Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, em viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas.
O que é este blog?
Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;
Eu pensava que a Europa tinha deixado de moldar o mundo em torno da Grande Guerra, ou seja, cem anos atrás. Alguns europeus acreditam que ela continua no jogo, mas o livro sobre o "efeito Bruxelas" é de um professor da Columbia University. Seria um americano? Duvido...
Egmont - the Royal Institute for International Relations, has the honour to invite you to an Expert Seminar on the occasion of the publication of:
The Brussels Effect – How the European Union Rules the World
Date:04 March 2020
Time:15:00 - 17:00 (Registration from 14:30) Venue:Orange Room of the Egmont Palace, Place du Petit Sablon, 8bis, 1000 Brussels
With the author, Professor Anu Bradford (Columbia Law School, New York City)
The Brussels Effect challenges the prevalent view that the European Union is a declining world power. It argues that notwithstanding its many obvious challenges, the EU remains an influential superpower that shapes the world in its image through a phenomenon called the “Brussels Effect.”
The Brussels Effect refers to the EU’s unilateral power to regulate global markets. Without the need to resort to international institutions or seek other nations’ cooperation, the EU has the unique ability among nations today to promulgate regulations that shape the global business environment, elevating standards worldwide and leading to a notable Europeanization of many important aspects of global commerce. Different from many other forms of global influence, the Brussels Effect entails that the EU does not need to impose its standards coercively on anyone—market forces alone are often sufficient to convert the EU standard into the global standard as multinational companies voluntarily extend the EU rule to govern their global operations. In this way, the EU wields significant, unique, and highly penetrating power to unilaterally transform global markets, including through its ability to set the standards in diverse areas such as antitrust regulation, data protection, online hate speech, consumer health and safety, or environmental protection.
The event will be chaired by Professor Sven Biscop (Egmont Institute & Ghent University)
Egmont - Royal Institute for International Relations
Rue des Petits Carmes 15 (postal address) - 1000 Brussels - Belgium
Tel: +32/(0)2.223.41.14 www.egmontinstitute.be
The World Bank Group Publications team is pleased to announce its latest book releases. Scroll through to learn more and find out how to access these newest titles, and check out our Publications and eProducts Spring 2020 Catalog.
Rethinking Power Sector Reform in the Developing World
By Vivien Foster and Anshul Rana
This book aims to revisit and refresh thinking on power sector reform in the developing world. Drawing on a wealth of historical evidence, and informed by emerging technological trends, the study offers practitioners a new frame of reference that is shaped by context, driven by outcomes and informed by alternatives.
By the Development Research Center of the State Council and the World Bank Group
This report proposes a reform agenda that emphasizes productivity and innovation to help policymakers promote China's future growth and achieve their vision of a modern and innovative China.
International Debt Statistics (IDS) is an annual publication of the World Bank featuring external debt statistics and analysis for the 122 low- and middle-income countries that report to the World Bank Debt Reporting System (DRS).
Enabling the Business of Agriculture 2019 examines how regulation affects local farmers. The study provides data on eight quantitative indicators in 101 countries. The study presents the main data trends and highlights which countries are reforming their agribusiness regulations.
Opportunities for Environmentally Healthy, Inclusive, and Resilient Growth in Mexico's Yucatán Peninsula
Ed. by Ernesto Sánchez-Triana, Jack Ruitenbeek, Santiago Enriquez, and Katharina Siegmann
Mexico's Yucatán Peninsula faces growing risks from environmental hazards. Oil spills, hurricanes, coral bleaching, extreme flooding, and erosion have all been experienced over the past decade. This report explores selected topics that aim to inform decision-making in the region.
Learning Environments and Learning Achievement in the Russian Federation
How School Infrastructure and Climate Affect Student Success
By Tigran Shmis, Maria Ustinova, and Dmitry Chugunov
Using rich data collected from the OECD School User Survey (LEEP) and the Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), this book analyzes how the physical characteristics and psychological climates of Russian Federation schools, in conjunction with the teaching methods used, may affect the progress and success of students.
Connectivity and Logistics to Sustain Bangladesh’s Success
By Matías Herrera Dappe, Charles Kunaka, Mathilde Lebrand, and Nora Weisskopf
This book provides a granular diagnostic of Bangladesh’s logistics system, its demand and associated costs, and the actions needed to improve its performance. It provides insights on chokepoints and makes a case for a comprehensive yet strategic approach to addressing them.
