O segundo ano da guerra na Ucrânia será assustador; leia o artigo de Thomas Friedman
Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, em viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas.
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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;
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terça-feira, 7 de fevereiro de 2023
O segundo ano da guerra na Ucrânia será assustador - Thomas Friedman (NYT, Estadão)
quinta-feira, 10 de março de 2022
O mundo confrontado à loucura de um único déspota - Tom Friedman (NYT)
Só existe uma maneira de interromper a marcha da insensatez: os militares russos tomarem o controle militar do Kremlin para depor o insano tirano. Como eles não o farão, o mundo caminhará to the brink…
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Putin Has No Good Way Out, and That Really Scares Me
Thomas L. Friedman
The New York Times – 10.3.2022
If you’re hoping that the instability that Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine has wreaked on global markets and geopolitics has peaked, your hope is in vain. We haven’t seen anything yet. Wait until Putin fully grasps that his only choices left in Ukraine are how to lose — early and small and a little humiliated or late and big and deeply humiliated.
I can’t even wrap my mind around what kind of financial and political shocks will radiate from Russia — this country that is the world’s third-largest oil producer and possesses some 6,000 nuclear warheads — when it loses a war of choice that was spearheaded by one man, who can never afford to admit defeat.
Why not? Because Putin surely knows that “the Russian national tradition is unforgiving of military setbacks,” observedLeon Aron, a Russia expert at the American Enterprise Institute, who is writing a book about Putin’s road to Ukraine.
“Virtually every major defeat has resulted in radical change,” added Aron, writing in The Washington Post. “The Crimean War (1853-1856) precipitated Emperor Alexander II’s liberal revolution from above. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) brought about the First Russian Revolution. The catastrophe of World War I resulted in Emperor Nicholas II’s abdication and the Bolshevik Revolution. And the war in Afghanistan became a key factor in Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms.” Also, retreating from Cuba contributed significantly to Nikita Khrushchev’s removal two years later.
In the coming weeks it will become more and more obvious that our biggest problem with Putin in Ukraine is that he will refuse to lose early and small, and the only other outcome is that he will lose big and late. But because this is solely his war and he cannot admit defeat, he could keep doubling down in Ukraine until … until he contemplates using a nuclear weapon.
Why do I say that defeat in Ukraine is Putin’s only option, that only the timing and size are in question? Because the easy, low-cost invasion he envisioned and the welcome party from Ukrainians he imagined were total fantasies — and everything flows from that.
Putin completely underestimated Ukraine’s will to be independent and become part of the West. He completely underestimated the will of many Ukrainians to fight, even if it meant dying, for those two goals. He completely overestimated his own armed forces. He completely underestimated President Biden’s ability to galvanize a global economic and military coalition to enable Ukrainians to stand and fight and to devastate Russia at home — the most effective U.S. coalition-building effort since George H.W. Bush made Saddam Hussein pay for his folly of seizing Kuwait. And he completely underestimated the ability of companies and individuals all over the world to participate in, and amplify, economic sanctions on Russia — far beyond anything governments initiated or mandated.
When you get that many things wrong as a leader, your best option is to lose early andsmall. In Putin’s case that would mean withdrawing his forces from Ukraine immediately; offering a face-saving lie to justify his “special military operation,” like claiming it successfully protected Russians living in Ukraine; and promising to help Russians’ brethren rebuild. But the inescapable humiliation would surely be intolerable for this man obsessed with restoring the dignity and unity of what he sees as the Russian motherland.
Incidentally, the way things are going on the ground in Ukraine right now, it is not out of the realm of possibility that Putin could actually lose early and big. I would not bet on it, but with every passing day that more and more Russian soldiers are killed in Ukraine, who knows what happens to the fighting spirit of the conscripts in the Russian Army being asked to fight a deadly urban war against fellow Slavs for a cause that was never really explained to them.
Given the resistance of Ukrainians everywhere to the Russian occupation, for Putin to “win” militarily on the ground his army will need to subdue every major city in Ukraine. That includes the capital, Kyiv — after probably weeks of urban warfare and massive civilian casualties. In short, it can be done only by Putin and his generals perpetrating war crimes not seen in Europe since Hitler. It will make Putin’s Russia a permanent international pariah.
