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Mostrando postagens com marcador Politico. Mostrar todas as postagens
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segunda-feira, 13 de junho de 2022

Patentes de vacinas anti-Covid na ministerial da OMC - Doug Palmer and Sarah Anne Aarup (Politico)

 Politico EU, Bruxelas – 11.6.2022

Globalization's gut check: 

World Trade Organization gathering offers a test of free trade system

If the global organization can’t reach a consensus on some of the low-hanging fruit on its agenda, there is little hope it can help tackle the world's biggest challenges.

Doug Palmer and Sarah Anne Aarup

 

The future of globalization faces a major test as the World Trade Organization kicks off its first big decision-making meeting in five years in Geneva on Sunday.

The immediate issues on the table involve Covid-19 vaccine patents, environmentally harmful fishing subsidies and global food security concerns heightened by Russia’s war in Ukraine.

But the bigger question looming over the gathering is whether the WTO can still forge international cooperation at a time when multiple crises and increasing frictions between the United States and China are upending the world order. Those crises have spurred a widespread re-think of globalization: Countries are increasingly turning their economic focus inward, looking to protect and promote their own industries — often at the expense of the open trade system that the WTO was designed to promote.

The WTO’s ministerial meeting, slated to run June 12 to June 15, will try to tackle some of those trends — albeit at the margins. If the organization can’t reach a consensus on even low-hanging fruit like easing fishing subsidies and maintaining a ban on e-commerce tariffs, there is little hope it can accomplish more challenging objectives such as contributing to the fight against global climate change or shoring up food systems as global hunger skyrockets.

“That’s why this is such a critical period for the system,” said Rufus Yerxa, a former WTO deputy director general who now works for McLarty Associates, an international trade consultancy. “Because if we really sort of disembowel the WTO now, it’s going to be harder to use it in the future to achieve those kinds of objectives.”

“I think it is important that the WTO be seen as part of the solution to the simultaneous crises we’re facing in the world now,” WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala told POLITICO in an interview. “All of these crises at the same time that no one country in the world can solve. You need multilateralism. You need international cooperation.”

Recent crises like the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have only served to further divide the globe, however — between rich countries able to rapidly produce their own Covid vaccines and low-income nations who couldn’t; and between Western democracies, who’ve rallied to isolate Russia, and much of the rest of the world, which is taking a far more ambivalent stance on the conflict. The crises have also heightened the rivalry between the U.S. and China, the world’s two leading economies, which are pushing very different models of trade and governance.

President Joe Biden has repeatedly described that rivalry as a battle to prove democracy still works better than autocracy in the 21st century. And his administration, including Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, have been advocating a new model of economic engagement that focuses on collaboration with friendly countries, or “friend-shoring.”

Okonjo-Iweala, however, warned this week that splitting up the world’s economies and supply chains into political blocs would have damaging consequences — noting that WTO economists have made a preliminary estimate that dividing the world into two economic spheres would lead to a 5 percent decrease in real global GDP over the longer term.

“That is quite a stunning number,” the WTO chief said. “I’d like us to be careful. This multilateral trading system was built up over 75 years. It’s helped to lift over a billion people out of poverty. It’s delivered peace, which is one of the things it was intended to do, through interdependence.”

Still, Russia’s war in Ukraine has further fractured the international community and propelled the world toward an unprecedented hunger crisis as inflation and conflict push up the price of food for the world’s lowest-income people.

Okonjo-Iweala said she did not expect Russia’s participation next week to prevent deals from being reached, even though many delegations refuse to meet with them. Negotiators have devised ways to work around that obstacle over the past few months, she said.

“Undoubtedly, there will be some tensions as there have been in every meeting. We hope this will not stop us doing our work,” Okonjo-Iweala said.

But the war adds to the array of problems distracting attention from the rules-based trading system embodied in the WTO.

“I can hardly think of a more difficult backdrop for a WTO ministerial than this one,” Yerxa said. “I think the biggest challenge, obviously, is to try to make governments recognize that the risk of even further destabilizing multilateralism is that it won’t make their domestic politics better in the long run, it’ll make them worse.”

Okonjo-Iweala, who took the helm of the global trade body a little more than a year ago, is trying to notch up two big wins in the form of agreements that could potentially expand production of Covid vaccines and curtail environmentally harmful fishing subsidies.

She also is pushing the WTO to fashion a broader response to the pandemic — even though many see any agreement at this point as too little too late — and to issue a statement aimed at keeping food flowing across borders by discouraging export restrictions.

