O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

Meu Twitter: https://twitter.com/PauloAlmeida53

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/paulobooks

terça-feira, 29 de dezembro de 2020

Batalhas identitárias na academia americana acabam se disseminando pelo mundo: vão chegar aqui também, se já não chegaram..

100,000 Little Stalinists

A new book examines ‘The Tyranny of Virtue’ on campus and in the wider woke culture

by 
David Mikics
Tablet Magazine, September 25, 2019

This spring, the writer Laurie Scheck, who teaches at the New School, asked her class why filmmakers had titled their documentary on James Baldwin I am Not Your Negro even though Baldwin actually said, in his debate with William F. Buckley Jr., “I am not your nigger.” A (white) student complained that the teacher had used a forbidden word, and Scheck, who does not have tenure, was placed under investigation. She was cleared in August after the usual months-long Kafkaesque inquisition. Scheck didn’t get to see the charges against her and was banned from taking notes during meetings with her tormenters. The New School never apologized to her and did not say what it should have, that citing the words of an author during class is protected free speech.

So can a white professor directly quote an African American writer’s use of the word “nigger”? And will I, for that matter, get in trouble for writing that sentence? Baldwin is perhaps our greatest writer on race. Must he now be bowdlerized?

Scheck’s case happened too late to be included in Robert Boyers’ The Tyranny of Virtue: Identity, the Academy, and the Hunt for Political Heresies, but Boyers describes a bushel of similar craziness. He teaches literature at Skidmore College, where, one gathers from his book, some of the looniest SJW battles have been fought. Boyers is a child of the ’60s, when political action often meant something substantial, like protesting your government’s mass murder of Vietnamese civilians.

Boyers identifies as a liberal, the ever-embattled species he has valiantly championed for decades in the magazine he edits, Salmagundi. Scandalously, liberals love to debate political questions because they think the other side might have its reasons, too. “The most novel and radical principle of liberal politics,” writes the political theorist Stephen Holmes, is that “disagreement is a creative force” (Boyers cites the passage). While liberals locate disagreement not just between people but also within the self, fanatics—whether putatively on “the left” or “the right”—crush any ambivalence they might feel about their beliefs, and pretend that righteous motives are all that is needed to make the case for a political agenda.

These days fanaticism is winning the battle on the left just as it has on the right. The correct political positions, we are meant to think, are so obviously true that only a bad person could possibly experience doubt. Boyers’ funniest and most acute comments take aim at the fake consensus that has been imposed on our campus culture. One day, he says, you just can’t take it, and find “you’re unwilling to sit quietly, hands nicely folded, in the total cultural environment many of your friends and colleagues want to inhabit.” But whenever you say something mildly critical about the current orthodoxy, the others stiffen as if they’ve noticed a bad smell. “Suspicion is now the required posture toward those who would wish to walk about under no one’s surveillance,” Boyers judges, and he’s right. Too often, today’s colleges and universities are comfortable with difference only when it is skin deep.

Boyers, gadfly that he is, has bailed out of the left’s neo-Stalinist uniformity of opinion, which sees dissent as a source of infection that might injure vulnerable victim groups, for whom the enforcers of correct opinion speak like the Lorax, in the Dr. Seuss book, who unironically proclaimed “My name is the Lorax. I speak for the trees.” Boyers points out that current politically correct culture clings to two contradictory beliefs, determinism (you are your skin color, your class origin, your gender) and free choice (you should identify as whoever you feel compelled to be). Determinism usually has the upper hand, but not always. If you’re trans, and especially if you’re nonbinary, you can redefine yourself freely; if you’re white or black, you can’t.

Woke determinism, Boyers argues, enforces racial categories that we once recognized as oppressive but now seem to welcome, since they relieve us of the task of evaluating individuals. In the case of “white people,” the type is a cartoonish myth. Poor people in eastern Kentucky cannot use their whiteness as a gilded path to the Ivy League and Wall Street. But in some mystical way their sheer “whiteness” means, to the righteous left, that they are not truly oppressed. Intersectionality allows for the bewildering suggestion that sexism and patriarchy are examples of “white male privilege” and therefore not to be found in the African American neighborhoods of Chicago, or among Mexicans, Japanese, or Africans.

For the campus left, most of them white, “white privilege” has become a shibboleth. If you say it, you instantly gain the upper hand. For the woketivists, “being political” means condemning others as ignorant or malicious. What’s missing, Boyers urgently says, is “the agitation we want to feel in confronting the other—or in confronting what is opaque or impenetrable in ourselves.” The left can only do its part in making society better if it recognizes that being anti-racist, or pro-woman, or pro-immigrant doesn’t mean that you’ll do the right thing. Boyers pleads that “we want, or ought to want, not to love ourselves as if our ostensible motives—to be right, to be good, to be correct—guaranteed defensible outcomes.”