Moreover, how would Putin maintain control of another country — Ukraine — that has roughly one-third the population of Russia, with many residents hostile to Moscow? He would probably need to maintain every one of the 150,000-plus soldiers he has deployed there — if not more — forever.
There is simply no pathway that I see for Putin to win in Ukraine in any sustainable way because it simply is not the country he thought it was — a country just waiting for a quick decapitation of its “Nazi” leadership so that it could gently fall back into the bosom of Mother Russia.
So either he cuts his losses now and eats crow — and hopefully for him escapes enough sanctions to revive the Russian economy and hold onto power — or faces a forever war against Ukraine and much of the world, which will slowly sap Russia’s strength and collapse its infrastructure.
As he seems hellbent on the latter, I am terrified. Because there is only one thing worse than a strong Russia under Putin — and that’s a weak, humiliated, disorderly Russia that could fracture or be in a prolonged internal leadership turmoil, with different factions wrestling for power and with all of those nuclear warheads, cybercriminals and oil and gas wells lying around.
Putin’s Russia is not too big to fail. It is, however, too big to fail in a way that won’t shake the whole rest of the world.
quinta-feira, 29 de abril de 2021
A paranoia anti-China alcança um dos melhores jornalistas americanos: Thomas Friedman (NYT)
Normal entre os generais do Pentágono, a obsessão por um conflito direto entre os EUA e a China contaminou os acadêmicos e agora atinge também um dos melhores jornalistas americanos: Tom Friedman. Abastecido por informações dos próprios militares, ele entrou na onda da paranoia que pretende que a China pretende alcançar hegemonia mundial — um objetivo que é exatamente o dos EUA, que já o exerce de maneira arrogante — pela via militar.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
The New York Times – 28/04/2021
Is There a War Coming Between China and the U.S.?
Thomas L. Friedman
If you’re looking for a compelling beach read this summer, I recommend the novel “2034,” by James Stavridis, a retired admiral, and Elliot Ackerman, a former Marine and intelligence officer. The book is about how China and America go to war in 2034, beginning with a naval battle near Taiwan and with China acting in a tacit alliance with Iran and Russia.
I’m not giving it all away to say China and the U.S. end up in a nuclear shootout and incinerate a few of each other’s cities, and the result is that neutral India becomes the dominant world power. (Hey, it’s a novel!)
What made the book unnerving, though, was that when I’d put it down and pick up the day’s newspaper I’d read much of what it was predicting for 13 years from now:
Iran and China just signed a 25-year cooperation agreement. Vladimir Putin just massed troops on the border of Ukraine while warning the U.S. that anyone who threatens Russia “will regret their deeds more than they have regretted anything in a long time.” As fleets of Chinese fighter jets, armed with electronic warfare technology, now regularly buzz Taiwan, China’s top foreign affairs policymaker just declared that the U.S. “does not have the qualification … to speak to China from a position of strength.”
Yikes, that’s life imitating art a little too closely for comfort. Why now?
The answer can be found, in part, in a book I have written about before: Michael Mandelbaum’s “The Rise and Fall of Peace on Earth.” It tracks how we went from a world defined by the Cold War between American democracy and Soviet communism — 1945 to 1989 — to a singularly peaceful quarter century without big power conflict, buttressed by spreading democracy and global economic interdependence — 1989 to about 2015 — to our current, much more dangerous era in which China, Iran and Russia are each deflecting the pressures of democracy and the need to deliver constant economic growth by offering their people aggressive hypernationalism instead.
What has made this return of Chinese, Iranian and Russian aggressive nationalism even more dangerous is that, in each country, it is married to state-led industries — particularly military industries — and it’s emerging at a time when America’s democracy is weakening.
Our debilitating political and cultural civil war, inflamed by social networks, is hobbling Americans’ ability to act in unison and for Washington to be a global stabilizer and institution builder, as the United States was after World War II.
Our foolish decision to expand NATO into Russia’s face — after the fall of the Soviet Union — hardened post-Communist Russia into an enemy instead of a potential partner, creating the ideal conditions for an anti-Western autocrat like Putin to emerge. (Imagine if Russia, a country with which we have zero trade or border disputes, were OUR ally today vis-à-vis China and Iran and not THEIR ally in disputes with us.)
