Variedades do capitalismo: liberal de mercado e coordenacao regulada - resenha de livro

Um livro interessante que chama a atenção para aspectos da política econômica dos Países Baixos, cuja experiência pode oferecer elementos úteis de informação para a discussão dos modelos de políticas econômicas mais suscetíveis de oferecer resultados com melhores retornos econômicos e sociais.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Published by EH.Net (August 2015)

Jeroen Touwen, Coordination in Transition: The Netherlands and the World Economy, 1950-2010. Leiden: Brill, 2014. xiv + 385 pp. $154 (hardcover), ISBN: 978-90-04-27255-2.

Reviewed for EH.Net by Annette van den Berg, School of Economics, Utrecht University.

One of the great debates of the late twentieth century has been around the well-known study Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (VoC) by Peter Hall and David Soskice, in which developed countries are characterized as either a Liberal Market Economy (LME) or a Coordinated Market Economy (CME), based on five interrelated criteria (spheres). Many scholars have applied the VoC approach since then — including economic historians — trying to reconcile the rather static nature of the approach with a historical, more dynamic analysis. Jeroen Touwen (lecturer in Economic and Social History at Leiden University, and the scientific director of the N.W. Posthumus Institute) adds to this line of research, by applying VoC to the case of the Netherlands after World War II in a careful, critical manner. This has resulted in an impressive and voluminous book of which the principal title, Coordination in Transition, neatly captures the key theme: How did a typical CME react to the structural changes as a result of ongoing globalization (influenced by trade liberalization and technological developments, foremost in information and communications technology), causing a shift to a market-based and knowledge-based economy? One of the new contributions of this book is that it also analyzes recent economic history of the Netherlands, in contrast with most other Dutch studies that only treat the twentieth century.

The Netherlands makes for an interesting case because it is seen as a successful and hybrid CME, with a liberal tradition in business relations as in Anglo-American countries; a strong welfare state like in Scandinavia; and a high degree of coordination similar to Germany. Also readers with no particular interest in the Dutch case (or those who think they already know the country, for that matter) will find this book worthwhile to read, as each chapter sets out with a broader treatment of theoretical considerations before analyzing the Netherlands, each time accompanied by a comparison with several other western OECD countries; and as the author makes relevant statements about (developments of) LMEs and CMEs in general. In so doing, he uses theoretical concepts from several socio-political fields of science, and of many statistical sources, thereby providing the reader with ample information and guidance for further research. The large number of interesting footnotes and references underline the thoroughness and dedication with which the book was written.

In my view, Chapter 2 is the most innovative part of the book because here the author comes up with a novel view on how the original, static VoC framework can accommodate for changes through time by adding a temporal dimension and by focusing on the central concept of non-market coordination, which not only encompasses state-induced regulation, but all kinds of information exchange and negotiation between different stakeholders operating at various levels in the economy. He argues that CMEs, despite all having become more liberal in reaction to structural change, remained characterized by a high degree of deliberative institutions (although often in an adjusted form). Hence, whereas Hall and Soskice theorized that due to institutional complementarities, deregulation of financial markets could “snowball into changes in other spheres as well,” possibly causing a break-up of CMEs, Touwen contends that the overall convergence to the LME did not take place, for which he provides plentiful evidence in the subsequent four chapters.

The limited space in this review does not allow me to elaborate on these chapters in depth. In a nutshell, in all of them Dutch postwar economic history is analyzed by focusing, in succession, on the business system, labor relations, the welfare state and economic policy. As these concern strongly overlapping topics an inevitable disadvantage thereof is that the same themes are addressed several times (be it from different perspectives), which is somewhat tiresome if one would read the whole book in one go. On the other hand, each chapter comes up with additional information and interesting details, thereby delivering further building blocks for the main message of the book: when faced by shocks and external threats, almost in all time periods (except during the polarized 1970s) the Dutch responded gradually but nevertheless adequately via an intricate system of coordination in all five distinguished spheres of the economy (in industrial relations, information sharing with employees, corporate governance, inter-firm networks, and vocational training). Although a deliberate choice of the author, it is a missed opportunity not to elaborate on this last-mentioned sphere, for reasons not explicitly mentioned.  Here and there he just touches upon this important topic, while a bit more comprehensive discussion thereof would have made the application of VoC to the Dutch case complete.

