Timothy Snyder on Ukraine, European Union and the challenges ahead

 

APR 7

Empire, Integration, and Ukraine

A lecture on the historical, political, and moral stakes of the war

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		TIMOTHY SNYDER

Dear Friends,

This is a lecture I delivered yesterday (6 April 2023) at Princeton University, in a series devoted to the European Union, and in the presence of colleagues who study Europe as social scientists and historians (and I was impressed by how many turned up!). 

I took as my title “Empire, Integration, and Ukraine,” because I wished to show how the present moment, that of the Russo-Ukrainian war, gives us a precious opportunity to consider what European integration actually means (and thus what it is for). 

The standard story from which both the policymakers and the scholars begin is that of European nation-states learning a lesson from the Second World War: war is bad; peace is good; trade is pacifying. This is very appealing, but it is not true. The historical trajectory is actually this: European empires lose wars; and after the Second World War, best understood as a German defeat in an imperial war, they begin a process of European integration that overlaps with (and distracts from, and compensates for) imperial defeat and decline. 

Seeing matters this way (as Tony Judt did in his Postwar) has the advantage of opening European history to world history, since part of the appeal of the standard story is that it allows Europeans to forget the imperial past. It also sets the Russo-Ukrainian war in a context that is easier to understand: another imperial war, where the defeat of the imperial power is a necessary condition for continued European integration. The actual question in European politics has been empire or integration, and this has been true for decades; the Russian invasion of Ukraine brings this to light. Russia’s invasion is obviously a colonial war; juxtaposing it with others helps us to understand it and think through the proper response.

Once recognized, this basic historical truth should alter policy discussions. Trade might be pacifying, but the European example is of trade among defeated empires (in particular a defeated Germany). The defeat is part of the story not to be overlooked. In general, defeat (not peace) is the relevant category; it was not peace that happened Germans in 1945 or the Dutch in 1949 or the French in 1962, but defeat. We also see that the stakes of this war for the European project are as high as can be. Finally, we recognize that Ukraine resistance cannot be understood only in national categories, as we tend to do, but also in the broader categories of anti-colonialism and European integration.

Drawing from arguments I made in Bloodlands,Black Earth and Road to Unfreedom, I develop all of this in what I hope is an accessible manner in the lecture, which I share with you now. 

TS 7 April 2023

Ucrânia: sete embaixadores da UE permanecem em Kyiv - Maïa de la Baume (Politico)

‘Our man in Kyiv’: How war has flipped diplomats’ day job

The last few EU ambassadors still in Ukraine now focus on getting aid in, refugees out and collecting evidence of possible war crimes.

BY MAÏA DE LA BAUME

Politico, April 1, 2022 4:02 am

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A day before Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, Etienne de Poncins, the French ambassador in Kyiv, hosted Mariupol’s mayor, Vadym Boychenko, in his office to discuss a more than €60 million French investment in a water treatment plant and other plans for a makeover of the southern port city. 

“He proposed some projects to develop his city, particularly how he wanted to modernize the seafront,” recalled de Poncins. 

Boychenko now presides over a city in ruins after a month-long battering from Russia’s military that has left 100,000 people believed to be trapped without food, water or electricity. 

De Poncins and half a dozen other senior European diplomats have swapped their pre-war ambassadorial duties such as awarding “women in business” prizes and opening libraries to organize the evacuation of their nationals, help deliver emergency equipment and collect evidence of war crimes. 

While the U.S., Germany and the Delegation of the EU in Ukraine have transferred their embassy staff to Poland, the ambassadors of France, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Latvia and Lithuania have stayed put in the country, with some shifting their offices and accommodation to the western city of Lviv. The Russian assault has turned them into unlikely humanitarians, coordinating their countries’ medical and logistical assistance on the ground.

“Now, I do humanitarian help,” de Poncins said. “I handle the last kilometer for supplies coming from Poland … I go catch them here in Ukraine and then I handle distribution, as well as requests from Ukrainians on what they need.”

“The fact that I am here gives me much more weight,” said the French diplomat. “An ambassador is made for being in the country where he is posted … you are here in the difficult moments and hours. I would have felt very bad if I had left,” he said, adding that France’s current presidency of the Council of the EU made it even more necessary that he stay in Ukraine. 

