A selection of works on Brazilian Foreign Policy and Diplomacy in English - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

PAULO ROBERTO DE ALMEIDA

A selection of works on Brazilian Foreign Policy and Diplomacy in English

Ordem cronológica inversa: 2019 a 2003

Atualizado em 10 de Janeiro de 2020

3474. “Brazil and the 1919 peace negotiations: a newcomer among the greats”, Brasília, 7-16 june 2019, 21 p. Paper prepared for the Peace Making after the First World War, 1919-1923 Conference, held on 27 and 28 June at The National Archives and Lancaster House. Sent to the Organizing Committee, on behalf of Dr Juliette Desplat (Head, Modern Overseas, Intelligence and Security Records; Collections Expertise & Engagement Department; The National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey TW9 4DU. Disponível na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/s/d498fd2bfa/brazil-and-the-1919-peace-negotiations-a-newcomer-among-the-greats-2019).

3284. “De la (Non) Démocratie en Amérique (Latine): a Tocqueville report on the state of governance in Latin America”, Brasília, 9 junho 2018, 41 p. Paper presented in the Estoril Political Forum; round-table “Brazil and Latin America: the challenges ahead”; postado em Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/s/a4cbf778cf/de-la-non-democratie-en-amerique-latine-a-tocqueville-report-on-the-state-of-governance-in-latin-america), em Research Gate (link: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325809199_De_la_Non_Democratie_en_Amerique_Latine_A_Tocqueville_report_on_the_state_of_governance_in_Latin_America) e divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (17/06/2018; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2018/06/de-la-non-democratie-en-amerique-latine.html) e no Facebook (link: https://www.facebook.com/paulobooks/posts/1950274015036039). Publicado na Revista de Estudos e Pesquisas Avançadas do Terceiro Setor, REPATS (vol. 5, n. 1, janeiro-junho 2008, p. 792-842; ISSN: 2359-5299; link: https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/REPATS/article/view/10020/5909; DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.31501/repats.v5i1%20Jan/Jun.10020). Relação de Publicados n. 1289.

3133. “A Brazilian Adam Smith: Cairu as the Founding Father of Political Economy in Brazil at the beginning of the 19^thcentury”, Brasília, 30 junho 2017, 2 p. Proposal submission to the IASS international conference on Adam Smith (Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez; Viña del Mar, Chile, January 12-13, 2018; Publicado na revista Mises: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Law and Economics (São Paulo, SP, Brazil; vol. 6, n. 1, edição 10 (janeiro-abril 2018); ISSN: 2318-0811, pp. 117-129; DOI: https://doi.org/10.30800/mises.2018.v6.64; e-ISSN: 2594-9187; link: https://www.misesjournal.org.br/misesjournal/article/view/64; artigo em pdf, link: https://www.misesjournal.org.br/misesjournal/article/view/64/179). Relação de Publicados n. 1278.

3125. “Brazil as a Failing State (or, is it already a Failed State?)”, Brasília, 12 June 2017, 15 p. Note of opinion drafted for the Estoril Political Forum, Panel Brazil, June 27, 2017. Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (26/06/2017; link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.pt/2017/06/brasil-existe-uma-crise-da-democracia.html).

3062. “Itamaraty and the new Brazilian Foreign Policy”, São Paulo, 1 dezembro 2016, 7 p. Palestra na conferência “Geopolitics of the Global South: changing patterns of development”, realizada na FEA-USP, em cooperação com a Universidade de Pec, da Hungria. Postado no Diplomatizzando(http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2016/12/geopolitics-of-global-south-changing.html); Disponível na plataforma Academia.edu (http://www.academia.edu/30208664/3062_Itamaraty_and_the_new_Brazilian_Foreign_Policy_2016_). 

3041. “China’s pivot, Brazil’s stance: a personal view”, Brasília, 24 setembro 2016, 6 p. Notas para intervenção no encontro GIBSA (Germany, India, Brazil, South Africa), realizado em Brasília, 26 e 27 de setembro, a convite do Emb. Roberto Abdenur. Publicado em Mundorama (24/09/2016, link: http://www.mundorama.net/2016/09/24/chinas-pivot-brazils-stance-a-personal-view-by-paulo-roberto-de-almeida/; URL: http://wp.me/p71o3r-59r). Disponibilizado em Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/s/42e5a419f5/3041-chinas-pivot-brazils-stance-a-personal-view-2016) e colocado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2016/09/chinas-pivot-brazils-stance-personal.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1242.

2924. “       Oswaldo Aranha: The continuity of Rio Branco’s Statesmanship”, Brasília, 23 janeiro 2016, 34 p. Tradução por Paul Sekscenski do trabalho n. 2502, destinado a ser publicado na versão em inglês do livro Pensamento Diplomático Brasileiro. Publicado in: José Vicente Pimentel (org.), José Vicente Pimentel (ed.), Brazilian Diplomatic Thought: policymakers and agents of Foreign Policy (1750-1964) (Brasília: Funag, 2016, 3 vols.; ISBN: 978-85-7631-547-6) Traduzido para o Espanhol por Paola Citraro; publicado in: José Vicente de Sá Pimentel (org.), Pensamiento diplomático brasileño: formuladores y agentes de la política externa (1750-1964); ISBN: 978-85-7631-588-9; vol. III, 496 p. sequenciais; p. 663-707.; Brasília: FUNAG, 2016; 3 v. – (História diplomática); Título original: Disponível no link: http://www.funag.gov.br/boletim-editorial/PDB-ES/livros/pdb_vol_3_es.pdf. Relação de Publicados n. 1110 e 1236.

2906. “Brazilian Diplomatic Thought: methodological introduction to the ideas and actions of some of its representatives”, Brasília, 14 dezembro 2015, 16 p. Tradução para o inglês, por Paul Sekscenski do trabalho n. 2503, “Pensamento diplomático brasileiro: introdução metodológica às ideias e ações de alguns dos seus representantes” (Hartford, 27 Julho 2013, 19 p.), in: José Vicente Pimentel (ed.), Brazilian Diplomatic Thought: policymakers and agents of Foreign Policy (1750-1964), vol. 1 (Brasília: Funag, 2016, 346 p.; ISBN: 978-85-7631-547-6; p. 19-41; translation by Paul Sekscenski; available: http://funag.gov.br/loja/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=841; livro em pdf: http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/1166-BRAZILIAN_DIPLOMATIC_THOUGHT-PDB-Ingles-VOL-1.pdf); disponível em Academia.edu (link: http://www.academia.edu/29111021/Brazilian_Diplomatic_Thought_Policymakers_and_Agents_of_Foreign_Policy_1750-1964_2016_). Relação de Publicados n. 1245.

2888. “The Great Destruction in Brazil: How to Downgrade an Entire Country in Less Than Four Years”. Publicado em Mundorama (n. 102, 1/02/2016, ISSN: 2175-2052; link: http://www.mundorama.net/?p=18052). Relação de Publicados n. 1210.

2875. Brazil, Latin America, and the World: Essays in Foreign Policy and in International Economic Relations, Hartford, 21 setembro 2015, 383 p. Livro (2881) para ser editado e publicado, com outro título, constando dos trabalhos n. 1999, 2128, 2494, 1902, 1213, 2207, 2871, 2516, 2510, 1983, 2025, 1871, 1845, 1920, 2202, 2680, 2488, 761+959; 2479 e 2321. Revisão completa, resultou no trabalho n. 2881, sob o nome de Going Global: Brazil and Latin America in International Context. To be published.

2871. “The (non-)continuity of Lula’s Diplomacy under Dilma Rousseff”, Hartford, September 17, 2015, 5 p. A small piece of evaluation for adding to a book on Brazilian diplomacy, as an appendix to the section on Foreign Relations. Unpublished. Available at blog Diplomatizzando (10/01/2020; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2020/01/the-non-continuity-of-lulas-diplomacy.html); Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/41579812/The_non-_continuity_of_Lulas_diplomacy_under_Dilma_Rousseff_2015_).