The book clearly describes how non-market coordination in the Netherlands originated in the interwar years and how it developed thereafter. At first this occurred in great harmony under guidance of the state (demand-side, Keynesian policy) in order to restore international competitiveness, culminating in the so-called Golden Years (1950s-1960s). There was close collaboration between government, employer associations and unions at all levels. During the stagflation period of the 1970s unemployment rose, labor relations hardened and the government failed to cut spending. Finally, forced by the structural changes in the world economy, by 1982 the sense of urgency was strong enough for all parties to switch to a more liberal, supply-side economic policy. Wage restraints were accepted in return for the creation of jobs, which were often part-time and temporary. The labor market thus became more flexible. Although this whole process coincided with a drastic reform of the welfare state, it was also accompanied by an active labor market policy, preventing segregation of the labor market as well as a rise in income inequality. So, “more market” went hand in hand with sustained coordination. Addressing the most recent time period, the financial crisis of 2007-10 clearly demonstrates the negative consequences of introducing too much free market, and underscores the continued need for coordination and government regulation. Touwen describes the success of the Dutch CME in terms of “managed liberalization under the wing of consultation.” The ability of non-market coordination to accommodate change forms the connecting thread.

Annette van den Berg (lecturer at Utrecht University School of Economics) is the author (together with Erik Nijhof) of “Variations of Coordination: Labour Relations in the Netherlands” in: K. Sluyterman (ed.), Varieties of Capitalism and Business History. The Dutch Case (Routledge, 2015) and (together with John Groenewegen and Antoon Spithoven) of Institutional Economics. An Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 

Copyright (c) 2015 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (August 2015). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://eh.net/book-reviews/

Aquecimento global: os custos e as alternativas de mercado - Ryan McMaken

Must Free-Marketers Reject Global Warming?
Ryan McMaken
Mises Institute, Friday, August 29th, 2014

You can’t make this stuff up. Someone at the UK Guardian named David Grimes has declared that “economic liberalism,” by which he means the ideology of laissez-faire, “clashes” with “scientific evidence.” Which scientific evidence, you might ask? Well, the unassailable scientific dogma of global warming is one:

Climate change illustrates this well, because despite overwhelming evidence of anthropogenic influence, there is a tendency for those with pronounced free-market views to reject the reality of global warming. The reason underpinning this is transparent – if one accepts human-mediated climate change, then supporting mitigating action should follow. But the demon of regulation is a bridge too far for many libertarians.

There is no doubt that some people who purport to be advocates for free markets reject arguments of anthropogenic global warming out of hand without even considering the evidence. I’m agnostic on the matter myself, although I certainly reject the ludicrous assertion that there is such a thing as “settled science” and that the matter is not debatable. And unlike many allegedly great men and women of scientific inquiry, I refuse to agree that global warming “deniers” are heretics who should be burned at the stake (or the modern equivalent of having one’s career ruined). To anyone capable of logical thought, it should be obvious that one’s support for free markets is utterly independent from one’s opinions on the matter of global warming. There’s no reason at all why someone who accepts the reality of anthropogenic global warming would have to support government regulation of all energy usage. To argue such would be like arguing that one’s acceptance of the Bering Strait theory determines one’s opinions about the minimum wage. So why would Grimes think this? We can see it in his quotation above where he says:

The reason underpinning this is transparent – if one accepts human-mediated climate change, then supporting mitigating action should follow.

Ah, so there it is. Acceptance of global warming = acceptance of “mitigation” = acceptance of government regulation. Case closed.

