anos. Na verdade, sem a paciente construção do caso e o emprego de diferentes técnicas de negociação e eventos de promoção nos nove anos anteriores certamente não teríamos alcançado o êxito no décimo.

O planejamento em relações exteriores, portanto, demanda uma perspectiva sui generis, adaptada a uma política pública cuja medida de sucesso nem sempre é óbvia. O sucesso diplomático pode significar a ausência de uma decisão de um governo ou de um organismo internacional que, se não fosse evitada, afetaria negativamente os nossos interesses. Pode representar a superação de um risco de conflito que jamais eclodirá, mas cuja mera divulgação de seu potencial poderia acarretar enormes prejuízos e minar a capacidade negociadora e a influência do País perante os envolvidos.

Essa consciência de que a realidade da diplomacia é peculiar não invalida a necessidade de implementar o planejamento, mas recomenda fugir das fórmulas tradicionais. Tendo presente essa premissa básica, determinei a execução, em 2018, do projeto piloto do “sistema de planejamento estratégico das relações exteriores” (Sisprex), cujo desenho básico conterá os seguintes elementos: diagnóstico do ambiente internacional para determinar as principais tendências regionais e globais e seu impacto nas diretrizes da política externa; esforço coletivo das unidades do Itamaraty na definição de objetivos estratégicos que deverão integrar, no futuro, um plano estratégico quadrienal; elaboração de planos de trabalho anuais contendo metas específicas e atividades a serem desempenhadas, com previsão de recursos necessários.

Utilizando as mais modernas técnicas disponíveis, esse sistema encadeado deverá garantir coerência entre os três elementos, prevendo também uma estrutura de governança encarregada de corrigir metodologias, sugerir indicadores e fazer atualizações nos documentos resultantes sempre que necessário, tanto em função das mudanças de prioridades governamentais quanto em reação a imprevistos no ambiente estratégico internacional.

Com isso será possível aproveitar a criatividade e a capacidade de inovação dos funcionários mais jovens e das unidades básicas, que serão chamados a contribuir para o processo de reflexão coletiva. Ao mesmo tempo, a liderança do ministério deverá validar o processo em cada uma de suas fases, resultando em instruções mais precisas, que propiciarão o engajamento de todos na busca dos resultados almejados. Não menos importante, esse sistema estruturado facilitará o monitoramento, a avaliação da eficiência, a alocação ótima de recursos e o compartilhamento das melhores práticas.

O Sisprex deverá evoluir rapidamente para se tornar também um elo entre o Itamaraty e a sociedade. Ele contém em seu DNA o diálogo e a transparência, como, aliás, deve ser numa chancelaria afinada com seu tempo. Tanto nas fases de diagnóstico de tendências quanto na definição de objetivos estratégicos, as consultas com especialistas e forças vivas da sociedade serão fundamentais. Os documentos de referência resultantes do planejamento, em sua versão ostensiva, serão igualmente valiosos instrumentos de diplomacia pública, ao evidenciarem claramente a importância do trabalho diplomático para a sociedade e sua contribuição central para um Brasil mais forte, próspero e justo.

MINISTRO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES

192     ISSN  1677-7042 1   Nº  240,  sexta-feira,          15 de dezembro de 2017

Ministério das Relações Exteriores 

GABINETE DO MINISTRO

PORTARIA DE 12 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2017

O MINISTRO DE ESTADO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES, no uso de suas atribuições legais, resolve:

Art. 1° Fica instituído Grupo de Trabalho com o objetivo de estabelecer um sistema integrado de planejamento da política externa brasileira no âmbito do Ministério das Relações Exteriores.

Art. 2° Compete ao Grupo de Trabalho:

I - definir parâmetros para o pensamento estratégico, de médio e longo prazos, em todos os níveis da estrutura organizacional do MRE, no Brasil e no exterior;

II - recomendar a participação de unidades do MRE, no Brasil e no exterior, no processo de planejamento estratégico;

III - implementar o processo de planejamento estratégico no MRE, integrando as áreas políticas e administrativas na consecução dos objetivos da política externa brasileira;

IV - realizar estudos e elaborar documentos para apoiar a tomada de decisão das altas instâncias do MRE sobre o planejamento estratégico e seus ciclos de implementação, monitoramento e revisão;

V - propor iniciativas que possam contribuir para a formulação e a execução do planejamento estratégico do MRE, incluindo o aperfeiçoamento de políticas de governança e de gestão financeira, de pessoas, de processos, de projetos, de riscos e de controles internos;

VI - elaborar documento de referência para a adoção de um sistema de planejamento estratégico no MRE, que tenha o propósito de subsidiar, de modo sistemático e coerente, a formulação e a condução da política externa brasileira, bem como atender às demandas dos órgãos de supervisão e controle da Administração Pública.

Parágrafo único. O Grupo de Trabalho deverá encaminhar ao Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores os resultados de suas atividades, podendo recomendar a adoção de medidas e a apreciação de determinados temas pelo Comitê de Governança, Riscos e Controles do MRE.

Art. 3° O Grupo de Trabalho será composto por representantes das seguintes unidades do Ministério das Relações Exteriores:

I- Gabinete;

II - Secretaria-Geral;

III - Secretaria de Planejamento Diplomático; IV - Coordenação-Geral de Modernização; e V - Divisão de Informática.

§ 1º As atividades do Grupo de Trabalho serão coordenadas pelas chefias da Secretaria de Planejamento Diplomático e da Coordenação-Geral de Modernização.

§ 2° O Grupo de Trabalho poderá convidar a participar de suas atividades representantes de órgãos e entidades públicas e privadas, além de pesquisadores, especialistas e integrantes de instituições da sociedade civil, quando considerar necessário para o cumprimento de suas finalidades.