Transition to Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) Payments for Health
Lessons from Case Studies
Ed. by Caryn Bredenkamp, Sarah Bales, and Kristiina Kahur
By looking at nine different health systems--U.S. Medicare, Australia, Thailand, Kyrgyz Republic, Germany, Estonia, Croatia, China (Beijing), and the Russian Federation--this book provides guidance on how health systems can transition to using case-based payments, especially diagnostic-related groups (DRGs), to pay for hospital care.
Scaling Up Nutrition in the Arab Republic of Egypt
Investing in a Healthy Future
Ed. by Christopher H. Herbst, Amr Elshalakani, Jakub Kakietek, Alia Hafiz, and Oliver Petrovic
This book aims to inform the development of a feasible nutrition policy and strategy and to guide nutrition investments over the coming years in Egypt. It looks at Egypt's nutrition situation, interventions currently in place, and opportunities to scale up, along with the fiscal requirements of doing so.
Para ser oficializado como embaixador, o nome do diplomata ainda precisa ser aprovado no plenário do Senado, o que deve acontecer na próxima semana.
Forster disse que é preciso "dar a dimensão devida" ao problema de imigração para os Estados Unidos envolvendo brasileiros sem documentação. Para ele, a questão é "pontual".
Entre 2018 e 2019, esse número cresceu dez vezes, chegando a 18 mil pessoas (sendo que 95% são famílias). Há 1,3 milhão de brasileiros vivendo nos EUA, de acordo com o diplomata.
"O que aconteceu? O Brasil está em crise econômica? Alguém está mandando eles embora? Não é isso. É que houve um redirecionamento de organizações criminosas de imigração ilegal que atuavam na América Central e estão atuando hoje no Brasil", afirmou.
Em janeiro, o governo norte-americano anunciou que brasileiros que tentassem atravessar a fronteira sudoeste dos EUA para pedir asilo no país seriam enviados de volta ao México para aguardar a tramitação de seus processos de imigração.
Ele também negou que, entre os países comandados pelos presidentes Donald Trump e Jair Bolsonaro (sem partido), haja um alinhamento automático, "uma expressão que é usada com um certo cunho depreciativo, mas que, na prática, não poder ser sequer realizada".
"Se houvesse alinhamento automático, nós não precisaríamos nem ter embaixada, talvez nem precisássemos ter o Itamaraty. Isso não existe com país nenhum", afirmou Forster.
O diplomata tratou de Amazônia em mais de uma oportunidade ao longo de sua sabatina. Disse, por exemplo, que foi ao Parlamento americano conversar com os congressistas, principalmente na Câmara, de maioria democrata.
"É preciso ter um diálogo aberto e franco com eles, explicar o que está acontecendo no Brasil e o que não está acontecendo, desfazer exageros e enfrentar os temas com realismo e determinação", afirmou Forster.
Depois, respondendo a perguntas de senadores, disse que as queimadas do ano passado não foram as maiores dos registros históricos e o papel da diplomacia "não é esconder nada, distorcer nada, fazer fake news", mas é, "com serenidade, esclarecer e trazer os fatos à realidade".
"Não é a floresta que está pegando fogo, são as bordas, áreas já desmatadas do cerrado, que fazem parte da Amazônia Legal, mas não do bioma amazônico. Quando a gente esclarece, explica as coisas, desfaz estas más impressões ou desinformações que tem nesta área", afirmou.
Forster fez algumas referências ao presidente da República. Chamou a visita que Bolsonaro fez aos Estados Unidos, em março do ano passado, por exemplo, de histórica.
"Uma virada de página, assinalando um novo momento em que Brasil e Estados Unidos podem usar o que chamei de leito profundo de valores e princípios compartilhados que podem aflorar de forma mais firme e efetiva para a realização dos interesses dos dois países", afirmou Forster.
O diplomata listou consequências da visita, como a mudança de postura dos EUA em relação ao pleito do Brasil para ingresso na OCDE (Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico), a designação de aliado especial extra-Otan (Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte), o que abre portas para uma maior cooperação no âmbito de defesa, além da assinatura do acordo de salvaguardas tecnológicas, permitindo o uso da base de Alcântara (MA) para o lançamento de satélites.
