O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

Mostrando postagens com marcador capitalismo corrupto. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador capitalismo corrupto. Mostrar todas as postagens

sábado, 28 de dezembro de 2013

O dificil nascimento do capitalismo no Estado Mafioso da Russia -NYTimes

Em certos países é difícil ser um simples capitalista: quando o proprio Estado é mafioso, as coisas se complicam. Já vi isso em algum outro lugar...
Ah, me lembro: no Estado nazista, que tinha um guia genial que sabia o que era melhor para o país, e seus companheiros se ocupavam em roubar, e não apenas judeus...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Signs of a Russian Thaw (Toward Business)


James Hill for The New York Times
Ruslan Telkov outside a warehouse near Moscow that he rented for his fabrics business. He was charged with copyright infringement in 2011.


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It was just after 9 on a mid-May morning in 2011 when Ruslan Telkov got into his car and headed toward one of his upholstery company’s warehouses near Moscow. His parents had warned him not to start his own business, that only frustration and heartache awaited, if not worse. But it was not the 1990s anymore, he told them; the days of bandit capitalism in Russia were over. “I decided it’s what I wanted, and that was that,” he said.
James Hill for The New York Times
Boris Titov, Russia’s new presidential commissioner for entrepreneurs’ rights, shown in his Moscow office.
Steffi Loos/Reuters
Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky, who led Yukos Oil,  was pardoned by President Vladimir V. Putin after 10 years in prison.
Sergei Ilnitsky/European Pressphoto Agency
Mikhail Khodorkovsky addressed an appeal hearing by video from a prison cell in August.
James Hill for The New York Times
Mr. Titov at an anti-corruption seminar.
And business was good. A year earlier, Mr. Telkov, who has tightly cropped brown hair and the shoulders of a hockey player, traveled to Guangzhou, on China’s southern coast — he speaks Mandarin, along with Arabic and English — to attend a trade show and meet with local fabric manufacturers. He negotiated a production contract on the spot. By cutting out the middlemen, Mr. Telkov was able to sell fabric for less than half the price charged by his more-established Russian competitors: around $5 per linear meter, as opposed to $12. In less than a year, Mr. Telkov had recouped his start-up capital of around $1 million and had a fleet of trucks, three warehouses and 18 employees. “I saw no limits to how big it could get,” said Mr. Telkov, now 33.
That May morning, not long after Mr. Telkov got to his warehouse, a convoy of speeding cars pulled up. Out came 10 police officers, some carrying automatic weapons. The officers told Mr. Telkov that he was under suspicion of copyright violations and that they would have to confiscate some of his goods as evidence.
Other men in plain clothes walked around and pointed to rolls of fabric: Take this, take that. The search lasted the whole day and continued into the next. In the end, the police carried away 527 rolls of fabric. Mr. Telkov was confused, not to mention panicked: a big furniture exhibition in Moscow was two days away, and he had just lost 80 percent of his inventory. He went from one government office to another, as he put it, “knocking on doors and saying, ‘Guys, you stole my goods, where are they?’ ” He got no answers.
Two months later, in July, investigators officially charged Mr. Telkov with copyright infringement. The indictment cites designs for five styles of fabric that Mr. Telkov had supposedly stolen; among them was a leopard-print pattern, as well as one that resembled a slab of marble. It was funny, absurd even, but it was also uncomfortably serious. If found guilty, Mr. Telkov could spend up to six years in prison.
Some 100,000 Russian businesspeople are either in prison or have been subject to criminal prosecution. Among the most famous is Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky, the former head of the Yukos oil company, who had been in prison for more than a decade until he was unexpectedly released this month by President Vladimir V. Putin. The pardon, coming as it did on the cusp of the Winter Olympics to be held in Sochi, Russia, was viewed more as a political expedient than as a harbinger of reform.
Mr. Telkov says that in his situation, investigators seemed more interested in pressuring him to plead guilty than in building a case; he says he was promised a suspended sentence, in which he would avoid prison but lose his confiscated goods. That’s how Russian businesspeople who find themselves in the middle of such cases often choose to plead. But Mr. Telkov was, simply put, a nuisance, filing requests and demanding to see the fabric that had been taken from him. If someone wanted to intimidate him or wear him down, it wasn’t working.
Finally, in January, at the request of investigators, a judge ordered Mr. Telkov arrested and held in pretrial detention. He was put into a cell with 10 other men, most of whom were facing drug charges. As Mr. Telkov remembers, investigators suggested that it was his own fault — if he would only make a deal, he could go home.
Weeks passed, then months. Mr. Telkov’s wife, Adilya, said she was sure that the court would see the absurdity of the case and release her husband. “At first I was absolutely certain that if not at this hearing, then the next one. If not there, then one more,” she said. After a few months, though, she said she “stopped being naïve.”