Grimes packs many assumptions into just this one statement. Let’s look more closely:

If one accepts that global warming is a grave danger, is it nonetheless necessary to support “mitigating action” even if it can’t be shown to actually improve anything at all? Even assuming that global warming were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden of proof of success is still on those who want mitigating action. Specifically, they need to be able to prove that such action has a reasonable chance of achieving the desired ends. They most certainly have not done so. Indeed, many scientists say it’s already too late to stop it. Many argue that even if major global action were taken right now, the expected result over the next century would be too small to make any difference. In other words, it’s futile at this point to enact mitigating actions. (Also here.) Presumably, if it’s too late, then there’s no reason we should still be debating mitigating action. But of course, having realized that the “it’s too late” message is a PR disaster, the message has instead been changed to “it won’t be too late if we act right now!”
By their own admission, if global controls on production and energy use are not imposed by 2020, we’re all doomed. When 2020, rolls around, however, look for the date to be changed to 2025, and so on. Indeed, the global warming gang is like the Seventh Day Adventists who kept predicting the end of the world in the nineteenth century, and then changing the date when it didn’t happen.

Note, however, that the entire narrative depends on the assumption that all mitigating action must consist of socialist edicts and regulations. Could there be mitigating action that is not based on socialist command and control systems? We all know that any such suggestion would be laughed out of the room by global warming scientists, who in addition to being experts on climate, are also experts on politics, economics, and anything else they decide to be “experts” on. Private solutions aren’t even worth discussing in their view, so even if a laissez-faire minded global-warming enthusiast were to suggest something other than government control of the global economy, he would be immediately excluded from the debate. We all know what “mitigating action” really means.

So, there may be any number of mitigating actions supported by global-warming minded free-market people, from better water filtration, to agricultural engineering, to desalinization, to water delivery systems, all which might be done within the context of markets. But no, none of that is acceptable. The only acceptable “mitigating action” for people like Grimes is global governmental control of the entire means of energy usage and production.

Also important to the support of any mitigating action is an analysis of the cost. Knowing that the true cost to people of submitting to a global warming regulatory regime would be very high, it is necessary for the global warming regulators to portray the effects of global warming as being nothing less than a nightmarish post-apocalyptic landscape of Mad Max proportions. This enables them to argue that no cost is too high to adopt their regime.

Back in the real world, however, costs must always be considered.

Most of the “solutions” to global warming offered by the global elites involve the widespread impoverishment of much of the human population by limiting the production of goods, and the use of transportation resources. Such “solutions” would massively undermine advances in the standards of living for billions of ordinary people just as they are finally starting to come out of grinding levels of poverty. In other words, most of the anti-global warming regulators (most of whom are wealthy white people in first-world countries) want to deny the poor of the world their washing machines. For Grimes, a white intellectual in a wealthy country, he won’t bear the true brunt of the global warming “solutions.” But for many people, the cost of the “solutions” for global warming will be extremely high indeed. So perhaps many people can be forgiven for rejecting the rich-white-man assumption that restrictions on energy usage and production are the bee’s knees.

The proponents of global warming regulation completely ignore these costs, and instead insist that desertification will destroy human society, so it’s better to just make everyone poor now, rather than later. The argument goes something like this: global warming will make many areas of the earth uninhabitable and people will become starving bands of scavengers as a result. So, the only solution to this is to force people back down to nearly-unbearable subsistence levels now, so that they don’t become post-apocalyptic cannibals later. They argue, for example, that much of the American South will become a desert and that many coastal cities will be flooded by rising water levels.

All they’re really saying, of course, is that in case of global warming, large numbers of people will have to migrate to other places. When noting that the South will become a desert, they never mention, for example, that Canada, will become much more hospitable in climate, or that the Hudson Bay would become a more temperate area and a natural location for major trade networks and new cities.