Earlier this week, de Poncins traveled to Siret, just over the border in Romania, to welcome 27 new ambulances, fire trucks and 50 tons of medical equipment sent by French regional authorities. “The Ukrainians said they urgently needed fire trucks due to the bombardments, so we passed along those requests to Paris … and then we receive the supplies,” de Poncins explained. He regularly leaves Lviv, under tightened security, to visit mid-sized cities “to see how the situation is there,” and gauge their needs.

From geopolitics to bussing out refugees

His Italian counterpart, Pier Francesco Zazo, won plaudits last month for sheltering about 100 Italians, including newborn babies in his embassy in Kyiv, from where they were later evacuated to neighboring Moldova. Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi paid public tribute to Zazo and his staff’s “spirit of service, dedication and courage.”

“Before the war, I was focused on following the geopolitical situation of Ukraine’s contested eastern region of Donbas, the efforts of the Ukrainian government in pursuing the necessary structural reforms, and promoting economical and commercial ties between Italy and Ukraine,” Zazo said, noting that Italy is Ukraine’s third-ranked European trading partner after Germany and Poland. 

“Now, we don’t have a full-fledged embassy anymore, we don’t even have easily access to contact numbers and therefore my job has become a very operational one … and a tiring one sometimes,” Zazo said. “We still represent an important reference point between Italy and the Ukraine government, the United Nations, the International Red Cross, our NGOs, associations and some Italian missionaries with whom we organize bus transfers with refugees.”

Zazo said that he and de Poncins have “a privileged access” to the Ukrainian government, including through meetings with Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and Ihor Zhovkva, deputy head of the Ukrainian presidential administration. 

The seven European ambassadors have set up a coordination group on Signal, an end-to-end-encrypted messaging app, to “exchange information, ideas on who to meet, what requests we should make, and it works really well,” Zazo said. 

Besides the few hundred French and Italian nationals still in Ukraine, a major concern for the ambassadors are the dozens of their nationals still stranded in the besieged southern cities of Mariupol and Kherson. 

“There was a family in Kherson who did not want to leave,” de Poncins said. “There are some cases of French people who want to leave but can’t because there is no possibility to come and transfer them.”

“For us, this is the main issue now,” Zazo agreed, adding that there were constant contacts with the U.N. and the International Red Cross to establish “safe humanitarian corridors” for their evacuation. His presence in Ukraine would provide some “psychological relief for the more or less 160 Italians who are still here.”

Those ambassadors still on the ground also now find themselves tasked with collecting evidence of war crimes taking place in Ukraine. Earlier this month, the International Criminal Court said it would investigatepossible war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide in Ukraine. 

“Ukrainian authorities send us elements, there’s regular and ongoing work with the police … ” de Poncins said. “We do it on site … they send us documents and we send them to Paris … we’re like a go-between … but the case law is in Paris.”

Many of the European ambassadors still in Ukraine admitted that despite the alarm raised by their British and American counterparts, they could not have anticipated the timing and magnitude of the Russian invasion. Boychenko, the mayor of Mariupol, had told de Poncins during his embassy visit that he was “not worried” about an imminent war because “I know the Russians.” 

However, de Poncins and Zazo acknowledged that their presence on the ground had become a moral imperative. 

“There are a certain number of things we can’t do from the outside,” said de Poncins. “But staying on the ground is a political decision at the highest level, it is a gesture of solidarity, of trust … and diplomacy is about gestures, signals we send out.”

Europe needs a China Strategy (se possível a mesma dos americanos) - Julianne Smith (Brookings)

Os americanos continuam insistindo numa atitude confrontacionista em relação à China e pretendem que os europeus os sigam nessa trajetória agressiva. 

Europe needs a China strategy; Brussels needs to shape it

Julianne Smith

Brookings Institution, Monday, February 10, 2020

Europe’s momentum in developing a clear-eyed approach toward China has stalled. In March 2019, the European Commission issued a white paper naming China a systemic rival and economic competitor. That publication marked a fundamental shift in how far European institutions were willing to go in raising the challenges China poses to Europe’s openness and prosperity. It also reflected shifts that were occurring in capitals across Europe. Just as the European Union was rolling out its white paper on China, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was arguing that Europe should view China as a competitor as much as a partner, and French President Emmanuel Macron warned China that “the period of European naivety is over.”