American Stalinist professors of the 1930s and ’40s had these same motives, and they supported a foreign tyrant. Rather than crushing capitalism, though, today’s campus activists have a much weirder goal, preventing vulnerable people, including themselves, from “having unwanted or disturbing thoughts.” Boyers describes a two-fold coercion: Campus activists both enforce silence and unleash torrential verbal abuse, often in the form of career-wrecking Twitter blitzkriegs. Students now mainly learn two things, “what not to ask,” and who they’re supposed to blame. Cowardly administrators, afraid for their own jobs, knuckle under to mob rule or even set the fires themselves, most disastrously at Oberlin.

The campus left’s “intolerance of ideas and persons felt to be divisive,” Boyers argues, is an effort to purge the self of anything that might spoil the unanimity and unquestioning adherence that is apparently now the goal of liberal education at some institutions. It’s a real question whether parents will continue to pay outrageous prices so that their children can be taught to censor themselves and others.

Censorship is both the goal and the means of the woke thought police. Boyers recounts his talk with a creative writing student who started a campaign to prevent the screening of a ’60s Italian comedy on the grounds that it might prove traumatic for her. Any film that shows abusive sexual relationships ought, in fact, to be banned from the classroom, the student implied, since it could trigger bad memories. So goodbye Hitchcock, Scorsese, and Kubrick. As for books, how will Shakespeare, Dostoevsky, or Dickens survive?

Such bargain-basement puritanism fails for several reasons. Sometimes an artist’s exploitation feeds insight. Boyers gives the example of Lucian Freud’s portraits of women: He strips them bare but also gives them vast penetrating power. And then, too, artists cannot tailor their aims to an audience’s political sensitivities. Last year one of my best students told me he was offended by Flannery O’Connor’s portrayal of a mentally disabled boy. But O’Connor, who was disabled herself, knew what she was doing; sometimes a wickedly one-dimensional character serves the writer’s purpose.

Trying to sanitize books, movies, and paintings by making them cloyingly life affirming or emotionally supportive is a hopeless task. Literature and culture are, by definition, a risk to your health, dangerous and disturbing. That’s why they’re good.

A large majority of Americans, including African Americans and other minority groups, think that political correctness is a problem. Those who disagree, a mere 8% of those surveyed, are disproportionately white and wealthy. The statistics I’ve quoted come from an article by George Packer, who reports on the new bias training required of all New York City school employees. The training program declares that “Perfectionism,” “Individualism,” and “Objectivity” are forms of “White Supremacy Culture,” and urges teachers to disrupt these insidious values. Any thinking person will see instantly that New York City’s bias training flatly contradicts what we require public schools to do: empower individual schoolchildren while also persuading them that wish-fulfillment differs from reality.




Boyers has given us a crucial lesson in the sweeping anti-liberalism of present-day leftists. Their will to enforce agreement with whatever one is supposed to think has spread far beyond the academy, and their loyalty tests get more absurd every day, as the laundry list of progressive positions becomes ever longer and more incoherent. Progressives have eagerly provided the muscle for conformism: Either you’re totally onboard, or else you’re the enemy, an unforgivable doubting soul.


The Deadliest Year In the History of U.S. Drug Use: além da pandemia, os americanos continuam a ter anti-racionais e usuários de drogas

THE OTHER EPIDEMIC 
The New York Magazine, Intelligencer, 

The Deadliest Year In the History of U.S. Drug Use

By  

https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/12/cdc-drug-overdose-deaths-in-2020-on-track-to-break-record.html 

While over 300,000 Americans and counting have died from COVID-19 since the beginning of the pandemic, another public-health disaster is taking more lives than ever before: drug overdoses.

Overdose deaths in 2019 were significantly higher than 2018, jumping from 67,367 deaths in 2018 to 70,630 overdose deaths in 2019, marking a nearly 5 percent increase, according to a new report issued Tuesday by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. If that’s not grim enough, a separate health alert published by the CDC this week reports a “concerning acceleration” in overdose deaths for 2020, which provisional data show is on track to be the deadliest year for U.S. drug overdose deaths in recorded history. Complete data for 2020 is not expected to be available until some time next year.

The CDC estimates that 81,230 drug overdose deaths occurred from June 2019 to May 2020. The largest overdose spike happened from March to May of this year, which coincides with the beginning of the pandemic when the economy collapsed, lockdowns were imposed and “social distancing” became a new way of life. In addition to unemployment and financial precarity driving up despair, public-health experts have also suggested that isolation during the pandemic has led more people to use drugs alone with no one around to revive them or call 911 if they overdose.