2830. “Latin American development trends and Brazil’s role in the region”, Anápolis, 1-4 junho 2015, 15 p. Contribution to the journal “International Relations”, from People’s Friendship University of Russia (PFUR), Prof. Alla Borzova. Publicado em PFUR, Bulletin of International Relations (Moscow: People’s Friendship University of Russia, vol. 15, n. 4, December 2015, p. 7-19). Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (20/08/2016; link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2016/08/latin-american-trends-paulo-roberto-de.html); Publicado na revista Paiaguás: revista de estudos sobre a Amazônia e Pacífico (UFMS; vol. I, n. 1, fevereiro-julho 2015, p. 37-53; link para a revista: http://seer.ufms.br/index.php/revpaiaguas . Link para o artigo: http://seer.ufms.br/index.php/revpaiaguas/article/view/997; em pdf: http://seer.ufms.br/index.php/revpaiaguas/article/view/997/606). Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/41579723/Latin_American_development_trends_and_Brazil_s_role_in_the_region_2015_). Relação de Publicados n. 1181 e 1209.

2680. “The Politics of Economic Regime Change in Brazilian History”, Hartford, 26 Setembro 2014, 41 p. Revisão final do trabalho 2673, para incorporação ao livro Ted Goertzel and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (eds.), The Drama of Brazilian Politics: From 1815 to 2015  (Amazon Digital Services; Kindle Book, 2014, 301 p.; ISBN: 978-1-4951-2981-0; ASIN: B00NZBPX8A; available at: http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00NZBPX8A), com a participação de outros colaboradores. (Available Academia.edu; link: https://www.academia.edu/41579661/The_Politics_of_Economic_Regime_Change_in_Brazilian_History_2014_). Relação de Publicados n. 1142 e 1143.

2534. “Historical and Contemporary Trends of Brazilian Foreign Policy: a critical assessment”, Hartford, 14 November 2013, 24 slides. Presentation prepared at the invitation of Dr. Thomas O’Keefe, Chair, Western Hemisphere Area Studies at the Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, for a talk in the Brazil Advanced Area Studies Course, at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center (4000 Arlington Blvd., Arlington, VA, 22204; Room K-1504; Tel. 703/302-6857), December 3, 2013, 11-12am. Shared through Dropbox (links to file in pptx: https://www.dropbox.com/s/8j63y5f62v6q96g/PRAlmeidaBrzForPol.pptx; in pdf: https://www.dropbox.com/s/5sb9e0gu087m296/PRAlmeidaBrzForPol.pdf).

2510. “Democracy Deficit in Emerging Countries: Undemocratic trends in Latin America and the role of Brazil”, Hartford, 3 September 2013, 34 p. Paper for the Conference “Promoting Democracy: What Role for the Emerging Powers?”, organized by the Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), the International Development Research Centre (IRDC), and the University of Ottawa (Ottawa, 15-16 October 2013). Feito resumo para apresentação por Joseph Marques, sob n. 2517, devido ao não comparecimento (available at Academia.edu; link: https://www.academia.edu/attachments/32627094/download_file).

2493. “Brazil-USA relations during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso governments”, Hartford, 23 Junho 2013, 28 p. Versão em inglês do trabalho 1413, preparado para o livro Relações Brasil-Estados Unidos: séculos XX e XXI. Munhoz, Sidnei J.; Silva, Francisco Carlos Teixeira da. (Orgs.). Maringá: Editora da UEM, 2011, p. 273-307; em tradução feita por Phillip Wigan, revista por mim. Publicado In: Munhoz, Sidnei J.; Silva, Francisco Carlos Teixeira da (editors). Brazil-United States Relations: XX and XXI centuries. Maringá: Eduem, 2013, 460 p.; ISBN: 978-85-7628-532-8; capítulo 7, p. 217-246; disponível no link: https://www.academia.edu/attachments/32626974/download_file. Relação de Publicados n. 1108.

2488. “Brazilian trade policy in historical perspective: constant features, erratic behavior”, Hartford, 14 Maio 2013, 23 p.; Artigo de caráter ensaístico para a RBDI e para a Auslandsgesellschaft Nordrhein-Westfalen; (http://law.bepress.com/expresso/), site da RBDI: http://www.publicacoesacademicas.uniceub.br/index.php/rdi/index; Feito upload no Academia.edu (disponível no link: https://www.academia.edu/attachments/31443360/download_file). Publicado na Revista Brasileira de Direito Internacional – Brazilian Journal of International Law (vol. 10, n. 1, 2013, número especial: Direito Internacional Econômico; p. 11-26; doi:10.5102/rdi.v10i1.2393; ISSN: 2236-997X (impresso) - ISSN 2237-1036 (on-line); link: http://www.publicacoesacademicas.uniceub.br/index.php/rdi/article/view/2393/pdf). Inscrita na plataforma SSRN (Social Sciences Research Network: Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3483346 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3483346; https://ssrn.com/abstract=3483346). Relação de Publicados n. 1098.

2479. “Brazilian Economic Historiography: an essay on bibliographical synthesis”, Hartford, 11 Abril 2013, 17 p. Versão em inglês do trabalho 2263, publicado como: “Historiografia econômica brasileira”, Revista de Economia e Relações Internacionais (vol. 11, n. 21, July 2012, p. 5-21; ISSN: 1677-4973). Para a 38^a. Conferência da Economic & Business History Society, em Baltimore (23-25 de maio de 2013); publicado em inglês na História e Economia: Revista Interdisciplinar (vol. 12, n. 1, 1^o. semestre de 2014, p, 149-165; ISSN: 1808-5318). Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/7858303/2479_Brazilian_Economic_Historiography_an_essay_on_bibliographical_synthesis_2013-14_). Relação de Publicados n. 1137.

2321. “Brazil and United States: parallel lives?”, Brasília, 29 setembro 2011, 3 p. Review of: Joseph Smith: Brazil and United States: Convergences and Divergences (Athens, GA: Georgia University Press, 2010; pp. xii, 244; $ 24.95, paper; ISBN: 978-0-8203-2770-9), for the International History Review (Dr. Gaynor Johnson:). Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (9/06/2013; link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2013/06/relacoes-brasil-estados-unidos-um-livro.html).

2207. “Never Seen Before in Brazil: Lula’s grand diplomacy”, Shanghai, 18 outubro 2010, 20 p. Revisão redutora do trabalho n. 2172, para RBPI; revisto em 8.12.2010. Publicado, sob o título: “Never Before Seen in Brazil: Lula’s grand diplomacy” na Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (vol. 53, n. 2, 2010, p. 160-177; ISSN: 0034-7329; link: http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292010000200009&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en; arquivo em pdf: http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rbpi/v53n2/09.pdf). Relação de Publicados n 1013.

2148. “The Foreign Policy of Brazil under Lula”, Shanghai-Hangzhou, May 27-30, 2010, 9 p. Respostas a questões colocadas por Candice Moore – PhD. Candidate at LSE. Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (9/01/2020; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2020/01/brazilian-foreign-policy-under-lula.html).

2128. “Attraction and Repulsion: Brazil and the American world”, Shanghai, 8 abril 2010, 9 p. Ensaio para livro organizado por Sean Clark e Sabrina Hocque, What Lies Ahead?: Debating the Prospects for a ‘Post-American World’ (Routledge: London, 2011), como resposta às teses de Fareed Zakaria em The Post-American World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009). Versão final em 5/03/2011, reduzida em relação ao original. Publicado in: Clark, Sean and Sabrina Hoque (eds.). Debating a Post-American World: What Lies Ahead? (London: Routledge, 2011, 288 p.; ISBN: 978-0415690553, p. 135-141; available: http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415690553/). Disponível (Academia.edu: link: https://www.academia.edu/41576924/Attraction_and_Repulsion_Brazil_and_the_American_world_2011_). Relação de Publicados n. 1061.

2025. “Relações do Brasil com a América Latina e os EUA”, Brasília, 9 julho 2009, 3 p. Artigo para a revista Conjuntura Econômica, edição especial sobre política externa brasileira (setembro 2009); Publicada versão em inglês, sob o título de “Brazilian Foreign Relations with South America and USA”, The Brazilian Economy: Economy, Politics and Policy Issues (FGV, Brazilian Institute of Economics: vol. 1, n. 8, September 2009) p. 30-33. Artigo postado em Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/41574082/Brazilian_Foreign_Relations_with_South_America_and_USA_2009_). Relação de Publicados n. 925.