However, since those March proclamations, neither the EU nor individual European leaders have taken the meaningful steps needed to close existing vulnerabilities in Europe’s relationship with China, stand up for European values of democracy and human rights, or strengthen Europe’s resolve against Chinese economic and political pressure. Certainly, the EU had significant distractions in the second half of 2019, as it managed a leadership transition and negotiated the Brexit arrangement, but EU leaders also had opportunities to press China on these key issues. During Merkel’s visit to China last September, she raised her concerns about Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement but failed to bring up Chinese human rights abuses against Muslims in Xinjiang. Macron was even more reserved on human rights in his visit to China in November. He made no public mention of Chinese human rights abuses in Xinjiang, nor did he call on President Xi Jinping to respect China’s commitment to Hong Kong people’s rights.

Back home in Europe, national decisions on whether to ban Chinese tech company Huawei in Europe’s 5G telecommunications auctions on account of security concerns have been delayed and remain uncertain. Meanwhile, Greece, Portugal and Hungary have largely ignored the political leverage that comes with China’s promises of investment. Last spring, Italy became the first member of the G-7 to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a move criticized by Brussels, Germany and France. There is also talk among some European experts of pursuing an “equidistant” approach between the United States and China, as President Trump’s unilateral foreign policy and trade practices drive Europeans away from the transatlantic relationship.

The lack of strategy to address China’s growing role in Europe has been compounded by domestic instability within Europe. Powerful capitals including Paris, Berlin and London are mired in political turmoil or stagnation. The coming months are unlikely to produce better results. The EU will continue to face domestic and regional challenges, including ongoing protests throughout France, a weakening coalition government in Germany, and Britain’s formal exit from the union on January 31, which will trigger months—if not years—of additional work to implement.

If Europe is to regain momentum in developing a tougher China policy, it will have to come from Brussels. While recent months were consumed by a complicated and lengthy political process to confirm EU leadership, the new commission finally started in December 2019 and is off to an ambitious start.

The new president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has called on the EU to become more “geopolitical.” She is leading an effort to revamp the EU’s competition laws to guard against unfair practices from state-owned enterprises and intends to appoint a “chief trade enforcer” for anti-dumping cases that hurt European companies. The EU’s new foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, is also pushing for tougher member-state responses to China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The EU has launched a framework for an EU-wide investment screening mechanism to address foreign (including Chinese) takeovers of European companies. Von der Leyen has also taken the lead on efforts to update and reform the World Trade Organization, which will be a central player in advancing cooperation between the United States and the EU on Chinese trade practices.

Von der Leyen’s ambitious agenda should be commended, particularly because 2020 will be a critical year for EU foreign policy as it hosts not one but two major summits with China and navigates intensifying competition between the U.S. and China. But neither von der Leyen’s plans nor the upcoming summits will be successful unless the EU does more to bridge the existing gaps across the continent when it comes to China. Europe already has several tools at its disposal to reduce vulnerabilities to Beijing’s economic leverage and political influence. Not everyone in Europe agrees, however, that China’s activities in Europe pose challenges.

Von der Leyen should therefore invest some time auditing China’s engagement in Europe, especially political influence operations. Some European countries are getting better at monitoring Chinese investments inside their own borders and many are sharpening their understanding of the complexities of the 5G debates. But individual capitals know little about China’s broader playbook in Europe. Among other policies, China is also doing its very best to keep Europe divided by pursuing regional forums like its “17+1” initiative for countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Brussels should therefore serve as a clearinghouse, enabling countries to share cautionary tales and best practices across Europe.

For example, EU members should hear from Zdenek Hrib, the mayor of Prague who recently broke sister-city ties with Beijing. How did he reach that decision, and what have been the ramifications? Brussels may also want to invite the Estonian government to share how the Chinese reacted when one of its daily papers, Postimees, published a three-part series on Chinese malign influence, intelligence gathering and soft power. Other governments could glean lessons from these stories.