§ 3° Os representantes designados para compor o Grupo de Trabalho desempenharão suas atividades sem prejuízo daquelas decorrentes de seus respectivos cargos ou funções, sendo a participação considerada prestação de serviço relevante e não remunerada.

Art. 4° O documento de referência citado no inciso VI do art. 2º desta Portaria deverá ser elaborado e encaminhado, até 31 de janeiro de 2018, à apreciação do Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores.

Art. 5° Esta Portaria entra em vigor na data de sua publicação.

ALOYSIO NUNES FERREIRA

Grand Strategy - John Lewis Gaddis

When to Wage War, and How to Win: A Guide

By VICTOR DAVIS HANSON

The New York Times Review of Books, APRIL 20, 2018

ON GRAND STRATEGY 
By John Lewis Gaddis 
368 pp. Penguin Press. $26.

What is “grand strategy” as opposed to simple strategy? The term is mostly an academic one. It denotes encompassing all the resources that a state can focus — military, economic, political and cultural — to further its own interests in a global landscape.

“On Grand Strategy,” by John Lewis Gaddis, a pre-eminent historian and biographer of the Cold War, does not offer a comprehensive analysis, much less a history, of strategy on a grand scale in the manner of the classic studies by Angelo Codevilla, Edward Mead Earle, Lawrence Freedman, B. H. Liddell Hart, Edward N. Luttwak or Williamson Murray. Gaddis does concede that “grand strategies have traditionally been associated, however, with the planning and fighting of wars.” And so wars — or rather how not to lose them — are the general theme of his often didactic book.

Ten lively essays proceed in chronological order from King Xerxes’ invasion of Greece to Isaiah Berlin’s thoughts on World War II and the Cold War. In all of them Gaddis keeps pounding — to the point of monotony — the seemingly self-evident: The grand strategist must prune away emotion, ego and conventional wisdom to accept that “if you seek ends beyond your means, then sooner or later you’ll have to scale back your ends to fit your means.” His repetitious observation about proportionality might have been banal — if so many leaders, many of them geniuses, had not forgotten it. The generals who led the Athenian expedition to Sicily, Julius Caesar poised at the Rubicon, Alexander the Great at the Indus, Napoleon and Hitler at the border of Russia and Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam all equated past tactical success with assured future strategic dominance, lied to themselves that the material or spiritual advantages were all theirs and so ended up dead, humiliated or defeated.

The case studies are variously drawn from some 16 years of co-teaching a well-regarded seminar on “Studies in Grand Strategy” at Yale. Gaddis’s present book is at least the fourth such volume by professors of the Yale class, along with Paul Kennedy’s edited “Grand Strategies in War and Peace,” Charles Hill’s “Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order” and more recently Linda Kulman’s “Teaching Common Sense: The Grand Strategy Program at Yale University.” While varied in tone and theme, all these efforts reflect the practical aims of the Yale seminar. Their implicit idea is to remind America’s future best and brightest how the mostly successful grand strategy of the past saw America become the pre-eminent world power of the 20th century by winning two world conflicts along with the Cold War. In contrast, the often arrogant neglect of grand strategic thinking has led to postwar quagmires, stalemates and the assorted misadventures that often drained American resources for either impossible or irrelevant aims, while tearing the country apart over the last 70 years.

Gaddis writes as he presumably teaches, informally mixing literary and historical analyses with the observations of his students, reminiscing in a personal voice about long-ago conversations or sharing conclusions that came to him over the years of the seminar. The book is as much personal remembrance as strategic reflection, and is chock-full of aphorisms and enigmatic adages.

Niccolò Machiavelli Palazzo Della Signoria, via Getty Images 

Gaddis believes the best way to hone strategic thinking is not just by mastering the advice of Machiavelli or Clausewitz (who both figure prominently in the class), much less contemporary high-tech wizardry, but also by understanding the interplay of history, literature and philosophy over 2,500 years of Western civilization — with occasional insights from Sun Tzu and other non-Western thinkers. In some sense “On Grand Strategy” is a traditional argument for the value of classical education in the broadest sense.

The student of strategy learns to balance a grasp of detail with proper humility: It is, of course, wise to have a plan and contingencies. But how will these prompt rival counter-responses? Do such agendas have the means adequate for their ends? Or are they more dreams, warped by ego and emotion (“And the heat of emotions requires only an instant to melt abstractions drawn from years of cool reflection. Decades devoid of reflection may follow”)? The better way is to be Isaiah Berlin’s versatile fox, not a single-minded obsessed hedgehog, or to embrace Machiavelli’s virtues of imitation, adaptation and approximation.

A recurrent theme is the danger of omnipresent hubris. Even a great power cannot master the unexpected and uncontrollable — from the great plague at Athens, to the harsh Russian winter, to I.E.D.s and tribal factionalism in Iraq. Why in the world, during a breathing spell in their war against Sparta, did democratic Athenians attack neutral and democratic Syracuse, 500 miles away? The answer is the same blinkered arrogance that sent Philip II’s huge but poorly led Spanish Armada into the British northern seas. Understanding the underappreciated role of irony is essential for a leader, and might have prevented the disasters of both 415 B.C. and 1588. Tolstoy and Clausewitz appreciated that bad things can come from good intentions and vice versa. The best generals live with and react to paradoxes, Gaddis argues. The worst ignore or seek to undo them.

Carl von Clausewitz

Gaddis sees these more successful global strategists as rope-a-dope pragmatists who remain elastic and patient enough to capitalize on events and opportunities as they unfold, rather than forcing them to fit preconceived schemes. Caesar tries to force a Roman republic into a global hegemony without full cognizance of the inevitable blowback from centuries of republican government, and so predictably is assassinated by a dying generation of dreamy senators. His savvier adopted son, Augustus, like the later Otto von Bismarck, builds coalitions, finds pre-existing seams to exploit at home and abroad, and waits to take advantage when enemies — or friends — stumble. Stalin’s prewar Bolshevik nightmare was responsible for 20 million dead, but apparently was not so loathsome that the Soviet Union could not prove temporarily useful for Churchill and Roosevelt in bleeding out the Nazi Wehrmacht.