So what the global warming crowd has to do is prove that the cost of migration in the future is evidently higher than the cost of destroying the global economy right now. This has most certainly not been proven, and given that huge migratory flows are relatively common in human history, depicting such a situation as akin to the apocalypse is dishonest at best. Moreover, since the sea levels and desertification processes would not occur overnight, we also know that there would be time for persons to migrate, and we also know that many of the places to which they would migrate, are now virtually uninhabited.

Indeed, it would seem that if mass migration is in our future, we would want to do everything we can to encourage economic growth now. To invest in technologies that contribute to making capital more easily transportable (like smaller and lighter computers and vehicles) and encouraging people to save for the future.

The alternative offered by the proponents of global warming regulation -pushing much of the developing world back into abject poverty- would be sure to bring something far worse, such as endless civil wars among populations where had a middle-class lifestyle within sight, but was then ripped away by the global elites in the name of saving the world.

So, if global warming is indeed on our horizon, it would appear that perfecting technologies like water desalinization, aqueducts, improved agricultural practices, and lowering the costs of basic staples such as housing and labor-saving appliances would be essential. Much of the world has already been working on these problems, and global warming has had nothing to do with it. The Israelis have been developing better and better water and agriculture systems for decades. Many desert countries (including the western United States) have been working on better water filtration and delivery systems. Many societies, such as The Netherlands and Singapore already deal with various issues related to dense populations.[1]

But can you guess which societies are the best as dealing with these issues? Not surprisingly, the societies that have the wealthiest populations and the most industrialized and capital-intensive economies offer the best solutions for dealing with all the problems that global warming has to offer. In other words, the most free economies offer the best hope for addressing these issues. We don’t hear much from Venezuela, for example, about the latest scientific advances in energy production, water cleanliness, and housing.

Meanwhile, those who support global warming “mitigation” are most interested in crippling the very system that makes it easiest to deal with climate-related issues. By impoverishing the world, the global warming regulators wish to see to it that few could afford the very sorts of technologies that would be most helpful in a warmer world. For David Grimes, “science” apparently tells him that poor population are better at mastering their environment than rich populations. If that’s “science” then we can only hope that “anti-science” eventually prevails.

Notes

[1] See the Copenhagen Consensus project for more reasonable comments along these lines.

Capitalismo: um termo ideologicamente carregado, deve ser abandonado - Steven Horwitz

Capitalismo, como dizia o historiador Fernand Braudel, tornou-se um superlativo conceitual, a ponto de não querer dizer mais nada. Para ele, o capitalismo era apenas uma parte das economias de mercado, talvez a mais bem sucedida, mas ainda assim sujeita a muitas confusões, a maior parte provocada pelos inimigos do capitalismo, como ensina este libertário, Steven Horwitz.
Grato ao meu amigo Orlando Tambosi por ter me chamado a atenção pelo artigo, que pesquei em seu blog.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Mas que diabo é esse tal de "capitalismo"?

Orlando Tambosi

Excelente artigo do economista Steven Horwitz põe em dúvida o uso do termo "capitalismo", que gera contradições. De fato, depois de Marx o termo parece ter se tornado mero jargão: capitalistas são os exploradores, espoliadores, rapineiros, isto é, todos aqueles que se contrapõem ao estatismo e ao totalitarismo, defendendo ideias liberais e o mercado livre. Texto surrupiado do Ordem Livre:

Um dos mais interessantes desdobramentos na esteira da Grande Recessão é o uso e abuso da palavra "capitalismo". Você sabe que algo estranho está acontecendo quando é possível encontrar artigos e editoriais que culpam o "capitalismo" por toda a crise, ao lado de outros afirmando que o "capitalismo" não tem nada a ver com ela. Obviamente não podem ambos ser verdadeiros, então uma reação comum é dizer que um dos autores está errado sobre os fatos ou em sua interpretação dos fatos.