In addition to auditing Chinese actions in Europe, von der Leyen and her team need to extract lessons from other democracies around the world. Taiwan, Australia and Japan have a lot to share regarding their own experiences with disinformation and foreign interference. In response to encroaching Chinese political influence, Australia passed a sweeping national security law in 2018 that banned foreign political interference and made it illegal to engage in covert activity on behalf of a foreign government, such as organizing a rally. The legislation also required foreign lobbyists to register on a public list. (In response, China canceled visas for Australian business leaders.) In Taiwan, the liberal democracy that receives the most disinformation spread by a foreign government, social media platforms are consistently flooded with disinformation from Chinese state-backed influence campaigns. This level of Chinese interference may not be on Europe’s radar yet, but China’s pressure campaign will likely move westward as its interests in Europe grow.

Just as it doesn’t have one perspective on Russia or the United States, Europe will never settle on a single view of China. But if von der Leyen manages to at least increase European awareness of Chinese activities in Europe, she could then turn to the important task of sharpening the EU’s existing toolkit. Here, there are three things she needs to do. First, she should use the Dutch decision to prevent China from acquiring one of its sensitive semiconductor equipment companies as a call to action. The Dutch government made that decision only after the White House gave the Netherlands prime minister an intelligence report on the dangers of China acquiring that firm. European governments should be able to make those assessments themselves, and European intelligence agencies should be raising similar concerns. Von der Leyen can lead policymakers toward more thorough evaluations of Chinese acquisitions.

Second, von der Leyen needs to strengthen European competition rules. Access to the single market is a major element of Europe’s geo-economic power. The EU should prioritize tougher regulation and enforcement laws to ensure that all companies, including Chinese state-owned enterprises, are playing by the same rules as European companies. Margrethe Vestager, the European commissioner for competition, is already looking into possible responses to state-owned companies outside the EU gaining an advantage over European companies. That’s a great start. The European Commission may also want to look at the Dutch proposal to add a pillar to EU competition law, allowing the EU to intervene if it finds that state-backed businesses are distorting markets and pursuing unfair practices.

Finally, von der Leyen needs to enhance European and national-level investment screening mechanisms. Chinese foreign direct investment in Europe increased 10-fold over a decade, peaking at 37.2 billion euros in 2016 (although it has tapered in recent years). In response, Brussels has been ramping up its efforts to develop an EU-wide approach. In April 2019, the EU created a new framework for foreign investment screening. It enables member states and the European Commission to exchange information and raise concerns related to foreign investments—an important first step. However, the screening framework has been watered down to accommodate internal differences and member states still have the final say.

The EU needs to strengthen this mechanism and continue to close loopholes. In doing so, it should look to the U.S. screening mechanism, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), for both its strengths and its weaknesses. The CFIUS is well staffed and resourced. It reviews hundreds of foreign acquisitions per year and has proved capable of blocking or restricting investments that are deemed a national security threat. It also requires companies to provide notification of potential acquisitions in critical industries and does not allow them to proceed without CFIUS review. Still, the U.S. system does miss some smaller transactions and could do a better job profiling foreign investments that try to circumvent the CFIUS through real estate acquisitions or technology transfers. Such drawbacks could be corrected in the European approach.

Brussels has many of the ingredients it needs to forge a stronger and more coherent strategy on China. The new leadership appears committed to tackling these issues, and the EU’s existing toolkit is a solid foundation that simply needs to be strengthened and implemented. The one missing piece for Brussels is willing partners. If powerful EU member states step up and make important decisions on their approaches toward China, including whether to strengthen national investment screening mechanisms and work with Huawei on 5G, Brussels could make 2020 a defining moment for Europe’s China strategy.

European Union Strategic Choices for the 2020 - Sven Biscop

Um grande scholar, belga flamengo, do Royal Institute for International Relations, em Bruxelas, Sven Biscop, acaba de me enviar seu mais recente paper, que acredito tenha interesse para todos os estudiosos de relações internacionais.

Neste link: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2020/02/SPB122.pdf?type=pdf

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Dear colleague,

I have the pleasure of sending you my first policy brief of 2020, in which I ambitiously look at the entire decade ahead: Strategic Choices for the 2020s.

These past few years, the European Union (EU) has taken various decisions which, when taken together, amount to a careful repositioning in international politics. Let us be bold and call it the inkling of a Grand Strategy: an idea of the Union’s shifting place in the great power relations that determine international politics.