“I’m horrified by the increases across the board,” Dr. Kim Sue, a physician-anthropologist who studies addiction at Yale University’s School of Medicine, told Intelligencer. “Even before the pandemic, the U.S. was going in the wrong direction.”

Illicit fentanyl, an Über-potent opioid manufactured around the world in clandestine labs and used to adulterate heroin, is largely responsible for the soaring death rate, according to the CDC. While illicit fentanyl used to be concentrated in New England, it has rapidly spread across the Midwest and in recent years has made its way to the West Coast. In San Francisco, more people have died this year from overdoses than from COVID-19. In 2019, the city saw 441 overdose deaths compared to 621 so far this year, a 40 percent jump. Across the country, deaths are also steeply rising from stimulants like cocaine and methamphetamine, the CDC found, and many deaths involve a combination of different kinds of drugs, not just opioids.

America’s overdose crisis is proving to be a dynamic and ever-changing phenomenon that experts say has played out in three waves. The first wave began in the early 2000s and mainly comprised deaths from opioid pain relievers like oxycodone. After a crackdown on prescription pills, people flocked to a ballooning heroin market as pills became scarce and expensive. The third and much more deadly wave that sent the overdose rate soaring was driven primarily by powerful illicit fentanyl analogues that began to be used in heroin.

Now the U.S. may be entering a fourth wave, or something more like a tsunami. Illicit fentanyl and stimulants such as meth and cocaine now account for the bulk of overdose deaths. From 2012 through 2019, the rate of overdose deaths involving cocaine increased more than three-fold, and stimulants like methamphetamine increased more than six-fold, according to the CDC. Trends in stimulant overdoses are also on track to worsen during 2020. Deaths involving cocaine increased by 26.5 percent from June 2019 to May 2020, while deaths involving stimulants such as meth increased by 34.8 percent during the same period.

President Trump took credit in 2018 for a meager decline in overdose deaths, but they have skyrocketed even as the federal government made $3.4 billion available to states to fund addiction-treatment services and purchase the opioid-overdose-reversal drug, naloxone. A new report by the Government Accountability Office shows why that funding has made little impact: Over $1 billion in federal grant money meant for the opioid crisis has yet to be spent by states. Addiction experts cite burdensome bureaucracy, needless paperwork, and poor use of existing treatment infrastructure as reasons why so much federal money that was earmarked for the overdose crisis remains unused. “Bureaucracy is literally killing people,” Robert Ashford, an addiction researcher who studies recovery, tweeted. The latest pandemic-relief package contains another sizable investment in mental-health and addiction services. Experts also lament that federal grant money specifically intended for the treatment of opioid-use disorders wasn’t available to people who needed treatment for other substance-use disorders — such as stimulant and alcohol addiction.

Yale’s Sue and many of her colleagues believe that America’s “drug war” approach is outdated and that it has caused more harm than it aims to prevent. Focusing on suing Big Pharma, ramping up trafficking busts, and sending people suffering from addiction to drug courts are “myopic” and “misguided” approaches, Sue said. “We have to innovate and pivot quickly, enacting evidence-based harm-reduction strategies to keep people alive,” she added.

There’s a long list of policies and interventions Sue hopes to see in the near future. “I am heartened to see in the CDC report that drug checking, mobile buprenorphine or telemedicine, wrap-around post-overdose care, and diversion from jail or prison, are critical components of a novel and engaged response,” Sue said, adding she’d also like to see supervised consumption sites and much greater access to effective medications that treat addiction.

Meanwhile, the Biden-Harris administration has yet to select a director for the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), a.k.a. the “drug czar,” but whoever takes the job surely faces an uphill climb in their effort to prevent the crisis from getting even worse. If Biden keeps up the trend of hiring from the Obama administration and the Washington drug policy blob, America’s approach to addiction is unlikely to dramatically change anytime soon.

“Why must U.S. drug policy be led by people who continue doing the same thing, putting a square peg in a round hole and expecting improvement?” Sue said.


Crescimento nem sempre é tudo: o paradoxo dos quatro "d"s - Paulo Roberto de Almeida (OESP, 1994)

 Acho que não preciso acrescentar mais nada no que já escrevi em 1994, em Paris, lendo a imprensa econômica francesa, dentro de minhas atribuições como chefe do setor econômico da embaixada do Brasil. O curioso é que na mesma edição do excelente jornal de negócios Les Echos eu tive quatro matérias diferentes, mas cada uma focalizando um aspecto da realidade econômica internacional. Cada uma reproduzia um problema que parecia exatamente do Brasil: só que não era.