A Well-Placed Advocate
When Boris Titov heard about Mr. Telkov’s case, it struck him as a clear reminder of why his job is necessary. Mr. Titov, who holds the official title of presidential commissioner for entrepreneurs’ rights, was appointed to his position — which reports directly to Mr. Putin — in June 2012. Fighting corruption and easing the way for business are among the main priorities, at least in rhetoric, of Mr. Putin’s current economic agenda. After years of oil-fueled growth and rising consumption, the economy is slowing, with growth in gross domestic product falling to just over 1 percent. Kremlin officials hope that an improved climate for small business will help save the country from a prolonged period of stagnation, thus preserving social and political stability.
But that will not be easy, in no small part because of policies enacted by Mr. Putin over the years. According to a global survey of entrepreneurship released in the spring, 7 percent of Russians are engaged in entrepreneurial activity and just 3.8 percent have plans in the next three years to open their own businesses. (For comparison, the overall average in the so-called BRICs countries — Brazil, Russia, India and China — is 21 percent, and 24 percent for Eastern Europe.) Most university graduates say they want jobs in government service or as managers in large corporations.
Mr. Putin’s decision this month to pardon Mr. Khodorkovsky was long awaited by the business and investment community, but does little to lift the many hurdles to entrepreneurship in Russia: a large state sector that crowds out private investment, an unwieldy thicket of regulation and bureaucracy, and a police force and court system that can often seem like the persecutors of businesspeople as much as their protectors.
One rainy afternoon this fall, I went to see Mr. Titov in his office tucked inside a small, leafy park just beyond Moscow’s central ring road. Russia’s entrepreneurs, he said, “wouldn’t have asked the president to create this position if everything was great.” One day, he said, he hopes his work won’t be required anymore. But for now, he imagines his office, with its staff of a few dozen people, as a kind of “joint venture” between business and the state in an effort to make entrepreneurship more “comfortable, profitable and safe.”
A 53-year-old businessman, Mr. Titov began his career in the 1980s, selling oil and petroleum products abroad for the Soviet foreign trade ministry. After the Soviet collapse, he helped found a company that sold mineral fertilizers and lubricants; he often worked from London. In recent years, he started a lobbying group, Business Russia, and had several notable successes in saving individual businessmen from criminal investigations.
At the same time, Mr. Titov has good relations with the state, enjoying access to the highest levels of power, Mr. Putin included. In May 2012, to celebrate Mr. Putin’s inauguration, he supplied to the Kremlin 5,000 bottles of sparkling wine, produced by a vineyard Mr. Titov owns.
Mr. Titov is fighting against a deep societal hostility toward private business that goes back to the Soviet days, when the sale of anything for even a kopeck of profit could be considered illegal speculation. But the animus really sharpened in the 1990s, a period of chaotic and murky deal-making in which a few became rich and most everyone else was left gasping to stay afloat. Suspicion toward private enterprise is so widespread, said Olga Romanova, who founded the group Russia Behind Bars after her husband was sent to prison on economic charges, that “even the guy who owns the local convenience store in a village is seen as a kind of oligarch.”
While speaking on a panel at an investment conference where Mr. Titov was also present, Igor Zubov, a deputy minister of internal affairs, said that many criminals simply take on the cover of business, and suggested that businesspeople are to blame for corruption since they are the ones giving bribes. But while many in the police and security services are sincere in such beliefs, just as often these attitudes can provide a cynical opening for corruption. “If nobody loves a private businessman,” Mr. Titov said, “then you can go to him and ask for a bribe, and he can’t say anything.”
But Mr. Titov argues that a majority of improper legal cases against entrepreneurs — he has said as many as 80 percent — originally stem from disputes among businesspeople themselves. A conflict arises, and one side goes to the police, who, as Mr. Titov said, “have learned very well how to take advantage of this.”
That appears to have been the case with Mr. Telkov. He didn’t think much of it at the time, but he later remembered that while attending a Moscow trade fair, some men came up to him and said: “You have very low prices. We suggest you raise them, otherwise you will have problems.” While in jail, after studying the case materials, he realized that those men in civilian clothes who pointed at the fabric to confiscate were representatives of his competitors. What’s more, Mr. Telkov learned that under Russian law, if investigators don’t have the room to store evidence before trial, they are allowed to use private spaces. In his case, police investigators decided to hold the fabric confiscated from Mr. Telkov in his competitors’ warehouses.