Yet that nascent Grand Strategy is not equally shared by all EU Member States or even by all EU institutions, nor has it yet been incorporated into all relevant strands of EU policy. If the implications are not fully thought through and the repositioning stops here, the EU as well as the Member States risk ending up in a permanently ambivalent position: more than a satellite of the US, but not a really independent power either. Such a half-hearted stance would alienate their allies and partners while tempting their adversaries. For now, the EU has done enough to irritate the US but not to obtain the benefits sought: to further the European interest and to play a stabilising role in great power relations.

Will 2020 see the EU and the Member States muster the courage to fully implement the choices that they have already started to make?

I hope this may be of interest! 

Best wishes,

Sven

En excerpt: 

"But whoever wins the White House in November of this year: China will be seen as the adversary to be contained or reduced in power; there will be a more transactional approach to multilateralism, including NATO; Europe will continue to be seen in a more instrumental way, as a source of allies to be mobilised against America’s adversaries; and the EU’s economic and energy interests as such will never be a priority for the US. Nor will they be for China or Russia, obviously."

Rumores sobre a morte do euro - Vaclav Klaus

Bem, eu não seria tão condenatório do euro, mas acredito que o presidente da República Tcheca tem toda a razão em seus argumentos econômicos.
Um mercado comum completo, acredito, ganha muito em abolir o câmbio, pois os fatores de produção possam a circular mais livremente. Mas, uma moeda comum exige políticas comuns em vários outros campos e uma total liberdade para a circulação de fatores, o que não é o caso, ainda, da UE e muito menos da zona do euro.
Creio que ele tem razão, em apontar a "sem-razão" (no sentido cervantino da palavra) para essa aventura do euro. Ou estamos falando de uma economia unificada, ou a moeda tem uma vida atribulada.
A Europa não constitui, a despeito do que disseram alguns economistas, uma zona monetária ótima, longe disso.


When Will the Eurozone Collapse?
by Vaclav Klaus
Vaclav Klaus is president of the Czech Republic.
Cato Institute, Economic Development Bulletin
No. 14, May 26, 2010

As a long-standing critic of the concept of a single European currency, I have not rejoiced at the current problems in the eurozone that threaten the very survival of the euro. Before discussing the events surrounding the Greek debt crisis further, I must provide at least a working definition of what the word "collapse" means. In the context of the euro, there are at least two interpretations that come to mind. The first one suggests that the eurozone project or the project establishing a common European currency has collapsed already by failing to bring about positive effects that had been expected of it.

The creation of the eurozone was presented as an unambiguous economic benefit to all the countries willing to give up their own currencies that had been in existence for decades or centuries. Extensive, yet tendentious and, therefore, quasiscientific studies were published prior to the launch of the single currency. Those studies promised that the euro would help accelerate economic growth and reduce inflation and stressed, in particular, the expectation that the member states of the eurozone would be protected against all kinds of unfavorable economic disruptions or exogenous shocks.

The Euro Has Not Led to Higher Growth in the Eurozone
It is absolutely clear that nothing of that sort has happened. After the establishment of the eurozone, the economic growth of its member states slowed down compared to the previous decades, thus increasing the gap between the speed of economic growth in the eurozone countries and that in major economies such as the United States and China, smaller economies in Southeast Asia and parts of the developing world, as well as Central and Eastern European countries that are not members of the eurozone. Since the 1960s, economic growth in the eurozone countries has been slowing down and the existence of the euro has not reversed that trend. According to European Central Bank data, average annual economic growth in the eurozone countries was 3.4 percent in the 1970s, 2.4 percent in the 1980s, 2.2 percent in the 1990s and only 1.1 percent from 2001 to 2009 (the decade of the euro) (see Figure 1).1 A similar slowdown has not occurred anywhere else in the world.

The Eurozone Economies Have Not Converged
Not even the expected convergence of the inflation rates of the eurozone countries has taken place. Two distinct groups of countries have formed within the eurozone ╉ one with a low inflation rate and one (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and some other countries) with a higher inflation rate. We have also seen an increase in long-term trade imbalances. On the one hand, there are countries with a balance of trade where exports exceed imports and, on the other hand, those countries that import more than they export. It is no coincidence that the latter countries also have higher inflation rates. The establishment of the eurozone has not led to any homogenization of the member states' economies.