2023. “Non-Intervention: a political concept, in a legal wrap: a historical and juridical appraisal of the Brazilian doctrine and practice”, Brasília, 8 Julho 2009, 17 p. Ensaio sobre o conceito em causa, para informar escritório britânico de advocacia. Posted Blog Textos PRA (03.03.2010; link: http://textospra.blogspot.com/2010/03/569-brazil-and-non-intervention-paulo-r.html). Disponível na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/41574014/Non-Intervention_a_political_concept_in_a_legal_wrap_A_historical_and_juridical_appraisal_of_the_Brazilian_doctrine_and_practice_2009_).

1996. “Brazil’s role in South America and in the global arena”, Urbana, 13 abril 2009, 7 p. Answers to questions presented by Amanda Wade, M.A. Candidate 2010 of the Latin American & Hemispheric Studies Elliott School of International Affairs - George Washington University. Blog Diplomatizzando (13.04.2009; link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2009/04/1063-turismo-academico-13-brazils-role.html).

1902. “Brazil in the world context, at the first decade of the 21th century: regional leadership and strategies for its integration into the world economy”, Rio de Janeiro, 26 junho 2008, 22 p. Essay for the volume edited by Joám Evans Pim (president IGESIP, Corunha; www.igesip.org; Editor Strategic Evaluation), on Brazilian Defense Policy: Current Trends and Regional Implications (to be published in United Kingdom). In: Joam Evans (org.), Brazilian Defence Policies: Current Trends and Regional Implications (London: Dunkling Books, 2009, 251 p.; ISBN: 978-0-9563478-0-0; p. 11-26). Divulgado em Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/41574135/Brazil_in_the_world_context_at_the_first_decade_of_the_21th_century_Regional_leadership_and_strategies_for_its_integration_into_the_world_economy_2008_).Relação de Publicados n. 935.

1900. “Brazil: Mileposts to Responsible Stakeholdership”, Brasília-Tóquio, 24 junho 2008, 53 p. Joint text, written with Miguel Diaz, for the project “Mileposts to Responsible Stakeholdership” of the Stanley Foundation (http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/); presented by Miguel Diaz in a Washington meeting (July 8, 2008) and published at the website of the Project “Powers and Principles: International Leadership in a Shrinking World” (November 3rd, 2008; link: http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?ID=504), under the title: “Brazil's Candidacy for Major Power Status”, by Miguel Diaz and Paulo Roberto Almeida, with a reaction by Georges D. Landau (Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation, Working Paper, November 2008, 24 p.; link: http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/powersandprinciples/BrazilCandidacyMPStatus.PDF). Published in book form as: “Brazil's Candidacy for Major Power Status”, with Miguel Diaz. In: Michael Schiffer and David Shorr (eds.). Powers and Principles: International Leadership in a Shrinking World (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009, 328p.; Co-published with: The Stanley Foundation; ISBN Cloth: 978-0-7391-3543-3; $85.00; ISBN Paper: 978-0-7391-3544-0; $32.95; p. 225-250; link: https://www.academia.edu/41574411/Brazils_Candidacy_for_Major_Power_Status_2008_). Relação de Publicados n. 897.

1868. “Brazil’s Integration into Global Governance: The rise of the Outreach-5 countries to a G-8 (plus) status”, Brasília, 9 março 2008, 29 p. Versão em inglês, ampliada, em colaboração com Denise Gregory, Diretora Executiva do Cebri, do trabalho 1866. Draft paper prepared for the Project Dialogue on Global Governance with the “Outreach” countries - Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, para apresentação em seminário no Cebri, Rio de Janeiro, em 4 de abril. Revisões: 4 de junho; 15 julho; 8 setembro (26 p.). Última revisão: 30 de dezembro. Publicado, como “Brazil”, no volume: Growth and Responsibility: The positioning of emerging powers in the global governance system (Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2009, 126 p.; ISBN: 978-3-940955-45-6; p. 11-30; link: http://www.kas.de/wf/en/33.15573/-/-/-/index.html?src=nl09-01). Trabalhos publicados n. 887.

1856. “Brazil and Global Governance”, Brasília, 30 janeiro 2008, 17 p. Colaboração a trabalho a ser apresentado pelo CEBRI para centro de estudos do Canadá (Centre for International Governance Innovation - CIGI). Unpublished. Available at Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/41576829/Brazil_and_Global_Governance_2008_).

1811. “The Foreign Policy of Brazil under Lula: Regional and global diplomatic strategies”, Brasília, 30 setembro 2007, 25 p. Published as “Lula’s Foreign Policy: Regional and Global Strategies”, chap. 9, In: Werner Baer and Joseph Love (eds.), Brazil under Lula (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009, 326 p.; ISBN: 970-0-230-60816-0; p. 167-183; link: https://www.academia.edu/41574913/Lula_s_Foreign_Policy_Regional_and_Global_Strategies_2009_). Publicados n. 811.

1748. “Brazil as a regional player and as an emerging global power: Foreign policy strategies and the impact on the new international order”, Brasília, 3 maio 2007, 23 p. Contribuição ao seminário Re-Ordering the World? Emerging Powers and Prospects for Global Governance, organizado pela Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlim, 15-16 de maio de 2007). Versão reduzida em inglês para publicação pela FES-SWP, dia 7.07.07; publicado sob a forma de Briefing Paper, series Dialogue on Globalization (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, July 2007; link: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04709.pdf).

1585. “Brazil story: once a vigorous country, now a lag behind economy!”, Brasília, 22 abril 2006, 5 p. Apresentação em PowerPoint para um encontro de estagiários da Comissão Fulbright, em São Paulo, no dia 2 de maio de 2006 (35 slides de texto, gráficos e tabelas), a convite de Luiz Loureiro. Available at Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/41576449/BRAZIL_story_once_a_vigorous_country_now_a_lag_behind_economy_2006_).

1213. “Comparing two foreign policies: FHC and Lula in perspective”, Brasília, 21 fev. 2004, 5 p. Revisto e ampliado em 28/02/2004. Tabela sinóptica, escrita originalmente em inglês, comparando princípios e práticas de política externa dos governos FHC e Lula, em grandes temas da agenda diplomática, para apresentação no seminário da Florida International University, em 4/03/2004: “Brazil Between Regionalism and Globalism: Old Ambitions, New Results?”, coorganizado pelo Summit of the Americas Center e o Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais; available at Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/41576385/Comparing_two_foreign_policies_FHC_and_Lula_in_perspective_2004_).

962. “Selective Bibliography: Brazilian Studies in the United States”, Washington, 10 out. 2002, 23 p. Seção final do livro Envisioning Brazil: A Guide to the Study of Brazil in the United States, 1945-2000 (Marshall C. Eakin, as co-editor). Available at the plataform Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/41576344/Bibliography_to_the_Guide_of_Brazilian_Studies_in_the_US_2005_).

961. “A Chronology of US-Brazil Relations and Academic Production, 1945-2002”, Washington, 10 out. 2002, 19 p. Capítulo 15 do livro Envisioning Brazil: A Guide to the Study of Brazil in the United States, 1945-2000 (Marshall C. Eakin, as co-editor). Tradução para o inglês Marcia Corteletti Loureiro; em Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/41576306/A_Chronology_of_US-Brazil_Relations_and_Academic_Production_1945-2003).

960. “Brazilian Studies in the United States: Trends, Perspectives and Prospects, 1945-2000”, Washington, 9 outubro 2002, 22 p. Capítulo elaborado para o livro sobre o brasilianismo acadêmico (publicado em O Brasil dos brasilianistas: um guia dos estudos sobre o Brasil nos Estados Unidos, 1945-2000; São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2002), preparado originalmente para o seminário de estudos brasileiros nos EUA (realizado em Washington em 10/2000), para publicação (com cronologia e bibliografia separadas) no livro Envisioning Brazil: a Guide to the Study of Brazil in the United States, 1945-2000 (Marshall C. Eakin, as co-editor). Livro publicado pela University of Wisconsin Press (Maddison) em 2005. Disponível em Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/41576278/Brazilian_Studies_in_the_United_States_Trends_Perspectives_and_Prospects_2002-2005_).