After Mr. Telkov had been in jail for several months, his wife wrote to Mr. Titov. Over the last year, Mr. Titov’s office has received several thousand such pleas and taken on many hundreds. Right away, Mr. Titov said, he could tell that Mr. Telkov’s was a “unique case.” It was almost unheard-of for a businessman to be charged with this particular violation of copyright law, let alone held in jail. The evidence seemed odd, and, as Mr. Titov remembered, the case struck him “clearly as an attack by competitors.”
Mr. Titov’s involvement made a difference right away, because, like it or not, police and investigators have to provide him with answers. “It’s one thing for an accused person to write from jail on a piece of toilet paper,” said Sergei Tayt, the head of Mr. Titov’s advisory secretariat. “But if a commissioner who reports to the president writes about some sort of outrageous situation, that’s a different status entirely.” Over the coming months, Mr. Titov would indeed be able to help, but the case would also reveal the limits in a system that favors the state at the expense of private businesspeople.
‘The Fires Are Burning’
As the months in jail went on, Mr. Telkov tried to keep himself from turning into a “zombie,” as he put it. His lawyer, Alkhas Abgadzhava, would have him look through the case materials and help write motions.
It didn’t take long to notice incongruities in the charges. Even the copyrights in question seemed odd: they were based on letters of unclear provenance from the United States and Turkey, where the original copyrights were said to be held. One copyright, for the pattern “Pemberton,” was registered on June 3, 2011. But the search of Mr. Telkov’s warehouse happened almost a month earlier, on May 12. Another copyright document from Turkey is dated from 2004 yet mentions a design registered two years later, in 2006. The case file contained two separate analyses of the fabrics, supposedly written by two different independent experts. But the analyses were word-for-word identical.
Mr. Titov and his staff were convinced of what had happened. “One of his competitors simply began to use criminal prosecution against Telkov,” Mr. Titov told me.
Mr. Tayt said it seemed as if “someone showed up, jump-started some investigators, and then they closed their eyes to the law.” Mr. Titov wrote letters to the general prosecutor’s office and the interior ministry on behalf of Mr. Telkov. At one meeting, he pushed for law enforcement officials to take another look at the case materials, with an eye toward dropping the charges. Mr. Tayt, who was also present, said some of the officials were themselves “puzzled” by the investigation.
Still, it was hard for Mr. Titov to win a conclusive victory for Mr. Telkov. The police and prosecutors have grown accustomed to a degree of unquestioned impunity, and the Russian justice system is permeated by a sense of inevitability. Proceedings chug along according to the logic of bureaucratic formalism, in which judges are wary of ruining their own statistics and thus instinctively paper over sloppiness on the part of the police and investigators. Mr. Titov, while not changing the fundamental system, is at least a voice — a “challenge to impunity and to this sense of quiet,” said Vladislav Korochkin, the vice president of the Moscow chapter of Opora, a nongovernmental organization that defends private business. “He is making certain people think about having to change their habits.”
In his first weeks on the job, Mr. Titov spoke to police officials in Ufa, a city of one million people 725 miles southeast of Moscow. He chastised the officials about suspicious cases against local businesses. Yana Yakovleva, the head of Business Solidarity, a nongovernmental organization that defends the rights of entrepreneurs, attended the meeting and told me that Mr. Titov produced a palpable sense of “discomfort” among the officers and bureaucrats present. “It wasn’t clear who this new figure is,” she said, “who at one moment appears on television meeting with Putin and in the next is issuing a reprimand.”
But Ms. Yakovleva compared Mr. Titov to a man who wakes up in the middle of the night to find cockroaches all over his kitchen. He starts hitting them with his slipper, she said, “but you could go crazy fighting these cockroaches every night.”
Mr. Titov himself once compared his office to a brigade of firefighters: “The fires are burning and burning, and new ones are being produced all the time,” he said. But he is proud to talk about successes that he has been able to achieve. And one of them, he says, is the case of Mr. Telkov.
On Jan. 26, 2013, after letters and pressure from Mr. Titov, months of work by Mr. Abgadzhava, as well as coverage in the local press, a judge ordered Mr. Telkov freed from pretrial detention. He had spent a year in jail. After being released, he went directly to a restaurant for lunch with his wife and friends. “The only thing I wanted was to eat fried potatoes,” he told me.
Now a free man, he was able to spend more time working with Mr. Abgadzhava on his defense, as well as trying to slowly rebuild his business, which was effectively destroyed. But despite his release, the charges remained. Mr. Telkov was still a defendant awaiting trial.
A Very Costly Ad Campaign
More than any individual case, the signal achievement of Mr. Titov’s tenure as ombudsman has been a so-called business amnesty, under which those prosecuted for a range of economic crimes would be freed and their records expunged. Mr. Titov says that more than 1,500 people have been freed since the law was passed in July, but that number is potentially misleading; just 116 have actually left jail or a prison colony, whereas the rest had their convictions lifted but already had suspended sentences or had served out their prison terms.