To accomplish that, she’ll have to bring every country on board — or at least persuade them not to voice their objections — because of the consensus-based nature of WTO rulemaking. Failure to do so could reinforce the idea that the WTO is incapable of reaching big deals involving all 164 members or addressing tough issues like climate change.

U.S.-China tensions are playing out in the Covid-19 vaccine talks, where the United States wants Beijing specifically excluded from using the proposed agreement to make generic versions of foreign vaccines, such as those produced by Moderna and Pfizer.

They’re also on display in the fishing subsidy talks, where Washington is pushing for countries to agree on a provision that would require WTO members to report annually on what they know about the use of forced labor in the seafood sector.

India, meanwhile, has issues that it is pursuing in a number of the negotiations that could frustrate efforts to reach agreement. One of its demands could lead to the end of a 24-year-old moratorium on the collection of duties on digital goods such as movies, software and video games, as well as an array of digitally-enabled services.

Members have also been fighting over the wording of a paragraph to set the stage for discussion for modernizing the WTO’s underlying rules.

Most countries favor a “streamlined” WTO reform statement containing three elements: a recognition of the broad consensus on the need for reform, the need for the process to be transparent and inclusive, and the need for it to address the interests of all members.

But India and a few other members favor a more prescriptive, strictly multilateral reform process that would open up the opportunity to revise the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO. “It’s an agenda going backwards and reopening what we negotiated 30 years ago,” a Geneva-based trade official said.

That disagreement just further illuminates how hard it is to make progress in an institution that requires complete unanimity to operate, and why members like the United States and the EU are increasingly attracted to plurilateral pacts among smaller groups of WTO members rather than the entire organization.

Adding to the nervousness: The WTO has a history of producing big flops at its ministerial meetings, including spectacular meltdowns in Seattle in 1999 and Cancún in 2003. The group’s last ministerial conference in Buenos Aires in 2017 ended without any tangible outcome.

“I view it as a moment of truth for the WTO,” said Wendy Cutler, a former senior U.S. trade negotiator who now is vice president of the Asia Society Policy Institute.

If trade ministers leave Geneva next week with nothing to show for their efforts, that would accelerate “a trend we’re already beginning to see where countries want to work with other like-minded countries to set the rules,” Cutler said. “The WTO rules have kept everyone in the same room, and as the WTO becomes less and less productive and efficient, its ability to be relevant in this complex, complicated world diminishes.”

Kelly Ann Shaw, a former Trump administration trade official now at Hogan Lovells law firm, agreed: “If they can’t even agree on language just directing countries to think about WTO reform, it’s really hard to think about how they’re actually going to reform it.”

Just days ahead of the meeting, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai was cautious about the chances for big breakthroughs at MC12.

“There are a lot of conversations, important ones, that we need to advance. Whether or not we can get them across the finish line, I don’t know,” Tai said on Monday at an event hosted by the Washington International Trade Association. “But it is really important for us to have MC12. And then it is really important for us to wake up the day after MC12 and feel like we have a vision for what we would like MC13 to be.”

Critics complain that the Biden administration has done little to shape that vision, aside from a speech Tai gave last year, where she repeated U.S. complaints about the WTO’s dispute settlement system and urged members “to start actually listening to each other” instead of spouting their favorite talking points.

“Historically, officials from the U.S. Trade Representative Office have worked diligently, often behind the scenes, to bring the members to positive outcomes,” Bill Reinsch, a trade policy specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, recently wrote. “That does not seem to be the case this time around.”

Despite that, even modest progress would provide a shot in the arm for a world that is becoming less and less stable.

“If we invest in it now and reaffirm its centrality to more multilateral trade cooperation, then it becomes possible in the future to expand the agenda,” Yerxa said.

 

segunda-feira, 6 de junho de 2022

China’s new vassal: Vladimir Putin - Stuart Lau (Politico)

O que eu tinha antecipado anteriormente – a colonização da Rússia pela China em dez anos –, vai se acelerar, depois da desastrosa "operação militar especial" de Putin na Ucrânia, e das severas sanções impostas pelos países ocidentais ao invasor. A Rússia não vai ter tudo o que espera da China, que também teme ser objeto de sanções ocidentais. Ela vai ficar em cima do muro, ajudando um pouco, mas esperando a Rússia enfraquecida cair em seus braços. Triste fim para o outrora império arrogante, que humilhava, como os ocidentais, o Império do Meio, continuou a desprezar a República da China, e tratou Mao Tsetung da pior maneira possível. Como indica o artigo, a China hoje tem DEZ VEZES o PIB da Rússia, que está bem próximo do brasileiro. 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

China’s new vassal: Vladimir Putin

Xi Jinping now holds the better cards in steering the Moscow-Beijing relationship. 