Em outubro do ano passado, o secretário de Estado dos EUA, Mike Pompeo, enviou um documento ao secretário-geral da OCDE, Ángel Gurría, no qual dizia que Washington defendia as candidaturas imediatas apenas de Argentina e Romênia.
Em janeiro, os Estados Unidos fizeram um gesto ao governo Bolsonaro defendendo "que o Brasil se torne o próximo país a iniciar o processo de adesão à OCDE", segundo embaixada dos EUA em Brasília.
Forster destacou também consequências do calendário eleitoral norte-americano, o que, segundo ele, impõe constrangimentos do lado dos EUA para um engajamento mais firme em acordos comerciais.
O diplomata colocou aos senadores como maior desafio uma questão que se discute há décadas: um acordo que permita evitar a bitributação para empresas e para pessoas físicas.
"Isso teria grande alcance na facilitação de comércio entre os dois países, no aumento da eficiência do comércio e tudo isso. É algo complexo, está na mesa há muito tempo", afirmou.
O principal objetivo do governo Trump, segundo a nota, é reduzir o número dos países em desenvolvimento que poderiam receber tratamento especial sem serem afetados por barreiras contra seus produtos.
Entre as consequências práticas de deixar o status na OMC (Organização Mundial do Comércio) –mas não na mudança da lista dos EUA– poderia estar o fim da isenção unilateral de tarifas em exportações, pelo SGP (Sistema Geral de Preferências), do direito a acordos parciais de comércio com outros países em desenvolvimento e de parte dos empréstimos do Banco Mundial.
Com a demora para o agendamento da sessão, disse a pessoas próximas que não havia como interferir no calendário de Brasília e que teria que esperar pela convocação dos parlamentares.
A paciência, dizem aliados, foi justamente a chave de Forster durante o caminho tortuoso que desembocou na sua indicação.
Jair Bolsonaro decidiu indicá-lo embaixador na capital americana somente depois que o filho, o deputado Eduardo Bolsonaro, desistiu do posto diante do desgaste de sua imagem em meio à crise do PSL e da relação turbulenta entre governo e Congresso. O Planalto avaliava que o Senado não daria os votos necessários para a aprovação do nome do filho do presidente.
Forster recebeu então o aval do governo Donald Trump para ocupar o posto em 19 de novembro. O chamado agrément é uma consulta que o Itamaraty faz de maneira sigilosa aos países que vão receber o futuro embaixador e, somente depois dele, sua indicação é encaminhada formalmente ao Senado brasileiro.
Bolsonaro, porém, já havia atropelado o rito natural desse processo quando anunciou, antes de qualquer pedido de aval ao governo dos EUA, que indicaria seu filho para a embaixada em Washington. Depois da desistência de Eduardo, afirmou —também sem a prévia chancela americana— que seria Forster o substituto.
Amigo do polemista Olavo de Carvalho, o diplomata tinha o apoio do ministro Ernesto Araújo (Relações Exteriores) para assumir a embaixada antes mesmo de Bolsonaro falar sobre a possibilidade de Eduardo abraçar o posto.
Forster havia ganhado força —e a simpatia do presidente— durante a viagem de Bolsonaro à capital americana, em março.
Ele foi um dos responsáveis por elaborar a lista de convidados da "Santa Ceia da direita", jantar com a presença de pensadores e jornalistas conservadores na primeira noite de Bolsonaro em Washington e, desde então, teve participação em reuniões importantes do governo brasileiro nos EUA.
Naquele momento, a conversa foi vista por integrantes do Itamaraty como o movimento que faltava para sua indicação formal a embaixador nos EUA, mas, pouco tempo depois, Eduardo entrou em cena.
Forster não comentava publicamente sobre a possível nomeação do filho do presidente para um dos postos mais cobiçados da diplomacia brasileira. A aliados, dizia que continuaria trabalhando até que a indicação de Eduardo fosse aprovada pelo Senado. Mas a possibilidade parecia cada vez mais difícil, até ser enterrada de vez.
Conservador, católico e alinhado ao governo americano, Forster tem na sua sala no terceiro andar da embaixada um boné de apoio a Trump e uma mensagem em que se lê "make unborn babies great again" —que adapta o slogan do presidente americano a campanhas antiaborto no país.
Especializado em América do Norte há quase 30 anos, o diplomata já comandou os consulados de Nova York e de Hartford, em Connecticut. Desde 2017, era responsável por temas migratórios e de administração na embaixada em Washington antes de assumir a função de encarregado de negócios.