The amnesty law, while pathbreaking, emerged with several major caveats. For starters, instead of a blanket amnesty that would apply to nearly all economic crimes, it was whittled down to exclude many categories, including the overarching charge for fraud, which Mr. Titov estimates applies to 70 percent of prosecuted businesspeople. Another requirement says that only first-time offenders are eligible. (At the time, some wondered if the purpose of this technicality was to exclude Mr. Khodorkovsky, who was tried in two separate cases.) And then, to be eligible, the convicted person — or even one who is merely accused — must pay back whatever losses they are alleged to have caused their victims.
Mr. Titov pushed to have the little-used copyright article included in the amnesty law, an addition meant specifically to aid Mr. Telkov. That means he is eligible for amnesty, which would close the case against him and expunge the charges — but only if he pays back the supposed damages, in his case claimed by investigators to be around $338,000. Mr. Telkov has refused.
The question for those watching Mr. Titov is how much he can achieve within the current political order, which arguably depends on allowing for a certain level of corruption among law enforcement for its stability. Moreover, the very creation of an ombudsman’s office is symptomatic of the habits of a highly centralized system, which thinks to solve problems by means of a single, powerful figure — an even stronger bureaucrat to defeat the evils of bureaucratism.
“Of course it’s easier to name Titov to his position than reform the courts,” said Mr. Korochkin, whose nongovernmental organization defends private business. But he acknowledged that “the first will help the second,” pointing to Mr. Titov’s efforts to change parts of the criminal code  and his ability to represent the perspective of small-business owners to high-ranking officials.
Mr. Abgadzhava, the lawyer for Mr. Telkov, is doubtful. “He can’t directly say to Putin that your whole system is constructed in such a way that makes it impossible for an entrepreneur to survive,” he told me. For Mr. Titov to bring about real change, Mr. Abgadzhava said, he would, in effect, have to join the political opposition.
When I asked Mr. Titov about that, he grew frustrated. He cited the thousand businesspeople who have been released from criminal prosecution as part of the amnesty as proof of his effectiveness. “We use our mechanism,” he said. “If we were to get involved in political work, that’s an entirely different type of activity.” He also argues that as Russia’s entrepreneurial class grows and matures, it will demand more from state institutions.
As for Mr. Telkov, he still doesn’t have his fabric back. After months of delay and refusal, investigators allowed him to see the fabric that had been stored as evidence at the warehouses of his competitors. According to Mr. Telkov, it wasn’t his fabric at all. Some rolls were stamped with production dates of November 2012, some 10 months after he was arrested. He suspects that the fabric originally confiscated from him was sold long ago. Mr. Tayt told me that although Mr. Titov’s office could not confirm that theory, “we haven’t heard refutation of this thesis either from his competitors or from investigative bodies.”
(The allegations against Mr. Telkov are based on copyright filings that come from four foreign companies — one in Turkey and three in the United States. One, a fabric producer based in Winston-Salem, N.C., called Microfibres, referred all questions to a law firm in Moscow, Sovetnik. Attempts to reach the firm were unsuccessful. Attempts to get comment from Docuswatch, in New Hampshire, and Arben, registered on Long Island, were also unsuccessful.)
In essence, investigators have two choices: Send the case to court, but the evidence appears flimsy and the prosecutor’s office has already twice declined to present the case to a judge; or close down the investigation, but that would hurt the careers of the officers involved and could make Mr. Telkov eligible for compensation for the year he spent in jail. Dropping the case would be the “optimal option,” Mr. Titov said. “But if the ministry of internal affairs” — the state body that oversees the police and the investigators working on the case — “has a different opinion, then, unfortunately, there’s nothing we can do.” Ultimately, his office can act only as an advocate for entrepreneurs, not take on the power of the courts.
Mr. Telkov told me that he was trying to look at the ordeal as a “very costly advertising campaign” that revealed his honesty and bravery to potential partners and investors. In recent months, he has received several offers to work as a manager for large multinational companies in Europe, but after running his own business, he said, he has no desire to work for someone else.
He has also become more involved in civic activism and would like to help other businesspeople avoid ordeals like his. “It’s impossible to break the machine,” he said of Russia’s criminal justice system. “But you can modify it, make life a little more comfortable for business.” It sounded, in a way, like something Mr. Titov might say.
But Mr. Telkov’s optimism has its limits. I asked what his overall advice was for anyone in Russia thinking of starting a business. He paused for a moment. “My general advice,” he said, “is that for now, better not to.”