647. “O Brasil e o futuro do Mercosul: dilemas e opções”, Brasília, 23 novembro 1998, 20 p. Reelaboração ampliada do trabalho n. 612, com base em pareceres anônimos solicitados pelo INTAL. Publicado como “Brasil y el futuro del Mercosur: dilemas y opciones”, Integración & Comércio (Buenos Aires: BID-INTAL, vol. 2, nº 6, set.-dic. 1998, p. 65-81; link: http://www.iadb.org/intal/aplicaciones/uploads/publicaciones/e_INTAL_IYC_06_1998_deAlmeida.pdf). Versão em inglês: “Brazil and the future of Mercosur: dilemmas and options”, Integration and Trade (Buenos Aires: BID-INTAL, vol. 2, n. 6, sept.-dec. 1998, p. 59-74) Divulgado em inglês em Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/41575485/Brazil_and_the_Future_of_Mercosur_dilemmas_and_options_1998_). Relação de Publicados nº 232. 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 10 de Janeiro de 2020

The Drama of Brazilian Politics, 1815 to 2015 - Book by Ted Goertzel and Paulo Roberto de Almeida

The Drama of Brazilian Politics: From 1814 to 2015 (English Edition) eBook Kindle

por Ted Goertzel (Autor), Paulo Roberto de Almeida (Autor), João Paulo Peixoto (Autor), Farida Jalalzi (Autor), & 6 mais

Karl Marx once observed that “all great world-historic facts and personages in world history occur, as it were, twice: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.” Brazilian history includes several tragedies and a good deal of farce, as well as some heroics, a few mysteries, and a little romance.

No Brazilian king, emperor or president has ever been assassinated, but our drama includes one dramatic suicide (Getúlio Vargas in 1954), four leaders who resigned out of frustration or pressed by grave political upheavals (Dom João VI in 1821, Dom Pedro I in 1831, Deodoro da Fonseca in 1891, and Jânio Quadros in 1961), while many others were forced out of office by coups or conspiracies (among them Dom Pedro II in 1889, Washington Luís in 1930, Getúlio Vargas in 1945, and João Goulart in 1964), and one forced from office in an impeachment process (Fernando Collor in 1992). Characters include the world's first sociologist president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the world's second labor leader president (after Lech Walesa), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and Brazil's first woman president, Dilma Rousseff. It ends with an exciting electoral struggle in 2014 between Dilma Rousseff and Marina Silva, a woman from the Amazon who fought with the martyred Chico Mendes to defend the environment and the rights of rubber trappers.

This book is suitable for students of Latin American history, politics and economics, as well as for journalists, diplomats, activists, business people, or anyone interested in Brazil. It is up-to-date, but also deeply rooted in Brazilian history and in a concern with lasting social problems. The authors vary widely in their ideological and political dispositions, and we have made no effort to homogenize the content. Each essay has a clear authorial voice. The chapters can be read separately, although readers without much familiarity with Brazilian history would probably do best to begin with the first chapter. That chapter, by Ted Goertzel, introduces the fascinating characters who played and are playing the leading roles in the drama of Brazilian politics.

The chapters are:

1. The Drama of Brazilian Politics: from 1815 to 2015, by Ted Goertzel
2.The Politics of Economic Regime Changes in Brazilian History by Paulo Roberto Almeida
3.The Brazilian Presidency from the Military Regime to the Workers’ Party by João Paulo M. Peixoto
4. A Woman’s Place is in the Presidency: Dilma, Marina and Women’s Representation in Brazil by Farida Jalalzai and Pedro G. dos Santos.
5.A Brazilian ex-President’s Public Speech: A Threat to the Existing Order? By Inês Signorini
6. Life without Turnstiles by Alipio de Sousa Filho
7.The Changing Face of Brazilian Politics by Sue Branford and Jan Rocha
8.Political Leadership and Protest in Brazil: The Social Protests of 2013 in Comparative Perspective by Guy Burton
9. Presidential Leadership and Regime Change in Brazil with Comparisons to the United States and Spanish America by Ted Goertzel

This book takes advantage of e-book technology to bring the reader a volume that is both timelier and less expensive than traditionally published volumes. We have updated our work to be released at the end of September, 2014, when interest should be high because of the Brazilian presidential election. We also plan to use the e-book technology to update the volume after the elections, and we invite readers to email us with comments and suggestions, as well as with corrections for any errors they may find.

• Formato: eBook Kindle
• Tamanho do arquivo: 1497 KB
• Número de páginas: 301 páginas
• Quantidade de dispositivos em que é possível ler este eBook ao mesmo tempo: Ilimitado
• Editora: Author's edition (26 de setembro de 2014)
• Vendido por: Amazon Servicos de Varejo do Brasil Ltda
• Idioma: Inglês
• ASIN: B00NZBPX8A
• 
  

The (non-)continuity of Lula’s diplomacy under Dilma Rousseff - Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2015)

The (non-)continuity of Lula’s diplomacy under Dilma Rousseff

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Hartford, September 17, 2015

Dilma Rousseff, president of Brazil by favor and grace of her mentor and patron, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, was expected to preserve, in her first government (2011-2014), the same political foundations, similar agenda priorities, and, probably, a comparable set of international commitments that characterized Lula’s diplomacy during the first eight years of PT’s governments (started in 2003). If those were the intentions of the party leaders – beginning by Lula himself –, the effective results (if any), by whichever criteria that we can pick to evaluate them, were below their expectations, certainly for the party apparatchiks, but also for the public opinion, at large, and for the diplomats themselves. If she tried to follow the aims and goals – but certainly not the style – of her more illustrious predecessor, she never succeeded, or perhaps, that was impossible, since her début. In fact, by personal features, political inclinations or some other reasons, Dilma’s achievements in foreign policy – if there was a single one – can be defined as mediocre, at the best, or irrelevant, to be realistic. 

Reasons for the pity attainments in foreign policy are not difficult to devise, starting by the most important one: Lula, who never departed from the presidency, really, also acted, not infrequently, as a kind of “shadow foreign minister”, traveling extensively with plenty of facilities – executive jets, embassy receptions, almost as a second head of State for Brazil – given by big Brazilian companies logistics, not to mention the political support of the diplomatic network abroad, and arranging (at least according to his declarations) new business opportunities for those companies, in reality building his own personal interests and strengthening the profits of his new patrons. Personality is also something to be counted in the erratic record of this accidental president: where Lula kept just one foreign minister during the whole period of his two mandates, Dilma replaced her two first diplomats as foreign minister, and kept her third at the beginning of her second (disputed) mandate. Even her closest advisors were not afraid to recognize her irritable behavior, bursts of rage and a notorious lack of esteem for the nuances of the diplomatic life and rituals. 

Those factors – an overbearing shadow, and a difficult personality – explain, probably, half of the lack of success of Dilma’s foreign policy, the other half being the different circumstances surrounding her first government, a complete failure in domestic economic affairs (by her own creation) and a deterioration of the political affairs in the regional scenario, starting by Venezuela, but also for the USA cases of hearing activities against Brazil and herself. She declined to undertake a State visit to Washington because of those findings – revealed by Edward Snowden – and choose to strengthen the cooperation with the Brics countries, at a moment when they also started to lack the same brilliance that they enjoyed since the beginning of the 2000s.

At the institutional level, things were not so different vis-à-vis the conceptual hybrid created since the beginning of Lula first government: decision-making process continued to be divided – even if at a uneven basis – between the PT’s views and political preferences (in particular those of the Cuban friendly foreign policy advisor of the presidency, a longtime International Secretary for the PT), and the Itamaraty high officials, hand picked by the adherence to, and conformity with, those views. Itamaraty’s role continued to be relevant mostly for the operational conduct of the diplomacy, but decisive choices always had to be delivered by party fiat. With a lack of the same “ideologues” of the first mandate, and the absence of president’s empathy for the nuances and customs of diplomatic activities, the performance suffered an evident decline, if not a complete deficiency of visibility. 