Morality matters, if defined less as self-righteous ardor and more as self-awareness of a leader’s effect on those around him and an appreciation of paradox. A pragmatic St. Augustine has no problem with war — if it is a last resort to save civilization, without which there can be neither calm nor organized religion.

Still, courting calculated risk is essential. The gambler Winston Churchill took chances in 1940, albeit rational ones backed by educated guesses that, for all Hitler’s bluster, the Third Reich had neither the air nor sea power to destroy the Anglosphere. Risk is not always risk when it is the natural expression of national advantages and a mixture of caution and audacity.

Sun Tzu Alamy 

Gaddis’s American heroes are Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, who he thinks “rescued democracy and capitalism.” Roosevelt somehow was cognizant early on of how the singular military and economic potential of America might save Europe and Asia, but only if he first prepared reluctant Americans materially and psychologically for the inevitable war to come. Woodrow Wilson, among others, was not so successful in creating a postwar peace because he forced conditions to preconceived realities that bore little resemblance to emerging ironies at Versailles — and was without a sellable idea of an American role after World War I.

Gaddis concludes with an invaluable warning that true morality embraces neither messianic interventionism nor the quest for utopianism — indeed that is how millions become deluded, endangered or doomed. Instead, ethical leadership pursues the art of the possible for the greater (not the greatest) good. Augustine did not demand the city of God absolutely over the city of man. Augustus did not self-righteously return the Principate to the strife of the late republic. Lincoln did not start the Civil War as a crusade to eradicate slavery everywhere.

With regard to the American 21st century, Gaddis’s favorite novelists and philosophers perhaps argue against both optional intercessions abroad and moralistic lead-from-behind recessionals. The better course is to marshal American power to prepare for the often unavoidable existential crises on the horizon, with the full expectation that we do not have to be perfect to be good.

“On Grand Strategy” is many things — a thoughtful validation of the liberal arts, an argument for literature over social science, an engaging reflection on university education and some timely advice to Americans that lasting victory comes from winning what you can rather than all that you want.

 When to Wage War, and How to Win: A Guide

Dia do diplomata — Vitória Alice Cleaver, presidente da ADB

20 de Abril – Dia do Diplomata. Responsabilidades e desafios da carreira

Vitoria Alice Cleaver, presidente da ADB
Folha de S. Paulo, 20 de abril de 2018

Desde a promulgação do Decreto 66.217, de 1970, o Dia do Diplomata é comemorado em 20 de abril, nascimento de José Maria da Silva Paranhos, Barão do Rio Branco, Patrono da Diplomacia brasileira. Ao celebrarmos este dia, revisitamos o sentido do patriotismo. A homenagem ao agente encarregado de elaborar e executar as diretrizes da política externa do País estará sempre associada ao lema “Ubique Patriae Memor” (Em qualquer lugar, terei sempre a Pátria em minha lembrança), que integra hoje a “Ordem de Rio Branco”, intitulada em homenagem ao Patrono.

Atualmente, mais de 1.500 diplomatas representam o Brasil e atuam para defender os interesses nacionais, seja na capital federal ou nas embaixadas, consulados e delegações junto a organismos internacionais. Os diplomatas atuam nas áreas cultural, ambiental, econômica, comercial, proteção e defesa dos direitos humanos, cooperação, paz e segurança internacionais, dentre outras.

Em virtude do aumento do número de brasileiros residentes no exterior, nosso serviço consular tem ampliado a estrutura de atendimento. Situações de emergência como resgate em casos de catástrofe ou de guerra, repatriação, encarceramento, acidente, morte, emissão de documentos também por perda ou roubo e inadmissão de brasileiros em outros países, são exemplos da assistência que prestamos. Também atuamos na concessão de vistos para estrangeiros que pretendem visitar o Brasil. A agilidade na produção destes documentos contribui consideravelmente para o crescimento do turismo.

A divulgação da imagem do Brasil no exterior é uma das funções dos diplomatas, que promovem os produtos, serviços e talentos artísticos nacionais, contribuindo para a atração de investimentos e para uma melhor difusão de nosso patrimônio artístico e cultural. Cabe destacar, ainda, a tarefa de atuar na negociação de acordos internacionais, seja para promover exportações, o que ganha especial relevância em contextos de crise, ou, como ocorreu historicamente, para garantir a integridade de território e a solução pacífica de conflitos.

Ainda nos dias de hoje, não é incomum o desconhecimento da contribuição diplomática para a formação e o desenvolvimento do Brasil. Muitas vezes são desconhecidos também os desafios enfrentados diariamente por muitos integrantes da carreira diplomática. Iniciamos a carreira com uma formação ampla e consistente, com um dos concursos mais rigorosos da Administração Pública, proporcional às exigências da atuação que precisamos ter dentro e fora do País.

Ao longo da carreira diplomática, as dificuldades enfrentadas não correspondem ao estereótipo glamoroso frequentemente associado à profissão. Parte considerável das missões para as quais somos designados acontecem em países em guerra, com ameaças de terrorismo, regiões de desastres ambientais e epidemias. São muitos também os custos de ordem pessoal e financeira, como a distância da família, que impõem a nós, sobretudo, a nossos familiares constante necessidade de adaptação a diferentes línguas, hábitos, culturas, climas e religiões. Contudo, nosso desejo de servir ao Brasil independe de onde estamos, ou do próximo destino.