terça-feira, 1 de outubro de 2013

Capitalismo companheiro: ambiente acolhedor? Dificilmente...

Empresas que arrematarem blocos e desistirem serão multadas, diz ANP

Marta Nogueira
Valor Econômico, 01/10/2013

RIO - A Agência Nacional do Petróleo (ANP) vai multar empresas que arrematarem blocos na 12ª Rodada de Licitação de blocos exploratórios de petróleo e não assinarem o contrato na data determinada no edital. A afirmação é do subprocurador-geral de assuntos estratégicos da Agência Nacional do Petróleo (ANP), Artur Watt.

A medida, segundo Watt, acontece para coibir empresas de fazer ofertas que não poderão cobrir posteriormente. A determinação acontece depois de a OGX, empresa do Grupo EBX, de Eike Batista, e a brasileira Petra, terem desistido de nove blocos arrematados na 11ª Rodada, cada uma delas. Ao todo, 24 blocos foram arrematados na 11ª Rodada e depois devolvidos.

Além de pagar a garantia de oferta, as empresas que desistirem dos ativos arrematados terão que pagar uma multa de 20% do somatório do valor do bônus de assinatura e do programa exploratório mínimo ofertado para o primeiro período exploratório. "Será um valor considerável", afirmou Watt.

Interest sours in Brazil’s Libra pre-salt oilfield auction

By Joe Leahy in São Paulo

Financial Times


What is not to like about an oilfield that over its lifetime is expected to generate revenue the equivalent of the annual gross domestic product of Austria?

Or, whose estimated reserves of 8bn-12bn barrels of oil or equivalent would be enough to more than match four years of US crude oil production at present averages if it was all extracted?

Yet in spite of these attractions, the auctionon October 21 of Brazil’s Libra oilfield, the first of the country’s giant so-called “pre-salt” discoveries to be offered under a new regulatory regime, will be much less fiercely contested than had been anticipated.

Only 11 companies of an expected 40 registered for the auction late last month. While national oil companies from around the world jumped at the opportunity, some of the biggest private sector names, including Chevron, ExxonMobil and BP, were conspicuously absent. The result suggestsBrazil’s pre-salt project could increasingly become a joint undertaking with foreign states, particularly China.