 It rapidly became clear that the meager theoretical views and the poverty of the conceptual diplomatic universe of the new actors involved in foreign policy-making, combined with the crude “developmentalist” and nationalist approach of the economic team – starting by the president herself – were depriving Brazil of any significant role in the important international discussions in forums such as the financial G20, but also at the regional level, were Mercosur and Unasur had their respective agendas neutralized by the Argentinians peronists – in the first case – or sequestered by the Bolivarian chavistas, in the second case. Brazil had the unfortunate privilege to be managed by the Chinese of the Russians at the international level, and led by the Venezuelans in the region. During the two previous administrations, the nonchalance, but also the impulsiveness, of Lula guaranteed at least some luminous roles for the Brazilian diplomacy; with Dilma, even that faded away.

To be honest, as far as the technical support and the operational substantiation of the diplomatic game are concerned, things improved for Itamaraty, as there was a reduction in the large number of political players involved in foreign policy (many party apparatchiks were abated by corruption scandals or left the government under Dilma), even if political agenda-setting continued to be controlled by a strict party orientation. So, the most important choices – South-South diplomacy, preference for the old leftist, or dictatorial, partners in the continent and elsewhere, mistrust towards “hegemonic” powers, etc. – preserved the same standards of conduct and patterns of relationships as in the preceding administration, but the lack of commitment of the president for the complexity of some diplomatic dossiers (regional integration, for instance, but also trade negotiations, and so on), and the above mentioned traits of her personality contributed to give Brazil a lesser role in determining South American affairs or in creating new opportunities for Brazilian businessmen with the traditional partners in Western Europe or North America. 

As regards the three major issues at the top of Lula’s hyper-activist foreign policy agenda – namely (a) obtaining a permanent seat in the United Nations’ Security Council; (b) securing a successful conclusion of the Doha Round of trade negotiations, and (c) strengthening and reinforcing Mercosur as a customs area – not a single progress was reached, but certainly not due to Dilma’s faults (except, perhaps, the complete lack of advances in any new regional trade agreement). In place and lieu of facilitating Mercosur’s reinforcement and expansion, according to the bloc’s rules and commercial requirements, there was an easy negotiation and entrance of new partners exempted of the same disciplines as the old members, especially the Single Customs Tariff and other mandatory trade rules. In fact, Mercosur, as much as Unasur, became just a setting for presidential political speeches, and for integration rhetoric without any real integration advancements.

While resisting intrusive activities of some major powers – such as the NSA penetration of Brazilian reserved communications, including the president herself – Dilma gave some attention to a few diplomatic priorities of Lula’s government: at least two interregional summit meetings with Africa and Arab countries, one IBAS meeting, and the annual ballet of the Brics group, with a new entrant, South Africa. Other issues also appeared, or reappeared, on the diplomatic agenda: reforming international economic institutions, a pet subject in the summits of the financial G20 and also within Brics. At this forum, the most important – at least from the point of view of PT’s diplomacy – issue was the creation of a New Development Bank (but with headquarters in Shanghai), dedicated to the financing of projects in the developing world, and a Contingent Reserve Agreement, a sort of IMF-like facility in case of disequilibria in external accounts. Brazil also adhered to the China proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, just for not being left out. 

So, Dilma has been less diplomatically outspoken than it was the case with Lula, and she certainly cannot emulate, or even try to imitate, the exaggerated presidential hyper activism of his mentor and “protector” (some would simply say “boss”). Additionally, besides making it difficult to manage items on the foreign political agenda with a personality who clearly has no elective affinities with the diplomatic style and substance, Itamaraty has suffered tremendously from the deep budgetary and economic crisis that has engulfed Brazil since the middle of Dilma’s first mandate. Her second mandate started with a deepening of that crisis, which evolved towards a governance crisis, menacing the continuity of her presidency. At the heart of the serious political crises, succeeding accusations of a vast scheme of corruption conduct by PT against Petrobras and some other public agencies, is a lack of confidence by politicians and the business community in her capacity to manage the economy during hard times. In those circumstances, no far-reaching diplomatic decisions or new initiatives can be made either by Itamaraty or the president herself, without a necessary background work by the former, or under reflection and guidance by the second, deprived of any strong influence over the public opinion or the governance community (mainly, the Parliament, which regained independence).

While it cannot be denied that Brazil continue to be an influential actor on the international and regional scenarios, and that its diplomatic staff is intellectually well equipped to defend its national interests, to gain international prominence while in the midst of such crises – economic, political, moral – is highly unlikely. Dilma’s erratic first mandate has undermined the real basis of Brazil’s economic stabilization, the foundations of which were lain during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s presidency (fiscal responsibility, exchange flexibility, and a good management of domestic debt and foreign accounts). In fact, Brazilians discovered that the accountability for those important elements of macroeconomic stability has completely disappeared: the target system for inflation vanished in face of a doubling of stated goal; the exchange rate fluctuation regime has been manipulated by the Central Bank since the beginning of her mandate (always for “developmentalist” purposes), the primary surplus in the management of the national budget was replaced by a nominal deficit superior to 8% of the GDP, and a law mandating fiscal responsibility (that prevents high-ranking politicians from spending irresponsibly and leaving debt for their successors) was eroded by secret mismanagement of the national accounts. The whole matter left the political realm to be transferred now to the high tribunals: the Supreme Court and the Electoral Tribunal, and is due to finish at the Parliament.

The large capital of sympathy acquired by Lula around the world is also being squandered by accusations of briberies and corruption in the “dubious affairs” that the ex-president has conduct with some prominent capitalists in many African and Latin American countries. Without good economic governance it is difficult to conduct good diplomatic transactions with bilateral partners and within multilateral forums. Despite the fact that PT governments have had, at their disposal, very large resources for self-publicity – and could count on the general public’s ignorance of the foreign policy agenda, given that Brazil has few research centers dedicated to international issues – public opinion arouse not only for the internal corruption schemes, but also for the fact the PT governments have contributed with other very large sums to some despicable dictatorships, in the region and elsewhere. Consequently, this government latitude of action in foreign affairs has substantively diminished. This is a new reality that affects not only domestic policies, but also the very heart of Brazilian diplomacy.

2871. “The (non-)continuity of Lula’s Diplomacy under Dilma Rousseff”, Hartford, September 17, 2015, 5 p. A small piece of evaluation for adding to a book on Brazilian diplomacy, as an appendix to the section on Foreign Relations. Unpublished. 

João Cabral de Melo Neto, 100 anos - poemas comentados

4 poemas de João Cabral comentados por escritores e críticos

Juliana Domingos de Lima e Thiago Quadros

Nexo, 08 de jan de 2020

Por ocasião do centenário do autor pernambucano, acadêmicos e poetas selecionam a pedido do ‘Nexo’ trechos que dialogam com o presente ou sintetizam traços de seu trabalho 

Foto: Thiago Quadros /Nexo

Racional, laborioso e reflexivo. Mas também sensível (embora avesso ao sentimentalismo), próximo à linguagem popular e aos temas sociais. Dos muitos grandes poetas de língua portuguesa que habitaram o século 20, essa combinação aparentemente paradoxal de adjetivos só poderia definir João Cabral de Melo Neto, cujo nascimento completa cem anos nesta quinta-feira (9).

Nele, essas duas facetas não constituem contradição. O rigor formal e a precisão de seu fazer poético, comparado por ele próprio ao trabalho matemático de um engenheiro, convivem com a artesania de um ferreiro ou catador de feijão. Em suas imagens recorrentes, coexistem também a dureza da pedra, a qualidade severa de uma faca feita só de lâmina e a fluidez do rio Capibaribe.