POLITICO, June 6, 2022 4:00 am 

https://www.politico.eu/article/china-new-vassal-vladimir-putin/

China can now enjoy turning the tables. 

When Chairman Mao Zedong visited Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in the winter of 1949, he was very much the junior supplicant. Stalin packed him off to wait for weeks in his snow-bound No. 2 dacha, 27 kilometers outside Moscow, where the humiliated and constipated Chinese leader grumbled about everything from the quality of the fish to his uncomfortable mattress. 

When the two Communist leaders did get to business, Stalin bullied his way to a very favorable deal that put Mao on the hook to buy Russian arms and heavy machinery with a loan on which Beijing would have to pay interest. 

As Russia faces a sharply contracting economy under sanctions and an impending oil embargo from Europe, China is the obvious potential benefactor for Putin to turn toward. 

Xi shares Putin’s hostility to the West and NATO, but that doesn’t mean he will be offering unalloyed charity. Xi’s overriding strategic concern is China’s prosperity and security, not saving Russia. Beijing is likely to buy at least some oil diverted from Europe, but only at a hefty discount from global benchmarks. China will only help Russia to the extent that it doesn’t attract sanctions and imperil its own ability to sell goods to rich countries in North America and the EU. 

A very public partnership

Publicly, China is making a big show of political solidarity with Moscow. It has increased overall trade with Russia, essentially abandoned Ukraine, expanded financial transactions without the use of dollars or euros, and doubled down on future cooperation to develop military technology while carrying out joint exercises in the Pacific region. 

Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, has acknowledged that his country’s future lies with China, saying: “Now that the West has taken a ‘dictator’s position,’ our economic ties with China will grow even faster.”

Xi himself also appears to be a strong admirer of Putin on a personal level. Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, calls this his “Russia complex.” (Since the war broke out, Xi has only spoken by phone with Putin, not his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelenskyy.) 

There are very serious limits to these “no limits” relations, however. For now, at least, China is stressing to Western nations that it is not selling weapons or plane parts to Russia. Beijing doesn’t want to fall victim to sanctions itself, so it sets boundaries to the relationship. Even more worryingly for Putin, China is also out to set a high price for support. Beijing, for example, wants to restrict Russia’s highly lucrative arms sales to India, China’s arch-foe across the Himalayas.

“In a reverse from the Cold War pattern, Russia will be the junior partner to a more powerful China. That will irritate Putin,” said Matthew Kroenig, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

That second-fiddle role is not a scenario Putin would have envisioned when the Russian president decided to invade Ukraine in February, propelled by a desire to rebuild a bygone glory for his nation.

But all in all, he should have seen it coming. China is a country obsessed by correcting historical humiliations and regaining its position of global leadership. The time when the Soviet Union was ideologically — and economically — superior to Communist China is long gone. Huawei Technologies builds Russia’s 5G networks, while Russia requires Chinese cooperation on everything from aircraft parts to currency swaps. Importantly, it’s also not just the U.S. and Europe imposing sanctions on Moscow, but also three other major Asian economies: Japan, South Korea and Singapore.

Andrey Kortunov, director general of the Kremlin-backed Russian International Affairs Council, doubts that Russia’s elites have much appetite to serve as China’s junior partner. But he sees few alternatives for Moscow. “Since the conflict began, Russia started needing China more than earlier because China remains in many ways the only game in town, with economic ties between Russia and the West curtailed and with sanctions imposed on Russia.”

Crude calculations

Perhaps the single biggest calculation for China is how far it will go to help Putin beat an impending EU embargo on Russian oil. This European ban will drill a significant hole in Russia’s budget unless other big buyers step in. 

Russia and Saudi Arabia are already the two leading suppliers of oil to China. In May, seaborne imports of Russian crude to China reached a two-year high with 1.14 million barrels per day, up from 800,000 barrels per day in 2021, according to data from Vortexa Analytics shared with POLITICO.

Much of the explanation for this is pure hard-headed economics from the Chinese more than a show of political solidarity, however. International sanctions mean traders have been wary of handling Russian crude, creating a mini glut that sees Russia’s oil trading $20 to $30 cheaper than international benchmark prices. 

Given that China imports more than 10 million barrels per day, there’s certainly room to buy more, especially when the economy restarts and lockdown measures are gradually removed in key cities like Shanghai. But Russian sales to the EU have been about 2.4 million bpd. Given China’s own security concerns about overdependence on individual suppliers, it would be highly unlikely for China to suddenly start buying all of Russia’s now-surplus oil. 