“We expected much more of a presence from the oil majors,” says Ivan Cima, an analyst with oil consultancy Wood Mackenzie.

The success of the Libra auction is important not only for the field itself but as a test of whether a new model for the oil industry set in place by the centre-left Workers’ Party government of President Dilma Rousseffwill work.

When state-owned oil operator Petrobras announced the discoveries in 2007, called “pre-salt” because they lie under a 2km layer of the material beneath the Atlantic, MsRousseff’s predecessor Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva rushed to place the state at the centre of their exploitation.

The model makes Petrobras the sole operator with a 30 per cent stake in all fields in the pre-salt area, which are located hundreds of kilometres off the coast near southeastern Brazilian cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.

Already partially explored, Libra is considered less risky than a virgin field. So the government is demanding a R$15bn ($6.8bn) signing bonus from the winning consortium, an amount considered steep by international standards.

The new model for the pre-salt is also a production-sharing contract rather than the concession-based model that still applies for other fields in Brazil.

Under a production-sharing contract, the government retains ownership of the resource allowing the operator to profit from selling a share of the oil, while under a concession model, the company owns the resource but returns a share to the state through taxes and royalties.

“Exploration risk is low in the pre-salt area, ie the possibility of finding oil is higher and thus it is more appropriate to use the sharing system,” the government says on its website, Portal Brasil.

The registration for the auction drew strong interest from China’s three major oil groups, China National Petroleum Corporation, the parent of PetroChina, Sinopec (which entered through its joint venture with Spain’s Repsol), and Cnooc. Other state-owned companies participating included India’s ONGC Videsh, Petronas of Malaysia and Ecopetrol of Colombia. Anglo-Dutch group Royal Dutch Shell, France’s Total and Japan’s Mitsui also participated.

Among the absentees, other than the US groups and BP, was the UK’s BG Group, which has already a large presence in Brazil. The failure of Chevron and Exxon was blamed in some quarters on a political controversy over US spying on Brazil, including on Petrobras.

But analysts say Libra contains important operational challenges for private sector participants.

For one thing, with only one exploration well drilled, Libra is still not a fully understood field and therefore is relatively high-risk for such a large signing bonus.

Then there is the issue of partnering with Petrobras. The company’s plate is already full with the world’s biggest corporate capital expenditure programme, worth $237bn in the five years to 2017, which covers everything from exploration and production to building refineries.

With its cash being drained by an unofficial government fuel subsidy – Petrobras must import petrol at international prices and sell it at lossmaking lower prices on the domestic market – the company’s finances are looking strained. External investors in Libra will in effect be “sleeping partners” of Petrobras, which will operate the fields.

“Maybe down the road the government will decide Petrobras does not have the resources to be operator on every pre-salt field,” says one oil industry executive. “But since this [Libra] is the first one they are going to go by the book.”

To add to the complexity, the government is setting up Pré-Sal Petróleo, a state company that will directly represent federal interests in the pre-salt fields. No one knows who will chair it or what it will really do. On top of this, there are stringent local content requirements for Libra, which given the complexity of the ultra-deep water field are likely to add to the costs.

Mr Cima, of Wood Mackenzie, estimates break-even on a 10 per cent discounted cash flow basis will only happen at Libra 16 years from now – assuming no delays in developing the field.

“This is a very long-term undertaking and the international oil companies might have believed there are better opportunities further afield,” he says. “It better suits resource-hungry state-owned companies.”

quinta-feira, 4 de abril de 2013

A Grande Deformacao e a corrupcao do capitalismo americano (2) - Sobre David Stockman

The US Corporate State
by Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr.
Mises Daily, April 3, 2013


LewRockwell.com, March 2, 2013

It didn’t take long for opponents of the market to pounce after the events of 2008. The crash was said to prove how destructive “unregulated capitalism” could be and how dangerous its supporters were—after all, free-marketeers opposed the bailouts, which had allegedly saved Americans from another Great Depression.