Mais conhecido pelo clássico “Morte e vida severina” (1955), João Cabral é autor de uma obra vasta, que inclui livros como “O cão sem plumas” (1950), “Uma faca só lâmina” (1955), “A educação pela pedra” (1966) e “O auto do frade” (1984). Textos inéditos em prosa e poesia, além de pelo menos duas biografias, serão publicados em 2020 como comemoração de seu centenário. João Cabral morreu em 1999, aos 79 anos, encerrando um período importante da poesia brasileira.

A pedido do Nexo cinco poetas e pesquisadores selecionam e comentam abaixo trechos de quatro poemas de João Cabral de Melo Neto, enfatizando de que maneira as passagens sintetizam aspectos da obra do poeta ou sinalizam como sua poesia pode dialogar com o tempo presente.

Os comentários são acompanhados de ilustrações criadas especialmente para o texto. Elas foram inspiradas no livro “Aniki Bobó”, feito por João Cabral em parceria com o designer Aloísio Magalhães.

Tecendo a manhã

“Um galo sozinho não tece uma manhã:

ele precisará sempre de outros galos.

De um que apanhe esse grito que ele

e o lance a outro; de um outro galo

que apanhe o grito que um galo antes

e o lance a outro; e de outros galos

que com muitos outros galos se cruzem

os fios de sol de seus gritos de galo,

para que a manhã, desde uma teia tênue,

se vá tecendo, entre todos os galos.

2.

E se encorpando em tela, entre todos,

se erguendo tenda, onde entrem todos,

se entretendendo para todos, no toldo

(a manhã) que plana livre de armação.

A manhã, toldo de um tecido tão aéreo

que, tecido, se eleva por si: luz balão”

Trecho do poema ‘Tecendo a manhã’

Do livro ‘A educação pela pedra’, de 1966

“O efeito desse poema – um verdadeiro clássico – é impressionante, magnético, hipnótico”, comenta a poeta Alice Sant’anna. “O ritmo, a partir do terceiro verso, é a própria ‘teia tênue’, como se um verso fosse acordando o outro, assim como um galo vai convocando o outro, até chegar ao fim do poema, quando todos os galos já estão de acordo. E o dia depende disso para começar”.

A escritora Jarid Arraes destaca o diálogo desse poema com o presente. “Sempre é tempo de amar a linguagem. E sempre é tempo de amar a coletividade. Esse poema dialoga com nosso tempo como um lembrete e com um desejo”, disse ao Nexo.

O lembrete, segundo ela, diz respeito ao fato de que nada se faz só. “Não se escreve só. Um poema como esse, com esse peso de técnica, de experimentação, poesia e beleza, foi feito com a junteza da linguagem, e fala perfeitamente sobre isso. Um só, hoje, não tece uma manhã. Precisa que outro leve as palavras e os movimentos pra cá e pra lá e que assim façam muitos outros, nunca sozinhos, costurando realidades a partir de desejos. É assim que esse poema dialoga com nosso tempo: é tempo de não ser só, de não permitir a morte do desejo, não deixar que a nova manhã não amanheça. Temos tantas linguagens para que essa tecelagem seja real”.

O Rio

"(...)

O canavial é a boca

com que primeiro vão devorando

matas e capoeiras,

pastos e cercados;

com que devoram a terra

onde um homem plantou seu roçado;

depois os poucos metros

onde ele plantou sua casa;

depois o pouco espaço

de que precisa um homem sentado;

depois os sete palmos

onde ele vai ser enterrado…"

Trecho do poema ‘O Rio’

Do livro ‘O Rio ou Relação da Viagem que Faz o Capibaribe de Sua Nascente à Cidade do Recife’, de 1953

Ao Nexo Adelaide Ivánova, que se apresenta como garçonete, ativista e escritora, afirma que o poema “é um comentário muito sofisticado de João Cabral sobre luta de classes, sobre a ‘fratura metabólica’ entre homem e campo problematizada por Marx e Engels já em ‘O Capital’ e aprofundada no século 20 por John Bellamy Foster.”

“É sobre justiça ambiental, latifúndio, monocultura. Sendo que, além de tudo, é uma poesia profunda, complexa, fantástica (o rio fala em primeira pessoa!) e afetiva, tanto pelas imagens quanto pelo uso da a sonoridade tão familiar do repente e do pernambuquês (essa língua maravilhosa!)”, afirmou. “Esse poema me politiza um pouquinho mais a cada releitura.”

Poema

“Meus olhos têm telescópios

espiando a rua

espiando minha alma

longe de mim mil metros.”

Trecho de ‘Poema’

Do livro ‘A pedra do sono’, de 1942

Primeira estrofe do primeiro poema do primeiro livro de João Cabral, a escolha do poeta, ensaísta e membro da Academia Brasileira de Letras Antônio Carlos Secchin sintetiza aspectos da obra do poeta.

“Formalmente, é uma quadra, tipo de estrofação que será, de longe, a preferida pelo poeta. O primeiro verso fala do olhar – e a visão será o sentido mais destacado em sua poesia. Ele afirmou, inclusive, que, se tivesse que escolher um lema para sua ideia de arte, seria ‘dar a ver’, aproveitando o título de um livro do poeta francês Paul Éluard. João Cabral sempre foi avesso ao confessionalismo, queria uma arte voltada para o outro, não para si – daí que usa um telescópio para fora, para a rua, e não um microscópio para dentro, seu interior. E até aquilo que poderia haver de mais íntimo, a alma, aparece como elemento externo, afastado, longe dele mil metros. Não por acaso – por essa capacidade de “despersonalizar-se” poeticamente –, José Castello, num estudo biográfico do poeta, chamou-o de ‘O homem sem alma’”, disse ao Nexo.

O sim contra o sim

“Miró sentia a mão direita

demasiado sábia

e que de saber tanto

já não podia inventar nada.

Quis então que desaprendesse

o muito que aprendera

a fim de reencontrar

a linha ainda fresca da esquerda.

(...)

A esquerda (se não se é canhoto) 

é mão sem habilidade:

reaprende a cada linha

cada instante, a recomeçar-se.

Mondrian, também, da mão direita 

andava desgostado;

não por ser ela sábia:

porque, sendo sábia, era fácil”

Trecho do poema ‘O sim contra o sim’

Do livro ‘Serial’, de 1961

Dedicado a alguns dos poetas e pintores admirados por João Cabral, o poema escolhido por Ítalo Moriconi evoca Marianne Moore, Francis Ponge, Miró, Mondrian, Cesário Verde, e Augusto dos Anjos. Moriconi é professor da Unifesp, poeta e ensaísta.

“Ao falar desses poetas e pintores, Cabral apresenta de forma sucinta seus próprios valores e métodos estéticos. Retiro do poema trechos referentes a Miró e Mondrian, dois artistas visuais com cujas obras a poesia de Cabral mantém afinidades”, explicou Moriconi.

O professor propõe uma leitura política do poema. “Nos dias de hoje, eu, como leitor, aproprio-me deste poema vendo nele uma alegoria sobre as relações entre direita e esquerda, num sentido amplo, existencial e político”, disse ao Nexo.

“A direita representa o já sabido, o senso comum, aquilo em que se tornou fácil acreditar. A esquerda é a posição deliberadamente canhota, que discorda do senso comum embrutecido, que ousa inovar e renovar-se. Vivemos um tempo em que se tornou importante defender a mão esquerda contra o autoritarismo da direita. A esquerda é a vontade de um novo começo, de recuperar o gesto infantil da alfabetização. A poesia como realfabetização do mundo, ressignificação pela prática.”

Economic Growth By Robert J. Barro and Xavier I. Sala-i-Martin: Introduction

Sempre recomendo este livro aos meus alunos: o melhor text-book, tanto no plano teórico, como no terreno histórico-empírico.

Economic Growth

By Robert J. Barro and Xavier I. Sala-i-Martin

Second edition

Hardcover

$110.00 X | £90.00ISBN: 9780262025539672 pp. | 7 in x 9 inOctober 2003

The long-awaited second edition of an important textbook on economic growth—a major revision incorporating the most recent work on the subject.

Summary

The long-awaited second edition of an important textbook on economic growth—a major revision incorporating the most recent work on the subject.