The global financial and economic crisis only escalated and exposed all economic problems in the eurozone ╉ it did not cause them. That did not come as a surprise to me. The eurozone, which comprises 16 European countries, is not an "optimum currency area" as the elementary economic theorems tell us it should be. The former member of the Executive Board and chief economist of the European Central Bank Otmar Issing has repeatedly pointed out (most recently in a speech in Prague in December 2009) that the establishment of the eurozone was primarily a political decision.2 That decision did not take into account the suitability of this whole group of countries for the single currency project. However, if the existing monetary area is not the optimum currency area, it is inevitable that the costs of establishing and maintaining it exceed the benefits.

My choice of the words "establishing" and "maintaining" is not accidental. Most economic commentators (not to speak of the non-economic commentators) were satisfied by the ease and apparent inexpensiveness of the first step (i.e., the establishment of the common monetary area). This has helped to form the mistaken impression that everything was fine with the European single currency project. That was a mistake that at least some of us have been pointing out since the very birth of the euro. Unfortunately, nobody has listened to us.

I have never questioned the fact that the exchange rates of the countries joining the eurozone more or less reflected the economic reality in Europe at the time when the euro was born. However, over the last decade, the economic performance of individual eurozone members diverged and the negative effects of the "straight-jacket" of a single currency over the individual member states have become visible. When "good weather" (in the economic sense) prevailed, no visible problems arose. Once the crisis or "bad weather" arrived, however, the lack of homogeneity among the eurozone members manifested itself very clearly. In that sense, I dare say that ╉ as a project that promised to be of considerable economic benefit to its members ╉ the eurozone has failed.

The Hidden Costs of the Euro
Of greater interest to non-experts and politicians (rather than economists) is the question of the collapse of the eurozone as an institution. To that question, my answer is no, it will not collapse. So much political capital had been invested in the existence of the euro and its role as a "cement" that binds the EU on its way to supra-nationality that in the foreseeable future the eurozone will surely not be abandoned. It will continue, but at an extremely high price that will be paid by the citizens of the eurozone countries (and, indirectly by those Europeans who have kept their own currencies).

The price of maintaining the euro will be low economic growth in the eurozone. Sluggish eurozone growth will result in economic losses in other European countries, like the Czech Republic, and in the rest of the world. The high price of the euro will be most visible in the volume of financial transfers that will have to be sent to eurozone countries suffering from the biggest economic and financial problems. The idea that such transfers would not be easy without the existence of a political union was known to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl back in 1991 when he said that "recent history, and not just that of Germany, teaches us that the idea of sustaining an economic and monetary union over time without political union is a fallacy."3 He seems to have forgotten it, unfortunately, as time went by.

The amount of money that Greece will receive in the foreseeable future can be divided by the number of the eurozone inhabitants and each person can easily calculate his or her own contribution. However, the "opportunity" cost arising from the loss of a potentially higher growth rate, which is much more difficult for a non-economist to contemplate, will be far more painful. Yet, I do not doubt that for political reasons this high price of the euro will be paid and that the eurozone inhabitants will never find out just how much the euro truly cost them.

To summarize, the European monetary union is not at risk of being abolished. The price of maintaining it will, however, continue to grow.

The Czech Republic has not made a mistake by avoiding membership in the eurozone so far. And we are not the only country taking that view. On April 13, 2010, the Financial Times published an article by the late Governor of the Polish Central Bank Slawomir Skrzypek ╉ a man whom I had the honor of knowing very well. Skrzypek wrote that article shortly before his tragic death in the airplane crash that carried a number of Polish dignitaries near Smolensk, Russia. In that article, Skrzypek wrote, "As a non-member of the euro, Poland has been able to profit from flexibility of the zloty exchange rate in a way that has helped growth and lowered the current account deficit without importing inflation." He added that "the decade-long story of peripheral euro members drastically losing competitiveness has been a salutary lesson."4 There is no need to add anything more.

Notes
The original Czech version of this article was published in Ekonom, a Czech weekly magazine, on April 22, 2010.
1. The European Central Bank, "Statistics Pocket Book," March 2010, http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/stapobo/spb201003en.pdf.
2. Otmar Issing, The Birth of the Euro (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
3. Quoted in Otmar Issing, "The Euro: Does a Currency Need a State?" International Finance 11, no. 3 (2008): 303.
4. Slawomir Skrzypek, "Poland Should Not Rush to Sign Up to The Euro," Financial Times, April 13, 2010.