In The Great Deformation, David Stockman—former US congressman and budget director under Ronald Reagan—tells the story of the recent crisis, and takes direct aim at the conventional wisdom that credits government policy and Ben Bernanke with rescuing Americans from another Great Depression. In this he has made a seminal contribution. But he does much more than this. He offers a sweeping, revisionist account of US economic history from the New Deal to the present. He refutes widely held myths about the Reagan years and the demise of the Soviet Union. He covers the growth and expansion of the warfare state. He shows precisely how the Fed enriches the powerful and shelters them from free markets. He demonstrates the flimsiness of the present so-called recovery. Above all, he shows that attempts to blame our economic problems on “capitalism” are preposterous, and reveal a complete lack of understanding of how the economy has been deformed over the past several decades.

The Great Deformation takes on the stock arguments in favor of the bailouts that we heard in 2008 and which constitute the conventional wisdom even today. A “contagion effect” would spread the financial crisis throughout the economy, well beyond the confines of a few Wall Street firms, we were told. Without bailouts, payroll would not be met. ATMs would go dark. Wise policy decisions by the Treasury and the Fed prevented these and other nightmare scenarios, and staved off a second Great Depression.

The bailout of AIG, for example, was carried out against a backdrop of utter hysteria. AIG was bailed out in order to protect Main Street, the public was told, but virtually none of AIG’s busted CDS insurance was held by Main Street banks. Even on Wall Street the effects were confined to about a dozen firms, every one of which had ample cushion for absorbing the losses. Thanks to the bailout, they did not take one dollar in such losses. “The bailout,” says Stockman, “was all about protecting short-term earnings and current-year executive and trader bonuses.”

Ten years earlier, the Fed had sent a clear enough signal of its future policy when it arranged for a bailout of a hedge fund called Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). If this firm was to be bailed out, Wall Street concluded, then there was no limit to the madness the Fed would backstop with easy money.

LTCM, says Stockman, was “an egregious financial train wreck that had amassed leverage ratios of 100 to 1 in order to fund giant speculative bets in currency, equity, bond, and derivatives markets around the globe. The sheer recklessness and scale of LTCM’s speculations had no parallel in American financial history…. LTCM stunk to high heaven, and had absolutely no claim on public authority, resources, or even sympathy.”

When the S&P 500 soared by 50 percent over the next fifteen months, this was not a sign that American companies were seeing their profit outlooks increase by half. It instead indicated a confidence on Wall Street that the Fed would prevent investment errors from receiving the usual free-market punishment. Under this “ersatz capitalism,” stock market averages reflected “expected monetary juice from the central bank, not anticipated growth of profits from free-market enterprises.”

It wasn’t just specific firms that would enjoy Fed largesse under chairmen Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke; it was the stock market itself. According to Stockman, Fed policy came to focus on the “wealth effect”: if the Fed pushed stock prices higher, Americans would feel wealthier and would be likely to spend and borrow more, thereby stimulating economic activity.

This policy approach, in turn, practically compelled the bailouts that were one day to come. Anything that might send stock prices lower would frustrate the wealth effect. So the system had to be propped up by whatever means necessary.

What does this policy have to show for itself? Stockman gives the answer:

If the monetary central planners have been trying to create jobs through the roundabout method of “wealth effects,” they ought to be profoundly embarrassed by their incompetence. The only thing that has happened on the job-creation front over the last decade is a massive expansion of the bedpan and diploma mill brigade; that is, employment in nursing homes, hospitals, home health agencies, and for-profit colleges. Indeed, the HES complex accounts for the totality of American job creation since the late 1990s.

Meanwhile, the number of breadwinner jobs did not increase at all between January 2000 and January 2007, remaining at 71.8 million. The booms in housing, the stock market, and household consumption had only this grim statistic to show for themselves. When we consider the entire twelve-year period beginning in the year 2000, there has been a net gain of 18,000 jobs per month—one-eighth of the growth rate in the labor force.

In the wake of the crash, the Fed has continued to gin up the stock market. By September 2012 the S&P had increased by 115 percent over its lows during the bust. Of the 5.6 million breadwinner jobs lost during the correction, only 200,000 had been restored by then. And during the vaunted recovery, American households spent $30 billion less on food and groceries in the fall of 2012 than they did during the same period in 2007.