This graduate level text on economic growth surveys neoclassical and more recent growth theories, stressing their empirical implications and the relation of theory to data and evidence. The authors have undertaken a major revision for the long-awaited second edition of this widely used text, the first modern textbook devoted to growth theory. The book has been expanded in many areas and incorporates the latest research. After an introductory discussion of economic growth, the book examines neoclassical growth theories, from Solow-Swan in the 1950s and Cass-Koopmans in the 1960s to more recent refinements; this is followed by a discussion of extensions to the model, with expanded treatment in this edition of heterogenity of households. The book then turns to endogenous growth theory, discussing, among other topics, models of endogenous technological progress (with an expanded discussion in this edition of the role of outside competition in the growth process), technological diffusion, and an endogenous determination of labor supply and population. The authors then explain the essentials of growth accounting and apply this framework to endogenous growth models. The final chapters cover empirical analysis of regions and empirical evidence on economic growth for a broad panel of countries from 1960 to 2000. The updated treatment of cross-country growth regressions for this edition uses the new Summers-Heston data set on world income distribution compiled through 2000.

Sample Chapter: Introduction

Introduction 

I.

The Importance of Growth To think about the importance of economic growth, we begin by assessing the long-term performance of the U.S. economy. The real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in the United States grew by a factor of 10 from $3340 in 1870 to $33,330 in 2000, all measured in 1996 dollars. This increase in per capita GDP corresponds to a growth rate of 1.8 percent per year. This performance gave the United States the second-highest level of per capita GDP in the world in 2000 (after Luxembourg, a country with a population of only about 400,000).

To appreciate the consequences of apparently small differentials in growth rates when compounded over long periods of time, we can calculate where the United States would have been in 2000 if it had grown since 1870 at 0.8 percent per year, one percentage point per year below its actual rate. A growth rate of 0.8 percent per year is close to the rate experienced in the long run—from 1900 to 1987—by India (0.64 percent per year), Pakistan (0.88 percent per year), and the Philippines (0.86 percent per year). If the United States had begun in 1870 at a real per capita GDP of $3340 and had then grown at 0.8 percent per year over the next 130 years, its per capita GDP in 2000 would have been $9450, only 2.8 times the value in 1870 and 28 percent of the actual value in 2000 of $33,330. 

Then, instead of ranking second in the world in 2000, the United States would have ranked 45th out of 150 countries with data. To put it another way, if the growth rate had been lower by just 1 percentage point per year, the U.S. per capita GDP in 2000 would have been close to that in Mexico and Poland. Suppose, alternatively, that the U.S. real per capita GDP had grown since 1870 at 2.8 percent per year, 1 percentage point per year greater than the actual value. This higher growth rate is close to those experienced in the long run by Japan (2.95 percent per year from 1890 to 1990) and Taiwan (2.75 percent per year from 1900 to 1987). If the United States had still begun in 1870 at a per capita GDP of $3340 and had then grown at 2.8 percent per year over the next 130 years, its per capita GDP in 2000 would have been $127,000— 38 times the value in 1870 and 3.8 times the actual value in 2000 of $33,330. 

A per capita GDP of $127,000 is well outside the historical experience of any country and may, in fact, be infeasible (although people in 1870 probably would have thought the same about $33,330). We can say, however, that a continuation of the long-term U.S. growth rate of 1.8 percent per year implies that the United States will not attain a per capita GDP of $127,000 until 2074.

Ler toda a Introdução neste link.

Brazilian Foreign Policy under Lula - Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2010)

Foreign Policy of Brazil under Lula

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

June 28, 2010; First draft; to be revised.

1. Formulation and implementation of the Foreign Policy: decision making under the influence of the Workers’ Party (PT)

For the first time in decades, or ever, Brazilian foreign policy is being conceived and conducted without the dominant presence of professional diplomats. PT’s “foreign policy” has been the dominant element in current Brazilian foreign policy, but not in a structured manner, as PT never “produced” a complete set of conceptions and solutions for Brazil’s international relations. It always had a poor theoretical elaboration, simply relying on “Gramscian” people from the academy – fellow travelers or compagnons de route – for the preparation of more sophisticated papers and proposals relating to economics and political life. But the core of its “thinking” – if one can indulge with such a concept – is a confuse mixture of typical (and stereotypical) Latin-American leftism, with brushes of Guevarism, Castroism, Stalinism, classical Marxism and Theology of Liberation beliefs.

From the standpoint of its organizational structures, PT is a quasi-like Bolchevist party, but without all the old apparatchik apparatus of the Soviet-style communist party. It’s core was formed, at the origin, by “alternative trade-unionists” – refusing the traditional trade-unions linked to the Ministry of Labour, but that have adapted quickly to the facilities of the easy money provided by the compulsory “labor tax”, and forming a trade union became an industry in Brazil –, by the ancient guerrilleros recycled to party politics – that is, former dissidents from the old Communist Party, having adopted armed struggle Cuban style, defeated – and some groups from the progressive movements of the Church, the leftist Theology of Liberation, ecclesial communities, workers’ priests and so on. 

Their ideology is of course an old style socialist one, previous to the fall of Berlin wall, and many of the sects that integrate PT are still true believers in the socialism. In any case, they are anti-capitalists, anti-imperialists, and anti-Americans, as almost all of the leftist Latin-American parties are. In the case of PT, there are people who were trained by the Cuban DGS – Dirección General de Seguridad, or the Cuban intelligence – like José Dirceu. Others are totally reliable and subservient to the Cubans, like Marco Aurélio Garcia, the main organizer of the Sao Paulo Forum, the Cuban-sponsored coordinating mechanism for all leftist parties in LA (which included the Colombian FARCs), almost analogous to the old Cominform of the Soviet era. But, as PT has no structured thinking on Foreign Policy, the main guidelines are established by all those involved in “international relations” within PT, starting by Lula himself – who, as a trade unionist, developed links to other organizations, in Cuba, in the USA, in France, Germany, and elsewhere – and Marco Aurelio Garcia, PT’s “international secretary” for more than 15 years, speaking Spanish and French from his exile times. José Dirceu was also very influent in the definition of foreign policy, and still is, despite not being anymore in the Government.

PT was, and is, always a “consortium” of leftists, engaged actively in the their cause, sects’ or party’s cause, not a national cause according to normal lines of parliamentary democracy; their message always relied on “mass politics”, “popular organizations” (which they controlled, of course, like National Students Union, labor or peasant movements, and many others); their concept of democracy is instrumental: all that serves the major objective of holding power for the party fits its “philosophy” and practices. This is the major political component of the Brazilian foreign policy during Lula’s government.

The two other elements in the definition of Brazilian current foreign policy are the “bosses of the House” – minister Celso Amorim and ex-Secretary General Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, this one even most important than the former, and the true ideological guide of PT’s foreign policy. Although Amorim is President Lula’s servile man-for-all-jobs-and-all-things, taking personally on him all that is needed to enhance the image and the figure of Lula on the world scenario, is Guimarães who is the ideological backbone of the new foreign policy. In fact, major initiatives of the Brazilian diplomacy since 2003 have all been taken with the main purpose to project Lula abroad, being indeed a superficial and rhetorical foreign policy, aimed at building a “great international leader” disguise to someone who has been, all his life, an opportunistic and “machiavellian” (in the bad sense of the word) trade unionist. Of all the major objectives of Brazilian foreign policy – gaining a permanent chair at UNSC, strengthen and expand Mercosur, and achieve multilateral trade negotiations – the sole to be achieved was to inflate the image of Lula at world level: this was a success of propaganda…

As for Guimarães, although not being a Marxist himself, only an old style nationalist and a “developmentalist” of the “structuralist” Latin-American economic school, he seemed perfect for the statist and dirigiste ideology of PT and leftist allies. He was chosen by the apparatchiks of the PT even before of Amorim, to be the “brain” behind the new, assertive, foreign policy of PT. He is the main “writer” and “penseur” of the new kids in the block, simply because PT had (and still does not have) nobody capable of articulating a meaningful foreign policy. Author of two books, and dozen of articles on a variety of subjects, he has operated a véritable retour en arrière in Brazilian diplomacy, bringing it again to the years of the “new international economic order” or the Seventies (perhaps even before that). 