Meanwhile, the failure of the U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq to produce the pluralism and decency hoped for after 9/11, coupled with the 2008 economic crisis and the current pandemic — together with the general hollowing out of America’s manufacturing base — has weakened both American self-confidence and the world’s confidence in America.
The result? Right when China, Russia and Iran are challenging the post-World War II order more aggressively than ever, many wonder whether the United States has the energy, allies and resources for a new geopolitical brawl.
“Just because communism is gone — and we don’t have two political and economic systems that claim universal legitimacy competing to govern every country — doesn’t mean that ideological considerations have disappeared from international politics,” Mandelbaum argued to me.
Regimes like those in China, Iran and Russia feel much more threatened — more than we think — by democracy, Mandelbaum added. During the first decade of the 21st century, these regimes were able to generate sufficient public support through economic progress. But after that proved more difficult in the second decade of the 21st century, “the leaders of these countries need to find a substitute, and the one they have chosen is hypernationalism.”
Are we up to the challenge? I’m pretty sure we can keep a more aggressive, nationalistic Russia and Iran deterred at a reasonable cost, and with the help of our traditional allies.
But China is another question. So we’d better understand where our strengths and weaknesses lie, as well as China’s.
China is now a true peer competitor in the military, technological and economic realms, except — except in one critical field: designing and manufacturing the most advanced microprocessors and logic and memory chips that are the base layer for artificial intelligence, machine learning, high-performance computing, electric vehicles, telecommunications — i.e., the whole digital economy that we’re moving into.
China’s massive, state-led effort to develop its own vertically integrated microchip industry has so far largely failed to master the physics and hardware to manipulate matter at the nano-scale, a skill required to mass produce super-sophisticated microprocessors.
However, just a few miles away from China sits the largest and most sophisticated contract chip maker in the world: Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. According to the Congressional Research Service, TSMC is one of only three manufacturers in the world that fabricate the most advanced semiconductor chips — and by far the biggest. The second and third are Samsung and Intel.
Most chip designers, like IBM, Qualcomm, Nvidia, AMD (and even Intel to some extent) now use TSMC and Samsung to make the microprocessors they design.
But, just as important, three of the five companies that make the super-sophisticated lithography machines, tools and software used by TSMC and others to actually make the microchips — Applied Materials, Lam Research Corporation and KLA Corporation — are based in the United States. (The other two are Dutch and Japanese.) China largely lacks this expertise.
As such, the American government has the leverage to restrict TSMC from making advanced chips for Chinese companies. Indeed, just two weeks ago, the U.S. made TSMC suspend new orders from seven Chinese supercomputing centers suspected of assisting in the country’s weapons development.
The South China Morning Post quoted Francis Lau, a University of Hong Kong computer scientist, as saying: “The sanctions would definitely affect China’s ability to keep to its leading position in supercomputing,” because all of its current supercomputers mostly use processors from Intel or designed by AMD and IBM and manufactured by TSMC. Although there are Korean and Japanese alternatives, Lau added, they are not as powerful.
China, though, is doubling down on research in the physics, nanotechnology and material sciences that will drive the next generation of chips and chip-making equipment. But it could take China a decade or more to reach the cutting edge.
That’s why — today — as much as China wants Taiwan for reasons of ideology, it wants TSMC in the pocket of Chinese military industries for reasons of strategy. And as much as U.S. strategists are committed to preserving Taiwan’s democracy, they are even more committed to ensuring that TSMC doesn’t fall into China’s hands for reasons of strategy. (TSMC is now building a new semiconductor factory in Phoenix.) Because, in a digitizing world, he who controls the best chip maker will control … a lot.
Just read “2034.” In the novel, China gains the technological edge with superior A.I.-driven cybercloaking, satellite spoofing and stealth materials. It’s then able to launch a successful surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
And the first thing China does is seize Taiwan.
Let’s make sure that stays the stuff of fiction.
domingo, 30 de junho de 2013
Tom Friedman on manifestations (NYT)
OP-ED COLUMNIST
Takin’ It to the Streets
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
The New York Times, June 29, 2013
quarta-feira, 3 de abril de 2013
Educacao: desempenho americano em ascensao - Tom Friedman (NYT)
My Little (Global) School
Thomas Friedman
The New York Times, April 2, 2013
Josh Haner/The New York Times
domingo, 24 de fevereiro de 2013
Ah, essa rivalidade diplomatica com o Mexico... - Thomas Friedman
É apenas da nova ascensão do México.