Mas deve-se considerar outra possibilidade: que ambos estejam usando a mesma palavra ("capitalism") para falar de coisas diferentes. A confusão gerada pela palavra é uma boa razão para os defensores da liberdade pensarem em abandoná-la, junto com sua contrapartida terminológica, "socialismo".

Há pelo menos três razões pelas quais os termos "capitalismo" e "socialismo" são problemáticos: (1) "capitalismo" foi cunhado por seus oponentes; (2) ambos são etimologicamente carregados de uma forma que predispõe contra o capitalismo; e (3) como nenhum sistema econômico existente corresponde a nenhum dos dois de forma coerente, o significado de ambos foi poluído por estar conectado a sistemas do mundo real que têm elementos não necessariamente característicos do ideal. Isso é particularmente verdadeiro sobre o capitalismo.

Os pontos (1) e (2) são interrelacionados. O uso moderno do termo "capitalismo" data de antes de Marx, mas foi Marx que o popularizou. Uma busca pela palavra "capitalismo" nas obras de grandes autores liberais do século XVIII ou da maior parte do XIX, como Adam Smith e outros escoceses, para descrever o sistema que favoreciam será vã. O uso do termo pelos proponentes do sistema é em grande parte um fenômeno do século XX.

Como o termo foi cunhado por oponentes, não é surpresa que seja etimologicamente carregado. Em geral o sufixo "ismo" se refere à "crença em" algo. No caso do capitalismo e do socialismo, podemos observar como, vistas dessa perspectiva, as palavras revelam o desequilíbrio. Os nomes sugerem que "capitalismo" é um sistema no qual o "capital" é a característica central e força motriz. Aqueles que apoiam tal sistema parecem "acreditar" no poder do capital, o que além disso sugere que os interesses do capital são os que são, e talvez os que devam ser, servidos pelo sistema.

Compare-se o termo com "socialismo", que coloca "sociedade" na mesma posição. Esse sistema presumivelmente envolver uma crença no poder da "sociedade" como um todo, e o termo sugere que os interesses da sociedade são os que são, e devem ser, servidos pelo sistema.

Se temos que escolher entre um sistema cujo nome sugere que serve os interesses de somente uma pequena fração dos já ricos e poderosos e outro cujo nome sugere que servirá os interesses da sociedade como um todo, qual acharemos mais atraente?

O problema aqui é que os nomes levam a uma série de questões de economia política ao parecerem sugerir quem se beneficia de cada sistema. As afirmaçãos implícitas de que o capitalismo (isto é, o livre mercado) serve primariamente aos interesses do capital e de que o socialismo serviria os interesses da sociedade como um todo não são fatos, mas proposições teóricas abertas a debate e, na minha opinião, ambas falsas. Usar esses termos tende a obscurecer as questões sobre se esses sistemas realmente funcionam da maneira como seus nomes sugerem. Nenhum dos dois é útil para se entender que tipo de instituição cada sistema de fato traz consigo.

E por fim, a palavra "capitalismo" veio a significar uma série de coisas, em grande parte por causa da forma como o termo como o "capital" sob os holofotes. (Note-se que foi preciso esclarecer que estou usando a palavra "capitalismo" para me referir ao "livre mercado".) Com frequência demais, os oponentes do capitalismo usam o termo para se referir a qualquer tipo de sistema no qual os interesses do capital vêm primeiro.

Então quando governos oferecem favores a empresas privadas, ou quando as empresas procuram ativamente tais favores, permitindo que controle mercados em detrimento de todos nós como consumidores, nos dizem que isso é "capitalismo". Quando defensores do livre-mercado os questionam sobre a diferença entre "capitalismo" e "livre mercado", os mesmo críticos simplesmente dizem: "São vocês que dizem que temos uma economia capitalista. Por que objetam ao uso do termo para descrever o status quo?"