The third, and less important, element of the current foreign policy is Itamaraty itself, but only as a technical basis for putting in place all the “prolific” ideas of the new group (and some follies of the president himself). Itamaraty has a good technical staff, with excellent intellectual preparation, and is a very professional service, although somewhat arrogant and it is, as already stated, too submissive to the powerful of the moment. With very few exceptions, Itamaraty has subjected itself to the worst initiatives of this government, diplomatic projects that would clearly be objected in the past: errors of judgment, gross mistakes of evaluation, failures of implementation and complete disasters in political manoeuvres. In its favor, most, if not all, of those initiatives were taken on request of the presidential advisor in foreign policy, aka “professor Marco Aurélio Garcia”, a total amateur in such things. 

2. An activist, and leftist, foreign policy as a compensation for a “neoliberal” economic policy making

Clearly, a “leftist” foreign policy is said to be a “compensation” for a neoliberal economic policy, but this is only a boutade by journalists. In fact, the leftist foreign policy is what the ideology of its commandeurs determined what it has to be: Lula, MAG, Amorim and Guimarães. Of course, the leftists followers, frustrated with the economic policy, find some respite in international affairs, but the mood is purely on the old style leftwing parties of LA: anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism, South-South solidarity, support for the oppressed everywhere, a North-South divide (and the perversity of the rich countries), strategic partnerships with developing or anti-hegemonic countries, in short, the periphery against the arrogant powers. 

This has represented a serious departure of an old tradition of Itamaraty: non-intervention, or non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. Since the beginning, Lula proclaimed, in the middle of electoral processes, his support for his preferred leftist candidates in neighboring countries: Nestor Kirchner, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa, perhaps Ollanta Humala (Peru; preferred by Guimaraes, instead of Alan Garcia), and, especially, Hugo Chávez, always and in every circumstance. Luckily for Lula, they all have been elected or re-elected, otherwise Brazil could be in an awkward situation thereafter. Some moves were perhaps illegal and started even before the inauguration of Lula’s government, such as providing Hugo Chávez with gasoline during the worst of the strikes at PDVSA, in December 2002. Other moves represented a clear abandonment of sovereignty by Brazil, as in the cases of Bolivian oil and gas nationalizations, Ecuadorian illegal measures against Brazilian companies operating there, Paraguayan pressures against Itaipu treaty, and, much more serious and detrimental to Brazilian interests, complacency towards Argentinean abusive and illegal protectionist measures against Brazilian exports in the framework of the free-trade zone (and customs union) that represents Mercosur. 

In the other side of the political tableau, there was no complacency regarding the tragic situation in Colombia and its struggle against the narcoguerrilla – remember that FARC is allied with PT in the Foro de Sao Paulo – neither in connection with the pathetic and ridiculous case of Honduras, where Lula was totally in line with Hugo Chávez. Never before, in the Brazilian diplomatic history, our legalist tradition was so alienated and baffled than in those months during which Manuel Zelaya used the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa to incite rebellion and political unrest; Brazil breached all the inter-American conventions on political asylum and many other established diplomatic practices and procedures. 

Those moves and initiatives – among them the constant action to isolate USA in the region, and to create new political entities restricted to South or Latin American countries – have a direct connection with domestic politics and the desire, by Lula and PT, to accommodate the anti-American feelings of their supporters, as well as the files and ranks of all other leftist parties. Different is the case of Haiti, where Brazil inserted itself in complete agreement with the USA: the intention was to acquire an entrance ticket to the UNSC, one of the megalomaniac projects of Lula and Amorim, disregarding totally the negative reactions of some neighboring countries, among them Argentina. 

In short: a leftist foreign policy is no compensation for other issues such a as land redistribution, social welfare, or inequality, first of all because each one has many different publics or clients. Land redistribution is no more a vital question in Brazil, despite all the talk around it: agriculture is capitalist in Brazil, and many small families of peasants, in Southern Brazil, for instance, are totally integrated in rural markets; those poor peasants could be farm workers or maintain other types of labor relations (including tenancies), as not everyone is capable or do need to be a farmer owner. This is a false question. The “clients” of movements such as MST (so called Landless Movement) are not really peasants, but rather lumpen recruited to be a mass of manoeuvre of a neo-Bolchevik party, less interested in land reform than in “revolution” along Cuban line. Social welfare is directed to a very poor fraction of the society, people who do not care about foreign policy. Inequality, at last, is question which regards intellectuals only, not the people; it a too abstract a question to attract attention.

International questions have no real importance in terms of domestic politics; they can be important topically in elections only by virtue of a really pressing issue. Haiti never had any importance in Brazil, before Lula decided to send troops there, just as a kind of payment for possible acceptation of Brazil in UNSC; it became important since, only because Brazil has some 1,200 troops there (so a lot of families are involved) and government keeps sending money for the mission. 

3. There was such a thing as a conservative foreign policy, as opposed to the activist, leftist, diplomacy of PT? What to think about nuclear questions and security matters?

It is important to state, as a departure, that a ‘neocon’ foreign policy never existed in Brazil, either as a concept or a reality. Brazil has always been multilateralist, and South-South diplomacy is not a novelty in Brazil, but of course never had received such a label, which is mostly used for questions of publicity and to remember that PT is “committed to the “Third World”. There is much rhetoric, and a lot of investment in those issues, but there is little, if any, independent analysis on the real benefits of this kind of option for Brazil as such.

Some members of the government, in different positions, have expressed their opinions about nuclear issues in a confuse manner. Those remarks HAVE NO real importance for Brazilian policy, because either they are naïf or irresponsible, or represent only personal opinions, without bearing on actual government policies; in any case, they can be viewed as mistakes, but probably reveal that Lula’s government has some people who never accepted the fact that Brazil, at Cardoso’s presidency, decided to sign the NPT. Some people believe that it was a wrong decision, and they are inclined to revert it if possible.

Brazil has a nuclear program, and it develops around the full ability over the complete cycle of nuclear enrichment, allegedly for pacific purposes (energy and nuclear submarine). There is no news concerning a nuclear weapons program, but it is possible to think that if the same people referred above would have the opportunity, they would divert some of the acquired capacity to prepare a military program (that is: there is none, but if the decision is taken, probably there will be enough human resources and some equipment to start one). 

 4. Brazil and its international role and the aspirations that come together

Many of the questions in this connection have no simple answers to them, as they involve issues of political thinking and strategic planning at the upper levels of the decision-making echelons. It depends primarily on who are deciding what in Brazil. Nowadays, there is a confuse and ill-informed foreign policy, a mix of the political feelings of PT, and the personal choices of the leftists in power and of one or two diplomats only. The result of all that is a presidential diplomacy tailored to enhance, enlarge and publicize the figure of Lula, the only tangible result of this diplomacy in eight years. No question that Brazil is today much more important and visible than eight years before, but that is due to its economic stability (a policy that was preserved from previous Administration), to the size of its internal market and attraction of it to foreign investment, and the good performance of its exports and international presence. Other negative factors are also relevant: Argentina and Venezuela are clearly tarnishing their respective reputations, and other countries are failing to modernize, so Brazil appears as a relative successful case. It does not need any projection through nuclear policy to become more important. The fact that some people in government are being ambiguous regarding nuclear policy only reverts in disfavor of Brazil, which is regrettable. 

5. Influence of the military in Brazilian politics and in foreign policy in especial

Military do not have much influence in the political process as such, but they still have some importance in certain number of issues related to their own organization, or security matters (equipment and doctrine). There is little integration between civilians and military, despite the creation of a Ministry of Defense and the integration of certain services. Nevertheless, a document, called the National Defense Strategy was delivered in December 2008, but it is still early to see if it will be a concrete and enduring doctrine, or just a reflex of a particular moment in the political life of Brazil. I have commented twice on this document but my analyses exist only in Portuguese.

Shanghai-Hangzhou, May 27-30, 2010.

Revised: Beijing-Shanghai, 28 June 2010.