Apenas duas informações que por acaso lhes tenham passado despercebidas.
Com 44 acordos de livre comércio, o México é a nação mais livre-cambista do mundo, pelo menos em quantidade (e quatro vezes mais do que o Brasil, que pela qualidade, aliás, fica ainda mais abaixo).
E, sozinho, o México exporta mais manufaturados do que todo o resto da América Latina junta, o Brasil inclusive.
Como isso foi possível?
Bem, quem sabe trabalhando?
Outra informação, talvez interessante para o Brasil, diretamente:
"Mexico’s three major political parties have just signed “a grand bargain,” a k a “Pact for Mexico,” under the new president, Enrique Peña Nieto, to work together to fight the big energy, telecom and teacher monopolies that have held Mexico back."
Quem sabe a gente consegue combater os sindicatos mafiosos de professores, o estatismo ineficiente na energia e os carteis pornográficos das telefônicas, para também crescer e se desenvolver?
Apenas uma sugestão...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Op-Ed Columnist
How Mexico Got Back in the Game
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
The New York Times, February 23, 2013 26 Comment
Josh Haner/The New York Times
A version of this op-ed appeared in print on February 24, 2013, on page SR11 of the New York edition with the headline: How Mexico Got Back in the Game.
segunda-feira, 18 de fevereiro de 2013
O futuro da universidade, e a universidade do futuro - Tom Friedman
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Revolução nas universidades
Avanço do ensino superior online nas melhores escolas tornará o conceito de diploma algo arcaico; e isso é bom
Nada tem mais potencial para tirar as pessoas da pobreza - oferecendo a elas um ensino acessível que vai ajudá-las a conseguir trabalho ou ter melhores condições no seu emprego. Nada tem mais potencial para libertar um bilhão de cérebros para solucionar os grandes problemas do mundo. E nada tem mais potencial para recriar o ensino superior do que as MOOC (Massive Open Online Course), plataformas desenvolvidas por especialistas de Stanford, por colegas do MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) e por empresas como Coursera e Udacity.
Em maio, escrevi um artigo sobre a Coursera - fundada por dois cientistas da computação de Stanford, Daphne Koller e Andrew Ng. Há duas semanas, retornei a Palo Alto para saber do seu progresso. Quando visitei a Coursera, em 2012, cerca de 300 mil pessoas participavam de 38 cursos proferidos por professores de Stanford e de outras universidades de elite. Hoje, são 2,4 milhões de alunos e 214 cursos de 33 universidades, incluindo 8 internacionais.
Anant Agarwal, ex-diretor do laboratório de inteligência artificial do MIT, hoje é presidente da edX, uma plataforma sem fins lucrativos criada em conjunto pelo MIT e pela Universidade Harvard. Anant disse que, desde maio, cerca de 155 mil alunos do mundo todo participam do primeiro curso da edX: um curso introdutório sobre circuitos do MIT. “É um número superior ao total dos alunos do MIT em sua história de 150 anos”, afirmou.
Claro que somente uma pequena porcentagem desses alunos completa o curso, mas estou convencido de que, dentro de cinco anos, essas plataformas alcançarão um público mais amplo. Imagine como isso poderá mudar a ajuda externa dos EUA.
Gastando relativamente pouco, o país poderia arrendar um espaço num vilarejo egípcio, instalar duas dezenas de computadores e dispositivos de acesso à internet de alta velocidade via satélite, contratar um professor local como coordenador e convidar todos os egípcios que desejarem ter aulas online com os melhores professores do mundo e legendas em árabe.
É preciso ouvir as histórias narradas pelos pioneiros dessa iniciativa para compreender seu potencial revolucionário. Uma das favoritas de Daphne Koller é sobre Daniel, um jovem de 17 anos com autismo que se comunica por meio do computador.