Acho que isso destrói um pouco a famosa teoria do Celso Furtado sobre o desenvolvimento, cujas características seriam diferentes nos países ricos e nos países em desenvolvimento. Sempre fui contra isso, dentro dos meus parcos conhecimentos de economia – sou da tribo dos sociólogos – e achava que apenas os resultados eram diferentes, mas que processos, mecanismos e ferramentas do crescimento econômico eram fundamentalmente os mesmos, provocando DESENVOLVIMENTO, e alguns casos, e POUCO desenvolvimento, em outros.

Os nossos desenvolvimentistas rezam pela cartilha furtadiana, o que eu nunca fui, ainda que admirando sua capacidade analítica e explicativa. Mas, como sempre pratiquei o CETICISMO SADIO, sempre mantive um pé atrás em qualquer argumento sociológico e até ECONÔMICO.

Fica aqui o artigo de 1994, para conferir se alguma realidade ou problema mudou, no Brasil e em outros países.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasilia, 29/12/2020

Crescimento nem sempre é tudo

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O Estado de São Paulo, 11/09/1994, Opinião, p. 2.

 

Desenvolvimento, desigualdade, desemprego e desequilíbrio: esses quatro “d”s podem apresentar-se como paradoxos no caso de uma economia em crescimento, como a do Brasil.

Comecemos pelo editorial de um jornal econômico: “É lógico que dirigentes ressaltem dados que demonstram o sucesso de sua política. Os indicadores convergem: o desemprego baixa, a inflação está controlada, o produto bruto está em alta. Mas, eles divulgaram também uma pesquisa sobre a renda das famílias. Descobre-se que um quarto das famílias e uma criança em três vivem hoje na pobreza. Seus recursos não alcançam o limite mínimo fixado pelas autoridades. A renda média progrediu 36% em 15 anos, mas os 20% mais pobres nunca foram beneficiados. Quanto aos 10% mais pobres, a renda média real baixou em 17%. Tal contradição obriga a perguntar qual o sentido da noção de desenvolvimento: esse agravamento das desigualdades traz o risco de uma explosão social sobre a qual os índices de crescimento não dão a mínima ideia”.

Brasil? Não! Trata-se da Grã-Bretanha, que passou à frente dos demais países europeus em crescimento e redução do desemprego. Mas, a combinação de crescimento e de aumento das desigualdades sociais e da concentração de renda apresenta um curioso aspecto “brasileiro”.

Vejamos outra citação: “Se a produtividade de nossos trabalhadores fosse a mesma de seus homólogos americanos, o produto interno bruto poderia ser realizado com uma população ativa de apenas 40 milhões de pessoas, contra 60 milhões atualmente. Ou seja, nós teríamos 20 milhões de trabalhadores sobrando”.

Brasil, novamente? Não, trata-se do Japão. A “Nikkeiren”, federação patronal, publicou uma pesquisa que traz a angustiosa conclusão de que os progressos da produtividade no país podem condenar 1/3 da população economicamente ativa ao desemprego. É apenas uma ameaça, mas ressalta a necessidade de controlar a alta de preços e dos salários para manter a competitividade externa. Os japoneses estão preocupados: a alta do yen e as deslocalizações industriais podem acarretar o fenômeno relativamente desconhecido, para eles, do desemprego.

Terminemos pela luta entre o poder central e governos estaduais para “racionalizar” a divisão da receita: “A divisão proposta entre a União e os estados, visando aumentar os recursos do Governo central, ainda não foi aceita por vários governadores. Os dois estados mais ricos recusam-se a seguir as recomendações do Governo central ou contribuir em favor dos estados mais pobres. Mesmas dificuldades para a reforma das estatais no limite da falência e mantidas graças a subsídios. Todo mundo sabe que será preciso, mais cedo ou mais tarde, desfazer-se dessas empresas, que custam muito caro para o Estado. Mas, todos temem as consequências sociais dessas falências”.

Ah, agora trata-se do Brasil ! Ainda não... Trata-se da China, esse fenômeno mundial. Ela vem passando por altas taxas de crescimento, mas os desequilíbrios regionais vêm acentuando-se a ponto de colocar em risco a unidade política do país. E, claro, nenhum governador quer ceder recursos para o Governo central, que tem a seu encargo algumas pesadas estatais ávidas por subsídios públicos.

Desenvolvimento, desigualdade, desemprego e desequilíbrio: quatro fenômenos paradoxais, ilustrados com exemplos diversos, mas que demonstram, de maneira angustiante, que o crescimento e a produtividade não resolvem problemas de emprego e de bem-estar social.

Esses paradoxos não são exclusivos de países pobres, já que a Grã-Bretanha e a França estão descobrindo agora o fenômeno da exclusão social (que é a pobreza do Norte). A economia pode ir bem e a riqueza aumentar, deixando ao mesmo tempo uma parte da população nos limites da precariedade. O Japão precisa enfrentar os dilemas da produtividade e do pleno emprego. O caso da China, por outro lado, indica que toda reforma econômica é sempre difícil, pois ela implica redistribuir recursos escassos, nem sempre com o assentimento de quem está ficando rico. Em tempo: todos os casos e citações foram retirados da mesma edição do jornal econômico francês Les Echos (22/08/1994). 