Que o dia 20 de abril seja uma data para nos orgulharmos do legado da diplomacia na formação da identidade nacional e para reconhecermos a responsabilidade e a importância de nossas atribuições. Que a memória constante do Brasil, com seus desafios e qualidades, nos motive ainda mais a atuar por um País justo e desenvolvido, em que as atribuições da carreira diplomática continuem sendo uma contribuição essencial para o desenvolvimento de nosso País.

*A Embaixadora Vitoria Cleaver é presidente da Associação dos Diplomatas Brasileiros (ADB/Sindical), formada em Ciências Jurídicas  e Sociais, pela Faculdade de Direito da PUC-RJ.

Revista Pesquisa Naval, da Marinha

Marinha comemora Dia da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação com lançamento de edição da revista Pesquisa Naval

Publicado em 20/04/2018

A Diretoria-Geral de Desenvolvimento Nuclear e Tecnológico da Marinha (DGDNTM) realizará cerimônia em comemoração ao Dia da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação (CT&I) na Marinha. O evento acontece no dia 25 de abril, às 16h, no Salão Nobre do Comando da Marinha, em Brasília, e contará com a presença de diversas autoridades do Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário Federal, além de membros do Corpo Diplomático e da Academia.

Neste ano, a cerimônia celebrará ainda o 10º aniversário da DGDNTM. No dia, haverá o lançamento da 29ª Edição da Revista Pesquisa Naval; a entrega da Menção Honrosa do Prêmio Soberania pela Ciência; e a entrega do Prêmio Soberania pela Ciência.

A Revista Pesquisa Naval

A revista Pesquisa Naval (RPN) é um periódico científico de publicação anual que apresenta à comunidade científica uma coletânea de estudos desenvolvidos por pesquisadores das áreas Científica, Tecnológica e de Inovação, cujos temas sejam das áreas de interesse da Marinha. O periódico é publicado pela Diretoria-Geral de Desenvolvimento Nuclear e Tecnológico da Marinha e é avaliado pelo Sistema de Classificação de Periódicos, Anais, Revistas e Jornais (Qualis) da Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (Capes).

O Prêmio Soberania pela Ciência

O prêmio, criado em 2016 com o objetivo de reconhecer e premiar o melhor trabalho, foi desenvolvido por pesquisadores e equipe de pesquisa das Instituições Científicas, Tecnológicas e de Inovação (ICT) da Marinha, com intuito de atingir objetivos estratégicos elencados na Doutrina de Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação da Marinha e para o desenvolvimento científico e tecnológico nacional.

Nesta segunda edição, o prêmio foi concedido ao trabalho intitulado Metodologia para a Estimativa Computacional do Ruído Vibratório em Propulsores, desenvolvido por pesquisadores da Diretoria de Desenvolvimento Nuclear e Tecnológico da Marinha (DDNM). O trabalho é de autoria do Primeiro-Tenente Eduardo Ribeiro Malta, com o Capitão-Tenente Alceu José dos Santos Moura e o Capitão-Tenente Rubens Cavalcante da Silva como coautores.

A DGDNTM concederá ainda menção honrosa ao Grêmio de Ciência e Tecnologia da Escola Naval, pela realização do Barco Solar. O projeto pretende aplicar tecnologias renováveis de ponta em diferentes tipos de embarcação, assim como incentivar o desenvolvimento de outros projetos de Ciência e Tecnologia.

Patrono

Nascido em 22 de abril o Almirante Álvaro Alberto é considerado patrono da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação da Marinha do Brasil e homenageado na data. Para a instituição, Álvaro Alberto deixou como legado a convicção de que o domínio e a aplicação do conhecimento são os vetores para o progresso acional.

Álvaro Alberto foi catedrático do Departamento de Físico-Química da Escola Naval, onde se dedicou ao desenvolvimento de pesquisas na área de explosivos e energia nuclear. Além dos cargos e funções desempenhados ao longo da carreira naval, foi presidente da Sociedade Brasileira de Química; um dos criadores e primeiro presidente do Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPQ); um dos idealizadores da Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN); representante brasileiro na Comissão de Energia Atômica da Organização das Nações Unidas e presidente da Academia Brasileira de Ciências.

O Almirante dá nome ao Prêmio Nacional de Ciência e Tecnologia, concedido pelo Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) e Marinha. Também em sua homenagem, o submarino com propulsão nuclear da Marinha será batizado com o seu nome.

Serviço:
Cerimônia alusiva ao Dia da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação na Marinha
Local: Esplanada dos Ministérios, Bloco N, Salão Nobre do Comando da Marinha - 9º andar
Data: 25 de abril
Hora: 16h

Mais informações:

Assessoria de Comunicação Social da DGDNTM
dgdntm-comunicacao@marinha.mil.br
(61) 3429-1809/1954

Para conhecer o trabalho da DGDNTM, acesse o site.

Justica mantem contribuicao sindical extinta pela reforma trabalhista (OESP)

Minha introdução, exortativa, ineficaz, mas tenho o direito de protestar:

JUSTIÇA DO TRABALHO TEM QUE SER EXTINTA

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

--------------------------------------------

Justiça mantém contribuição sindical extinta pela reforma trabalhista

Sindicatos já conseguiram 123 liminares para manter sua principal fonte de financiamento; algumas decisões foram derrubadas em segunda e terceira instâncias, mas ao menos uma empresa não recorreu e vai descontar o imposto dos funcionários.

A reportagem é de Luciana Dyniewicz, publicada por O Estado de S.Paulo, 20-04-2018. 