Ele fez um curso online de poesia moderna oferecido pela Universidade da Pensilvânia. Segundo Daniel e seus pais, a combinação de um currículo acadêmico rigoroso, que exige que ele se concentre na sua tarefa, e do sistema de aprendizado online, que não força sua capacidade de se relacionar, permite que ele administre melhor o autismo.
Daphne mostrou uma carta de Daniel em que ele escreveu: “Por favor, relate à Coursera e à Universidade da Pensilvânia a minha história. Sou um jovem saindo do autismo. Ainda não consigo sentar-me numa sala de aula, de modo que esse foi meu primeiro curso de verdade. Agora, sei que posso me beneficiar de um trabalho que exige muito de mim e ter o prazer de me sintonizar com o mundo.”
Um membro da equipe do Coursera, que fez um curso sobre sustentabilidade, me disse que foi muito mais interessante do que um estudo similar que ele fez na faculdade. Do curso online participaram estudantes do mundo todo e, assim, “as discussões que surgiram foram muito mais valiosas e interessantes do que os debates com pessoas iguais de uma típica faculdade americana.
Mitch Duneier, professor de sociologia de Princeton, escreveu um ensaio sobre sua experiência ao dar aula num curso da Coursera. “Há alguns meses, quando o campus de Princeton ficou quase em silêncio depois das cerimônias de graduação, 40 mil estudantes de 113 países chegaram aqui via internet para um curso grátis de introdução à sociologia. Minha aula de abertura, sobre o clássico de C. Wright Mills, de 1959, The Sociological Imagination, foi concentrada na leitura minuciosa do texto de um capítulo-chave.
Pedi aos alunos para seguirem a análise em suas cópias, como faço em sala de aula. Quando dou essa aula em Princeton, normalmente, são feitas algumas perguntas perspicazes. Nesse caso, algumas horas depois de postar a versão online, os fóruns pegaram fogo, com centenas de comentários e perguntas. Alguns dias depois, eram milhares. Num espaço de três semanas, recebi mais feedback sobre minhas ideias na área de sociologia do que em toda a minha carreira de professor, o que influenciou consideravelmente cada uma das minhas aulas e seminários seguintes.”
Anant Agarwal, da edX, fala sobre um estudante no Cairo que teve dificuldades e postou uma mensagem dizendo que pretendia abandonar o curso online.
Em resposta, outros alunos no Cairo, da mesma classe, o convidaram para um encontro numa casa de chá, onde se ofereceram para ajudá-lo. Um estudante da Mongólia, de 15 anos, que estava na mesma classe, participando de um curso semipresencial, hoje está se candidatando a uma vaga no MIT e na Universidade da Califórnia, em Berkeley.
À medida que pensamos no futuro do ensino superior, segundo o presidente do MIT, Rafael Reif, algo que hoje chamamos “diploma” será um conceito relacionado com “tijolos e argamassa” - e as tradicionais experiências no campus, que influenciarão cada vez mais a tecnologia e a internet para melhorar o trabalho em sala de aula e no laboratório.
Ao lado disso, contudo, muitas universidades oferecerão cursos online para estudantes de qualquer parte do mundo, em que eles conseguirão “credenciais” - ou seja, certificados atestando que realizaram o trabalho e passaram em todos os exames. O processo de criação de credenciais fidedignas certificando que o aluno domina adequadamente o assunto - e no qual um empregador pode confiar - ainda está sendo aperfeiçoado por todos os MOOCs. No entanto, uma vez resolvida a questão, esse fenômeno realmente se propagará muito.
Posso ver o dia em que você criará o seu diploma universitário participando dos melhores cursos online com os mais capacitados professores do mundo todo - de computação de Stanford, de empreendedorismo da Wharton, de ética da Brandeis, de literatura da Universidade de Edimburgo - pagando apenas uma taxa pelo certificado de conclusão do curso.
Isso mudará o ensino, o aprendizado e o caminho para o emprego. “Um novo mundo está se revelando”, disse Reif. “E todos terão de se adaptar”.
* É COLUNISTA
domingo, 5 de fevereiro de 2012
Republica Putinesca da Russia: sort of, not really - Tom Friedman (NYT)
OP-ED COLUMNIST
Russia: Sort of, but Not Really
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
The New York Times, February 4, 2012
Related
Times Topics: Russia | Vladimir V. Putin
Josh Haner/The New York Times
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