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida é mestre em economia internacional e doutor em ciências sociais pela Universidade de Bruxelas. 

 

450. “O Paradoxo dos 4 ‘d’s”, Paris, 23 agosto 1994, 2 p. Artigo com base em notícias econômicas sobre desigualdade, desemprego e desequilíbrio em outros países. Encaminhado por Alberto Tamer. Publicado, sob o título “Crescimento nem sempre é tudo”, em O Estado de São Paulo (11 setembro 1994, p. 2). Relação de Publicados n. 160.

 

2020 no resumo do Washington Post: Trump difundiu 25 MIL MENTIRAS desde 2017 !!!

O Washington Post foi um inimigo implacável do Grande Mentecapto desde o início de seu mandato. Aliás, o WP já catalogava e denunciava as suas MENTIRAS desde a campanha eleitoral. 

Foi o presidente que mais MENTIU na história política dos EUA. Parece incrível que tenha ainda tantos idiotas que acreditam nele e que inclusive deram dinheiro – milhões e milhões – para que ele conduzisse uma nova campanha FRAUDULENTA contra alegadas fraudes no processo eleitoral e nas apurações.

Merece certas amizades, igualmente fraudulentas e que vivem a contar mentiras.

O mundo está mesmo cheio de IDIOTAS! Nos EUA, isso não me surpreende muito: é um dos países mais carolas do mundo, daquela religiosidade ingênua que acredita que os dinossauros conviveram com os homens, mas que não sobreviveram ao dilúvio porque não cabiam na Arca de Noé.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

How we covered a year like no other

The Washington Post, December 29, 2020

A global pandemic. A historic presidential election. Protests for racial justice and equality. Wildfires, hurricanes and an impeachment trial. It all happened in 2020.

It was a year of loss. The world lost legends, heroes, family and friends. If there was anything to gain, perhaps it was perspective. We found new ways to look at age-old problems, long unexamined. New ways of thinking about the future. And new ways to connect with each other.

Through it all, The Washington Post newsroom reported on thousands of stories with the goal of helping you understand, process and talk about each new tragedy and development as it unfolded.

Below, are just some of the stories that defined 2020 — a year of extraordinary tumult and disruption.

(Harry Stevens/The Washington Post)
Why outbreaks like coronavirus spread exponentially, and how to “flatten the curve”

In the early days of the pandemic, we created a simple simulation demonstrating how social distancing can help slow the spread of the virus. It was translated into 13 languages and became the most-viewed story in the history of The Post. Today,we’re still tracking coronavirus infections in every state.

Read the story → 
(Joshua Lott/The Washington Post)
Born with two strikes: How systemic racism shaped George Floyd’s life and hobbled his ambition

Nationwide protests for racial justice were sparked by George Floyd’s final moments, but his life was shaped by the very forces people are protesting after his death — entrenched poverty, systemic racism, a broken criminal justice system and police violence.

Read the story → 
(Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)
Fact-checking more than 25,000 false claims

The year started with an impeachment trial and ended with a presidential election. The Fact Checker team paid attention throughout, with an eye on the truth.According to the Fact Checker, President Trump has made more than 25,000 false or misleading claims since he assumed office in 2017.

Read the story → 
(Celeste Sloman for The Washington Post)
From dream job to nightmare: Women claim sexual harassment by employees at Washington Football Team

In July, we broke the news that more than a dozen women had accused Washington Football Team employees of sexual harassment and verbal abuse. The accused staffers resigned in the midst of our reporting and the team hired a lawyer to audit the organization.

Read the story → 
(Eve Edelheit for The Washington Post)
The pandemic made them homeless. Post readers helped.

The economic collapse sparked by the pandemic is triggering the most unequal recession in modern U.S. history. We interviewed a family near Orlando that was sleeping in their car after their money ran out. The story inspired more than 1,900 people to donate more than $130,000 to help turn the family’s life around.