The sudden emergence of enormous budget deficits in recent years, Stockman explains, simply made manifest what the bubble conditions of the Bush years had concealed. The phony wealth of the housing and consumption booms temporarily lowered the amount of money spent on safety-net programs, and temporarily increased the amount of tax revenue received by the government. With this false prosperity abating, the true deficit, which had simply been suppressed by these temporary factors, began to appear.

All along, the Fed had assured us that the United States was experiencing genuine prosperity. “Flooding Wall Street with easy money,” Stockman writes, the Fed

saw the stock averages soar and pronounced itself pleased with the resulting “wealth effects.” Turning the nation’s homes into debt-dispensing ATMs, it witnessed a household consumption spree and marveled that the “incoming” macroeconomic data was better than expected. That these deformations were mistaken for prosperity and sustainable economic growth gives witness to the everlasting folly of the monetary doctrines now in vogue in the Eccles Building.

Stockman also discusses the fiscal condition of the US government. Part of that history takes him through the Reagan military buildup. Stockman’s isn’t the story you heard at the Republican conventions of the 1980s. The real story is as you suspected: a feeding frenzy of arbitrary and irrelevant programs which, once begun, could be stopped only with great difficulty if at all, given the jobs that depended on them.

But at least this buildup brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union, right? Stockman doesn’t buy it. “The $3.5 trillion (2005$) spent on defense during the Gipper’s term did not cause the Kremlin to raise the white flag of surrender. Virtually none of it was spent on programs which threatened Soviet security or undermined its strategic nuclear deterrent.”

At the heart of the Reagan defense buildup … was a great double shuffle. The war drums were sounding a strategic nuclear threat that virtually imperiled American civilization. Yet the money was actually being allocated to tanks, amphibious landing craft, close air support helicopters, and a vast conventional armada of ships and planes.

These weapons were of little use in the existing nuclear standoff, but were well suited to imperialistic missions of invasion and occupation. Ironically, therefore, the Reagan defense buildup was justified by an Evil Empire that was rapidly fading but was eventually used to launch elective wars against an Axis of Evil which didn’t even exist.


What would actually bring the Soviet Union down was its command economy itself—a point, Stockman notes, that libertarian economists had been making for some time. Neoconservatives, on the other hand, advanced ludicrous claims about Soviet capabilities and the Soviet economy at a time when its decrepitude should have been obvious to everyone. These inflated claims about the regime’s enemies continued to be standard practice for the neocons long after the Reagan years were over.

To do it justice, The Great Deformation really requires two or three reviews. One could be devoted just to Stockman’s striking analysis of the New Deal. Stockman advances and then defends these and other arguments: the banking system had stabilized well before FDR’s ill-advised “bank holiday”; the economy had already turned the corner before FDR’s accession and worsened again as a result of FDR’s conduct during the interregnum; the New Deal was not a coherent program of Keynesian demand stimulus, so it makes no sense for Keynesians to draw lessons from it; the 1937 “depression within the Depression” was not caused by fiscal retrenchment; and FDR’s primary legacy is not the economic recovery, which would have occurred faster without him, but rather the impetus he gave to crony capitalism in one sector of the economy after another.

You may have gathered that The Great Deformation must be a long book. It is. But its subject matter is so interesting, and its prose style so lively and engaging, that you will hardly notice the pages going by.

The target of Stockman’s book is just about everyone in the political and media establishments. Left-liberal opinion molders—defenders of the common man, they would have us believe—supported the bailouts in overwhelming numbers. Herman Cain, meanwhile, lectured “free-market purists” for opposing TARP, and virtually the entire slate of GOP candidates in 2012 had supported it. Both sides, in tandem with the official media, repeated the regime’s scare stories without cavil. And both sides could think of nothing but good things to say about how the Fed had managed the economy for the past quarter century.

The free market stands exonerated of the charges hurled by the state and its allies.

Thanks to The Great Deformation, not a shred of the regime’s propaganda is left standing. This is truly the book we have been waiting for, and we owe David Stockman a great debt.

Copyright © 2013 by LewRockwell.com. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is gladly granted, provided full credit is given.

Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr. is chairman and CEO of the Ludwig von Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, editor of LewRockwell.com, and author of The Left, the Right, and the State. Send him mail. See Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr.'s article archives.