Similarly, China holds the cards when it comes to gas. Just before he invaded Ukraine, Putin signed a deal with Xi agreeing to increase natural gas exports to 48 billion cubic metres per year in future, from a humble 4.1 billion cubic meters in 2020. Russia is also planning a new pipeline, Power of Siberia 2, which could see Russian gas exports to Europe more easily switched to China.

“The problem, however, is that China holds all the cards in the negotiations,” Nikos Tsafos, chief energy advisor to the Greek prime minister, wrote in a think tank report in May. “And like the first Power of Siberia line, China will drive a hard bargain. What is unknowable at this point is whether China is ready to make a deal. Russia is likely to offer very attractive terms — if nothing else, due to its desperation. But will China accept them? Will they be tempted by the price, or will they think twice about expanding their dependence on Russia at this moment?”

Watching the weapons

Russia’s need for an ally coincides with China’s growth in assertiveness. The more isolated Moscow becomes, the more it may have to help China further its geopolitical ambition.

For years, Chinese officials have been quietly lobbying their Russian counterparts to cut arms sales to India, which has had a sometimes bloody border dispute with Beijing. 

Between 2017 and 2022, India was the largest arms export market for Russia, followed by China, according to statisticsfrom the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Fighting Indian soldiers armed with Russian equipment may not be fun for China, but it’s certainly a lucrative business for Russia.

Before the war, “Russia was very stubborn and [would] say, ‘Oh, you’re not in a position, China, to dictate us our choices to whom we sell weapons. But I think that China will be in this position probably five years down the road,” said Alexander Gabuev, an expert on Russia-China relations with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think tank.

India, for its part, is trying to keep an open relationship with Putin. New Delhi, like Beijing, is snapping up cheap oil, even though it’s also eager to maintain strong ties with the U.S.

“A Russia weakened by war and sanctions but not chaotic and unstable suits China’s long-term interests,” said Bobo Lo, a former deputy head of the Australian mission in Moscow who now works at the Lowy Institute. “Russia’s isolation will further push it into a position of a junior partner in the relationship, while increasing its economic and strategic dependency on China.”

Today’s power reversal would have looked highly peculiar to those singing L’Internationale in Moscow in the post-war era. 

After all, the USSR and the People’s Republic were on difficult terms for decades, despite their supposed ideological proximity. 

“In the 1950s, it absolutely was the case that the fact that China was the junior partner was very grating, because there was a view in Beijing that Moscow too often as a status quo power cared too much about its relations with the West at the expense of its relations with China,” said Joseph Torigian, author of Prestige, Manipulation, and Coercion, a new book about Stalin and Mao. “When it was Stalin and Mao, Stalin was a teacher, he was the titan of the communist movement. When Stalin died, Mao looked down on Khrushchev, as someone who didn’t understand ideology. When Deng Xiaoping met Gorbachev, Deng by all accounts thought Gorbachev was an idiot.”

While Xi and Putin share a better personal rapport than their predecessors, they also have very different considerations for the future of their countries’ role in the world. 

Xi’s full focus is on securing the presidency for a third time, armed with an appeal to make China — a market deeply embedded with the West — more prosperous, eventually overtaking the U.S. to become the world’s No 1 economy. Sanctions would wreck that playbook.

Putin, meanwhile, is in a tougher bind. He would be happy to take whatever he can from China given his country’s current distress — even if that means Russia is seen as a junior partner to China.

“Being in China’s pocket is kind of less feared, because the focus is really on fighting the U.S.,” he said. “If China provides the necessary resources — and at the same time doesn’t seem to interfere in Russia’s domestic affairs — that’s the price that he’s accepting to pay in order to continue his fight with the U.S.”

Victor Jack and America Hernandez contributed to the report.


sexta-feira, 1 de abril de 2022

Ucrânia: sete embaixadores da UE permanecem em Kyiv - Maïa de la Baume (Politico)

‘Our man in Kyiv’: How war has flipped diplomats’ day job

Etienne de Poncins-art


A day before Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, Etienne de Poncins, the French ambassador in Kyiv, hosted Mariupol’s mayor, Vadym Boychenko, in his office to discuss a more than €60 million French investment in a water treatment plant and other plans for a makeover of the southern port city. 

“He proposed some projects to develop his city, particularly how he wanted to modernize the seafront,” recalled de Poncins. 

Boychenko now presides over a city in ruins after a month-long battering from Russia’s military that has left 100,000 people believed to be trapped without food, water or electricity. 