Read the story → 
(Elijah Nouvelage/Getty Images)
The Endless Call: Demands for change are part of the American story

Demands for racial equity and justice have always been part of the American story. In this photography project, images of Black 


20 Anos da Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal: 2000-2020 - Oficina Municipal, Fundação Konrad Adenauer

 A LRF começou bem, mas logo tropeçou nas patifarias dos companheiros. Quando Martaxa (ex-Suplicy), prefeita de SP, contrariou a LRF, por gastos que poderiam tê-la levado à cadeia (se a LRF tivesse dentes efetivos), o então ministro da Fazenda, Antonio Palocci (trotsquista neoliberal, o único do PT, mas também coordenador, junto com o Richelieu José Dirceu, da gigantesca máquina de corrupção do partido e dos seus chefes mafiosos, inclusive ele próprio), ele fez aprovar uma regulamentação RETROATIVA que absolvia a "relaxa e goza" de qualquer pena, ou sequer de condenação. Começou aí a desmoralização da LRF, que conheceu outras piores sob Madame Pasadena, ops, Dona Dilma, a célebre por sua teimosia e dois neurônios, que jogou o Brasil na MAIOR RECESSÃO de nossa história, que eu chamo de a Grande Destruição. Mas, ela foi submetida a impeachment (meio fajuto, é verdade), e foi cassada (mas incrivelmente não perdeu seus direitos políticos, pois o STF também calha ser uma Suprema Corte INCONSTITUCIONAL), mas não por corrupção ou por ter violado a LRF e outras leis, inclusive a lei orçamentária, e sim por não se entender com o bandidão da CD, o supermafioso (vale por um PT inteiro) Eduardo Cunha. Em todo caso, leiam esta brochura sobre a LRF.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida


 20 Anos Da Lei De Responsabilidade Fiscal

Equilíbrio e disciplina nas contas públicas e transparência na gestão dos recursos financeiros utilizados pelos governos nas esferas municipal, estadual e federal. A Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal tem um objetivo principal bastante claro. Promulgada no ano de 2000, a legislação chega ao seu vigésimo aniversário em meio a uma pandemia que tem se mostrado como um dos principais desafios para sua manutenção. Depois de duas décadas orientando o cotidiano de gestores públicos na federação brasileira, é tempo de avaliar esse importante mecanismo legal e a relevância de seu papel no fortalecimento da Democracia e da Gestão Pública no Brasil. 

Convidamos os professores Alexandre Cialdini e Fabiana Pascoaloto para redigir dois artigos, duas análises dos 20 anos da Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal pelos olhos de dois profissionais que testemunharam a implementação da LRF no país

download

https://oficinamunicipal.org.br/uploads/attachments/libraryitem/48/Publica%C3%A7%C3%A3o_20_ANOS_DE_LRF.pdf



Le Brésil de 1984 à 1994: Stabilisation du régime démocratique et bouleversements dans la vie économique - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 447. “Le Brésil de 1984 à 1994: Stabilisation du régime démocratique et bouleversements dans la vie économique”, Paris, 15 agosto 1994, 21 p. Texto sobre a história contemporânea, elaborado para integrar, juntamente com texto dos Profs. Katia de Queirós Mattoso e Antonio Fernando Guerreiro de Freitas (Brésil: Cinq Siècles d’Histoire), brochura de divulgação da Embaixada. Longo processo de revisão (publicação postergada). Divulgado na plataforma Academia.edu (29/12/2020; link: https://www.academia.edu/44790963/447_Le_Bresil_de_1984_a_1994_Stabilisation_du_regime_démocratique_et_bouleversements_dans_la_vie_economique_1994_).

Le Brésil de 1984 à 1994

STABILISATION DU RÉGIME DÉMOCRATIQUE ET

BOULEVERSEMENTS DANS LA VIE ÉCONOMIQUE

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Docteur ès Sciences Sociales de l’Université de Bruxelles

 

Sommaire : 

1. Une Vue d’Ensemble 

2. La Transition au Régime Civil: alliances et compromis

3. La Tentative de Stabilisation Économique et la Nouvelle Constitution

4. Une Politique Extérieure faite de Continuité et de Changements

5. Les premières élections directes en 30 ans: l’espoir et la déception

6. Ascension et chute d’un Président

7. Le Vice-Président: un homme proche du peuple

8. Une grande démocratie en fonctionnement

9. La question sociale au Brésil à l’aube du XXIe siècle

 

 

1. Une Vue d’Ensemble

Les dix années qui s’étalent de 1984 à 1994 ont constitué une période marquante et mouvementée dans la vie politique, sociale et économique du Brésil contemporain. En effet, tour à tour et parfois dans des séquences fort agitées, on assiste aux processus et événements suivants: 

– transition pacifique du régime militaire, inauguré en avril 1964, à un gouvernement civil d’alliance nationale;

– de multiples tentatives et expériences, à la fois frustrées et réussies, de stabilisation économique;

– restructuration institutionnelle du pays, avec l’adoption d’une nouvelle Constitution, en octobre 1988;

– début de la détente nucléaire avec l’Argentine et du processus d’intégration régionale qui, à terme, doit mener au Marché Commun du Sud, avec d’autres voisins du Cône Sud;

– les premières élections directes, depuis 1960, au suffrage universel, du Président de la République, en 1989, rompant un jeûne de presque 30 ans;

– l’impeachment, par le Congrès, de ce même Président et sa substitution démocratique par le Vice-Président; 

– finalement, de nouvelles élections générales dans ce que l’on peut bien appeler, désormais, l’une des plus grandes démocraties du monde occidental.