E essa é uma resposta justa, que ilustra bem os problemas que surgem quando usamos uma palavra para significar uma coisa ("capitalismo" para "livre mercado") mas tantas outras pessoas usam-na para significar outra coisa ("capitalismo" para "qualquer coisa que beneficie o capital"). Também explica as análises contrastantes da recessão que notei no início.

O que devem fazer, então, os defensores da liberdade?

Para dar um exemplo, poderíamos usar "mercados" e "planejamento" para substituir "capitalismo" e "socialismo". Se acreditamos que o arranjo institucional fundamental para o capitalismo é o mercado, e para o socialismo, alguma forma de planejamento do governo, então essas duas palavras descrevem mais precisamente a configuração institucional de cada sistema. Esses termos são puramente descritivos e não predispõem a nenhuma preferência. Um julgamento normativo requereria argumentação adicional.

Usar "mercados" em vez de capitalismo tem uma vantagem e uma grande desvantagem. A vantagem é que o termo parece resolver a preocupação expressa pelo filósofo da Universidade Auburn, Roderick Long, e outros libertários de esquerda, de que o termo "capitalismo", ou mesmo "propriedade privada dos meios de produção" implica que o capital deve ser de alguém que não os próprios trabalhadores. Essa é frequentemente uma fonte de objeção dos socialistas ao capitalismo. No entanto, o termo "mercado" não carrega tais implicações. Afinal, pode-se conceber uma economia em que a maior parte ou mesmo todas as empresas são propriedade dos próprios trabalhadores, e no entanto as relações das empresas com outras empresas e com os consumidores se conduzem inteiramente pelo livre mercado.

A desvantagem do termo é que "mercado" apenas não distingue entre mercados livres e aqueles nos quais o estado, ou por sua própria vontade ou a mando de agentes privados, desempenha um papel significativo, em detrimento do público. Na atual economia americana, os mercados predominam, mas não são exatamente irrestritos. O uso de "mercados", portanto, parece um avanço do sentido de especificar o principal processo institucional do sistema favorecido, mas pode precisar de mais uma qualificação para distinguir o ideal irrestrito da realidade restrita. Long e outros sugeriram os termos "mercados liberados" para designar o ideal, o que tem a vantagem de deixar claro que não temos mercados livres atualmente.

Substituir "socialismo" por "planejamento", no entanto, levanta outros problemas. Embora, no século XIX e no início do século XX, muitos vissem o planejamento como a essência do socialismo, essa crença não era universal e desapareceu em grande medida nas últimas décadas. Para muitos, hoje, o socialismo se refere mais à melhoria de condições de trabalho do que à substituição dos mercados pelo planejamento. Por exemplo, Ted Burczak, em seu Socialism After Hayek [Socialismo depois de Hayek], daria aos mercados grande latitude entre empresas e entre estas e os consumidores, mas proibiria contratos de trabalho assalariado, forçando todas as empresas a terem donos e proprietários trabalhadores. Historicamente, essa ênfase na propriedade do trabalhador foi vista como uma característica essencial do socialismo. Conforme observado, não é incompatível com os mercados liberados, contanto que não seja forçada através de coerção. Assim sendo, libertários de esquerda podem legitimamente dizer que apoiam "mercados libertados" e "socialismo", se com este querem dizer simplesmente a propriedade dos meios de produção pelos trabalhadores.

Então mesmo que usássemos "mercados" e "planejamento" para "capitalismo" e "socialismo", ainda assim precisaríamos de adjetivos adicionais. A pergunta é se os circunlóquios um tanto mais tediosos que poderiam substituir "capitalismo" valem a pena. Dada a confusão que descrevi, estou cada vez mais convencido de que sim. Mesmo libertários como eu, que não acredito que propriedade e gerência de trabalhadores sobre os meios de produção sejam essenciais para nosso ideal, os problemas com a palavra "capitalismo" se tornaram tão importantes que é hora de pensarmos seriamente sobre abandoná-la como nome da alternativa ao status quo que favorecemos.