Depois da sabatina desta quinta, Forster pretende fazer reuniões com autoridades em Brasília e no Rio de Janeiro, e passar uns dias no seu estado natal, o Rio Grande do Sul, antes de voltar aos EUA na próxima semana.
Os americanos continuam insistindo numa atitude confrontacionista em relação à China e pretendem que os europeus os sigam nessa trajetória agressiva.
Europe needs a China strategy; Brussels needs to shape it
Julianne Smith
Brookings Institution, Monday, February 10, 2020
Europe’s momentum in developing a clear-eyed approach toward China has stalled. In March 2019, the European Commission issued a white paper naming China a systemic rival and economic competitor. That publication marked a fundamental shift in how far European institutions were willing to go in raising the challenges China poses to Europe’s openness and prosperity. It also reflected shifts that were occurring in capitals across Europe. Just as the European Union was rolling out its white paper on China, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was arguing that Europe should view China as a competitor as much as a partner, and French President Emmanuel Macron warned China that “the period of European naivety is over.”
However, since those March proclamations, neither the EU nor individual European leaders have taken the meaningful steps needed to close existing vulnerabilities in Europe’s relationship with China, stand up for European values of democracy and human rights, or strengthen Europe’s resolve against Chinese economic and political pressure. Certainly, the EU had significant distractions in the second half of 2019, as it managed a leadership transition and negotiated the Brexit arrangement, but EU leaders also had opportunities to press China on these key issues. During Merkel’s visit to China last September, she raised her concerns about Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement but failed to bring up Chinese human rights abuses against Muslims in Xinjiang. Macron was even more reserved on human rights in his visit to China in November. He made no public mention of Chinese human rights abuses in Xinjiang, nor did he call on President Xi Jinping to respect China’s commitment to Hong Kong people’s rights.
Back home in Europe, national decisions on whether to ban Chinese tech company Huawei in Europe’s 5G telecommunications auctions on account of security concerns have been delayed and remain uncertain. Meanwhile, Greece, Portugal and Hungary have largely ignored the political leverage that comes with China’s promises of investment. Last spring, Italy became the first member of the G-7 to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a move criticized by Brussels, Germany and France. There is also talk among some European experts of pursuing an “equidistant” approach between the United States and China, as President Trump’s unilateral foreign policy and trade practices drive Europeans away from the transatlantic relationship.
The lack of strategy to address China’s growing role in Europe has been compounded by domestic instability within Europe. Powerful capitals including Paris, Berlin and London are mired in political turmoil or stagnation. The coming months are unlikely to produce better results. The EU will continue to face domestic and regional challenges, including ongoing protests throughout France, a weakening coalition government in Germany, and Britain’s formal exit from the union on January 31, which will trigger months—if not years—of additional work to implement.
If Europe is to regain momentum in developing a tougher China policy, it will have to come from Brussels. While recent months were consumed by a complicated and lengthy political process to confirm EU leadership, the new commission finally started in December 2019 and is off to an ambitious start.
The new president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has called on the EU to become more “geopolitical.” She is leading an effort to revamp the EU’s competition laws to guard against unfair practices from state-owned enterprises and intends to appoint a “chief trade enforcer” for anti-dumping cases that hurt European companies. The EU’s new foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, is also pushing for tougher member-state responses to China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The EU has launched a framework for an EU-wide investment screening mechanism to address foreign (including Chinese) takeovers of European companies. Von der Leyen has also taken the lead on efforts to update and reform the World Trade Organization, which will be a central player in advancing cooperation between the United States and the EU on Chinese trade practices.
Von der Leyen’s ambitious agenda should be commended, particularly because 2020 will be a critical year for EU foreign policy as it hosts not one but two major summits with China and navigates intensifying competition between the U.S. and China. But neither von der Leyen’s plans nor the upcoming summits will be successful unless the EU does more to bridge the existing gaps across the continent when it comes to China. Europe already has several tools at its disposal to reduce vulnerabilities to Beijing’s economic leverage and political influence. Not everyone in Europe agrees, however, that China’s activities in Europe pose challenges.
