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terça-feira, 13 de agosto de 2024
The Kursk incursion logic - Hans Petter Midttun (EuroMaidan)
The Kursk incursion logic
The Kursk Offensive helps speed up the Russian military’s demise, reinvigorate Western support, and strengthen Ukrainian resolve and resilience.
On 6 August, Ukraine executed an assault against Kursk Oblast, to the surprise of both Russia and Ukraine’s international partners. In a fully transparent battlefield, it managed to secretly relocate and deploy units from at least four elite brigades and execute a surprise mechanized assault.
The new offensive comes at great risk. Attacking the Russian Federation, Ukraine risks triggering Article 4 of the CSTO Collective Security Treaty, in which “Member State shall immediately provide the [victim of aggression] with the necessary help, including military one, as well as provide support by the means at their disposal in accordance with the right to collective defense pursuant to article 51 of the UN Charter.” This would completely change the dynamic of the war.
The incursion will also challenge an already stretched Ukrainian Armed Forces, still suffering the consequences of the Russian offensive, the US temporary stop in defense aid (Oct-Apr), the slow and incremental inflow of European pledged weapons and ammunition, and Ukrainian manpower shortage.
The incursion, however, potentially also offers huge gains.
1. Force Russia to redeploy forces from the frontline
Russia is being forced to redeploy units from the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Pokrovsk, Kharkiv, and Kupiansk directions. Russian milbloggers allege that it is redeploying up to nine brigades (or elements of brigades) to Kursk Oblast as a response to the Ukrainian attack. A Ukrainian military observer reports, however, that Russian forces have so far redeployed 10 to 11 battalionsfrom across the theatre to the Kursk Oblast. These battalion units are believed to lack manpower and equipment but are sufficiently strong to buy Russia time to organize a proper defense and counteroffensive.
The intensity of fighting along the frontline in the East and South has already somewhat decreased. The daily average of combat clashes has fallen from 130 during the first week of August to 105 after the start of the Kursk offensive. The number of artillery and MLRS attacks, however, remains unaffected.
2. Demonstrate Russian vulnerabilities
On 23-24 June 2023, the Wagner rebellion and its march against the Kremlin demonstrated how vulnerable Russia’s interior is to surprise attacks. Having deployed most of its regular ground forces to Ukraine and lost the entire professional army by the fall of 2022, Russia is today “fighting with mobilized soldiers, prisoners – anyone.” The Russian interior is lightly defended by conscripts and irregular forces.
The assault was executed at a moment when more experts were gradually highlighting Russian defense industrial shortcomings. Russia’s war efforts depend on its ability to repair and send Soviet legacy tanks, APCs, and artillery to the frontline. While its manpower might be close to “inexhaustible,” its stockpiles of heavy weapons are not.
The IISS believes that Russia can sustain its assault on Ukraine for about two or three years. Other experts believe Russia will reach a “critical point of depletion” in 2025 already.
The Kursk invasion helped speed up Russia’s demise and helped “shoot down” the perception that Russia could not be defeated.
3. Undermine Western argument policy of self-deterrence
Russian President Putin has repeatedly warned the West not to cross a “red line” with Russia, stressing that this would trigger an “asymmetrical, rapid and harsh” response. Russia’s red lines include:
Undermining Russia’s external security interests (hinting at its near abroad (Ukraine and Belarus), NATO’s so-called “eastward expansion,” zone of special influence (former USSR states), the Arctic and the Baltic states);
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