Cinco meses após o fim do imposto sindical, com a entrada em vigor da nova legislação trabalhista, sindicatos de todo o País têm conseguido liminares na Justiçapara manter a contribuição, que é uma de suas principais fontes de receita. Segundo levantamento online feito por advogados de associações de trabalhadores, já são 123 decisões a favor dos sindicatos, sendo 34 em segunda instância – a pesquisa não informa as decisões contrárias. O Judiciário não tem um levantamento oficial sobre o tema, mas já houve liminares derrubadas em segunda e terceira instâncias. Em Santa Catarina, de acordo com o Tribunal Regional do Trabalho da 12ª Região, que contabilizou os processos, são 54 decisões favoráveis às entidades de trabalhadores até agora e apenas uma contra. A judicialização da briga em torno da contribuição obrigatória é o segundo passo dos sindicatos na tentativa de manter suas receitas. O primeiro foi a realização de assembleias extraordinárias para votar a continuidade da contribuição. Os sindicatos defendiam que, se a contribuição fosse aprovada em assembleia, ela se tornaria válida para toda a categoria. A decisão na assembleia, porém, não obrigava a empresa a reter o valor – o que levou as entidades a entrarem na Justiça. Por enquanto, ao menos um sindicato do País saiu vitorioso dessa briga e deverá receber, até o fim deste mês, a quantia equivalente a um dia de trabalho de cada funcionário. O caso envolve o Sindicato dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias de Alimentação de São Paulo(STIA) e a empresa de laticínios Vigor.

O STIA conseguiu, no mês passado, uma liminar em primeira instância que obriga a Vigor a reter a contribuição dos funcionários da fábrica de São Caetano do Sul (SP) e repassar o valor à entidade. Como a empresa optou por não recorrer – em nota, afirmou que “não apresentou recurso” e “está cumprindo a decisão liminar”. O sindicato deverá receber o dinheiro dos cerca de 650 empregados até o próximo dia 30. O STIA entrou com 53 processos na Justiça, cada um contra uma empresa diferente. Por enquanto, foram seis liminares favoráveis.

No Rio, o Sindicato dos Comerciários, um dos maiores da cidade, também entrou com diversas ações ao mesmo tempo. Foram 30 até agora e seis liminares favoráveis.

Em sua briga na Justiça, os sindicatos têm se valido de um documento da Associação Nacional dos Magistrados do Trabalho (Anamatra) que afirma que a contribuição sindical tem natureza de imposto e, portanto, só pode ser modificada por uma lei complementar – a reforma trabalhista se deu por meio de uma lei ordinária. O texto da Anamatra, porém, não tem valor legal.

Do outro lado da briga, as empresas Aliança Navegação e Logística e a Hamburg Süd foram as que conseguiram a maior vitória até agora. Elas foram as primeiras a obter, em terceira instância, a suspensão da liminar que favorecia o sindicato de seus funcionários. As empresas informaram que recorreram após os trabalhadores reclamarem “voluntariamente” da liminar.

O advogado Fabio Chong, sócio do L.O. Baptista Advogados, destaca que o assunto só deve ser resolvido após discussão no Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF). Até agora, 15 Ações Diretas de Inconstitucionalidade (ADIs) questionando o fim do imposto sindical foram protocoladas no Supremo. Por enquanto, diante de liminar favorável aos sindicatos, o advogado Rodrigo Baldo, do escritório Miguel Neto, orienta que as empresas peçam para os trabalhadores fazerem um documento caso sejam contrários à retenção da contribuição.

Arms Control Today - Steven Pifer, Oliver Meier

ARMS CONTROL TODAY

Arms Control Today 48 
January/February 2018
By Steven Pifer and Oliver Meier

As relations between the West and Russia deteriorate, a key Cold War arms control accord has come under threat.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan shake hands December 8, 1987 at their Washington summit, as dignitaries give a standing ovation after the two leaders signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The ceremony was held in the East Room of the White House. (Photo: DON EMMERT/AFP/Getty Images)

The United States charges that Russia has violated the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by deploying a prohibited ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) having a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Moscow rejects the charge and instead claims that Washington has violated the agreement. The Trump administration has announced several steps in response to the Russian violation, including beginning research and development of options for U.S. intermediate-range missiles.

If the treaty unravels, it will open the door to an arms race in production and deployment of these missiles, which would weaken security in Europe and Asia. It would undermine support for other arms control treaties, such as the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and make it difficult to reach new accords. That would not be in the interest of the United States, Russia, Europe, or Asia.

Washington and Moscow should work to preserve the INF Treaty and its benefits. If the United States and Russia desire to maintain the treaty, there are ways to resolve their compliance concerns. If they do not act to save the treaty, its days are likely numbered.

INF Treaty History

The Soviet Union began deploying the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile in the late 1970s. The SS-20’s mobile launcher, three independently targetable warheads, and estimated range of 5,000 kilometers made it a significant improvement over older Soviet intermediate-range missiles and provoked alarm in Europe.

Washington at first downplayed the concern, but NATO agreed in December 1979 to the “dual-track” decision: The United States would seek to engage the Soviet Union in a negotiation aimed at reducing and limiting intermediate-range ground-launched missiles. In parallel, the U.S. military would develop and, beginning in late 1983, base GLCMs in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom and Pershing II ballistic missiles in Germany, provided that an arms control agreement did not obviate those deployments.

Dutch protesters demonstrate October 29, 1983 in The Hague against deployment of U.S. Pershing cruise missiles. The Soviet Union quit negotiations on a ban on such intermediate-range nuclear missiles in late 1983 but returned to talks in 1985 that concluded successfully with the INF Treaty eliminating a whole class of weapons. (Photo: HERMAN PIETERSE/AFP/Getty Images)

U.S.-Soviet negotiations began in 1981, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced the “zero-zero” proposal under which the United States would forgo its planned deployments if the Soviet Union eliminated its SS-20 and other intermediate-range missiles. Moscow rejected zero-zero, and the first two years of negotiations yielded little common ground between the sides. When the first U.S. GLCMs and Pershing IIs arrived in Europe in November 1983, the Soviets broke off the negotiations.