Les dernières élections directes à la Présidence de République, avant l’établissement du régime militaire, avaient vu s’opposer, en 1960, les candidats de trois coalitions de partis qui se disputaient les votes d’un peu moins de 12 millions d’électeurs. En 1994, ce sont huit candidats qui, lors du premier tour, demandent l’appui de presque 95 millions d’électeurs, une croissance spectaculaire de plus de 600% de la masse de votants dans la période. Cette large démocratisation de la vie politique, avec une expansion constante de la participation populaire au jeu politique, constitue peut-être le trait le plus saillant du Brésil moderne, à côté, en moins brillant, des inégalités criantes de son structure sociale et de la large masse d’exclus de la croissance économique.

Du point de vue matériel, social et économique, c’est bien à une décade entière de bouleversements dans la politique économique que les Brésiliens ont assisté. Il y eut alternance de périodes de croissance et de conjonctures de crise ou dépression, la stagnation relative du pouvoir d’achat, le transfert net de capitaux vers l’étranger à titre du paiement de l’énorme dette extérieure, le remplacement, pas moins de cinq fois, de la monnaie nationale avec autant de Plans de redressement du système économique et monétaire (chaque fois frustrés), pour finalement aboutir, en juillet 1994, à un sérieux effort de stabilisation macro-économique. Cette fois, le plan comportait, au préalable, l’ajustement fiscal de l’État, suivi du lancement d’une nouvelle monnaie, le Réal, dont la garantie est basée sur les réserves de change du pays. Indéniablement, le Brésil constitue, aussi bien du point de vue politique que de celui de la vie économique, l’un des plus grands laboratoires en grandeur nature que l’on puisse connaître dans le monde.


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Ler a íntegra neste link: 

https://www.academia.edu/44790963/447_Le_Bresil_de_1984_a_1994_Stabilisation_du_regime_démocratique_et_bouleversements_dans_la_vie_economique_1994_ 



segunda-feira, 28 de dezembro de 2020

Brésil: Données de Base, Brochure préparée pour l'Ambassade du Brésil à Paris (Inédite) - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

442. “Brésil: Données de Base”, Paris, 31 julho 1994, 36 p. Brochura preparada para servir de informação de base para a Embaixada do Brasil, cobrindo 18 capítulos de dados gerais (históricos, políticos, econômicos, geográficos, sociais e culturais) e uma bibliografia sumária. Não publicada. Divulgada na plataforma Academia.edu (28/12/2020; link: https://www.academia.edu/44790710/442_Bresil_Donnees_de_Base_Ambassade_du_Bresil_a_Paris_1994_).



AMBASSADE DU BRÉSIL À PARIS

Service de Documentation et d’Information

 

BRÉSIL

DONNÉES DE BASE

 


Paris, 1994

 

 

AMBASSADE DU BRÉSIL

34, Cours Albert 1er

75008 Paris - France

Tél.: (33.1) 42 25 92 50

Fax: 42 89 03 45

Télex: 650063 

 

Paris, Août 1994


 

Cette brochure a été élaborée par l’Ambassade du Brésil pour être distribuée gracieusement à tous ceux qui en font la demande. Les informations qui sont ici rassemblées ne représentent pas nécessairement les positions officielles du Gouvernement brésilien ou du Ministère des Relations Extérieures.

 

 

Auteur/Éditeur: Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Impression: Manuel Alves

Première édition: août 1994. 


 

BRÉSIL: DONNÉES DE BASE


 

Sommaire Général

 

Avant-Propos

 

1. L’Histoire en raccourci

2. Territoire

3. Population

4. Organisation Politique et Administrative de l’État           

5. Participation Politique

6. Enseignement et Culture

7. Emploi et Travail

8. Habitation et Conditions de Vie

9. Santé

10. Organisation Syndicale

11. Agriculture et Élevage

12. Industrie

13. Énergie

14. Transports et Communications

15. Tourisme

16. Système Financier            

17. Commerce Extérieur et Investissements

18. Comptes Nationaux

 

Bibliographie

  

Avant-Propos

 

La présente publication n’a d’autre but que celui de rassembler des statistiques et des données éparpillées pour permettre une information de base à tous ceux qui doivent se documenter sur le Brésil, ne fut ce que sommairement. Elle n’a pas la prétention de se substituer à d’autres ouvrages, d’information générale ou spécialisée, et doit être considérée comme ayant un objectif essentiellement didactique.