De Poncins and half a dozen other senior European diplomats have swapped their pre-war ambassadorial duties such as awarding “women in business” prizes and opening libraries to organize the evacuation of their nationals, help deliver emergency equipment and collect evidence of war crimes. 

While the U.S., Germany and the Delegation of the EU in Ukraine have transferred their embassy staff to Poland, the ambassadors of France, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Latvia and Lithuania have stayed put in the country, with some shifting their offices and accommodation to the western city of Lviv. The Russian assault has turned them into unlikely humanitarians, coordinating their countries’ medical and logistical assistance on the ground.

“Now, I do humanitarian help,” de Poncins said. “I handle the last kilometer for supplies coming from Poland … I go catch them here in Ukraine and then I handle distribution, as well as requests from Ukrainians on what they need.”

“The fact that I am here gives me much more weight,” said the French diplomat. “An ambassador is made for being in the country where he is posted … you are here in the difficult moments and hours. I would have felt very bad if I had left,” he said, adding that France’s current presidency of the Council of the EU made it even more necessary that he stay in Ukraine. 

Earlier this week, de Poncins traveled to Siret, just over the border in Romania, to welcome 27 new ambulances, fire trucks and 50 tons of medical equipment sent by French regional authorities. “The Ukrainians said they urgently needed fire trucks due to the bombardments, so we passed along those requests to Paris … and then we receive the supplies,” de Poncins explained. He regularly leaves Lviv, under tightened security, to visit mid-sized cities “to see how the situation is there,” and gauge their needs.

From geopolitics to bussing out refugees

His Italian counterpart, Pier Francesco Zazo, won plaudits last month for sheltering about 100 Italians, including newborn babies in his embassy in Kyiv, from where they were later evacuated to neighboring Moldova. Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi paid public tribute to Zazo and his staff’s “spirit of service, dedication and courage.”

“Before the war, I was focused on following the geopolitical situation of Ukraine’s contested eastern region of Donbas, the efforts of the Ukrainian government in pursuing the necessary structural reforms, and promoting economical and commercial ties between Italy and Ukraine,” Zazo said, noting that Italy is Ukraine’s third-ranked European trading partner after Germany and Poland. 

“Now, we don’t have a full-fledged embassy anymore, we don’t even have easily access to contact numbers and therefore my job has become a very operational one … and a tiring one sometimes,” Zazo said. “We still represent an important reference point between Italy and the Ukraine government, the United Nations, the International Red Cross, our NGOs, associations and some Italian missionaries with whom we organize bus transfers with refugees.”

Zazo said that he and de Poncins have “a privileged access” to the Ukrainian government, including through meetings with Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and Ihor Zhovkva, deputy head of the Ukrainian presidential administration. 

The seven European ambassadors have set up a coordination group on Signal, an end-to-end-encrypted messaging app, to “exchange information, ideas on who to meet, what requests we should make, and it works really well,” Zazo said. 

Besides the few hundred French and Italian nationals still in Ukraine, a major concern for the ambassadors are the dozens of their nationals still stranded in the besieged southern cities of Mariupol and Kherson. 

“There was a family in Kherson who did not want to leave,” de Poncins said. “There are some cases of French people who want to leave but can’t because there is no possibility to come and transfer them.”

“For us, this is the main issue now,” Zazo agreed, adding that there were constant contacts with the U.N. and the International Red Cross to establish “safe humanitarian corridors” for their evacuation. His presence in Ukraine would provide some “psychological relief for the more or less 160 Italians who are still here.”

Those ambassadors still on the ground also now find themselves tasked with collecting evidence of war crimes taking place in Ukraine. Earlier this month, the International Criminal Court said it would investigatepossible war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide in Ukraine. 

“Ukrainian authorities send us elements, there’s regular and ongoing work with the police … ” de Poncins said. “We do it on site … they send us documents and we send them to Paris … we’re like a go-between … but the case law is in Paris.”

Many of the European ambassadors still in Ukraine admitted that despite the alarm raised by their British and American counterparts, they could not have anticipated the timing and magnitude of the Russian invasion. Boychenko, the mayor of Mariupol, had told de Poncins during his embassy visit that he was “not worried” about an imminent war because “I know the Russians.” 

However, de Poncins and Zazo acknowledged that their presence on the ground had become a moral imperative. 

“There are a certain number of things we can’t do from the outside,” said de Poncins. “But staying on the ground is a political decision at the highest level, it is a gesture of solidarity, of trust … and diplomacy is about gestures, signals we send out.”