The Kremlin seemed to hope that public opposition within NATO countries would derail the U.S. missile deployments. Although it appeared a near thing at times, leaders in the five basing countries held firm despite significant domestic opposition, and the alliance moved forward with deployment. In 1985 the Soviets agreed to resume negotiations.

The negotiations made progress in 1986-1987 along the lines of the zero-zero proposal. Reagan and his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, signed the INF Treaty on December 8, 1987. The treaty banned the production, flight-testing, and possession of all ground-based cruise and ballistic missiles having ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (300 and 3,300 miles) and required the elimination of all such existing missiles. When the treaty’s reduction period concluded in 1991, the United States and Soviet Union had destroyed some 2,700 missiles, as well as launchers and other support equipment.

Following the Soviet Union’s collapse at the end of 1991, Russia and several other post-Soviet states assumed the Soviet INF Treaty obligations. The treaty’s inspection period ended in 2001. The Special Verification Commission (SVC), established by the treaty as a venue for discussing the treaty’s implementation and compliance concerns, with the participation of the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, had its last meeting in 2003 before a 13-year hiatus.

In 2005, Russian officials expressed interest in withdrawing from the treaty and suggested to the United States to jointly terminate the accord. Washington refused. In February 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed concern that, although the United States and Russia were banned from having intermediate-range missiles, third countries were developing and fielding such systems, and those countries tended to be in close proximity to Russia.

The following October, Putin proposed making the INF Treaty “global in scope.” The United States and Russia at the UN General Assembly jointly called on third countries to eliminate their intermediate-range missile systems. Moscow did not seriously pursue its proposal, although Russian officials continued to express concern about the proliferation of intermediate-range missiles.

Treaty Violation Charges

During the Obama administration, reports began to circulate that Russia was violating the INF Treaty. In July 2014, the U.S. government publicly charged that Russia had violated the accord. Washington offered few public details, but press reports indicated that Russia had tested a prohibited intermediate-range GLCM. The INF Treaty does not ban development per se, but draws the line at testing. In March 2017, a senior U.S. military officer said Russia had begun to deploy the missile, confirming press reports that had appeared two months earlier.

USS Florida launches a Tomahawk cruise missile during a test in the waters off the coast of the Bahamas in January 2003. (Photo: U.S. Navy/Getty Images)

U.S. government officials have made little information available publicly on the specifics of the Russian violation. This stems from their desire to protect sources and methods, that is, how the U.S. government learned of the violation. They have been consulting with allies on INF Treaty questions and the Russian violation.

The Trump administration says the Russian system of concern is the SSC-8 GLCM, which the U.S. government says uses the Russian designator 9M729. This missile appears to be an extended-range version of the SSC-7 (Iskander-K) cruise missile. The Iskander-K is an INF Treaty-permitted cruise missile with a range of less than 500 kilometers. The SSC-8/9M729 reportedly uses a launcher that differs from the Iskander-K launcher. Deployment of SSC-8 missiles is expected in all four Russian military districts, that is, in the European and Asian parts of Russia.

Russia has denied the U.S. charge and asserted that U.S. officials had not produced enough information for it to identify the system of concern. U.S. officials flatly rejected that, saying that Moscow has all the information it needs. The U.S. Department of State’s 2017 compliance report notes that, during several meetings, the U.S. side provided “more than enough information for the Russian side to identify the missile in question,” including “[i]nformation pertaining to the missile and the launcher,” such as “Russia’s internal designator for the mobile launcher chassis and the names of the companies involved in developing and producing the missile and launcher,” as well as data on “the violating GLCM’s test history, including coordinates of the tests and Russia’s attempts to obfuscate the nature of the program.”¹ Russian officials recently acknowledged that the 9M729 (SSC-8) is the missile in question, but they maintain that it is fully compliant with the INF Treaty.

Russian officials charge the United States with violating the INF Treaty. The primary Russian concern appears to center on the Mk-41 vertical launch system for the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors in Romania, soon to be deployed in Poland, which are part of NATO’s missile defense program. Russian officials note that Mk-41 vertical launch systems on U.S. Navy warships can launch sea-launched cruise missiles, which are quite similar to the now eliminated GLCMs, as well as SM-3 interceptors and other missiles, and say that the launchers in Romania and Poland can contain cruise missiles.

Moreover, the Russians charge that the United States uses intermediate-range ballistic missiles as targets in missile defense tests and operates armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones) that are equivalent to GLCMs of intermediate range.

U.S. and Russian officials discussed the charges in political channels for several years before convening the SVC in November 2016. The commission met again in mid-December 2017. Thus far, it has not reported progress toward resolving the compliance questions.

Resolving Compliance Issues

From a technical perspective, parties to the INF Treaty could resolve these concerns through a combination of political-level talks and technical exchanges in the SVC. A group of nongovernmental experts, the
trilateral Deep Cuts Commission, has developed a number of proposals on how the SVC could tackle these noncompliance concerns.²

If Moscow were prepared to address the U.S. charge seriously, the SVC could agree on procedures under which the Russian side would exhibit the SSC-8 and its launcher to U.S. experts and explain the missile’s characteristics, particularly its range. If that exhibition satisfied the U.S. side that the missile was consistent with the INF Treaty, the matter would be put to rest. If there were further questions, they could be discussed in the SVC. Another option for addressing the problem would be to create a new panel of technical experts from the United States and Russia to discuss ways to resolve noncompliance concerns.

If it turned out that the SSC-8 had a range in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 5,500 kilometers, the issue would be more difficult to resolve. All missiles and their associated launchers, including all launchers from which the missile was tested, would have to be eliminated in a verifiable manner in order for Russia to return to compliance with the treaty. The INF Treaty contains precise verification procedures, but they were developed and tailored to certify the destruction of U.S. and Soviet systems in existence as of 1987. Those procedures would require adaptation for the SSC-8 and its launcher, which could be agreed in the SVC. In any case, the sooner that detailed discussions on the violation commenced, the easier it would be to find solutions to tackle the compliance problems raised by Washington and Moscow.