Dans son élaboration, ont été utilisés, pour la plupart des chapitres, des chiffres qui intègrent les publications de l’Institut Brésilien de Géographie et Statistique, dont notamment la brochure Brasil em Números (Rio de Janeiro, IBGE, 1993). D’autres données, puisées dans des sources diverses, sont venues compléter un travail qui se veut, avec raison, préliminaire.

En effet, il serait difficile de condenser en quelques pages une réalité si complexe et variée comme celle du Brésil, dont le développement, au cours des cinq siècles depuis sa découverte par les Portugais, mais tout particulièrement depuis de début de son processus de modernisation à partir des années 30, diffère entièrement de celui connu par les pays avancés, mais aussi de beaucoup d’autres pays en développement. Le Brésil est aussi vaste qu’un continent, possède des larges espaces à peine exploités, un potentiel énorme au point de vue économique, mais aussi des problèmes sociaux qui représentent autant des défis lancés à une société nationale multi-ethnique et pourtant dotée, à la différence de beaucoup d’autres pays, d’une homogénéité culturelle fondamentale. Il lui faut poursuivre la croissance économique, tout en opérant une distribution plus équitable du revenu, dans un contexte politique entièrement démocratique.

 

(...)


Bibliographie sommaire

 

Sans avoir aucunement la prétention d’être complète, la présente liste bibliographique indique quelques titres choisis parmi beaucoup d’autres livres sur le Brésil parus en France. Sont ici cités essentiellement des ouvrages d’auteurs brésiliens (ou en collaboration), ainsi que de quelques auteurs français, couvrant des problèmes et des aspects historiques, économiques, politiques, technologiques, culturels ou sociaux du Brésil contemporain.

 

ALVES, Márcio Moreira: L’Église et la politique au Brésil (Paris: Le Cerf, 1974)

ARRAES, Miguel: Le Brésil, le pouvoir et le peuple (Paris: Maspero, 1969)

CARDOSO, Fernando Henrique: Dépendance et développement en Amérique Latine (Paris: PUF, 1978)

_________ : Les Idées à leur place: le concept de développement en Amérique Latine (Paris: A.-M. Métaillié/MSH, 1984)

CARELLI, Mario: Brésil, épopée métisse (Paris: Gallimard, 1987)

CASCUDO, Luís da Câmara: Contes Traditionnels du Brésil (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1978)

DA MATTA, Roberto: Carnaval, bandits et héros (Paris: Seuil, 1983)

DE CASTRO, Josué: Une zone explosive: le Nordeste du Brésil (Paris: Seuil, 1965)

FREYRE, Gilberto: Maîtres et esclaves (Paris: Gallimard, 1952)

_________ : Terres du sucre (Paris: Gallimard, 1956)

FURTADO, Celso: La formation économique du Brésil, de l’époque coloniale aux temps modernes (Paris: Mouton, 1973)

_________ : L’analyse du “modèle” brésilien (Paris: Anthropos, 1974)

_________ : Le Brésil après le miracle (Paris: MSH, 1987)

L’Histoire Quantitative du Brésil de 1800 à 1930 (Paris: CNRS, 1973)

MARTINIÈRE, Guy et CARDOSO, Luiz Claudio (éds): France-Brésil: Vingt Ans de Coopération, Science et Technologie (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires, 1989)

MARTINS, Luciano: Pouvoir et Développement Économique: formation et évolution des structures politiques au Brésil (Paris: Anthropos, 1976)

MATTOSO, Katia M. de Queirós: Être esclave au Brésil, XVIe-XIXe siècles (Paris: Hachette, 1979)

MAURO, Frédéric: Le Brésil du XVe au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: SEDES, 1977)

MONBEIG, Pierre: Pionniers et Planteurs de São Paulo (Paris: Arland Colin, 1952)

MOOG, Viana: Défricheurs et pionniers (Paris: Gallimard, 1963)

MORAZÉ, Charles: Les Trois Âges du Brésil (Paris: Arland Colin, 1954)

PARVAUX, Solange et REVEL-MOUROZ, Jean (coords): Images réciproques du Brésil et de la France (Paris: IHEAL, 1991)

RIBEIRO, Darcy: Frontières indigènes de la civilisation (Paris: UGE-10/18, 1979)

VERGER, Pierre: Flux et reflux de la traite des nègres entre le golfe du Bénin et de Bahia de Todos os Santos du XVIIe au XIXe siècle (Paris: Mouton, 1978)

 

Divulgada na plataforma Academia.edu (28/12/2020; link: https://www.academia.edu/44790710/442_Bresil_Donnees_de_Base_Ambassade_du_Bresil_a_Paris_1994_).