Download the PDF of Economic Development Bulletin no. 14 (458 KB)

Contact:
Ian Vasquez, director, Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, (202) 789-5241, ivasquez@cato.org - Tanja Stumberger, research associate and manager of global external relations, (202) 789-5205, tstumberger@cato.org

Cato Institute • 1000 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. • Washington D.C. 20001 • (202) 842-0200 - Fax: (202) 842-3490 • www.cato.org/economicliberty/

1455) Relações entre União Européia-Brasil, Rodada de Doha, PAC e Grupo de Cairns

Como no caso do post precedente, estas respostas minhas foram fornecidas a um estudante, mais precisamente uma pesquisadora de pós-graduação, e permaneceram inéditas até o momento. Talvez interesse a alguns os temas tratados. Eis a ficha do trabalho:
1911. “Questionário de Investigação sobre as Relações entre União Européia-Brasil, Rodada de Doha, PAC e Grupo de Cairns”, Niterói, 17 julho 2008, 3 p. Respostas a questões colocadas por pesquisadora, para Master em European Studies da Universidade de Siena, Montpellier e Coimbra.

Questionário de Investigação sobre as Relações entre União Européia - Brasil
Rodada Doha, PAC e Grupo de Cairns
Data e local: 17 de julho de 2008, Niterói, RJ
Nome do entrevistado: Paulo Roberto de Almeida (PRA)
Instituição para qual trabalha: Ministério das Relações Exteriores
Cargo /posição profissional: Ministro da carreira diplomática, professor universitário.

1. As relações comerciais entre a União Européia e o Brasil podem ser entendidas como uma reação do Brasil ao poderio negociador dos Estados Unidos e da ALCA a fim de obter mais poder de barganha nas rodadas de liberalização do comércio internacional? Se sim, como a União Europeia percebe isso? Se não, por quê?
PRA: As relações comerciais entre a UE e o Brasil têm uma longa história atrás de si, uma vez que elas são tradicionais no quadro do relacionamento bilateral entre o Brasil e cada um dos integrantes do esquema de integração europeu, precedendo de muito qualquer arranjo formal de caráter institucional (pois que remontando à própria formação histórica do Estado brasileiro e suas relações comerciais, desde sempre majoritariamente voltadas para a Europa ocidental). No plano histórico mais recente, deve-se registrar que essas relações comerciais precedem, seguem e acompanham quaisquer projetos dos EUA para a negociação de acordos comerciais específicos ao hemisfério americano (em especial a “Iniciativa para as Américas”, de 1990, proposta por George Bush, pai, assim como a Alca, iniciativa de 1994, do presidente Clinton), posto que desde o surgimento do Mercosul, em 1991, a então CE já propunha a intensificação das relações entre os dois blocos, primeiro sob a forma de um acordo de cooperação técnica (1991), firmado entre a Comissão Européia e os países do Mercosul (em sua fase de transição), depois desdobrando essa iniciativa no Protocolo de Madrid (1995), já prevendo a assinatura de um acordo de liberalização comercial e de intensificação das relações entre as duas partes.
Deve-se, portanto, reconhecer que, desde o início (e com inteira concordância do Brasil), a UE buscou intensificar suas relações com o Mercosul, independentemente de qualquer oferta, arranjo ou iniciativa dos EUA, em relação seja ao Mercosul, como bloco, seja em direção de cada um dos países membros do esquema sul-americano. Mas, deve-se reconhecer que a UE, como seria natural em situações de concorrência intensa pela busca de mercados e de oportunidades de negócios para suas empresas, preocupou-se em não permitir o acesso exclusivo dos EUA à possível ampliação dos fluxos de comércio e de investimentos aos países membros do Mercosul em decorrência de eventual acordo preferencial que fosse negociado e concluído entre estes países e os EUA (dentre os quais o Brasil se destaca naturalmente).
O Brasil igualmente – e isto vem praticamente desde a primeira conferência americana de Washington, em 1889-1890 – sempre se preocupou em equilibrar suas relações comerciais com seus parceiros mais importantes, barganhando as melhores vantagens possíveis tanto do lado europeu, tradicional em suas relações econômicas externas, como do lado americano, muito relevante desde o final do século XIX e extremamente importante no que se refere ao acesso de determinados produtos aos mercados consumidores. Cabe, com efeito, registrar igualmente, que o mercado europeu encontra-se concentrado mais nas commodities oferecidas pelo Brasil do que em produtos de maior valor agregado (manufaturados), que comparece de modo mais intenso nas relações comerciais entre o Brasil e os EUA.
O que a UE percebe, pragmaticamente, é que ela não pode deixar os EUA dominarem os mercados dos países da América do Sul de modo tão amplo quanto os EUA já dominam os fluxos com os países da América Central e Caribe, posto que os sul-americanos apresentam enormes oportunidades de intercâmbio e investimentos para as suas empresas. O Brasil e o Mercosul, tanto quanto a UE, percebem esse lado “compensatório” e tentam exercer o seu potencial de barganha, tanto quanto é possível nesse tipo de relacionamento complexo.