With regard to the Russian charges, the dispute over the U.S. use of booster stages in target missiles for ballistic missile defense tests should not prove difficult to resolve. The INF Treaty makes an allowance for such missiles, and the sides’ technical experts could work out language in the SVC to distinguish between prohibited intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missiles and allowed target missiles for missile defense tests. In addition, they might agree on language restricting target missiles to production facilities and sites associated with missile defense tests.

The second dispute regards whether armed UAVs, which the United States deploys and Russia is developing, are covered by the agreement. Armed UAVs did not exist when the United States and Soviet Union concluded the INF Treaty. UAVs differ from cruise missiles because they can return to base after their mission is completed. This clear distinction between GLCMs and UAVs should enable experts in the SVC to agree on language to clarify the scope of the INF Treaty.

The more serious Russian charge concerns the Mk-41 vertical launch system deployed in Romania and scheduled to become operational in Poland in 2018. Experts could address that in two ways. One would be modification of the land-based Mk-41 system with an observable difference—ideally, a functionally related observable difference—to distinguish the launchers in Romania and Poland from Mk-41 vertical launch systems on U.S. warships.

The second approach would employ transparency measures to reassure Russia that the launchers in Romania and Poland did not contain cruise missiles or weapons other than SM-3 interceptors. With the agreement of NATO and, in particular, Romania and Poland, U.S. officials could invite Russian inspectors to periodically visit the SM-3 sites, where they could randomly choose two or some other agreed number of the 24 launch tubes in the vertical launch system to be opened, allowing confirmation that they contained SM-3 interceptors.

The SVC would work out procedures for such inspections, as well as the particulars for observable differences for the vertical launch systems in Romania and Poland. Given the concerns of NATO member states, it might make sense to include European experts on visits to the SM-3 interceptor sites or to any Russian exhibition of the SSC-8.

The Politics of Compliance

The political obstacles to resolving the INF Treaty issues appear more difficult to overcome than the technical hurdles. The INF Treaty dispute happens at a time when a number of other arms control and transparency agreements, including the Open Skies Treaty, are increasingly affected by the crisis in U.S.-Russian relations. These accords may lack the strong supporting constituencies in Moscow, Washington, and, to some degree, Europe that they used to have.

A number of Russian military and civilian officials seem to favor withdrawal from the INF Treaty. They argue that it is a Cold War relic that has been overtaken by technological advances. These include the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Europe and the growing number of intermediate-range missiles in the inventories of third countries. China, for example, deploys hundreds of intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles. North Korea, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel also possess intermediate-range missiles.

Those Russians who support continued adherence to the treaty worry about a new arms race and the prospect of the deployment of new U.S. precision-guided weapons systems in Europe. Moscow’s official position remains that it has not violated the treaty and remains committed to it. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said that Russia remains willing “to discuss the concerns of both parties.”³

U.S. Attempts to Bring Russia Back Into Compliance

While charging Russia with violating the INF Treaty, the Obama administration made clear its interest in maintaining the treaty and sought to bring Russia back into compliance. It failed. The Trump administration conducted a review of the agreement while senior administration officials spoke in the fall of 2017 of looking for leverage to bring Russia back into compliance with the accord.

Also at that time, Congress agreed on language in the National Defense Authorization Act that authorizes up to $58 million to respond to the alleged Russian INF Treaty violation, including by the establishment of a program of record to develop an intermediate-range GLCM.⁴

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in remarks October 20, 2017, at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference that Russia is willing to “discuss the concerns of both parties.” (Photo: C-SPAN)

On December 8, 2017—the 30th anniversary of the signing of the INF Treaty—the Trump administration announced what it called an integrated strategy for dealing with the Russian violation. The strategy reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to preserving the treaty and said the United States would (1) continue efforts to seek a diplomatic settlement of the Russian violation, including through the SVC; (2) begin research and development on options for conventionally armed intermediate-range ground-launched missile systems; and (3) impose economic sanctions on Russian entities that had taken part in development and production of the SSC-8.

Development of a new U.S. intermediate-range ground-launched missile, although not a violation of the treaty as long as the United States did not proceed to flight-testing, would be at odds with the purpose of the INF Treaty. After all, it was negotiated with the goal of eliminating all land-based intermediate-range missiles from Europe and globally. The Russians undoubtedly will attempt to exploit the contradiction between U.S. words and actions if Washington were to pursue development of a new intermediate-range ground-launched missile while insisting on the value of a prohibition of those weapons.

The push for a tough response is based on the hope that the United States and NATO can pressure Russia to come back into compliance. Congress, which distrusts the Trump administration’s Russia policy, may also hope to make sure that the president does not paper over the INF Treaty issue. Proponents of a tit-for-tat response recall that deploying GLCMs and Pershing IIs in the early 1980s helped to trigger a discussion in Moscow that eventually led to the agreement to eliminate all INF Treaty-covered missiles.

Could a second dual-track decision, including a decision to deploy new U.S. intermediate-range systems in Europe, push Moscow back to the negotiating table? A number of factors appear to lower the likelihood that such a policy would work. First, finding consensus within NATO for such a course would prove difficult. In the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union’s military position relative to NATO was significantly stronger than that of Russia today relative to NATO. Second, the relationship between Moscow and Washington 30 years ago was on an upward trajectory, whereas today U.S.-Russian relations are in a downward spiral. Arguably, the leaderships in Moscow and Washington in the 1980s were pursuing more consistent and predictable policies and were more interested in reversing the nuclear arms race than their successors are today.

Moreover, a program that moved beyond early research and development to flight-testing and production of a new U.S. intermediate-range ground-launched missile would cost billions of dollars at a time when the Department of Defense budget already faces major shortfalls. Fielding a new missile system would take years and not provide a timely response to Russia’s current violation.