Von der Leyen should therefore invest some time auditing China’s engagement in Europe, especially political influence operations. Some European countries are getting better at monitoring Chinese investments inside their own borders and many are sharpening their understanding of the complexities of the 5G debates. But individual capitals know little about China’s broader playbook in Europe. Among other policies, China is also doing its very best to keep Europe divided by pursuing regional forums like its “17+1” initiative for countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Brussels should therefore serve as a clearinghouse, enabling countries to share cautionary tales and best practices across Europe.
For example, EU members should hear from Zdenek Hrib, the mayor of Prague who recently broke sister-city ties with Beijing. How did he reach that decision, and what have been the ramifications? Brussels may also want to invite the Estonian government to share how the Chinese reacted when one of its daily papers, Postimees, published a three-part series on Chinese malign influence, intelligence gathering and soft power. Other governments could glean lessons from these stories.
In addition to auditing Chinese actions in Europe, von der Leyen and her team need to extract lessons from other democracies around the world. Taiwan, Australia and Japan have a lot to share regarding their own experiences with disinformation and foreign interference. In response to encroaching Chinese political influence, Australia passed a sweeping national security law in 2018 that banned foreign political interference and made it illegal to engage in covert activity on behalf of a foreign government, such as organizing a rally. The legislation also required foreign lobbyists to register on a public list. (In response, China canceled visas for Australian business leaders.) In Taiwan, the liberal democracy that receives the most disinformation spread by a foreign government, social media platforms are consistently flooded with disinformation from Chinese state-backed influence campaigns. This level of Chinese interference may not be on Europe’s radar yet, but China’s pressure campaign will likely move westward as its interests in Europe grow.
Just as it doesn’t have one perspective on Russia or the United States, Europe will never settle on a single view of China. But if von der Leyen manages to at least increase European awareness of Chinese activities in Europe, she could then turn to the important task of sharpening the EU’s existing toolkit. Here, there are three things she needs to do. First, she should use the Dutch decision to prevent China from acquiring one of its sensitive semiconductor equipment companies as a call to action. The Dutch government made that decision only after the White House gave the Netherlands prime minister an intelligence report on the dangers of China acquiring that firm. European governments should be able to make those assessments themselves, and European intelligence agencies should be raising similar concerns. Von der Leyen can lead policymakers toward more thorough evaluations of Chinese acquisitions.
Second, von der Leyen needs to strengthen European competition rules. Access to the single market is a major element of Europe’s geo-economic power. The EU should prioritize tougher regulation and enforcement laws to ensure that all companies, including Chinese state-owned enterprises, are playing by the same rules as European companies. Margrethe Vestager, the European commissioner for competition, is already looking into possible responses to state-owned companies outside the EU gaining an advantage over European companies. That’s a great start. The European Commission may also want to look at the Dutch proposal to add a pillar to EU competition law, allowing the EU to intervene if it finds that state-backed businesses are distorting markets and pursuing unfair practices.
Finally, von der Leyen needs to enhance European and national-level investment screening mechanisms. Chinese foreign direct investment in Europe increased 10-fold over a decade, peaking at 37.2 billion euros in 2016 (although it has tapered in recent years). In response, Brussels has been ramping up its efforts to develop an EU-wide approach. In April 2019, the EU created a new framework for foreign investment screening. It enables member states and the European Commission to exchange information and raise concerns related to foreign investments—an important first step. However, the screening framework has been watered down to accommodate internal differences and member states still have the final say.
The EU needs to strengthen this mechanism and continue to close loopholes. In doing so, it should look to the U.S. screening mechanism, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), for both its strengths and its weaknesses. The CFIUS is well staffed and resourced. It reviews hundreds of foreign acquisitions per year and has proved capable of blocking or restricting investments that are deemed a national security threat. It also requires companies to provide notification of potential acquisitions in critical industries and does not allow them to proceed without CFIUS review. Still, the U.S. system does miss some smaller transactions and could do a better job profiling foreign investments that try to circumvent the CFIUS through real estate acquisitions or technology transfers. Such drawbacks could be corrected in the European approach.
Brussels has many of the ingredients it needs to forge a stronger and more coherent strategy on China. The new leadership appears committed to tackling these issues, and the EU’s existing toolkit is a solid foundation that simply needs to be strengthened and implemented. The one missing piece for Brussels is willing partners. If powerful EU member states step up and make important decisions on their approaches toward China, including whether to strengthen national investment screening mechanisms and work with Huawei on 5G, Brussels could make 2020 a defining moment for Europe’s China strategy.