2. Quanto Portugal contribuiu e continua contribuindo política e economicamente para ser o promotor da parceria entre o Brasil e a União Européia?
PRA: Por afinidades históricas patentemente reconhecidas por ambas as partes, Portugal e Brasil mantêm um relacionamento muito estreito no que se refere à intensificação possível das relações políticas e econômicas entre este último e a UE. Cabe, no entanto, não exagerar nesse papel, uma vez que a UE é uma construção política e institucional extremamente complexa, dotada de “ferramentas” próprias para negociações econômicas externas – concedidas pelos países membros à Comissão Européia –, com muitos interesses nacionais projetados sobre as instâncias negociadoras de Bruxelas, interesses que são, no conjunto e individualmente superiores ao poder político e econômico do pequeno Portugal. Países como Alemanha, França, Itália e Reino Unido apresentam interesses econômicos tão importantes, ou até mais, no Brasil, do que Portugal, e parecem dispor de condições ainda mais fortes do que Portugal para fazer valer esses interesses na determinação das políticas (comerciais e outras) que serão seguidas pela UE em relação ao Brasil e ao Mercosul. Mas, pode-se dizer que Portugal de fato exerce um papel “patrocinador” dos interesses brasileiros (que são também os de seus nacionais e investidores residentes no Brasil e aqui dispondo de interesses concretos a defender) junto às instâncias comunitárias. O status de “parceiro estratégico” concedido ao Brasil pela UE certamente tem a ver com esse papel.

3. Quanto você acredita que o Brasil esteja disposto a ceder na área de serviços e quanto a União Européia esteja disposta a ceder na área agrícola para o êxito da Rodada de Doha?
PRA: Observando realisticamente o desenvolvimento das negociações comerciais, tanto no plano multilateral (Rodada Doha), quanto no plano birregional (Mercosul-UE) ao longo de mais de uma década de desenvolvimentos sempre frustrantes (desde 1995, praticamente), acredito que, tanto do lado brasileiro quanto do lado europeu, as possibilidades de concessões reais nos terrenos agrícola (do lado europeu) e industrial e de serviços (do lado brasileiro e do Mercosul) são muito modestas, para dizer o mínimo. Nenhum lado parece querer oferecer acesso efetivo aos seus mercados, que parece terem sido colocados num patamar de extrema sensibilidade recíproca, o que é efetivamente uma pena, tendo em vista que esse protecionismo só prejudica os interesses de seus respectivos consumidores.
Ambas partes, como é visível e patente, cedem continuamente aos lobbies setoriais e continuam a manter esses setores sob estrita proteção comercial e fechamento regulatório, concorrendo assim para um possível fracasso (ou resultado extremamente modesto) na Rodada Doha. Minha visão do processo não é muito otimista, uma vez que não vejo nenhuma das partes conduzindo as negociações, nos planos multilateral e bilateral, para a abertura efetiva dos respectivos mercados. Como em muitos outros exercícios negociadores, oportunidades serão perdidas de expandir comércio e abrir novas oportunidades de investimento uma vez que os negociadores políticos não parecem exibir a coragem de resistir aos impulsos e pressões protecionistas vindos de seus setores menos competitivos em escala econômica interna.
Assim, as concessões, se houver alguma, serão mínimas e estritamente condicionadas à necessidade de um acordo restrito no plano multilateral e eventualmente birregional.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Niterói, 17 de julho de 2008