The Alliance Dimension

The U.S. and NATO military responses to Russian deployment of a new GLCM should primarily aim at reassuring allies. Although allies may not object to U.S. development of a new intermediate-range ground-launched missile, proceeding to flight-testing and deployment would severely stress NATO solidarity.

Deploying U.S. conventionally armed air- and sea-launched cruise missiles to Europe would offer an alternative action. Temporary deployments of conventional B-1 heavy bombers combined with Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles, as well as more frequent deployments to northern European waters of U.S. warships and submarines carrying conventionally armed sea-launched cruise missiles, could also signal the U.S. commitment to Europe. Deployment of the USS Georgia or USS Florida—converted Ohio-class submarines that carry up to 154 sea-launched cruise missiles—to seas near Europe would also underscore that any attempt by Moscow to create zones of different security are not going to be successful.

Steps such as these would be easier, faster, and cheaper than building a new ground-launched missile. They might affect Moscow’s calculation and encourage the Kremlin to return to compliance with the INF Treaty. If Russia did so, these steps would be readily reversible.

Such moves are also less likely to provoke a crisis within the alliance about its response to Russia’s actions. It is by no means certain that NATO would agree to deploy U.S. missiles now, as it did in its 1979 decision. The development of new intermediate-range ground-launched missiles will inevitably bring back memories of contentious debates within NATO about moving forward with the deployment of GLCMs and Pershing IIs in the early 1980s.

NATO members favor maintaining the INF Treaty. The communiqué of the 2016 NATO Warsaw summit termed preservation of the agreement “crucial to Euro-Atlantic security” and called on Moscow “to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and verifiable compliance.”⁵

At a November 2017 NATO defense ministers meeting, U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis again briefed allies on Russia’s alleged INF Treaty violation. Mattis reportedly urged allies to craft a joint position to force Russia back into compliance by the time of the next NATO summit in July 2018, suggesting that Washington would otherwise react unilaterally.⁶

On December 15, NATO allies took note of the U.S. decision to begin development of a new GLCM but stopped short of collectively endorsing it by stating that “our actions, including national measures taken by some allies, seek to preserve the INF Treaty, strengthen the alliance, and incentivize Russia to engage in good faith.” NATO also stated that “allies have identified a Russian missile system that raises serious concerns,” yet allies did not jointly affirm the U.S. finding of Russian non-compliance.⁷

That silence frustrates U.S. officials, particularly because a Russian intermediate-range GLCM would be designed and built to strike targets in Europe and Asia, not the United States. To improve alliance cohesion, Washington should inform the alliance in more specific detail about its intelligence on the SSC-8. It should consult with allies on the way forward. Any attempt to force allies to support U.S. military deployments could well increase skepticism in Europe about the reliability of Washington’s nuclear policies under President Donald Trump.

Given that Congress has become a driving force behind the U.S. push to respond in kind to Russia’s policies, a parliamentary dialogue on how to respond to the INF Treaty violation would be important. NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly, which regularly brings together legislators from alliance members, might be a good place to have discussions about a response to Russia’s actions. This could be complemented by bilateral dialogues between parliamentarians.

Any division among allies on how to act on the INF Treaty question would play into Moscow’s hands. In any event, it would make no sense for Washington to withdraw from the treaty unless it can present compelling evidence of Russia’s violation. Absent such information, the United States likely would get the blame for the treaty’s end, and Russia would be free to deploy intermediate-range missiles without any treaty constraints.

Conclusion

The INF Treaty is fundamental to European security and important to the security of U.S. allies and others in Asia. The treaty’s collapse would open the way for an arms race in intermediate-range ground-launched missiles, with unpredictable strategic and political consequences for relations between the West and Russia.⁸ It would also weaken the U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control regime. Indeed, although their proposal did not survive congressional conference committee negotiations on the National Defense Authorization Act, some Republicans had proposed to deny funds for extension of New START beyond 2021 if Russia was not in compliance with the INF Treaty.

The INF Treaty has made a significant contribution to security in Europe and Asia over the past 30 years. It should be preserved. That will require smart decisions by the Trump administration and concerted action with NATO members, which will otherwise find they are confronting a new Russian missile threat.

Saving the INF Treaty will also require a change in the Kremlin’s current course. The West should do what it can to encourage such a change. 

ENDNOTES 

1 Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State, “2017 Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” April 2017, pp. 13-14, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/270603.pdf.

2 See Hans Kristensen et al., “Preserving the INF Treaty: A Special Briefing Paper,” April 24, 2017, http://deepcuts.org/files/pdf/Special_Brief_-_Deep_Cuts_INF.pdf. For information on the Deep Cuts Commission, see http://deepcuts.org/.

3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference,” October 20, 2017, http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/2913751.

4 Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Analysis of Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Bill: HR 2810,” n.d., https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/NDAA-conference-analysis-111417.pdf.

5 “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” NATO press release no. (2016) 100, July 9, 2016, para. 62, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.

6 Matthias Gebauer, Christoph Schult, and Klaus Wiegrefe, “Alleged INF Treaty Violation; U.S. Demands NATO Action on Russian Missiles,” Spiegel Online, December 8, 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/us-delivers-ultimatum-to-nato-regarding-russian-missiles-a-1182426.html.

7 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,” NATO Press Release (2017) 180, December 15, 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_150016.htm.

8 For example, see Ian Anthony, “European Security After the INF Treaty,” Survival, Vol. 59, No. 6 (December 2014-January 2018): 61-76.

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Steven Pifer is a nonresident senior fellow with the Brookings Institution. Oliver Meier is deputy head of the International Security Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Both are members of the Deep Cuts Commission, a nongovernmental group of German, Russian and U.S. experts.